Extracted from The Official Military History of Kansas Regiments During the War for the Suppression of the Great Rebellion by W. S. Burke. REPORT NO. 11, OF ENGAGEMENT AT CABIN CREEK, C. N., SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1864.

FORT GIBSON, C. N., September 22, 1864.      

   I would respectfully make and forward the following report:
        The supply train under my command, having been repaired and loaded at Fort Scott, Kansas, I moved on the 12th of September with as much despatch as the condition of the animals would permit for this place.
        On leaving Fort Scott, I sent orders to the commanding officers of stations on the road between that post and this, to thoroughly scout the country in their vicinity, and notify me if the enemy be there and their movements, and also to reinforce me with as many troops as they could spare, being fully convinced that the enemy intended an attack on the train at some point on the route between Scott and Gibson.
        The escort under my command numbered two hundred and sixty (260) men,
composed of the following troops:  Fifty men mounted and thirty dismounted, of the Second Kansas Cavalry; sixty mounted and seventy dismounted men of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, under command of Captain Stevenson, and ten mounted men forty dismounted, of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under command of Captain Ledger.  The entire train numbered three hundred wagons---two hundred and five government wagons, four government ambulances, and ninety sutler wagons, &c.
        On arriving at Baxter Springs, this force was increased to three hundred and sixty (360) men by the arrival of one hundred (100) Cherokee Indians, under command of one white officer, First Lieutenant Waterhouse, Second Indian Regiment, and one Indian officer--Captain Tahlala, Third Indian Regiment.  At this place I received a despatch from Colonel C. W. Blair, commanding at Fort Scott, to the effect that General Price had crossed the, Arkansas river at Dardanelle, and was moving north.  I forwarded this to Colonel Wattles, at Fort Gibson, and urgently requested him to forward, without delay, all the troops lie could spare to reinforce me, as I anticipated an attack from a heavier force than my present force could contend with successfully.
        Arriving at Hudson's crossing of the Neosho river, I ordered Lieutenant Waterhouse with his command to remain at that station, and moved with the rest of my command and train to Horse Creek, fifteen miles south.
        On the night of the 18th, at 12 o'clock, while camped at this place--fifteen miles north of Cabin Creek--I received a dispatch from the commanding officer at Gibson, stating that the enemy were in force, numbering twelve hundred or fifteen hundred, with infantry, and moving in the direction of Cabin Creek; and embodied in the dispatch was an order for me to move with all possible dispatch to Cabin Creek, and there await further orders to move the train.  I immediately moved the train in double column, and arrived at Cabin Creek at 9 o'clock A.M. on the 18th instant.
        Lieutenant B. Withlow, Third Indian, with one hundred and forty Cherokees,
reinforced me at this point, together with one hundred and seventy Cherokees stationed at that point, under command of Lieutenant Palmer, Second Indian Regiment.  My entire force at this point numbered one hundred and twenty mounted cavalry, (white), one hundred and forty dismounted cavalry, (white), and thirty mounted Cherokees and three hundred and thirty dismounted--the entire force under my command numbering six hundred and ten white men and Indians.
        On arriving at Cabin Creek, in the afternoon of the same day I moved out to the south of that point with twenty-five men of the Second Kansas Cavalry, under the command of Captain Cosgrove, Second Kansas Cavalry, for the purpose of ascertaining the position and force of the enemy.  Moving south from the station at Cabin Creek three miles, I found the enemy strongly posted in a hollow on the prairie.  Pickets were reinforced, and the train formed in a quarter circle, preparatory to an attack.At 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th my pickets were driven in, and the enemy reported advancing in force.  My lines were formed, and the train was ordered to be parked in close order in rear of the stockade.  At 1 o'clock the enemy opened with artillery and small arms, and moved upon my lines with a yell.  At that time information was received that the enemy numbered from six hundred to eight hundred men, and was not informed that they had any artillery until it opened fire upon my lines.
        The enemy's lines were formed in a quarter circle, covering my right and left flank, and the nearest estimate I could form of their numbers was between two thousand and twenty five hundred, and four or six pieces of artillery.  [They numbered not less than two thousand at the very lowest estimate, and four to six pieces of artillery, some of them rifled guns.]  The enemy formed in two lines, with mounted men in the first line, and dismounted in the rear line, a few paces in the rear of the first.  Two pieces of their artillery were posted in our immediate front, and two pieces opposite the right flank, making a cross fire on my line and the train.  At the first charge of the enemy, the teamsters and wagon-masters, with but very few exceptions, stampeded taking with them one or more mules our of each wagon, leaving their trains and going in the direction of Fort Scott.  This rendered it impossible to move any portion of the train.
        The enemy was held in check from 1 o'clock A.M., by about four hundred of my men, until seven and a half o'clock, when they advanced upon my line, planting their artillery within one hundred yards of our position, and our forces were compelled to fall back in disorder, leaving the train, excepting a few wagons and an ambulance, that immediately moved back on the Fort Scott road across Cabin Creek.
        I encouraged the men to hold out until daylight, at which time I was in hopes Major Foreman, Second Indian regiment, with six companies of Indians and two howitzers, would arrive and attack the enemy in the rear.
        In order to move the train across the creek to a more remote position, I made
every effort to rally the teamsters and wagonmasters; and while attempting to accomplish this, the enemy swung around my right flank and took possession of the road in our rear, rendering all efforts to move the train useless.  On seeing this, I collected all the scattered troops possible together, and moved in the direction east of Cabin Creek on Grand River, where I was in hopes of joining Major Foreman, and if possible retake a portion of the train.
        At daylight I sent a messenger to the commanding officer at Hudson's crossing of the Neosho River, to immediately join me with his entire force, and in doing so he would protect any parties or part of the train that might have fallen back in that direction.
        Finding it impossible to join Major Foreman, I sent a messenger to the commanding officer at Gibson, informing him that the train had been captured, and I immediately marched for that place, and arrived there on the morning of the 21st, at 7 o'clock A.M.
        I expected Major Foreman to join me on the morning of the attack, but I find he was not within forty-five miles of my position at the time the enemy moved upon me.
        The force sent under Colonel J. M. Williams I knew nothing of until my arrival at Gibson.
        I sent four messengers to Gibson, calling for reinforcements, two of whom were cut off and captured, and consequently were not received by the commanding officer at the Post, but every effort was made on his part to hurry up my assistance all the force he could possibly spare.
        I was not apprised that the enemy had more than one thousand two hundred
(1,200) to one thousand five hundred (1,500) men, and did not expect they had any artillery, until the opened it upon my lines, at 10 o'clock in the morning.
 The night previous to the attack it was my understanding that Major Foreman,
with three hundred (300) Indians and two mountain howitzers, would camp within nine or ten miles of the post at Cabin Creek, and move on to reinforce me at daylight next morning.
        It is my opinion that the enemy did not get away with more than seventy-five or one hundred wagons, including Government wagons, sutler wagons and ambulances.  The remainder were destroyed at Cabin Creek.
        Great credit is due the commanding officer at Gibson, in forwarding reinforcements, and also to all the officers and men under my command, throughout the entire engagement, for their bravery and gallant conduct.  Lieutenant G. W. Smith,
Adjutant Thirteenth Kansas Infantry, rendered, throughout the entire engagement, very efficient service and prompt action.
        It is, at this time, impossible to forward the number of killed, wounded and
prisoners, but will forward, as soon as possible the result.
        Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Wheeler, Thirteenth Kansas Infantry, was on the field with me at the opening of the engagement.
        Three (3) men of the Second Kansas Cavalry, taken prisoner two days before they attacked me, have just escaped from them, but at different times, and report their force at from four to five thousand, and six pieces of artillery, General Gano commanding.
        Very Respectfully,                                        HENRY HOPKINS,
                                                                   Major Second Kansas Cavalry.
 


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