This Lady Justice statue dates back to Roman and Greek times, represented as Themis, the goddess of justice and law. Well known for her clear sightedness, she typically holds a sword in one hand and scales in the other.
During the 16th century, artists started showing the lady blindfolded to show that justice is not subject to influence.
Or, that justice today is indeed blind, meaning that only injustice exists under an oligarchy.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Dennis
Reid Eidson
Complainant/Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 03-CV-758
Michael
Burrage,
d/b/a U.S. District Judge
H.
Dale Cook,
d/b/a U.S. District Judge
Stephen
Lewis
d/b/a U.S. Attorney
David
O'Meilia
d/b/a U.S. Attorney
Allen
Litchfield
d/b/a Asst. U.S. Attorney
Tiffany
Harper
d/b/a Financial Litigation Agent
Shannon
W. Phelps,
d/b/a Case Manager, FCI Seagoville
Dale
Eberle
d/b/a Drug Task Force Agent
DEMAND FOR RESOLUTION OF DISPUTE
Seargent
Valentine
IN COMMERCIAL LAW
d/b/a Tulsa County Deputy Sheriff
Respondents/Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
IN
SUPPORT OF A R.I.C.O. ACTION
I,
Dennis Reid Eidson, hereinafter "Dennis Eidson 1' Complainant and Petitioner for Redress, will attempt to show the manner,
method, and success of the conspiracy against me. There should be no doubt in
the prosecution of a crime of the four elements that must exist, and there
should be no doubt from the long train of abuses and usurpations of this high
court of treason, wielded by the Judges, Prosecutors, and their Agents and
Assistants named above as Respondents, to reduce those that step into their
court as the accused to absolute despotism and conditions of slavery.
(1)
"We
the People" are the sovereigns of the united States of America. All the
power and authority of government was given to it by the People, yet
legislators or bureaucrats or judges pretend they can make laws to implement
powers "we the People" did not, and cannot, give them. They publish
interpretations of laws and promulgate rules based on those interpretations,
or they render decisions that are clearly antithetical to the concepts set
forth in the U.S. Constitution as the Founding Fathers and People understood
and expounded them, and thereby these judges, bureaucrats and attorneys
violate their sworn oath to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United
States.
This separate "Memorandum" is an attachment to a R.I.C.0 Civil
Action. The Memorandum provides irrefutable evidence that Titles 3, 18, 21,
and 28 of the United States Code, and the Federal Magistrates Act, were not,
nor ever has been enacted into law, or at least, law that applies to the
sovereign people of the several States.
The
Courts and Prosecutors promote and rely on the general misconception that any
statute passed by a legislature is valid and/or applicable to everyone
equally. It is impossible for both the Constitution, and a law violating it to
be valid; one or the other must prevail.
The United States Code (USC) includes a raft of laws pertaining to
production, distribution, purchase and use of marijuana, cocaine, and other
commodities presently classified as controlled dangerous substances. If in
fact, you were to read all fifty titles of the Code (USC) from cover to cover,
you would find that some provision in the Code regulates nearly every aspect
of life; the object obviously being to impose Federal authority over subject
classes from cradle to grave. The Code clearly exceeds enumerated powers
delegated to the United States by the Constitution. Therefore, we must
conclude that at least some portions of the Code do not apply to the several
States and the American people at large. Either that, or the Constitution has
been pitched out the window.
NON-ENACTED
STATUTES
The United States Code -- Titles 3, 18, 21, 28, and others, were
allegedly enacted into federal law on June 25, 1948; supposedly "positive
law" enacted by Congress. However, by consulting the Congressional
Record, Vol.94, Part 7 (covering June 15, 1948 to June 19, 1948, p.8229-9160),
and Vol. 94, Part 8 (covering July 26, through December 31, 1948, p. 9353), it
is found that Congress was not assembled in session on June 25, 1948. Thus,
Congress did not enact these Code-Titles in question.
The
authority of the Congressional Record fits well within the allowable
parameters of Rule 201(d) of Federal Rules of Evidence, whereby the court is
compelled to take Judicial Notice of the Congressional Record, and that the
federal Constitution provides that it is only Congress "when
assembled" and "in session" (61 Stat. 633 §101), who has the
authority to create, enact, and promulgate federal law. The Constitution does
not grant a delegation of such authority to subcommittees or representatives
of West law, to the Attorney General, or to Judges and Prosecutors.
It
is asserted that, had Congress intended Titles 3, 18, 21, and 28 of the United
States Code to have nationwide jurisdictional reach and applicability over
private citizens, Congress would have done one of the following: 1) Enacted
the Titles; 2) Moved for an Article in Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to
be ratified by the several sovereign States, and/or; 3) Promulgate the law in
the Federal Register, to give notice to all who may be affected by the law and
its legitimate
application (44 USC §1505(a), 1 CFR §5.2, 21.40 and 24.410.
From Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949),
the Supreme Court illustrated the proper application of federal law. See also
FRCrP, Rule 54(c), which sets the jurisdictional parameters for the legitimate
reach of Acts of Congress to places which are within the legislative,
territorial, or admiralty jurisdiction of the federal United States. These are
facts which the attorneys for the government should have been well aware of,
since they are presumed to possess a superior knowledge of the law (see, In re
McCowan, (1917) 177 C.93, 170 p. 1100).
In the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which begins on page 705
of the 1997 Index Volume to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 18, 21, and
28 are absent. Therefore, the absence of these Titles confirm that the Special
Maritime and Territorial Authority of the United States District Courts does
not reach the population at large concerning these statutes. The authority
only applies to federal enclaves which have been ceded to the United States
for constitutional purposes, and applies only to federal agencies and its
officers, not to Dennis Eidson. Any arbitrary contract that presumes otherwise
is fraudulent for nondisclosure and is void on its face, resulting in
rescission.
Title 26 USC §5861(d) is titled under "Gun Control Act of 1968.”
The Gun Control Act enumerated Public Law 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, and was
created on October 22, 1968. To be in compliance with the Constitution of the
United States, a properly enacted clause must show its full authority "on
its face" which is mandatory, not discretionary. By consulting 82 Stat.
1213 §100, it is discovered that the Act, where it is "An Act to amend
Title 18 USC, to provide better control of the interstate traffic in
firearms," it does not state that Congress intended the Act to be
positive law. Also 82 Stat. 1213, "Gun Control Act," doesn't
conclude with a resolving clause, as is required under 61 Stat. 633 §§101,
102, which formulates it into positive law.
The Federal Magistrates Act (FMA) is also purported to be enacted on June 25, 1948. However, as shown
supra, Congress was not in session and therefore could not have enacted this
Act into positive law; neither does this Act apply to Dennis Eidson.
If there is no law, there can be no crime, and if there is no crime,
there is no subject matter jurisdiction, 22 Corpus Juris Secondum, Criminal
Law 157, p. 189, citing People v. Catrinak, 185
Cal. RPTR 869, 136 Cal. App. 3rd 145 (1982).
If a criminal statute is unconstitutional, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and cannot proceed to try the case. The law provides that once
state or federal jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven to exist; Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
Further, "Everything charged must be charged positively, not
inferentially." U.S. v. Cruiksbank, 92 U.S. 542.
Art.
III vs. Art. IV Courts
As quoted from the Seventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution:
"In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law."
(3)
These
original, Common Law, Art. III courts were established by Acts of 1789 and
1792 as "district courts of the United States," and laws of the U.S.
were to proceed through these courts in the course of common law as
established in England at the time. These are the courts to which lawsuits for
and against the people of the U.S. were to be brought. There is no presumption
in common law. When some matter of authority or liability is challenged, proof
must be provided in an open hearing and be established by documentary evidence
and testimony.
But these rules and procedures of the Art. III, Common Law courts were
too restrictive on the judges and prosecutors and in the minds of those above
the law, so on June 25, 1948, new rules were concocted and their own courts
were created called "United States district courts" (not district
courts of the United States).
These new courts operate to a great extent on presumption. Presumption,
including undisclosed presumption, lies against the defendant and enforces
fraud, leaving the defendant to prove innocence, sometimes only against
"legal" lies by the prosecutor, rather than requiring the plaintiff
to prove guilt or liability. The common practice has become the application of
so many presumptions, and so many "undisclosed" presumptions,
including known damaging lies, that a defense has become nearly impossible.
Thus the conviction rate of 93% - 97% in these new federal Courts called
United States district courts, which are Art. IV, Bankruptcy/
Admiralty/maritime Courts. Many are convicted in these new courts without any
evidence whatsoever or witnesses of liability. Once charged, the defendant is
automatically guilty, his possessions are automatically seized, and all that
remains is to decide how to defile the defendant and how much performance the
defendant should pay, whether in prison time, or money, or both. This new Art.
IV court itself is a presumption, and entirely unlawful. This is why these
courts are clogged with appeals and lawsuits--because of the methods of
prosecution utilizing fraud and lies as legal process. If the legal process
were lawful, there would be very few overcrowded prisons and very few appeals,
and this document, itself, would not be necessary.
These
new courts and the so-called corporate State they operate within, which acts
as an instrumentality of the United States, exists and operates as a
completely de facto entity. It has no lawful existence of authority.
This is a result of the major slight-of-hand moves made in 1948. United
States district courts were authenticated by Title 28 USC §132, allegedly
enacted by Congress on June 25, 1948. The authority for the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure were also allegedly
"enacted" at Title 28 USC §2072. The alleged Congress of June 25,
1948 gave the Supreme Court the right to do away with any constitutional law
(in effect, doing away with the U.S. Constitution itself), and statutes at
large, by allowing the Supreme Court to simply make a "rule" from
the fiduciary, contrary to established laws.
Terminally, Congress was not in session on June 25, 1948 to
"enact" these new laws and rules. Only "Congress in
session" can enact positive law. Nor did Congress have power or authority
to do so. The U.S. Constitution vests no legislative authority in the judicial
branch of the United States Government. The repeal power conferred by Title 28
USC §2072(b) is in contradiction to the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
(4)
Supreme
Court Order of December 20, 1937:
"It is ordered that Rules of Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States be adopted pursuant to Section 2 of the
Act of June 19, 1934
1)
That the title of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be, and it
hereby is, amended to read as follows: "Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts."
1)
That the title "Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States" be amended to read "Rules of Civil Procedure
for the United States District Courts."
Through
some sort of clever slight-of-hand trick, the federal courts today are
operating as though Congress gave power to the Supreme Court to transfer
authority from the "district courts of the United States" to the
"United States district courts," even though Congress had no
authority to do so, nor were they in session at the time in order to do so.
From the Minutes of the Congressional Record, page 8297, referring to
June 12, 1948, Senator Johnson of Colorado withdrew his motion to
reconsider the bill H.R. 3214, to revise, codify, and enact into law Title 28
of the United States Code.
So
how, and by what authority, are these new federal courts operating against
sovereign people within the several States? That is the primary issue of this
lawsuit, to answer that question. How was Dennis Eidson prosecuted and why,
without legitimate law and authority? How and why is Dennis Eidson being held
in federal prison?
Current
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal
Rules of Appellant Procedure, Supreme Court Rules, and Federal Rules of
Evidence are promulgated under statutory authority evidenced at Title 28 USC
§§2071-2074, particularly §2072, and are applicable only in legitimate
United States district courts, not district courts of the United States. Ah,
now we begin to see the reason for the switch, and the success of the trick.
As an example, consider the grand paradoxes set up by this move to
Article IV plenary power, as opposed to Article I delegated powers, is framed
in the statute which grants the Supreme Court power to promulgate rules of
procedure, at 28 USC §2072(b): "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
The
Separation of Powers Doctrine comes into the picture here: Congress does not
have authority to delegate legislative powers to administrative and judicial
branches of government. Yet with Title 28 USC §2072(b), Congress gave the
Supreme Court repeal power. Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court repeal any
conflicting statute.
(5)
To
reconcile implications of Title 28 USC §2072(b) with the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, authority for rules promulgated by the Supreme Court to repeal any
and all conflicting law must be an exercise of Congress' Article IV
legislative power over territories and other possessions of the United States.
As a test, consider the authority for the Attorney General to imprison
people, set out at 18 USC §4001(a): "No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress." Since the Supreme Court has stipulated that an Act of Congress
is locally applicable in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or in a
territory or an insular possession of the U.S., the term "Act of
Congress" used in 18 USC §4001 must comply with the application the
Supreme Court prescribed in Rule 54(c), FRCrP, or it is repealed by 28 USC
§2072(b). Therefore, current authority for the Attorney General to imprison
people is applicable only in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and territories or insular possessions of the
United States. The further inescapable conclusion is that Title 18 of the
United States Code is evidence of law applicable only in Territories and
possessions of the United States, not in the 50 States. This also holds true
for Title 21 and Title 28 of the United States Code.
By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, located in
the Index Volume to the Code of Federal Regulations, it is found that 28 USC
§§2071-2074 are not listed. Therefore, there are no general application
regulations published in the Federal Register. This authority check
corresponds with and supports the conclusion above. Neither is Title 21
listed.
One of the more important statutory restrictions which secures and
reinforces Congress' authority is at Title 4 USC §§71 and 72. The first of
these sections establishes territory within the current borders of the
District of Columbia as the seat of government for the United States; the
second prohibits any government department from operating outside the District
of Columbia save as Congress authorizes by statute.
For example, Congress didn't create the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). The FBI simply appeared in the Department of Justice--it is an
administratively created entity, so cannot exceed authority originally
vested in the Attorney General or the Department of Justice. Statutory
authority vested in the FBI and the Attorney General is found at Title 28 USC
§535. The FBI has no statutory authority to disturb anyone in the 50 States
other than government officers and employees. What they use is de facto
authority of presumption--the same as these new federal United States district
courts--"I can, therefore I will." The FBI has legitimate authority
only in insular possessions and territorial waters belonging to the United
States, all of which are subject to Congress' plenary power under Article IV
§3.2 of the Constitution of the United States. Neither has
statutory authority beyond borders of the District of Columbia except
in insular possessions of the United States, per Title 4 USC §72.
The same statute condemns United States District Courts situated in the
Union of the several States, and the "United States of
America"--civil and criminal process in the Union of several States must
issue in Art. III district courts of the United States in the name and by
authority of the United States (judicial authority over criminal actions in
district courts of the United States is at 18 USC §3231).
(6)
All courts are corporate contract courts, dealing with
fictitious entities and contracts between them. The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, and STATE OF OKLAHOMA are fictitious entities,
as are the parties in the conflict. This is all proven and of record as truth
by my Affidavit of Specific Negative Averment and Bill of Peace.
The judge and/or prosecutor, and their Agents in this conspiracy have
construed facts, conduct, circumstances and instruments beyond the character
assigned to each in its own essential nature by acquires such character in
consequence of the way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law;
hence, inferred, implied, made out by legal interpretation, in essence making
"legal" something that is constructive, e.g. a constructive trust.
In this way, with the final basis of decision-making being the
"conscience of the court," meaning whatever the judge feels it
should be at the time.
The court is an appearance or semblance, without substance, or legal
right or authority against a sovereign man. Misuse of power by the judge,
possessed by virtue of State law, "constructive" to the benefit of
the court, is made possible only because the wrongdoer (judge) is clothed with
authority of State, is action taken under "color of law," or Code.
So the court, or judge, hiding a set of facts behind a sham, takes advantage
of the confidence, and prosecutes with seeming impunity.
The crucial and incurable flaw in the government and the "law"
which issues therefrom, is the non-existence of genuine agreement between
the parties, due to absence of full disclosure, true meeting of the minds, and
mutual good faith, and instead relies on chicanery, deception, and
presumption. Any purported "contract" characterized this way is
flawed from inception, and is either void or voidable. From 17A AM JUR 2d
§238, "...transaction in violation of law cannot be made the foundation
of a valid contract." In presuming to have formed a bona fide, good faith
contract with the government, Dennis Eidson was never informed of the full
terms and conditions of the alleged contracts. Both parties to all contracts
and causes were each a nullity.
All courts and law function on the basis of unrevealed/undisclosed
presumptions and assumptions that stand as the "truth" if they are
not rebutted. This is nothing short of chicanery. It is agreed and truth by
Dennis Eidson's affidavits that an artificial person or corporation named
DENNIS EIDSON was prosecuted under pretense and fraud. Using the juristic
artifice known as "legal fiction," I have been identified by my
proper-noun name of Dennis Eidson, then prosecuted in propia persona. How can
one do anything outside of "one's own person" unless there exists
some other "person" by whom/which one could act? How can Dennis
Eidson agree or disagree with anything if he did not understand what was being
stated and presumed? With so many hidden and undisclosed elements, how can
this be anything but the legitimacy of predatory acts by the court, instigated
by Michael Burrage and Allen Litchfield, and allowed by Dennis Eidson's own
attorney? This is the deceit, extortion, fraud, and barratry that is so nicely
called "abuse of discretion."
According to Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, (1), 4 U.S. 308 (1797):
"The jurisdiction of this [or any) court is not prima facie general, but
special ... A man [or U.S. Attorney]
must assign good reason for coming here. If the fact is denied upon which he
grounds his right to come here, he must prove it. He therefore is the actor in
the proof; and consequently, he has no right, where the point is contested, to
throw the onus probandi on the defendant."
(7)
Prosecutor
and Grand Jury as Co-Conspirators
Whether
the court has been granted statutory jurisdiction to try the offenses alleged
is an issue that I have raised before. Law of the case cites were provided to
the prosecutor and the court. These cites provide support for my rebuttal of
the use of presumptive evidence (prima facie) of law as the basis for this
indictment against me. Specially, the Grand Jury(ies), which handed down this
indictment, or decision(s), was erroneously led to believe that a positive
charge of a criminal act had been presented to them, when in fact and at law,
no such positive charge at law was ever made; rather, only presumptive
evidence was used to infer that a valid law exists. And since no law exists or
could exist which could impose a charge on my unalienable rights, the Grand
Jury was misled in their understanding of the facts of the case. Therefore,
they made an error in voting to hand down the indictment.
I declare that the Prosecutor, Steve Lewis and Allan Litchfield,
appearing as the United States, did willingly, knowingly and intentionally
present to the Grand Jury a presumption of a legislative presumption of
evidence of law as the source of a corpus delicti. As an attorney and officer
of the court, the Prosecutor knows that the facts defining a crime must arise
from law, not from any illusion of law, which may be designated as pretense of
law, presumption of law, implication of law, inference of law, fiction of law,
etc.
I affirm that all the declarations in this Allocution, as well as all
the evidence, is evidence in itself that the Prosecutor has abused the use of
the rules of law in an effort to obtain a conviction against me based on an
alleged-to-be violation of a presumption of a legislative presumption of law,
which infers an impossibility at law.
The indictment brought against me by the Prosecutor was not a True Bill
because there were no affidavits of information signed true, correct or
complete, which were brought before the Grand Jury allowing them to indict. If
an indictment fails to be complete, it may not be correct and therefore, it
stands the test of logic that it may not be true.
I declare that a valid indictment must be true, correct, and complete.
The Grand Jury Foreman only signed it as true.
The indictment was not correct.
The indictment was not complete.
I declare that Judgment should not have been pronounced against me on
verdict of conviction because it is based upon false accusations that should
have never been brought. I have yet to face my accusers because no affidavit
of information signed true, correct and complete was ever brought forward by
the prosecution, or from, or for the court. This is a procedural Due Process
violation.
I declare that the Prosecutor directed a Kangaroo Court (Grand Jury) of
his own making, and in a direction of his own concocted conspiracy.
(8)
Judge
and Prosecutor as Co-Conspirators
I affirm
that the court erroneously accepted the illusion of law known as Titles 18,
21, and 28 of the United States Code as the authority for the exercise of its
power and jurisdiction in this case. I affirm that the court nor the
Prosecutor have established jurisdiction with respect to Title 21 crimes.
I affirm that Title 18 §4001 defines the limitation on detention and
control of prisons as: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress. My
statements, Affidavits, and Exhibits prove, beyond a doubt, that Title 21 was
not passed by an Act of Congress and henceforth that Title 21 is not positive
law.
I affirm that the court and Prosecutor have detained me for three years
on bond, and over six years in federal prison, when they restricted my travel,
denied me employment opportunities, seized my personal possessions, placed me
under bond, forced me to secure bail, denied me my freedom of movement and
employment of my choice, forced me to appear before the court and file papers
to defend myself as if the court had jurisdiction, denied me effective and
meaningful assistance of counsel, denied me my 1*, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 11th
Amendment Rights among others, denied me due process, invoked improper
procedure upon me, and failed to provide solicitude for my rights.
I affirm that this court has seized jurisdiction and is in want of
jurisdiction with respect to Title 21 crimes imposing sentence. I affirm that
this court lacks jurisdiction and that I demand immediate dismissal for said
defect.
Any U.S. Public Office Holder, owing allegiance, by Oath to the united
states of America and State constitutions, who willfully and knowingly give
aid and comfort to those interests whose acts are subversive to the united
States of America, and as such are destroying the constitutional rights of the
citizens, destroying and stealing our homes and property, our businesses, our
contracts, our American constitutional monetary system and working to
overthrow our government, are the real criminals of organized crime.
Premeditated acts of negligence, failure to perform, violence, or injury
are personal acts bearing personal liability, not corporate acts, official
acts, or bonded acts.
I affirm that the Prosecutor submitted, and the Judge accepted erroneous
data in order to issue a warrant without a sworn affidavit swearing to the
liability of Dennis Eidson. The warrant issued was in fact an order to kidnap.
(9)
How
can the Federal Sentencing Commission derive its authority from Section 994(a)
of Title 28 USC if these Titles have not been enacted? The true nature of the
law therein is not made clear without the Titles, and therefore have been
concealed and made uncertain, the very basis for deceit. Clearly, the
authority of the Commission is in grave doubt. Further, we find that the
United States Sentencing Commission Guideline is under a copyright. No public
document of a State or Federal United States can be under copyright.
Terminally, we find that the Congressional Controlled Substance Act is
policy, not law, because there was no enacting clause, as required under 61
Stat. 633 §101. The un-enacted policy of the Congressional Controlled
Substance Act best illustrates the government's Agents acting under a policy,
not under law, but under color of law, which denies constitutional rights to
citizens, by the application of Codes and Titles, authorized under Article IV,
§3, Cl. 2, "Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
property belonging to the United States ... " and under Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17, "to
exercise authority over all places purchased by the consent of the
Legislature of the State ... " (underlining mine).
The Republic of Oklahoma is not a "Territory," nor was it
"purchased" by the United States, and therefore, is not under
federal jurisdiction.
"The criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is
wholly derived from the statutes of the United States;" Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 132 U.S. 262 (1890). Maybe they should have added the
qualifier, "legitimate" statutes, and maybe "applicable"
statues. "[The] legislative authority of the Union must first make an act
a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare that Court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offense. Certain implied powers must necessarily result to
our Courts of Justice ...
But
jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those powers." U.S.
v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 33, 34 (1812).
From Am Jur Vol 16 §177: "Since an unconstitutional law is void,
the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights,
creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no
protection and justifies no acts performed under it ... No
one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to
enforce it."
Further, from §178 of the same volume: "The general rule is that
an unconstitutional act of the Legislature protects no one. It is said that
all persons are presumed to know the law, meaning that ignorance of the law
excuses no one; if any person acts under an unconstitutional statute, he does
so at his peril and must take the consequences."
From Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 491: "Where rights secured by
the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them."
In order for a law to be proper, it must be just. There is nothing
mysterious about proper law; it is based on reasonableness and common sense,
and is harmonious with the Laws of God. There is nothing proper, or lawful,
about these aforementioned Statutes, Codes, and Titles.
In so applying unconstitutional law by the judge and prosecutor, in the
instant case, these government officials have instituted a Mixed War situation
and/or condition, that where those in authority violated their oaths of
office, violated
(10)
the
Codes, Statutes, Titles, Rules, and Regulations that govern them, thereby they
disregarded the peace and safety of the community by their actions, acting for
undisclosed foreign agents or governments, in concert and conspiracy with
other attorneys, against me and those whom they swore to protect; simply put,
an act or acts of Treason in a secret war against the people of America.
According to Corpus Juris Secundum, every government is a constructive
trust. Black's 5th states: "A trust raised by construction of law, or
arising by operation of law, as distinguished by an express trust ... constructive
trusts do not arise by agreement or from intention, but by operation of law,
and fraud, active or constructive."
A judge has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of an estate the
legal title to which is vested in another, yet he is trustee and fiduciary of
a cestui que trust, which is really only the appearance of a trust, since
there is no creator/trustor/grantor/settlor, or other party responsible for
bringing a trust into existence, thus fraudulent. The judge is also
beneficiary to any booty captured in his vice-admiralty court (as are his
Agents), via his personal retirement fund. Certainly it is in the best
interest of all Federal Agents to obtain a prosecution at all cost.
In court the judge acts as executor/administrator of the trust managing
the estates of the people who function as "persons"
(corporations/debtors) through the all-capital-letter juristic names
existing as fictitious entities and non-existent corporations. Through a court
proceeding, the judge decides which corporate debtor entity owes what money or
specific performance (prison time) to which other corporate creditor entity,
thereby "constructing" the terms of the constructive trust on the
spot; by definition, constructive fraud.
A client is a ward of the court, and as a citizen, has submitted himself
to the dominion of a government for the promotion of his general welfare and
the protection of his individual as well as collective rights.
In the instant case we have a judge, fiduciary of a fraudulent trust,
co-conspirator with the prosecutor, presiding over a court descended to the
level of a mere corporation, administering unconstitutional laws, and
administering chattel paper and a claim, or dispute over title, most
fundamentally, as to who holds legal title over a "person"
(all-capital-letter juristic name) existing as a fictitious entity--non-living
and therefore dead entity, and as a citizen of the UNITED
STATES, civilly
dead in the law due to the 1933 bankruptcy of the UNITED
STATES, whereby
this "person" exists, if at all, only by presumption of the court,
to decide which creditors (the court, judge, government, or other officer)
gets the benefit through fraudulent deceit from the spoils of the
client/debtor.
Brief
History of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970
The
heart of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 was registration (21 USC
§822). Those who intend to manufacture, distribute, import, and export
controlled substances legally must obtain a registration from the Attorney
General. Those who intend to possess for research purposes a Schedule 1
substance that had to be approved for medical use, and a high potential for
abuse, were to obtain a registration from the Attorney General. All other
practitioners involved in
(11)
dispensing
and administering Schedule II, III, IV, and V substances that had been proven
safe and useful for medical purposes were required to register in the State in
which they practice. The failure to register has always been an offense (21
USC §331(p) as required by 21 USC §360 et. seq., amended to 21 USC §822).
The punishment for failure to register was continued to be codified as 21 USC
§333(a).
The
constitutionality of this Act was challenged in 1948 (United States v.
Sullivan). The Supreme Court interpreted the Act to cover any holding for
sale, and held that so interpreted, the Act was constitutionally applied to
Sullivan, the druggist, who received drugs that traveled in interstate
commerce, and through him delivered to the consumer. The charge was
misbranding (violation of 21 USC §301(k), that was added in the Federal, Food
and Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 USC §331 et.seq., Prohibited Act
Provision). The penalty for these violations were set out in 21 USC §333(a).
In House Report No. 700, July 16, 1951, 2 Cong. Serv. 82nd Cong., First
Ss. 1951, p. 2454-2456, Congress clearly defined the Act of misbranding as any
act, in violation of the promulgated regulations of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare with respect to potent prescription drugs that could be
sold in any manner to a consumer. These drugs are now exempt from provisions
of the newly enacted amendment of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (21
USC §801 et. seq., 21 USC §811(g)(1), exempt chemical preparation). These
drugs remain under the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 USC §301 et. seq.
The Act of 1970, 21 USC §801 et. seq. was a congressional response to a
broad Senate investigation, whose findings and facts indicated there was a
great problem with the diversion of drugs of legal origin, to illegal sources.
In order to address this problem of drug diversion, the Controlled Substances
Act of 1970 created a closed system of drug distribution for legitimate
handlers of drugs, and made all transactions outside of the closed system
unlawful.
Consequently, those who intend to manufacture, distribute, import or
export controlled substances legally, must obtain a registration from the
Attorney General, 21 USC §822, and those registered must adhere to certain
record keeping and reporting requirements, 21 USC §827. The Attorney General
was authorized by Executive Order No. 11727, July 6, 1973, 38 F.R. 18357, to
replace the Secretary of Health and Welfare, the cabinet member selected by
Congress to enforce the will of Congress, and this Act. The Attorney General and his delegates, through ad hoc measures,
created the Interpretive Rule, 21 USC §841(a)(1), in violation of 5 USC
§706(l)(b) and 5 USC §706(2)(d) and in violation of the principles and
requirements of the Separation of Powers Doctrine between the Legislative and
Executive Branches of government. Title 21 USC §841(a)(1) was applied to
Dennis Eidson by presumption, but is null and void.
The constitutionality of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, 21 USC
§801 et. seq., was challenged by Doctor Moore in United States v. Moore, 423
US 122 (1975). The Supreme Court's holdings were:
(a) Physicians registered under the Controlled
Substance Act, 21 USC §801 et. seq., may be prosecuted under §841(a)(1);
(b) The purpose of the Controlled Substance Act, 21
USC §801 et. seq., is to provide a more flexible penalty structure than the
one used under prior law, and to strengthen rather than weaken, existing law
enforcement in the field of drug abuse;
(12)
(c) The Supreme Court squarely held that the
Controlled Substance Act of 1970, 21 USC §801 et. seq., does not establish a
two-penalty system, one for registrants, and one for non-registrants;
(d) The term "registrant" is of limited
significance;
(e) The court clearly states that there is no
indication in the legislative history of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970
that the term "persons" means non-registrants;
(f) The court further states that the common sense
recognition of the regulation 21 USC §841(a)(1), is that only a registrant
could, for example, distribute drugs not authorized by his registration and
unconformity with other provisions of Ch. 13, 21 USC §801 et. seq., and only
a registrant could manufacture substances not expressly authorized by his
registration or in excess of his quotas.
The Controlled Substance Act of 1970 was an act to amend prior existing
laws and regulations. This Act created a closed system of drug distribution
for legitimate handlers of controlled substances, and was never lawfully
promulgated for the public at large (see H.R. Reptn 91 Congress Sess.
reprinted in 1970, U.S. Cong. & Ad News, pg. 4566-4572). The rules and
this Act do not apply to "persons", but by a concocted scheme to
present a presumption of evidence as fact, it has been used repeatedly in the
instant case, and is rebutted.
Defense
Attorney as Co-Conspirator of the Court
Since
there is no positive law applied to a sovereign citizen in an Article IV
Court, only Code that must be deciphered or "decoded" by special
decoders, called attorneys, the client is put in a very weak position, has no
idea of the magnitude or multitude of presumptions being made or that he is
being deceived by a fraudulent court and a collective brotherhood of
attorneys, and has put his trust and protection and entire collective rights
as a citizen in the hands of wolves robed as a judge and clothed as attorneys
who have preconceived a method for the client's commercial rape and
destruction, and finally, imprisonment.
A BAR Attorney has an immediate, major conflict of interest, which both
he and the courts ignore and do not disclose even though they both have a
legal and moral duty to inform the Accused of this conflict.
According to the Ethics Rules-4 of American Bar Association (ABA) Rules
of Professional Conduct (RPC), "Loyalty to a client is so impaired when a
lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action
for the client because of the lawyer's
other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses
alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client."
Such conflict arises when an attorney cannot recommend a pleading
"in propia personal' or a "special appearance" by the Accused
making a plea, for example, of, "I plea in bar coram non judice,"
because these are pleas to the jurisdiction of the court, and if pleaded by an
attorney, the jurisdiction is admitted, since an attorney is an officer of the
court and he is presumed to plea after having obtained leave, which admits
jurisdiction.
(13)
The attorney must inform the Accused of the limitations
and conflicts regarding his or her conduct (RPC, Rule 1.2(e), RPC Rule 1.8(f),
and ER-4), but he does not. Attorneys must inform the Accused that they are
"officers of the court," and that in fact, they are government
agents. But they do not. Quite obviously, the alleged "Defense
Counsel" is a government agent sitting at the "Defense Table,"
but is not the "effective assistance of counsel" guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution providing for conflict-free
representation.
With no written consent or release for conflict of interest, as in the
instant case, the BAR Attorney, as a government agent, can neither inform the
Accused of the problem or compromise the government's case. There can be no
greater prejudice than when you have a government spy controlling acquisition
of evidence, submission of evidence and presenting issues and arguments under
the guise of "representation." Silence can only be equated with
fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak.
The Attorney for the defense in this case, John D. Echols, was too
preoccupied with his own political agenda, and effected by his superiors in
the court system and powers that be, however foreign or alien, and had higher
allegiances than to his client, such as his oath to the B.A.R. Association (a
foreign agency), and displayed his title of nobility as "Esquire"
like a badge among his brotherhood in court, playing out the conspiracy that
was predetermined, to convict and imprison his client, and say nothing of
non-existent jurisdiction, non-existent law, non-existent juristic names
attached to Dennis Eidson by fraud, or the lack of authority of the court to
prosecute a sovereign man in an action or proceeding which is not strictly in
rem.
The duty of Mr. Echols to himself, as an agent of the court, was to
maintain the status quo, protect public policy, and follow the agenda set by
the court according to his oath to the B.A.R. and the system. These are
multiple priorities that stand above the interests of his client, but are not
mentioned. Never mind these are conflicts of interest with a client.
From 17A Am Jur 2d §289, at Breach of Trust or Confidence:
"Agreements where the object or tendency is to induce fraud or breach of
trust on the part of one who stands in a fiduciary relation are illegal as
being, in effect, agreements to wrong or defraud the person whose interest the
fiduciary has in charge. The invalidity of an agreement entered into in
violation of this principle does not depend upon whether the trustee has
intended an actual wrong."
To further the conspiracy, John Echols, attorney of record for Dennis
Eidson, failed to mention his obligation to the court and to the B.A.R., and
failed to mention his superior knowledge of the law in failing even to attempt
breaking any one of the following presumptions made by the court:
1. that DENNIS EIDSON is a
proper party, without whom a decree
cannot be made determining the issues in the cause; a fictitious,
non-existent "person".
2. that Dennis Eidson is a
party to the cause, even though he was never named, or party to the record,
except by presumption, trickery, and fraud.
3.
that adversarial parties need not be present in court proceedings.
4.
to have jurisdiction over Dennis Eidson.
(14)
5.
that the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, as sole plaintiff, lawfully exists
or is solvent, or a real party in interest; another fictitious entity.
6. that plaintiff had legal capacity to sue or be sued (59
Am Jur 2d §24).
7.
to ignore that failure of plaintiff in bringing it's action into
compliance with the rules prescribed by common law is defective.
8.
that the breach of trust and confidence of the court's obligations
would remain unknown.
All
Mr. Echols had to do, to win this case for me, was break only one of the above
presumptions. All he had to do, was ask the question "Is this a
Constitutional court?" All he had to say was that my rights are protected
by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in common law. Title 28
§1631 applies transfer to cure want of jurisdiction, and it is mandatory for
the court to take judicial notice if requested, under Title 28, Rule 201(d).
Juristic
Fictional "Person"
Dennis
Reid Eidson was not named as a party to the instant case, but unknowingly went
along for the ride. The prosecution and judge utilized the manufactured
Diversity of DENNIS REID EIDSON as a party in the action to gain jurisdiction
over the sovereign Dennis Reid Eidson. This is clearly prohibited by 28 USC
§1359.
In regard to criminal prosecution, a mandate to correct the legal
paperwork involved when proper names are provided, is clearly set forth in the
Oklahoma Statutes, Chapter 22, §403:
"When a defendant is indicted or prosecuted by a
fictitious or erroneous name, and in any state of the proceedings his true
name is discovered, it must be inserted in the subsequent proceedings,
referring to the fact of his being charged by the name mentioned in the
indictment or information."
In general, it is essential to identify parties to court actions
properly. If the alleged parties to an action are not precisely identified,
then who is involved with whom or what, and how? If not properly identified,
all corresponding judgments are void, as outlined in 46 Am Jur 2d §1001 at
Judgments:
"A judgment should identify the parties for and
against whom it is rendered, with such certainty that it may be readily
enforced, and a judgment which does not do so may be regarded as void for
uncertainty."
From 17A Am Jur 2d §234: "Where a contract is a unit and is left
uncertain in one particular, the whole will be regarded as only inchoate,
because the parties have not agreed, and therefore, neither is bound."
From Am Jur 2d §16, "In actions or
proceedings which are not strictly in rem but are in personam or only quasi in
rem, there is generally no authority to proceed,against unknown persons in the
absence of statute or rule."
(15)
The
word "person" as applied to practice in a court of law generally
includes and applies to corporations. This is how the court justifies
insisting that natural men testify against themselves: people unwittingly
answer to the name of their fictitious name (corporate name,
all-capital-letter juristic name) and the judge enforces his agenda against
the accused. A "person" then, in a court of law, becomes an
artificial person.
The phrase "natural person" does not include corporate
entities, but the word "person," without qualification, may or may
not include artificial persons, depending on the context. Thus the phrase
"no person" in the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause
has been held to include natural and artificial persons, but the same phrase
11no person" in the Fifth Amendments' "privilege against
self-incrimination" clause has been held to include only natural persons
and not corporations since the privilege is personal and may not be asserted
by an artificial person (Barron's 3rd).
The courts seem to be confused by their own constructive and fictitious
maneuvering, and apply a double standard. Is a "person" a
corporation, or not? It is clear, that it is just as impossible for a
"person," as defined by the court, to be "natural" as it
is for a man to be artificial. "Person" is a moniker hatched by
lawyers.
In accordance with timeless and universal principles of contract law,
in4absence of genuine agreement no contract exists. From 17A Am Jur 2d §243,
"As a general rule, participation in the unlawful intention or purpose of
the other party to the contract renders the agreement illegal." At best,
the court can only make a presumption of contract based on the deceived party
having been kept in the dark by the court and Dennis Eidson's attorney (a
clerk of the court or Agent), being ignorant of the presumptions and totally
reliant on John Echols, and/or having foolishly trusted in the other party and
John Echols.
When one fails to object to, i.e. rebut, the presumption that a contract
exists, whether verbal or physical, it may, perforce, rightfully be assumed or
construed to exist and be acted upon that a contract does indeed exist. In
this way, Claimant has assented to fraud of the court and government, and the
unrebutted claim, charge/ or affidavit stands as truth in commerce, and so
Claimant has submitted himself to some form of alien dominion or chimera.
In this alien dominion or chimera, John Echols, attorney for Dennis
Eidson is either very stupid, or involved in the deceit and fraud against
Dennis Eidson, himself, and/or conspiracy with Michael Burrage (the court)
against Dennis Eidson. There are simply too many instances for John Echols not
to be knowingly involved.
The broad general doctrine founded on the maxims "ex turpi causa
non oritur actio" (no cause of action can arise out of an illegal or
immoral inducement) and "ex dolo malo non oritur actio" (no action
can arise out of fraud) is that no court will allow itself to be made the
instrument of enforcing obligations arising out of an agreement or transaction
which is illegal (17A Am Jur 2d §304).
A matter must be expressed to be resolved, yet an attorney leaves so
much unexpressed in defense of his ..client, because of his oath to the BAR,
and fear of the court (conflict of interest). Use of an attorney sets in stone
one's status as an artificial person and restricts one's power and freedom to
protect, one's interests as proclaimed in the Ninth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. How ignorant can we all be with 60 million Statutes, Codes, and
Titles in effect today. This guarantees the use of an attorney, and that the
is~5ues discussed will only be those that the court wants to discuss.
(16)
Discussion
of Claimant's Affidavits
The following unrebutted affidavits of Claimant afford proof of the
above claims and stand as truth of record:
Verified Actual And Constructive Notice, dated January 15, 2001
Verified Actual And
Constructive Notice (Amendment), dated February 1, 2001
Affidavit of Specific
Negative Averment, dated February 1, 2001
Bill of Peace, dated
February 1, 2001
Notice of Default And
Stipulation, dated March 12, 2001
Claimant recognizes the fact that corporate entities do have
jurisdiction in their own corporate realm, but that does not give them license
to bring in uninvolved, disinterested, non-corporate parties to that
jurisdiction, which amounts to fraud and barratry, among other crimes.
Claimant's Affidavit of Specific Negative Averment pierces the veil of
pretense of existence, solvency, and legitimacy, and, at the same time,
exposes the true nature of non-existent jurisdiction and prosecution by
presumption, but the prosecution and the court ignores the law and truth
entirely and seeks to have their own way to the very end -- no matter what --
even at the risk of professional suicide or significant personal damage.
The power to commit violence, perpetrate injustice, take private
property by force without compensation to the owner, and compel the receipt of
promises to pay in place of money, may be exercised, as it often has been, by
irresponsible authority, as in the instant case, but it cannot be considered
as belonging to a government founded upon law. Yet Michael Burrage, a/k/a
JUDGE MICHAEL BURRAGE has initiated documents, and continues to do so over a
four-year span against Claimant, even though by initiating something that can
result in harm or loss to another, the alleging party simultaneously agrees to
be held personally, legally, and commercially accountable and liable for the
accuracy, validity, relevance, and verifiability of everything he states,
claims, or demands. Only individual free-will men act; no nation,
government, or agency acts. At the origin of each and every allegation
and act is the man who is the cause thereof. In the instant case, it is
Michael Burrage, Allan Litchfield, Thomas Scott Woodward, and in a passive
sense, John D. Echols.
(17)
Claimant's
Bill of Peace is a formal opportunity for the court and Claimant's other
persecutors to disclaim all association between themselves and the War Powers,
as per the Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as amended March 9,
1933 and codified in 50 USC App., commonly known as the War Powers. Claimant
believes that the War Powers comprises the greater part of the "legal
authority" used by the court and all federal government officers to come
against Claimant as a sovereign Inhabitant of Oklahoma. Further proof of this
claim is the authority displayed in every federal courtroom as the gold
fringed American flag, or rather a military flag, or at least an altered
American flag making it alien, not a flag signifying freedom, but war-the
ultimate in control and persecution.
Claimant's Bill of Peace establishes on the record, confession and
consent of judgment that Michael Burrage is acting against Claimant under the
War Powers as an avowed enemy of Claimant, the united States of America, and
the people, Constitution of 1787, and government thereof. He thereby confesses
to be an alien aggressor, as well as committing treason and forfeiting all and
every basis to claim legitimacy for any of his actions against Claimant, or
requiring that Claimant complies with anything he demands. Anyone acting
against anyone under such non-law is self-confessing to be a naked criminal
aggressor, and con man who has forfeited all credibility and right to demand
allegiance, obedience, or compliance with any jurisdiction he might assert.
Jurisdiction covers only other artificial persons. The proper jurisdiction for
a lawful being is a constitutionally sanctioned, common law court (Article III
court), rather than a statutory court. The issue of jurisdiction is never
waived, even if John Echols or Michael Burrage or Allan Litchfield claim
ignorance.
The Claimant's Affidavits may not be regarded as invalid, groundless,
frivolous, fraudulent, nebulous, or sham without legal effect. Claimant's
Affidavits, summarily dismissed by Michael Burrage, with his own words,
"without merit," is nothing less than the court pleading the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, thereby failing in the duty of
the court.
Any view held contrary to Claimant's Affidavits by any public official
must be tested before a jury or by a categorical point-for-point rebuttal of
Claimant's Affidavits. Evasion of commerce by force, subversion of commercial
due process, perjury, or subornation of perjury, instantly voids any
commercial event which it purports to create. Might does not make right.
From 46 Am Jur 2nd §79, "... judges of courts both of general and
limited jurisdiction are liable for acts done entirely without jurisdiction
whether or not activated by malice or corrupt and impure motives ... it
Whatever
force a statute or rule has, arises from some person attempting to execute it,
based upon the personal liability of the executor. A judge who ignores genuine
issues of material fact (commerce) and rules without a jury, sustains the
liability. A judge has no discretion over Affidavits unless the judge is
willing to pay out of his own pocket for the commercial defects of his
processes. Generally, a judge is not allowed to make a ruling in commerce,
because he would be tempted to exercise that power to extricate his peers from
commercial obligations. Only Juries are trusted to make commercial judgments.
A judge may make commercial judgments if, and only if, he has the express
(written) permission of all parties to the process.
(18)
Judge
Burrage and other public officials have taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution of the United States, and have agreed with Article I, from said
Constitution that 11 the
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they
are declared otherwise." Further, they've agreed that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'
The court and its agents have broken more laws than most "criminals"
ever thought about breaking, and the court does it every day.
As a nation of justice and due process, we cannot tolerate a court or
government that seizes our property, sends us to prison without law, and
induces fear in our hearts -- while refusing to provide us basic proof of
their legal authority. This cause is the result of the Defendant's failure to
rebut claims and provide their authority, proving by this failure that the
federal court and its agents are themselves the true criminals of organized
crime.
Our forefathers knew, from the oligarchy/monarch of England, that no
outside agency, no foreign government, and certainly no central government
should police citizens. Only our own community can decide what laws to enforce
in that community, and what penalty to enforce, not some alien invading force
from a thousand miles away. From the United States Constitution, Art. IV, ~4,
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican form of Government
There is no provision in the Constitution or other authority for the
federal government to invade our communities, confiscate our property, and
redistribute it to others. Nor is there any constitutional law, federal or
otherwise, that can prohibit any commodity, whether it be liquor, drugs, guns,
or cheese. Prohibition of any commodity could only be possible by amending the
Constitution of the United States. No agency of the federal government, nor
Congress, has authority to institute Prohibition or otherwise limit sale and
distribution of any commodity. Drugs are the excuse for federal government to
invade every corner, nook and cranny of society, every crevice of our physical
bodies, and for access to every transmitted piece of communication. This
assumed authority amounts to usurpation of power and treason.
It is a well understood fact of American history that the most dynamic
document that set the course of America is the Declaration of Independence. It
was/is the document that disclosed the tyranny of English government. It
expressed the "elements" of the "Rights of Men," within
any society, and that "all Men are created equal." The Declaration
of Independence stipulated the chain of authority within
"governments," and of the obvious fact that the people
"created" government. That it was the it people" who instituted government and in so doing, the people
"secured these rights," and that government (at every level)
derives their "just powers from the consent of the governed."
It is also well established that the people did not give up all of their
"power" to the government, or their sovereignty. The Declaration of
Independence created the sovereignty the people, not in government. Therefore
the people are above the creature(S5 they created (government) and that those
who work for/in government are "Public Servants" and have placed
themselves in a subservient position, to serve the people within their
function/office/position via their "Oath of Office."
(19)
SUMMARY
By some undisclosed contractual nexus, the federal government, or
"State," has acquired or presumed "interests" in people
without their knowledge, denoting some right, claim, title, or legal share
unlawfully, allowing the State to treat people as property. When people are
treated as property, they are no more than slaves or are under debt bondage
and peonage. Slavery clearly violates federal law.
By a legal device known as presumption, people have become corporations
by some secret presumptive definition of the word "person." People
are guaranteed the right to an Article III, Common Law Court, but fictitious
"persons" and other corporations are herded into the Art. IV,
Bankruptcy/Maritime Court where no people can exist except as a fiction. The
scheme gains prominence by getting the people to admit their name vocally,
which the Court confirms is a fictional all-capital lettered it person" by presumption, then the real man is held liable for
actions of property in which the State claims a priority interest, again, by
presumption, and then the if accused"
or "offender" has become the "defendant."
These concocted schemes of lies and untrue presumptions are acceptable
to a conspiracy of attorneys, including the judge, prosecutor and defense
attorney, among others, but does not meet the requirements of due process, nor
has the exact nature and cause of the accusation ever been entered into
evidence as is required by the Sixth Amendment. Where, or what is the nexus
between people and the federal Maritime/Bankruptcy Court? This all falls under
"fraudulent concealment" or 11studied concealment," and is all
misrepresentation, false representation, and conspiracy by everyone involved
against the "accused."
It is easy to see why the court and its system of conspirators must
concoct such elaborate schemes of presumption heaped upon presumption to
prosecute people. As United States jurisdiction is foreign to the United
States of America jurisdiction, their powers are foreign to the Constitution
and have no constitutional standing or authority in the several states
whatever, except against their own agents and employees of the federal system.
Nor is there any constitutional law applied to the people in these federal
courts; only presumptions.
There is no statutory authority for the FBI or any other federal police
force to operate or control the people in the several states of America. Nor
is there legitimate authority for a federal court to prosecute people in the
several states -- our own state governments and laws provide for that purpose.
The federal government has become an enemy in the bowels of America, at
war with its own citizens by invading the 50 states. They have redefined what
government is into a series of corporations called "United States"
that is presumed to stand outside the confines of our Constitution. The
Justice Department now acts as its own Executive Branch making decrees over
the people, enacts presumed laws without Congress having passed them, as if
they are their own Legislative Branch, and enforces unlawful laws decreed as
"prohibited acts" with their own special Judicial Branch that allows
any or all lies or presumptions. By redefining government and destroying
Separation of Powers, they now rule Americans at will. They have redefined
what a "person" is and created a new identity with secret
significance for all citizens in the form of our name in all capital letters;
a government-created fictional slave. We are all still American citizens, but
now as a fiction, we are also presumed to be a citizen of the federal
corporation called "United States,"
(20)
which
presumes jurisdiction or other secret meaning. This chicanery and secret
manipulation and deception is the basis for control, intervention, invasion,
confiscation, and prosecution. It amounts to tyranny and treason.
The victim of this predatory system -- a citizen turned into a legal
"person" -is then prosecuted by an artificially fabricated,
unconstitutional, unlawful court. Legally, the courts operate on fraud and
untrue presumptions by the use of monopolistic, closed-circuit or Brotherhood
of Attorneys, who have been trained and taken an Oath to preserve that system,
and uphold the Codes, Titles, and Statutes (policies, not positive law) of
that system. The federal court is an artificial fabrication of frauds and lies
created by government rulership systems based upon usurpation and false claims
as applied to the people in our several states of America.
The purpose of what the federal system has become is to infiltrate and
invade every aspect of our lives, control us, and to make the majority of
"persons" into felons, to instill fear in the general populace, and
to bar them from holding public office or voice public opinion by vote or
outcry, and finally, to bar them from owning guns.
Justice and liberty and freedom for the people have become a myth.
But these new Art. IV, Bankruptcy/Maritime Courts can, by design,
lawfully prosecute legitimate corporations and employees of federal
government. Now we wait to see if they will.
REFERENCES
"In common usage, the term "Person" does not include the
sovereign, and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do
so." (U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), 91 LEd 884, 67
S.Ct. 677).
"The Constitution is the voice of the people speaking in their
sovereignty capacity, and it must be heeded; when the Constitution speaks with
reference to a particular matter, it must be given effect as the paramount law
of the land." (People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624).
"It is the duty of all officials, whether legislative, judicial,
executive, administrative, or ministerial, to so perform every official act
as not to violate constitutional provisions." (Montgomery v. State, 55
Fla. 97, 45 So. 879).
"Courts should not tolerate or condone disregard of law and
arbitrary usurpation of power on the part of any officer." And neither
should the people! (Ex
parte Owenf 10
Okla Crim Rep 284, 136, P. 197, Ann Cas 1916A 522).
"The provisions of the Constitution must be given effect even if in
doing so a statute is held to be inoperative." (State ex rel West v.
Butler, 70 Fla 102, 69 So 771).
(21)
"The Constitution was made not to
act upon the legislative department alone, but upon every department of the
government." (Way v. Hillier, 16 Ohio 105).
"The officers of the law, in the
execution of process, are obliged to know the requirements of the law, and if
they mistake them, whether through ignorance or design, and anyone is harmed
by their error, they must respond in damages." (Rogers v. Marshall
(United States use of Rogers v. Conklin) 1 Wall. US 644, 17 LEd 714).
"It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative,
quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise -- who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability ... 11 (Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App DC
100, 99 F2d 135, 118 ALR 1440; Chamberlain v. Clayton, 56 Iowa 331, 9 NW 237,
31 Am Rep 101).
“…
the Congress cannot revoke the sovereign power of the people." (Perry v.
United States, 294 US 330, 353 (1935)).
"We the people have discharged any
debt which may be said to exist or be owed to the state/government. The
governments are, however, indebted continually to the people, because the
people (the sovereigns) created the government corporation and because we
suffer its continued existence. The continued debt owed to the people is
discharged only as it continues not to violate our private rights, and when
government fails in its duty to provide protection-discharge it debt to the
people, it is an abandonment (an injury) of any and all power, authority or
vestige of "sovereignty" which it possessed, and the laws remain the
same, the sovereignty reverting to the people whence it came.: (Down v.
Bidwell, 182 US 277).
VERIFICATION
State
of Arkansas
ss:
County
of St. Francis
Dennis Reid Eidson, the Claimant
herein, having fully read this Memorandum in support of a R.I.C.O. Civil
Action, being first duly sworn according to law, has subscribed hereto and do
affirm that the facts herein are true and correct and not misleading, to the
best of my knowledge and belief, and as to those things stated upon reason and
belief, Affiant verily believes these facts to be true.
Dennis
Reid Eidson, Secured Party
Before me, a Notary, appeared Dennis
Reid Eidson, who having made himself known to me did affirm and subscribe
hereto :
on
this 15th
day of November, 2003.
Notary: Susan
DeLaRosa, CSW
JULY
7,1955. AS AMENDED, TO ADMINISTER
OATHS
(18 USC 4004)
(22)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Non-enacted Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . 2
Article
III vs. Art. IV Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Prosecutor
and Grand Jury as co-conspirators . . . . . . .
. . . . 8
Judge
and Prosecutor as co-conspirators .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
History
of Controlled Substance Act of 1970 .
. . . . . . . . . . . 11
Defense
Attorney as co-conspirator of the Court .
. . . . . . . .13
Juristic
fictional person . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Discussion
of Claimant's Affidavits . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 15
Summary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 21
Verification
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 22
