Social Epistemology and Public Libraries
Public libraries have traditionally
been viewed as an essential resource for an educated and enlightened
citizenry
in a democratic society. Public library
policies for acquiring and disseminating knowledge have broad societal
implications and consequences. This
paper will examine the epistemic objectives and consequences of the
practice of
responding to patron requests to acquire new materials, from the
comparative
perspectives of Goldman and Bloor.
According to Goldman, knowledge is “true
belief”. The primary epistemic objective
of any collection development practice, from this perspective, would be
to
ensure that the materials acquired enhance the “veritistic value” of
the
collection for the patron. This means
that the materials in the collection would all have the most positive
impact
possible on the development of “true beliefs” by patrons who use the
materials. (Goldman, Alvin. 2001. "Social
Epistemology").
In fields such as politics and social
criticism, one might argue that the “veritistic value” of a collection
is a
function of the extent to which it reflects and makes accessible to the
patron
the broadest spectrum of ideology and belief.
(Goldman, Alvin.
2001. "Social Epistemology"). The implicit assumption is that it is
vital that patrons be able to educate themselves about the entire
spectrum of
ideology and practice in the political and social arenas.
From Goldman’s perspective, a
policy of acquisition by request has both positive and negative
potential
consequences for the “veritistic value” of the collection.
On the positive side, it allows for direct
input from patrons about what they think is required to promote the
acquisition
of knowledge, which in Goldman’s view is equivalent to “true belief.” On the negative side, if a group of patrons
with a particular ideological slant, or a small number of patrons
dominates the
acquisition requests, the “veritistic value” of the collection could be
compromised by no longer reflecting in a balanced way the broad
spectrum of
views.
In the domain of science, particularly in
areas like San Diego
where
“creationism” and other religiously informed doctrines are strongly
held by
vocal minorities of the population, and where the theory of evolution
is
denounced as ideological and unscientific, the epistemic consequences
of
acquisition by request, from the perspective of Goldman’s theory,
potentially
become more problematic. The function of
a public library collection, and the role of requests from patrons in
acquisitions, could potentially be manipulated to advance the
ideological
agenda of a particular group or groups.
Further, the library acquisition policy itself, with or without
patron
input through acquisition by request, could be viewed as promoting a
particular
ideological agenda.
The aforementioned possibilities
are instances in which non-epistemic considerations such as organized
patron
political behavior, (i.e., campaigns to over-represent certain kinds of
materials in the collections) could have epistemic consequences. Such problems might be remedied in part
through policies limiting the number of acquisition requests honored in
a given
budget year for each patron, or policies limiting the number of
acquisition
requests honored in a given subject area for each budget year. It is
useful to
evaluate a practice such as honoring patron acquisition requests from
the
perspective of Goldman’s standards of the power, fecundity, speed,
reliability
and efficiency with which a practice leads to “true belief.”
Where Goldman views knowledge as
“true belief,” with the implication
being that one ought not waste one’s time on false beliefs (except
perhaps to
prove them false, which then contributes to true belief, or knowledge),
Bloor
takes a radically different position. He
views “all knowledge, whether in the empirical sciences or even in
mathematics….as
material for investigation….There are no limitations which lie in the
absolute
or transcendent character of scientific knowledge itself, or in the
special
nature of rationality, validity, truth, or objectivity.”
(Bloor, David. 1976. "The Strong
Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge.") According to Bloor, the
sociology of knowledge (included within the broad domain of social
epistemology)
focuses on the distribution of belief and the various factors which
influence
it. For example: how
is knowledge transmitted; how stable is
it; what processes go into its creation and maintenance; how is it
organized
and categorized into different disciplines or spheres.
Bloor might take issue with the
concept of “veritistic value” on a more fundamental basis i.e., it is
not a
useful concept, rather more interesting is why do people believe some
things
and not others (not just because the truth is self-evident and belief
in it
needs no explanation, only the failure to believe the truth needs
explanation). However, if Bloor were to
discuss “veritistic value”, perhaps he would do so in terms of the
value of
information practices for helping people to understand the causes and
conditions that bring about beliefs and states of knowledge. This mission seems to have particular merit
for the mission of the public library to help promote an educated and
informed
citizenry.
It seems like Bloor’s approach
makes somewhat more sense with regard to collection development in a
public
library, particularly with regard to a policy of patron request. The librarian is not setting herself or
himself up as the ultimate arbiter of truth or falsehood, nor does the
librarian
have to evaluate the absolute “veritistic value” of a piece of material
from
some set of ostensibly “objective criteria.”
Rather, to the extent that a broad range of viewpoints is
represented,
perhaps representative of the relative strength of competing views in
society,
the librarian would be developing a collection with overall “veritistic
value.”
References:
·
Goldman, Alvin, "Social
Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2001
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/epistemology-social/>.
·
Bloor, David. 1976. "The Strong
Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge." Pp. 1-19 in Knowledge and
Social Imagery. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.