This is another paper I wrote during 1994

This is another paper I wrote during 1994. While the topic is now old to most of the world, as we are experiencing the effects of failed policy, and another year of war, perhaps some interesting thoughts might be generated by its presentation.
This paper was my prediction about where I thought the world was headed.
Yes, you can dismiss this paper as yet one more opinion, but if you read it carefully, you will see that every current comment made reflects an accurate assessment submitted in 1994.

Questions:

What are the specific issues facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the following areas:

1. Economic Intelligence
2. Counter Intelligence
3. The improvement of National Technical Measures...Satellites etc.?
4. Arms Control Verification?
5. What are the lessons to be learned from the experience of other countries in the intelligence area (e.g., Russia or the Third World)?

    The impact of intelligence if the past and significance of intelligence today, cannot be overrated in its shaping of world development and policy making, "only if policy makers and decision makers are sufficiently informed about the state of the world and the likely consequences of policies and actions can they be expected to make intelligent decisions"(1). Today, with the end of the Cold War, and the drawdown of the United States military in the shawdow of the Persian Gulf War,
* I must stop myself in typing this to note that as of today: 03/24/08, the Gulf War, which resumed since the first writing of this article, and has reached a 4,000 plus -troop casualty level.*
policymakers decisions are of critical importance, having vital impact on the various issues facing world development. The task of gathering and interpreting information has, therefore, become equally important. Unfortunately, the issues that confront policy makers have diversified in nature, creating many new problems to which the intelligence community is yet unacquainted. That is, new answers must be created to deal with the changing world structure of today, as opposed to the answers created to solve past Socio-Economic and Geo-Political challenges.

Economic Intelligence

    Economic Intelligence will undoubtedly become a vital issue in determining the future of both a nation as well as the strength of its military. Regarding this, on a microcosmic level, I have personally experienced that the draw down of the military has left many gaps in both training quality, through the lack of providing more advanced classes to a greater number of individuals, as well as the purchasing of advanced equipment due to the “lack of funds available” to purchase such items. The significance of this microcosmic problem is that it will have long-term consequences. In other words, poorly trained individuals, as well as policy and decision makers, will be forced to substitute lack of potential knowledge with experience, that they do not have, when dealing with the unknown problems of today. Saving money by not providing essential training and relying upon equipment that does not offer new solutions to the advancing challenges that confront intelligence operations, therefore, may not be in our best interests for meeting the threats of tomorrow.
*Personal note 03/24/08: remember the date that this was written, 1994? (proof that this is the case, I submitted this as a paper to my college) *
    On a Macrocosmic level, unfortunately, these problems of training and equipment supply are complicated by the additional dilemma of not knowing which topics are the most significant to address, and which equipment is the “best” or most advanced, since rapid changes are occurring constantly. In order to deal with these economic difficulties, the United States must constantly monitor the developments of other countries new potential advancements and estimate their capabilities. While at the same time, reexamining our own modernization strategy in regards to production and product improvement. This, however, may also pose a problem, since it also forces policy makers to guess at what is the most plausible range of options they have to deal with advancements. However, the advantages of an educated guess far outweigh those of an undereducated one, as it provides the policy maker a more realistic vision of the situation, and the options available in decision making.

National Technical Measures (NTMs)

    The reliance upon National Technical Measures, controlled by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), incorporates signal and technical collection, through means such as photo reconnaissance satellites and telemetry collection satellites, and has been responsible for many successes in operations. Therefore, it should be of great concern to intelligence policymakers. Frequently in the past these systems have provided information about areas of interest, which were not easily accessible, due to the prevailing unfavorable environment or geographic conditions of an area. Yet, there is much debate as to the value of the information that they provide. Indeed, many argue that the information given is open to human interpretation, and does not always yield the full picture of the various intentions of the opposition. Nevertheless, they give “an enormous increase in our total knowledge”(2), and provide a means to check treaty verification of arms control.

Arms Control

    It may be said that Arms Control, “which effectively began in October 1963 with a limited test ban treaty”(3), brought about many significant changes in intelligence operations, and the reshaping of current conventional force strategy. While the idea of controlling the ever escalating building of powerful weapons of mass destruction did bring some sense of security to the world powers, it unfortunately also brought with it the problem of verification that the treaties were not being followed. Today, while the Soviet Union retains significant military capability, it is encumbered both by its uncertain internal political conditions and the changed international environment, and this problem has become more complicated through nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation. In the past, the Soviet Union was a primary threat in these weapons, with its fall, many of the third world powers have scrambled to acquire the knowledge of these capabilities, causing the major world powers to ask where the threat would come from next. Additionally, this problem has become aggravated with the possibility that those with these weapons may decide to sell to the highest bidder.
*Personal note 03/24/08: Remember the date that this was written? 1994?*
    In order to deal with this problem, the intelligence community will be tasked with having to become the “world policeman”, watching all countries that are in pursuit of this new capability through any means available. Furthermore, and to the misfortune of the United States, while the U.S. has had prior experience in the field of treaties, it has, in most cases, negotiated poorly with other nations, giving them the “upper hand” in talks, and compromising its position through its own incentives to limit the possibilities of war. In order to contain this problem, the Intelligence Community will be faced with having to restructure its approach to deal with the various possibilities of this great threat. If the United States realizes the potential of other countries acquiring nuclear capability and the implications of the conventional threat developing to the level of a nuclear one, it will recognize the necessity for an expanded intelligence force to deal with the issue of proliferation, military readiness, and mobilization of such a capability. Additionally, the intelligence community will give serious consideration to the importance of developing its own abilities in the process of negotiating and verifying treaties with all countries of the world, as this will be of vital consequence to preserving world peace. Moreover, the intelligence community, in dealing with other countries will have to develop a higher degree of Counterintelligence. That is we must have a greater ability to apply our intelligence efforts without as much scrutiny and opposition.
* Personal note 03/24/08: Remember the date this was written? 1994? This was before A.Q. Khan and Water boarding.*

Counter Intelligence

What the Soviets termed as “active measures”(4), certainly must apply to intelligence dealings of the 1990s. That is, we must acquire the ability to establish and negotiate with countries that are considered hostile, so as to avoid future confrontations. Additionally, we must find new ways to protect our vital interests through not only the forestalling of other countries intelligence efforts to acquire information that may not be pertinent, and perhaps even harmful, to negotiations, but even halt the intelligence efforts of other countries that would lead to hostile outcomes.

Lessons learned from other countries

    Today, with all the countries of the world attempting to develop to the degree of acquiring nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare, and most having successful outcomes in acquiring the increased benefits from international communication, the survival of the U.S. intelligence community must be able to apply not only the lessons that it has learned from in past international dealings, but learn how to think in an international sense, rather than in a bipolar or even one sided one. Versatility then should be the key word for intelligence in the 1990s.
*Personal note 04/15/08: I think that I can say today the world is fragile. On a positive note, I still think that the problems that we face can be fixed.

I will comment about this and other papers later in my writings. I may be contacted for comments at my email: glenndj@cox.net