To prepare against the above outline possibilities, a co-ordinated operation was planned with PTs, MTBs, ML and Steam Gun Boats working with destroyers and controlling frigates. This type of operation was developed by the British at sea in the Nore command and at the training establishment in M.M.S. Bee. In actions that took place after D-Day, the efficacy of this method of using a vectoring control ship was illustrated and it was demonstrated that several units of different ships, can, by means of vectoring control, take part in an engagement without risk of confusion or misidentification.
British MTB flotillas 14, 35, 53 and 64 were given pre-D-Day training by Lt. M.G. Duff, RNVR, who organized the entire training program for British Coastal Forces craft in Portsmouth. The British MLs were trained in Portland.
At this stage in the planning, MTBs and MLs were allocated as follows - the British 51st MTB flotilla to Newhaven, the 29th (anti-W-boat & E-boat) to N.C.E.T.F., the 53rd and 35th to work on the western flank, the 63rd, 1st SGB and U.S. MTB RONS 30, 34, and 35 to work from Portland under N.C.W.T.F. and the British 13th, 14th and 64th to work on the westwall when not required for mine laying.
A mining program was conducted with mines being laid by
British MTBs of the 13th and 64th flotillas. 202 moored mines, 16 ground
mines and 40 moored mines fitted with snag lines were laid off Cherbourg
to bottle up the enemy there. To protect the eastern flank of the cross-channel
convoy route, ground and moored mines were laid off Cap d'Antifer to protect
convoys from E-boats and destroyers. Assault convoys were led by MTBs,
MLs and HDMLs. Two control frigates were attached to MTBs patrolling north
of Pointe de Barfleur in defunct of the western flank and another MTB patrol
group was established of Cap de la Hague.
The "B" type Fairmile MLs were employed as navigational leaders, minesweepers and convoy escorts, during the initial stages of the assault.
During the first three weeks after D-Day, the availability of these craft did not drop below 80% and after a month dropped to 75% where it remained static up to the time of this report.
July, the Germans operated R-boats and flak trawlers off Cap d'Antifer. 4 August, the British forces operating on the eastern flank were reinforced by two units of 3 of the US PTs from RONs 30 and 35, based at Portland.
Operations from Cherbourg got underway 5 August with Mourad IV. as control at Joburg (near Cap de Hague) and several days later, the U.S.S.. Maloy was used as control ship. Lt. Cdr. Peter Scott, RNVR, a veteran MTB operator, was loaned to C.T.F.125 for three weeks and acted as vector controller in the U.S.S.. Maloy and later in the U.S.S.. Borum.
During the evacuation of Le Havre 23 August, a final intensive period of activity commenced with the enemy which had begun to evacuate shipping from Le Havre to Fecamp. A British Hunt class destroyer was included in the actions here. By creating diversions for each other, the destroyer and MTB units were able to develop their attacks while the frigate vectoring frequently drew the fire of the shore batteries. This action period lasted seven days during which the forces involved are believed to have sunk 18 enemy vessels, damaged 13 others and driven ashore 3, with comparatively light casualties to their own boats and personnel.
RONs 30 and 35 and British MTB flotillas 13, 14, 35, 53 and 55 were included in these actions. Thronborough, Seymour and Retclick acted as the control vessels with the destroyers Melbreak, Cattistock, La Combattants, Talybout and Middletown working in conduction with the MTBs.
Before D-Day and after D-DAy during the convoying period,
it had been anticipated as has already been stated, that enemy surface
craft would attack both flanks of the convey route. A bombing raid on Le
Havre on D-plus 8 destroyed most of the enemy's torpedo boats and our larger
surface craft dealt with the enemy's destroyers that attempted to come
into the convoy area from Brest.
An interesting comparison of damage inflicted on our shipping by E-boats as compared to coastal craft (including boats and ships mentioned in this plan) damage to the enemy, is given below:
E-boats sank - 1 M/T ship, 2 L.S.T.s, 1 L.C.I., 2 coastal vessels, and damaged 2 frigates, 1 L.C.T. and 4 M/Vs.
Allied Coastal Forces sank - 4 E-boats, 7 coasters, 1 tug, 8 Robots, 9 T.L.C.s, 3 trawlers, 1 M-class mine-sweep and 1 corvette. Drove ashore - 1 T.L.C., 1 Robot. Probably sank - 1 M-class mine-sweep, 1 trawler, 6 R-boats, 1 coaster. Damaged - 28 E-boats, 21 R-boats, 2 coasters, 2 M-class mine-sweeps, 1 trawler and 1 torpedo boat.
Because of the E-boats excellent sea keeping qualities at all speeds (E-boats were frequently plotted at speed in excess of 40 knots) and their unwillingness to engage the allied coastal craft, the technique of vectoring from control ships made possible interceptions which without the aid of vectoring would have been missed.
Recognition and Identification During This Period.
1. Fighting lights were fitted to the radar masts of
all PTs.
2. Colored smoke identifications were used.
3. All boats were equipped with I.F.F. acknowledging
equipment and several boats had challenge equipment installed. However
I.F.F. was not used as it was thought that the Germans also had this equipment.
4. Q.H. was used for accurate station-keeping and it
was possible for control ships, by means of radar, to establish the identity
of all ships in its area of operation.
5. By use of a fighter grid system to insure station
keeping. This was later supplanted by area overlay markings on all charts.
Conclusion - Although much operating time of the
U.S. Channel Area PTs was spent conducting routine patrols of a blockade
line rather than in frequent clashes with the enemy, it is thought that
the PTs presented a threat to enemy action which quite probably prevented
concentrated E-boat thrusts at the invasion convoy routes. U.S. PTs arrived
in the Channel area too late to fully demonstrate their potential superiority
offered by superior speed and maneuverability over the British M.T.B.s,
but after indoctrination in the methods of MTB activity in the channel
area by seasoned British M.T.B. personnel, the U.S. PTs operated effectively
in their limited contacts with the enemy. 4 September 1944, Charles Little,
Admiral, R.N. in a report to the Secretary of the Admiralty, stated "On
5 August, operating with our MTBs, they (referring to U.S. PTs) were in
action for the first time.
In a report dated 18 September 1944, from Admiral Little, RN., to the Secretary of the Admiralty covering the evacuation of the Germans from Le Havre between 23 and 30 August 1944, Admiral Little referred to Lieut. N. Ryan, USNR, of P% 519 and Lieut. S.E. Saltsman, USNR., PT 520, as having distinguished themselves and deserving particular mention for their conduct during the above mentioned operations.
The failure of PT squadrons 30, 34 and 35 patrol activities on and preceding D-Day and RON 2s OSS activity prior to and after D-Day is considered to well warrant the existence of a Channel Area PT Task Force.
Admiral Kirk, in a letter to Lt. Comdr. Bulkeley, 5 July 1944, expressed this thoughts as to the value of PTs in this area when he stated -
"Dear Bulkeley:
As you know, I have turned over the command of the beaches and at Cherbourg to Admiral Wilkes, and have withdrawn from the assault area. I cannot leave without congratulating you, and, through you, all your men, on the very fine job done by PT boats during the first month of the campaign. Your boys have fully justified our very high expectations, and if they have not had as much direct action as we had all hoped, that in itself is a tribute to the high respect the German has for them.
Whether in the Area Screen or on Advanced Patrol, or in the dull but demanding business of ferrying old men around the bay, your boys have done themselves proud. I wish you and them all the luck in the world.
Sincerely,
Alan Kirk"
However, the value of this Task Force ceased to exist after 15 October, and it is considered that the use of PTs for dispatch and like service, for which PTs were not designed, does not make the most of the potential value of the boats and their highly trained crews.