To understand this progression, remember that Willingham came to Stanford with thin qualifications for a Division I head coaching position. He had been a pro position coach for most of his career and had not even held the title of coordinator. Understandably enough, given the very steep learning curve in these positions, he chose largely to continue as much of Walsh's system and group of assistants as he could. While Willingham had two good initial years (7-4-1 and 7-5, following 4-7 and 3-7-1 seasons by Walsh), the 1997 and 1998 seasons were major disappointments. After Stanford defeated Michigan State 38-0 in the Sun Bowl at the end of the 1996 season, the Cardinal was a pre-season favorite to win the Pac 10. The 1997 campaign, however, resulted in a 5-6 record followed by a 3-8 campaign in 1998. Had Willingham not done some successful housecleaning, his career would probably have been over at Stanford. However, in 1998 he installed Diedrick as his offensive coordinator and in 1999 he installed Baer as his defensive coordinator. Stanford's three-year run of 22-13 that followed was, as I've discussed in other posts, one of the best stretches in recent times for the Cardinal, and included Stanford's only trip to the Rose Bowl since the 1971 and 1972 seasons.

Now, as to some basics about Willingham's offenses from a statistical point of view. For his 7-year career at Stanford, the Cardinal averaged 27.6 points per game, which is better than the NCAA average of about 26.5 per game. In the three years before Diedrick took over as OC, Stanford averaged only 24.8 per game, after Diedrick's hiring Stanford averaged an impressive 29.3 per game, including an excellent 35.2 per game this season. (The 37.1 per game figure posted on N.D.'s website with Diedrick's biography is the regular season figure.)

By way of comparison, N.D's modern coaches have averaged as follows: Ara: 30.6, Devine: 24.9, Faust 22.9, Holtz 32.5 and Davie 25.4. Note here, however, that although Davie's figure looks adequate, the trajectory was bad, ending with this year's 19.9 per game debacle. Davie's decent offensive figures are mostly concentrated at the beginning of his tenure. Davie also was statistically, by far, the worst defensive head coach in modern N.D. history.

Another interesting comparison is Stanford and N.D. against common opponents. Since 1997 (the beginning of Davie's tenure) N.D. and Stanford have played 9 games against common opponents. Both teams have played U.S.C. every year; in 2001 both played B.C., both played Oregon St. in 2000 and both played Arizona St. in 1999 and 1998. In those nine games, Stanford averaged 29.3 points per game and N.D. 23.2.

Unsurprisingly, Willingham's offenses have been much more pass oriented than N.D.'s, but they are perhaps not as pass happy as one might imagine. In fact, Diedrick's primary contribution seems to have been steady improvement of the Cardinal rushing attack which in turn yielded some of the most impressive offensive outputs.

Here are the offenses at Stanford beginning in 1998:

1998

Points per game: 23.7
Rushing yards per game: 75.5
Yards per carry: 2.4
Passing yards per game: 320
Yards per attempt: 6.9
% rushing plays: 40.3

1999

Points per game: 34.8
Rushing yards per game: 154.0
Yards per carry: 4.1
Passing yards per game: 314
Yards per attempt: 9.0
% rushing plays: 51.4

2000

Points per game: 23.7
Rushing yards per game: 139.0
Yards per carry: 3.4
Passing yards per game: 237
Yards per attempt: 6.8
% rushing plays: 54.0

2001

0Points per game: 35.2
Rushing yards per game: 201.0
Yards per carry: 4.4
Passing yards per game: 251.0
Yards per attempt: 8.3
% rushing plays: 60.5

Interestingly, both the frequency with which Stanford runs the ball and the effectiveness of its rushing attack have improved dramatically. The NCAA average is about 55% rushing plays, so last year Stanford was more run-oriented than the average team. By way of comparison, if we look at the 8 teams that played in BCS Tier-1 bowl games last year, we see them on the whole range from run to pass heavy. Here are the teams in descending order of their run preference with the fraction of rushing plays in parentheses: Nebraska (77.2), Colorado (64.9), Maryland (60.3), Oregon (55.5), Miami (55.1), Illinois (55.0), LSU (52.3) and Florida (41.1). Nebraska is extremely rush heavy and Florida pass heavy, but the other 6 clustered around the NCAA average. Stanford on this scale was more rush heavy than any but Nebraska and Colorado.

Now, by N.D. standards, Stanford is not a heavy rushing team. Under each of the five most recent N.D. coaches, here is the fraction of rushing plays: Ara (72.2), Devine (70.7), Faust (65.0), Holtz (72.5) and Davie (66.7). Note that N.D.'s most successful coaches are the most prone to run the ball.

Now, before we conclude that Willingham is headed for disaster because he doesn't run the ball enough, let's consider the subsequent history of N.D.'s most rush-prone coach: Lou Holtz. I can only find that last two years' statistics for Holtz at South Carolina, but recall that those have been two of the best years in South Carolina football history, with the Gamecocks winning 17 games, a 2-year record. In 2001 South Carolina ran the ball 60.4% of the time and in 2000 ran it 54.8% of the time. Those percentages are essentially identical to the 60.5% and 54.0% figures generated by Stanford in 2001 and 2000. Holtz, like every good coach, adjusts to his personnel and the game situation. At N.D., Holtz had the personnel to run the ball effectively and was so frequently on the right side of lopsided scores that he had little reason to pass the ball. The same was true of Ara and to a lesser extent Devine: their teams were so good that they could run the ball over 70% of the time. Davie and Faust were so often behind or locked in close games that they didn't have this luxury. Dogged running of the ball does not necessarily win games by itself, however. In 2001, for example, (N.D.'s worst offensive team in a great while), N.D. ran the ball over 70% of the time, but managed less than 20 points per game.

Now, of course, there is no question that an effective running attack is essential. The pitiful rushing attack of Stanford in 1998 was nearly certain to end with a disastrous season, and it did at 3-8.

Another potentially interesting point of comparison between Stanford and N.D. is to look at rushing by players other than the QB, most often running backs, of course. In Stanford's offense, the QB has had much heavier passing responsibilities and included many fewer designed runs for the QB. Here are how the teams stack up on non-QB rushing since 1999 (the 1998 individual statistics for Stanford necessary to make this calculation are not posted on the official website):

Stanford

2001

Yards per game: 187.3
Carries per game: 39.0
Yards per carry: 4.8

2000

Yards per game: 131.3
Carries per game: 33.3
Yards per carry: 3.9

1999

Yards per game: 162.5
Carries per game: 31.3
Yards per carry: 5.2

Notre Dame

2001

Yards per game: 129.2
Carries per game: 31.3
Yards per carry: 4.1

2000

Yards per game: 172.0
Carries per game: 40.0
Yards per carry: 4.3

1999

Yards per game: 134.5
Carries per game: 30.2
Yards per carry: 4.5

Stanford's generally stronger rushing numbers by running backs may be partially due to differences in the quality of the opposition, but not entirely so. In their 6 common opponents since 1999, Stanford has (for all rushers, including the QB) averaged 160 yards per game, 45 carries per game and 3.6 per rush. Against these teams, N.D. has averaged 195 per game, 51 carries per game and 3.8 per rush. If one took the time to go through these games and subtract QB rushing (which I have not), the numbers would probably look even closer.

For these 6 common opponents, however, Stanford's passing attack has been decidedly more prolific, averaging 240 yards per game, 33 attempts per game and 7.3 per attempt. Against these same teams, N.D.'s passing attack has yielded 169 per game, 22 attempts per game and 7.7 per attempt.

It should be noted, as well, that the N.D. figures are bolstered somewhat because these common opponents include probably the two best offensive outings of the Davie era: the 1999 ASU game where ND scored 48 points with 47 rushes for 265 yards and 17 passes for 223 yards and the 2000 U.S.C. game where N.D. scored 38 points with 62 rushes for 246 yards and 15 passes for 142 yards. Stanford hung big numbers on both of these teams as well, scoring 50 against ASU in 1999 and 35 against U.S.C. in 2000, but while neither offensive performance was particularly unusual for Stanford, they truly stand apart for N.D. during the Davie era.

It will be an interesting process to watch Willingham and Diedrick work N.D.'s personnel into their offensive scheme. The good news, I think, is that both have come to understand the importance of an effective rushing attack. While it seems likely that N.D. will throw the ball more, I doubt that it will be an aerial circus. It seems likely as well that running backs will be called upon to shoulder a larger part of the burden of the rushing attack.