The Death of Yassin and the Limits of Rationalism


I recently scanned an article about the killing of Yassin BY GERSHOM GORENBERG, an associate editor of the Jerusalem Report. Scanning is possible, and nearly automatic, when reading every word is unnecessary. This, in turn, is possible when an author’s phrases and lines of thought are common enough to be filled in by the reader on the basis of occasional word cues.
Filling-in is a regular strategy of the nervous system. Thus, for example, the visual system does not require that the eye actually focus on—read, as it were--each square millimeter of a uniformly painted wall before the mind perceives the wall as being uniform. Because such surfaces are common, the mind, after sufficient cues, can and does guess the rest. The purpose of filling-in, both of a uniform wall and of an unoriginal argument, is to save the brain the work of processing a flood of data devoid of informational content. Mr. Gorenberg’s article will be used here to represent a type: a polemical analysis presented as being based on reason. In particular, it is a polemic against the killing of Yassin that advocates a different approach for Israel, presenting itself as being based on a reasoned analysis of the situation. After summarizing and analyzing it, I offer some general conclusions about all such appeals to reason; they may contribute to the reader’s stock of filling-in strategies. The conclusions are listed first, followed by comment and analysis in support of them.

Conclusions:;

(i) Rationalism is a belief in the sovereign efficacy of reason as applied to human affairs. Although reason is an indispensable tool, and rationalism, an indispensable approach, for dealing with conflicts, they can be over-emphasized; and this is often dangerous. Intellectuals, for obvious reasons, are especially prone to such error.

(ii) Polemicists typically represent their analyses as the only reasonable, rational ones possible, and do so by emphasizing the logic of their arguments. But conclusions also depend on premises, which, in controversies, are optional; for that is why controversies arise in the first place and then persist.

(iii) Choices of premises involve not only judgment, but reasons of the heart with respect to which Pascal’s maxim: "The heart has reasons that the mind knows not of" applies. Thus, they are typically chosen, consciously or otherwise, to achieve sought for conclusions.

(iv) Thus, consumers of analyses, and, if possible, even their producers, should always focus great suspicion on premises.

(v) Thus, serious opponents are rarely, if ever, converted through rational argument. A heart must change before a mind can follow; and in serious struggles, that is usually initiated physically.

(vi) Thus polemic analyses are never the models of rational thought they purport to be; they cannot be; they can only be propaganda.

Comment and Analysis

Mr. Gorenberg is a reasonable man who presents a reasonable, if predictable, argument. Thus:
Sadly, …the odds are that killing Yassin has made Israelis less safe. Saying this, I express no sympathy for Yassin, … But his death is likely to escalate the conflict - precisely what terrorists seek.
This is not unreasonable. Why do terrorists seek to escalate? This he explains as follows:
The first challenge of extremists is that most of the people in whose name they fight don't share their extremism. To radicalize "the masses," the extremists engage in political judo: They use violence against civilians in the hope of provoking the government they oppose to respond harshly, in ways that hurt its own legitimacy and make peaceful politics seem impossible. The worse that conditions get, the more angry people there are to support the extremists, to engage in terror themselves - and to provoke further escalation.
How should Sharon have countered this ‘judo’ strategy?
What's missing in Sharon's strategy is an effort to show Palestinians that they have more to gain through compromise than through terror. … But Sharon has abjured diplomacy.
Why did Sharon miss the classic terrorist strategy and the ways, which Mr. Gorenberg lists, to counter it? He and George Bush (who also missed) are both slaves to macho, unable to do or think rationally. Thus:
[Bush’s] own approach to terror has been heavy on the macho , short on efforts to build bridges to moderate Muslims - and he, too, has thereby risked playing into terrorists' hands. …[and Israel too] should consider whether its actions will boost support for groups like Hamas. Killing Yassin is the latest example of Sharon's inability to do that.
Thus Mr. Gorenberg.

There are, of course, simple and direct responses. For example: Where have you been? What has Israel been doing but trying the strategy your recommend? What were the Oslo accords about? And so on. And naturally, these evoke a range of by now, well known counter responses. At one extreme are the Chomskians who tell us that Oslo offered nothing but Bantustans to the Palestinians leaving, sadly but necessarily, only the possibility of killing schoolchildren as a response. There is really nothing to say to such people. We can only observe and wonder at the varieties of God’s creations.

Mr. Gorenberg is not in this category. He is one of those who say, yes, you have tried for peace, but your only recourse is to simply keep trying. For, they say, the alternatives--that through its judo tactics, Hamas succeeds in having Israel effectively destroy itself, or that innocents on both sides be killed indefinitely--are much worse. Mr. Gorenberg and those like him shine with reasonability, they exude the certainty that they have rationality on their side, and that those who disagree with them must therefore be irrationally ruled by varying degrees of emotion and stupidity.

There are basically three parts to Mr. Gorenberg’s argument: First, an analysis consisting of premises (relevant factors and their interactions) and their logical consequences. Second, a strategy based on the analysis. Third, a disparagement of alternatives.

The analysis recognizes three factors: (1) The fraction of extremist Palestinians in the population; (2) the level of Palestinian terrorism; (3) the level of Israeli reprisals. In terms of them, the reasoning is as follows. The worse that conditions get, the more angry people there are to support the extremists, to engage in terror themselves - and to provoke further escalation. This describes a positive feedback loop:
Hamas drives (2), which drives (3), which drives (1), which increases the abilities of Hamas to drive (2),….
Israel, he points out, has the option to restrain itself thereby cutting the loop—the part that says (2) drives (3)--but falls into the trap by not doing so. (Note, that no one ever assumes the Palestinians also have an option of restraint that could cut the loop—they are always hapless victims of fate.)

The logic here is indisputable; to dispute the analysis, one must attack its premises. These have problems and alternatives that are obvious to anyone with any knowledge of the situation in Israel. One, for example, is the implicit assumption that (1) will always vary directly with (3). Thus, even if (3) decreases to zero, will there not always be enough extremists to support a considerable program of terror? This, because of many factors ignored in the analysis: for example, the religious influence and financial support of outside parties. Conversely, not only is it physically impossible for (1) to keep increasing indefinitely with (3), but also, when (3) does increase, will it not degrade the leadership and spirit of Hamas, and thus cause (2) to actually start decreasing?

These comments are merely to illustrate how, typically, only a few relevant factors (here, the factors are 1,2, and 3) are chosen for such analyses, and how their interactions are simplified (here, the simplification is to assert that (1) varies directly with (2) varies directly with (3) varies directly with (1) ). In general, all controversial situations are always very complex and very poorly understood; and virtually all problems in their analyses result from oversimplifications concerning what is known and uncertain assumptions concerning what is unknown.

The problematic premises singled out here as examples, are merely illustrative. Many other easily accessible analyses, equally logical but based on other premises and leading to vastly different conclusions, have been published, and it would be pointless to review them here. However worthy an analysis may be, its premises are always problematic and each of its critics will choose his or her own favorite set of problems to argue with. Common experience teaches us that critiques rarely change the views of veteran disputants; and this for fairly obvious reasons. Each disputant in a complex situation (virtually all disputed situations are so because of their complexity) has at hand, a cornucopia of factors and possible interactions between them, all neglected by his or her opponents. For each argument one puts forth, there is a counter— ad infinitum. Arguments remain inconclusive because each disputant rates the importance of points and counter-points differently, and because no other mode of rating—no objective one--exists. Judgment is all, and all may judge.

Rationalism is a belief in the sovereign efficacy of reason as applied to human affairs, and this is its mode of thought. It focuses on certain selected factors and mechanisms in a situation and then deduces the consequences that logically flow from them. In doing this, the rationalist adapts a scientific style of reasoning to situations that are outside the normal range of science . Within its proper range, science is able to draw conclusions and make predictions with a relatively high degree of certainty that can be objectively and quantitatively evaluated. And this is ultimately so because the systems science studies are just those for which it has an effective handle on all relevant factors and mechanisms. The crucial distinction is between ‘only certain selected’ and ‘all’; the range of science is limited to those systems for which the ‘all’ applies. In this sense, therefore, Rationalism is a quasi-scientific approach to problems that cannot be treated by science itself.

 The foregoing is not so much a criticism of rationalism, as a reminder of its necessary limitations. We must live with these limitations but we should not be fooled into dying in ignorance of them. This is the ignorance of the classic sophomore--literally the wise fool—the person who, having learned a little believe he or she knows it all. Sophomores learn logic and how to create, or at least appreciate, a logical argument, and as a consequence, can become or be deemed, intellectuals. Too often, they become overly confident. Only a fraction of life’s sophomores have or gain the experience and judgment of seniors.