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Guns,
Germs, and Steel, by Jared Diamond Review date: April 22, 1997 Reviewed by: Kevin Drum Overall grade: A- |
Books that tackle the broad sweep of history--say, A Study of History or The Decline of the West--have mostly gone out of style these days, replaced by monographs and detailed historical studies rich in primary sources. I suspect that historians have become afraid of the potential for ridicule inherent in trying to explain 10,000 years of human history with only a couple of theories and a word processor to hide behind, and that makes it all the more fun to find someone like Jared Diamond who's still willing to give it a try. Diamond is a professor of physiology, which may explain why he's not afraid to try this, and the basic question of Guns, Germs, and Steel is, "Why did a bunch of white guys from Europe end up ruling the world?" Diamond's answer is simple, interesting, and compelling: it happened because they had a head start on everyone else. His basic argument goes like this:
The most interesting part of the book consists of a few chapters in the middle where Diamond explains why certain civilizations took up farming when they did and why others didn't. The basic points are these:
All of these things conspired to prevent crop farming from taking hold until around 8000 BC or so, and even then it was only likely to happen in an area that already had lots of wild crops to choose from and in which most of the large wild mammals were extinct, thus forcing a change in lifestyle. It turns out that only the fertile crescent area of the Middle East met these conditions 10,000 years ago. It's true that at first glance it seems as if all the continents would be equally good as sources of domesticable crops and large mammals, but Diamond makes a very convincing argument--the core argument of the whole book--that 10,000 years ago only the Eurasian continent had all the right ingredients to make crop farming sustainable. The Americas were settled only about 10,000 years ago to begin with, and had only a few domesticable crops and only one domesticable large mammal (the llama). Australia was hopeless (no crops and no animals) and Africa was only a little better off: it had a few decent crops but no domestic animals. The Eurasians also had the advantage that their continent stretches mostly east/west, which means that crops domesticated in one region can be transplanted to another. Continents like Africa and the Americas, which are aligned north/south, can't exchange newly discovered crops because crops that grow well in, say, Missouri, won't grow at all in Mazatlan. The bottom line is that by around 1000 AD or so, the Eurasians had had 9,000 years to use their food surpluses to build up great civilizations and the same amount of time to build up immunity to their own epidemic diseases. The rest of the world had only begun domesticating crops a couple of thousand years earlier, and were so far behind that it was really no contest when they met the Eurasians. The result was that when the European Age of Discovery began it was like a teenager taking on a baby, and within a few hundred years the Europeans had thoroughly wiped out or absorbed every other culture on the planet thanks to superior technology and a wide array of epidemic diseases. (The population of North American Indians in 1520, for example, was about 20 million. A mere five years later it was reduced to 1 million without a shot being fired.) This is interesting as far as it goes, but it stops short of answering another interesting question: even granted that Eurasia had a big advantage over other continents, why did Western Europeans win out over their fellow Eurasian civilizations in the Middle East, India, and China? After all, if a Martian had visited the Earth in AD 1000, he would almost certainly have picked Western Europe as the longest of longshots to prevail over the others. I spent half the book wondering when Diamond was going to get to this, but he never really did. In the very last chapter he simply suggests that this is a fit subject for further study and then offers a few tentative hypotheses. The fertile crescent, for example, lost its early lead because it became arid and dry and unable to support large populations (it really was fertile 10,000 years ago). China is more difficult to explain, but Diamond suggests that Europe was ultimately better able to compete because it was composed of lots of warring states rather than a single monolithic state. Since there were more competing ideas in Europe, a mistake in one area did not necessarily hold back the entire region. In the end, however, Diamond seems to hold the commonsense idea that to some degree the answer is simply chance. China could have won out, but didn't (at least, not yet), probably due to some small quirk of fate that we will never know about. On the scale that he writes about in Guns, Germs, and Steel, a few hundred years is just a drop in the ocean, and it was probably no more than luck that Europe enjoyed a major flowering at just the time in history when worldwide dominion first became technologically possible. Guns, Germs, and Steel is well written and absorbing, and its only real flaw is the final hundred pages, which basically recapitulates everything he has already said. My advice: if you like this kind of broad historical theorizing, buy the book but skip the section titled "Around the World in Five Chapters." Overall, Guns, Germs, and Steel is thought-provoking stuff that's well worth reading. Back to DrumNet Home Page |