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Chapter Seven: SINS in Qualitative Research Endeavors, Individual
Effects
“For the present, it will
be sufficient that I repeat to you what I have said before about our two
minds. One is our true mind, the product of all our life experiences, the
one that rarely speaks because it has been defeated and relegated to
obscurity. The other, the mind we use daily for everything we do, is
a foreign installation.” don Juan, to Carlos
Castaneda, quoted in The Active Side of Infinity, p. 9 (emphasis in
original).
Habermas (1984) termed the third part of his model of reproduction
“socialization” in which social identities, motives, and expressions of the
self are altered and developed. Ideas about the individual-in-society will
be explored in this chapter. Adorno (1989b) says,
Human beings find their
‘roles’ in that structural mechanism of society which trains them to pure
self-conservation at the same time that it denies them conservation of
their Selves ... The all-powerful principle of identity itself, the
abstract interchangeability of social tasks, works toward the extinction of
their personal identities. (p. 270)
In terms of method, Forester (1993) argues for the exploration of
concrete social interactions, i.e. promises, threats, agreements, deals,
conflicts and so on. Forester, along with Foucault (1972), utilizes textual
interactions for study, as will be done here.
Relevant Aspects of Qualitative Research
As established, qualitative research implies an emphasis on process and
a search for depth of understanding of perceptions, meanings,
interpretations, and behaviors, in contrast with the measurement of the
quantity, frequency, or even intensity of some externally defined variables
(operationalizations, most prominently). I focus on those aspects of
qualitative research that make the phenomena very difficult to control,
predict, or standardize.{242}*
Much qualitative work is designed to detect SINS. It is an area of the
“real” world where (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS (here obvious methodological examples include
ideology critique, resistance readings, observing, surveying, and
interviewing—especially about how one goes about ordinary ways of living
and reasons offered about why, etc.) are perhaps more apparent to
qualitative researchers—it is the qualitative researcher’s area, i.e.
relatively common part of their work, to discover, describe, discuss,
and/or deconstruct (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS. The kinds of SINS on which a researcher may
focus, and what the researcher does with the SINS (describe, deconstruct,
defend, debunk, etc.) varies, contributing to diversity (and many different
labels such as critical theory, ethnomethodology, textual analysis,
participant observation, etc.) in qualitative research approaches and
results.{243}*
Individual qualitative researchers use a wide array of interconnected
methods, and the enterprise is a creative adaptive process (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2000, and numerous others cited herein, including the work of Van
Maanen, Agar, and Punch). It is inherently impossible to know in advance
exactly what will be done or found in qualitative research (see also
discussion, Chapter Six, re: application form difficulties, p. 174-185,
herein). If new methods are needed, they are created, often parts of
existing methods pieced together or used in new ways. All (or some) of this
often occurs retrospectively. The qualitative researcher engages in what
might be called “emergent construction” of the study, in terms of both
content and method. Qualitative research is inductive, the research
process cannot be formulated in detail in advance. It is this creative
discovery process that, while increasing the difficulty of regulating it,
greatly contributes to the scientific value of qualitative research. Much
qualitative research is conducted in the course of doing quantitative studies,
although this activity is often not considered (therefore not labeled)
“research.” Via this (lack of) labeling, a very “real” exemption is
created.
What is an organization? Schutz (1973, especially p. 16-17)
focused on the meaning interaction has for the participants, and Berger and
Luckmann (1966) contend that reality is constituted by the participants, i.e.,
participant meaning is reality. Foucault (1972) takes a step to the
position that discourse actually constitutes organizations. Foucault (1972)
also puts forth a useful framework for illuminating various aspects of
organizations, including what he terms “discursive formations.” This would
suggest that researchers have more power to deconstruct the IRB process, in
the literal sense, than they may presume they have. The process is
constituted, as Foucault (1972) contends, through discourse (and certainly
the IRB system relies on written texts). Therefore, regulators cannot
“really” accomplish the process without the researchers’ cooperation, i.e.,
researchers have to play along (and research participants, too) in order to
make the regulation process work. In this way, power to regulate is given
rather than a given but this distinction does not often rise above the
horizon of awareness. (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS such as “operating for the greater good” and
perceptions of the IRB processes as being “necessary” or “unavoidable” are
apparent.
Schutz’ (1973) ideas are related to the work of Habermas (truth as intersubjectivity,
1987, p. 71-72) and Goffman (frame analysis, 1974). Lived experience is
“intersected by world time, biological time, and social time, and is
sedimented in the unique sequence of an articulated biography” (Schutz and
Luckmann, 1973, p. 103). Mead (1934), according to Schutz and Luckmann
(1973, p. 42-43), is to be given credit for having analyzed the “reality
structure” of the relationship between physical objects and human action
and the manipulation of those structures. Mead's (1934) idea of the
“manipulative zone” supports the description of the lifeworld offered by
Schutz (1973, p. 208). Mead (1934) set forth the idea that meanings are not
individually determined but are derived through social interaction.
Meaning, like power, doesn’t occur in a vacuum, i.e., power is given
and meaning is made, as described above. They (power and meaning) are negotiated
in the discourse, through what Foucault (1972) has described as the
“relationships of power.”
The shared group meanings make up the world of individual actors, and
these shared meanings provide the framework in which action is carried out,
although they do not cause or fully determine behavior, Mead (1934)
contends. These ideas are related to the IRB system in that they describe
the “common world” of the IRB system, the shared meanings among and between
regulators and researchers, the (overwhelmingly textual) framework that
indicates what actions are “supposed” to be taken by an individual, etc. It
is particularly crucial in a regulatory system that shared meaning exist
for the participants, especially the (SINS) STRUCTURES,
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS (such as the mysticism
embedded in beliefs that “rules are good,” “following rules is good,”
“rules are needed,” etc.), with gradually more and more layers of
interpretation (whether or not a certain rule is a good rule is, who must
follow which rules, etc.) heaped on. And, it is essential (for the system
to work) that power be given to the regulators. This may be a source of
researcher justification and rationalization for “bending” the rules, i.e.,
circumventing various processes, occasionally talking (officially or not,
whether considered reasonable or not, and from any side of a controversy)
about the absurdities of a system.{244}*
Emerging issues. Situations developing in the research
arena, for example gene therapy and stem cell research, require new labels.
This is a right generally extended to regulators—even when the researchers
themselves during the course of their work and in their applications or
elsewhere first suggest terms, the endorsement, positioning, and
vilification of terms is a function of regulators (along with, most often
subsequently, the press). In view of Foucault’s (1972) position that
institutions are actually comprised of discourse, labeling, categorizing,
and characterizing phenomena are especially strong sources of power.{245}*
Examples of labeling activity in the IRB system include special discursive
constructions such as “informed consent” and The Common Rule,
Multiple Project Assurances, etc. Regulators construct these, define them,
“acronymize” them, and implement them, and researchers accept them as
required without much regard for whether or not they are necessary or how
much they restrict research and/or affect the findings of research.
The initial creation of rules and definitions, and the subsequent
interpretations of them comprise the vast majority of the communication
activity involved in this system, and many of these socio-historical
structures are considered as “real” concrete physical objects by
individuals, as obvious, and unquestionable, and (the focus of this
chapter) mostly, self-evident. Further, as Deetz (1995) points out, “To the
extent that a person uses [a] codified form, he or she implicitly consents
to the values and processes by which it was formed. The potential
interest-laden value debate is thus suppressed in the face of the neutral
and natural” (p. 136).
Other Relevant Theories and Observations
Many of these (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS,
SIMULATIONS can be seen and have been reported by others, including the
findings of the AAUP survey conducted in spring 2000 (AAUP, 2001).{246}*
The survey responses indicated:
Some researchers gave good
marks to their campus IRBs for drawing their attention to ethical issues
and for improving their proposals. Others reported excessive delays in
review of researcher proposals, failures of IRBs to follow federal
regulations that apply to survey research and oral history, and members of
IRBs having little familiarity with social-science research compared to
what they know about clinical and biomedical research. Some worried that
the regulatory structure could improperly restrain freedom of inquiry and
the pursuit of knowledge, and others claimed that it had done so already.
(p. 3)
A (complete) lack of ambiguity (impossible of course) in the system is
sought by regulators, consistent with Weber’s observations about the goals
of bureaucracy and McGregor’s description of the Theory X view of the
capabilities and culpabilities of people. Even researchers, often
frustrated by a lack of clarity in the rules, seem to want a lack of
ambiguity and more consistent interpretations. This contention is supported
by Schutz’ notion that people may enjoy the simplicity regulation
brings.{247}*
Goffman’s frames. In the social interaction/social
construction area, Goffman (1974) points out various ways that primary
frames can be transformed or altered, and analyzes the way experience is
organized for individuals. (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS may be considered “primary” frames (see
Goffman, 1974, p. 21-39), i.e., many aspects of the IRB system “are
neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules”
(Goffman, 1974, p. 21), and “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify,
and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in
its terms” (p. 21). Frames may be created through discourse, and are at
least mostly invisible to the participants themselves in the day-to-day lifeworld,
even if they weren’t always so, i.e., frames are learned, so when
they were first being learned they were more visible, perhaps.
Goffman (1974) adds, when writing about primary frames, that the person
is “likely to be unaware of such organized features as the framework has
and unable to describe the framework with any completeness if asked, yet
these handicaps are no bar to … easily and fully applying it” (p. 21). As
mentioned earlier, when considering active consent, and the systemic
processes that render coercion unnecessary, the worker’s own self-understanding
of his/her experiences becomes central (see p. 59, 99, and 224).
Questions useful in considering these aspects of the IRB system (in
addition to those provided by Foucault, see Appendix A, p.
344) are provided by Forester (1993): “What makes possible or impedes a
worker’s finding out information at the workplace, challenging rules or
norms, or expressing needs, feelings, his or her identity, way of being?”
(p. 131) Answers to these questions aid understanding of the ways SINS
operate in the IRB system, for example, why don’t researchers challenge
norms? Express needs? Reject the ridiculous?
Schutz and Adorno: Relief and sanctuary. One of Schutz’
notions is particularly relevant to the IRB system as it relates to
individual researchers. Schutz and Luckmann (1973) state, "The social
stock of knowledge transmitted to the individual relieves him of the
necessity of independently solving a whole series of important everyday
occurrences … more importantly, such an unburdening allows one to turn to
non-everyday problems" (p. 298). Adorno (1989a) says “each product [of
the culture industry] affects an individual air; individuality itself
serves to reinforce ideology, insofar as the illusion is conjured up that
the completely reified and mediated is a sanctuary from immediacy and life”
(p. 130). We erect and respect (and eventually become blind to) the bars.
We “contain” ourselves.
This freedom not to think is an example, even if troubling in other
respects, of (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS,
SIMULATIONS described by many of the theorists mentioned here including
Adorno (1989a, p.132) regarding the SINS related to the adoption of the
“vacuous, banal, or worse” culture industry); and Schutz, (1973, p. 3-4)
regarding the SINS of experiencing things in the world as self-evident
and/or unavoidable, and an overall lack of questioning. In addition to the
more common use of stereotyping (Lippman, 1922) as it is applied to people,
I believe that we also stereotype systems (i.e., social structures)
and for the same reasons we stereotype people: in order to make the world
more manageable/comprehendible/simpler/easier. One might say, for example,
“ IRB (or any) regulation works.” If the person convinces him/herself that
it is true, s/he doesn’t have to think more intensely or directly about
human protection (or whatever a particular regulation is about). Following
the rules (the means) becomes the (relatively simple) end. Brings relief
(Schutz). Is a sanctuary (Adorno).
Values and rules. Gadamer (1960/1989) maintains we cannot
escape the historically conditioned character of our own understanding of
texts, laws, rites, and other objects of hermeneutical study. We cannot
approach objects (life or science) in a value-free, undistorted
context{248}* (see also Deetz, 1978). In other words (SINS)
STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS, in this
case in the form of values, are present in every researcher’s worldview (by
virtue of his/her person-hood) including the perhaps desirable SINS such as
humanity, compassion, trustworthiness, etc., whether discussing structures
of the lifeworld, discursive formations, or values; whether conducting
quantitative, qualitative, rhetorical, critical analysis or some other
analysis; and whether the researcher acknowledges the presence of his/her
values or does not.
Values are more deeply held (in the heads and hearts of individuals, i.e.,
intrinsic phenomena), perhaps because they are more “readily available”
(rules are extrinsic, found in books or on websites, or somewhere apart
from the individual). Further, we “write” our own values, we control them
(even when we don’t think we can or don’t exercise control). Ordinarily,
most of us have much less control over the writing of rules. And, finally,
we always control our own compliance with and interpretations of the rules,
again, even when we don’t think we can or don’t exercise the control.
Therefore, people act most often on their own (local and liquid) values,
and (most times) tolerate (for some reason and to various degrees) the
rules (i.e., attempts to standardize personal values, set them in
concrete with the expectation that concrete will stay put, and, perhaps,
that jackhammers don’t exist). Meanwhile, IRB members maintain the fairly
strange idea that they are somehow affecting the research environment in
the intended way (regarding the ability of the system to establish and meet
process goals, see GAO, 1996 and 2001; NIH, 2001, Jun 26, and 2000, Jun 5;
ACHRE, 1995; AAUP, 2001; and DHHS OIG, 2000b), and in a positive way, even
thinking they (the regulators and the processes) are necessary for the
safety of research participants and patients. This demonstrates confusion
and is delusional, on the part of the IRB members, but even more curiously,
on the part of the researchers who “go along” with procedures that are
(often and often clearly) bizarre.{249}*
Institutional IRB members are not, I argue, significant to the purpose
of regulation, regardless of the control they demonstrate over the process.
Values are most related to the regulatory purpose, and, as with values, purpose
is therefore more familiar to people. The purpose enters our psyches on an
emotional level, it makes good sense to us, it “seems right.” Rules, on the
other hand, are related to regulatory process and are endured rather
than embraced, not desired, tolerated at a more superficial level. Rules
are less salient than values. Therefore, processes are (generally) followed;
purposes are felt. IRB members don’t affect researchers and
participants (i.e., they don’t change what is felt toward
participants), rather they have effects on them (they change what is
done). The process is often criticized for creating problems
including problems that have harmed research participants (see Campbell,
1997, Sep 12; 1998, Apr 3; Brainard, 2000, Feb 4; 2000, Mar 17; 2000, Jul
21; 2000, Sep 13; 2001, Mar 9; DHHS OIG, 1998b, 1998d, 2000b; GAO, 2001;
Gray, 1982; AAUP, 2001; Whyte, 1987; O’Connor, 1979, and others).
Individual Effects
Alvesson and Deetz (1996) reason that if identity is socially produced,
it will be relatively stable in homogeneous societies, but as a society
becomes more fragmented and/or more simulated, i.e., the discourse
becomes less and less connected to any “real world” reference,
identity-stabilizing forces are lost. While suggesting the possibility of
tremendous freedom and opportunity for dominated groups, this idea also
suggests that the lack of stability may lead to naturalization strategies
in which people voluntarily cling themselves (concede to; contain themselves
within) consumer identities (we are what we have), corporate identities (we
are what we do), academic identities (we are what we think we know),
etc.{250}* (see also Willmott, 1994).
With respect to an individual researcher’s social and moral obligations,
Punch (1998) states, “On the one hand, there is the nature of the
researcher’s personal relationships with people [s/he] encounters in the
field. On the other hand, there are the moral and ethical aspects related
to the purpose and conduct of research itself. In effect, how far can you
go?” (p. 166). Neither academic programs nor the regulatory system itself
seems to be able to make this clear or reasonable.
Student researcher exemption. As a member of a qualitative
methods class, I witnessed the problems of many students in the class who
had not yet gained approval at the end of the semester for their class
projects, even though their applications had been made, generally, a few
months earlier. According to the authors of the rules, students are
generally exempt from the IRB process.{251}*
What “real” reason exists for this (lack of) reasoning? What reasoning
makes the exemption of students reasonable? None.
First, this exemption appears to indoctrinate students in a way contrary
to the goals of education in general, and IRB procedures and the
perpetuation of them in particular. The exemption policy suggests to the
students (and faculty) that IRB rules are frivolous formalities rather than
essential protections. Exempting students from the process marginalizes
the purpose. Second, it renders the student’s data unusable for future
projects, “teaching” what might be called “academic wastefulness” or
“inefficiency,” or another exercise in “class project futility.” {252}*
Finally, and most important, the policy doesn’t do what it is “intended” to
do, i.e. protect human subjects. Unless extraordinary circumstances exist,
what prevents an IRB from acting quickly (i.e., within a week or
two) on proposals involving minimal risk to human subjects? Using no
unprotected classes? Where no treatment is involved? Why are such studies
reviewed at all?
Concluding Remarks
As discussed elsewhere, the central (legitimate) foci for protections of
human subjects of social science research involve matters of privacy,
confidentiality, and informed consent. Invasion of privacy issues are
addressed with the assurance of confidentiality. But, as with most rules,
they are impotent. Even assurances with the best intentions are not
absolute. Sometimes, it should be acknowledged, “people who participate in
research have to accept a considerable measure of exposure, particularly if
the popular media pick up on the research” (Punch, 1998, p. 176).
Assurances of absolute anonymity such as these are at best precarious.
To assert that no harm or embarrassment will come to a participant is
somewhat like making a promise “to always be there,” walking out the door,
and being killed by an oncoming truck. There are some promises we can’t
make, life and death being what they “really” are. This speaks too about
the liquidity and locality of promises themselves. Promises, like
regulations, have more to do with intent than prediction. More to do with
immediate context than remote control.
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