Extracted from The Official Military History of Kansas Regiments During the War for the Suppression of the Great Rebellion by W. S. Burke. REPORT NO. 3, OF ENGAGEMENT AT COON CREEK, MISSOURI.

      On the 23rd of August, 1862, the 2nd Kansas Cavalry received orders to march, and at 3 o'clock A.M. the regiment started from camp on Dry Fork, about twelve miles northeast of Carthage, and marched in the direction of Fort Scott. Just at daylight the command reached Coon Creek, where it halted to feed the horses and prepare breakfast, the command intending to resume its march in one hour, when some men rode hurriedly up from the rear guard and reported that there was a large force upon the north side of the creek, moving towards the west, on a road running parallel with the creek, and about one mile north of it. The command not being advised of any force of Union troops in that vicinity except a detachement of the 6th Kansas Cavalry, under Major Campbell, and a detachment of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, under command of Captain Conkey, which had been left behind in camp on Dry Fork, and which were under orders to march for Fort Scott at sunrise the same morning, the conclusion arrived at was, that the force on the other side must be rebels, and consequently a line of battle was formed. The hills on either side of the creek were low and gradually ascended for more than a mile each way, and any one standing a mile from the creek could look over the timber and readily see on standing the same distance from the timber on the opposite side. As the column approached the creek it was impossible to see far in any direction on account of the early dawn; but in a few moments afterwards it became sufficiently light to discover objects at even a much greater distance. Lieut. Pat. Cosgrove and eight men were sent across the creek to reconnitre, and he returned bringing with him a citizen who lived on the road heretofore mentioned on the north side of the creek, who, on being interrogated, said that the force seen was a rebel force under command of Col. Jo. Shelby, and that they were intending to move around our camp at Dry Fork and pass to the south, and that they claimed to have two thousand men. The command of the 2nd Regiment consisted of one hundred and twenty-eight men and officers, and was eight miles north from Dry Creek, where Major Campbell had been left with two hundred men of the Sixth Kansas, and Captain Conkey with seventy men of the Third Wisconsin, and no other reinforcements nearer than Fort Scott, sixty miles distant. The enemy was evidently trying to pass us unnoticed, having probably over estimated our force in camp at Dry Fork, undoubtedly believing it to be the entire force with which Col. Coffey had been pursued. Situated as the command was it could easily have passed on, crossing the enemy's track at right angles in their rear, and proceed to Fort Scott or make some attempt to fight them. Determining at once on the later course, the question then to decide was, how best to do it. If reinforcements were sent back after and hurried up--then eight miles in the rear--the enemy would have at least two hours the start, and the command had just had ten days' experience and more than three hundred miles travel in trying to overtake the enemy, concluded that plan was impracticable. Believing that the enemy was trying to gain a road parallel with the one on which the command was, and about eight miles to the west, it was determined then to head them off, and the command moved back to the place from whence it had that morning started. Orders were sent Major Campbell to be in readiness to march immediately, or, if already on the march, to halt until the Second could rejoin him. The Sixth Kansas and Third Wisconsin Cavalry were joined one mile from camp, just where the road turned off leading southwest in the direction of Carthage. To reach Carthage from the point where the enemy had first been discovered, they would have to travel eight miles west and seventeen miles south, and by the route the Second intended to march, it would have traveled eight miles south and about twelve miles southwest, and although the enemy had perhaps four or five miles to the start, it was thought that the comand could cross their route before they could reach Carthage, or cross Spring River on the north side of that place.
      As soon as Major Campbell's command was joined, the entire force moved as fast as possible, and reached the Lamar and Carthage road on which the enemy was expected, and then moved cautiously forward on that road, passed over the ground where the rebel General Price fought the Union forces under command of General Sigel, in July, 1861, and reached Dry Fork, a branch of Spring River, running parallel with Coon Creek, and about eight miles south of it. The enemy was expected at least at that creek, if not before; but finding nothing of them, small scouting parties were sent out to the right and left in advance, and continued moving forward to a point about two and one-half miles south of Coon Creek, when information was received from scouts that the enemy had formed in a heavy body of timber on the right of the road on the north side of the creek. The road on which the command was advancing crossed Coon Creek about three-fourths of a mile from where it empties into the north fork of Spring River, and another road south of and parallel with Coon Creek and crossed North Fork.
      Captain Russell, with twenty five men of the Second Kansas Cavalry, and Lieut. Gordon and twenty-five men of the Sixth Kansas, went forward to reconnoitre and ascertain, if possible, the exact location of the enemy. The command formed in line and moved forward near to the creek, and just ast the cross road was reached, a messenger from Captain Russell stated that "the enemy had left their position on the east side of the road and were retreating down the creek," and just at the same moment firing commenced between the advanced parties and the enemy. The column was immediately turned to the left and passed at a gallop down the creek, crossed over North Fork expecting fo intercept the enemy; the object was to get in front of them. It was ascertained that the command had passed too far in advance and that the enemy had halted, and by the rapid firing in their rear, were making determined resistance, Captain Gardner, Co. E, and Lieut. French, Co. F, were sent to reconnoitre their position on the west side of the creek. The detachement of the Third Wisconsin followed the Second Kansas, but Major Campbell, with the Sixth Kansas, did not; but states that on arriving at the point where the Second Kansas had turned to the left, he directed the Third Wisconsin to follow, but the firing between the enemy and Captain Russell's and Lieut. Gordon's detachement becoming more rapid, he thought best to go to their assistance, and as the action resulted his course was the best; but had the enemy been found "retreating down the creek," as the messenger from Capt. Russell stated, the case might have been very different. Major Campbell says in his report: "I arrived to the support of Capt. Russell and Lieut. Gordon and ordered them to charge dismounted. I reinforced them with twenty-five men under Capt. Greene, Sixth Kansas; they charged but were repulsed, losing two officers, Capt. Greene and Lieut. Gordon wounded, and twenty-one men killed and wounded in less than fifteen minutes. I then formed my men in line about six hundred yards from the enemy and awaited further developments, and then heard firing on the opposite side of the creek, about a mile, as I judged, to the west. The enemy was strongly posted in heavy timber with thick underbrush, which entirely concealed their movements, and I made up my mind at once that it was useless to attempt to drive them out with our small force." Captain Gardner was then ordered to fall back and join the regiment on the other side of the creek, for which place the regiment on the other side of the creek, for which place the regiment started at once where Major Campbell, with his command was found as he has above stated.
      A new line was formed somewhat nearer the enemy's position, the command was given, "Prepare to fight on foot." The command awaited the return of Captain Gardner with companies E and F; but after waiting half an hour, two messengers were sent to meed and direct him to hurry up, and expecting him every moment, the command still waited. The firing on the west side of the creek had ceased soon after the regiment had left, but Capt. Gardner, having received no orders to follow, his delay could not be accounted for. After the command had waited for some time longer, Lieutenant Cosgrove and six men were ordered to proceed to the place where Captain Gardner was left, and order him to rejoin the command at once. To enable him to do so, it became necessary for him to pass the enemy's right flank and rear. Lieutenant Cosgrove returned after an absence of more than an hour, and reported that he had carried out instructions fully, so far as the required him to make dilligent search for Captain Gardner's command, but could not find him or any trace of it, and accordingly returned. The only conclusion that could be arrived at was that Captain Gardner's detachment was either captured, or had passed up on the west side of North Fork towards Lamar, and the latter being the most probable, was accepted as true. The force was thus weakened by the withdraw of more than fifty of its best armed men, which was at that time an irreparable loss. From the experience of the attack made, it was evident that the force was entirely too small to successfully attack the enemy in their own position, and after maneuvering for more than three hours within six hundred yards of them, and had failed to draw them out; the men were wearied with ten days' forced marching, had a train of sixteen wagons to protect, and a number of wounded men and no medical officer; fifty-five miles from reinforcements; in front of a force which outnumbered ours as four to one; defeat would have resulted in capture or death. The principal officers had no hope of success, as the severally stated when cosulted; and under all these circumstances, it was concluded to abandon any further attempt to fight them.
      The detachement of the Third Wisconsin was ordered to proceed with the train towards Lamar, and in half an hour, Major Campbell, with the Sixth Kansas, was ordered to follow in the same direction, the rear being guarded with sixty men of the Second for more than an hour afterwards. Yet, the enemy made no advance. They either had no desire to fight, or overrated the numbers they had to contend with; but the latter would have been of but little advantage had they come out on the open ground where they could have seen the entire force.
      Upon reaching Coon Creek, the first attack was made before eleven o'clock, and it was after five P.M. before the regiment started towards Lamar, which place it reached at eight o'clock that evening.
      Captain Gardner rejoined the command at that place shortly after its arrival, and stated that he did not receive any orders after he had been sent forward to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and after having dismounted and skirmished for some time, finding his support withdrawn, he recalled his men, remounted them and withdrew a short distance, where he waited for some time, and hearing no further firing, and believing that he could not, with any degree of certainty, pass around the enemy by the route he had reached his then present position, he determined to make his way, if possible, to Lamar, and accordingly passed up the west side of North Fork.
      Had the messinger carried the orders to Captain Gardner, in the first instance, to withdraw and follow, or had the two messengers in the second instance succeeded in finding him, an attack would have been hazarded; but, weakened as the command was, by the loss of seventy-five men, it was not deemed expedient.
      Captain Greene and Lieutenant Gordon, of the Sixth Kansas are deserving of much praise for gallantry displayed in their attack with such odds against them.

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