APPENDIX II
The Lost Soldiers at Cedar Mountain
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page 1481 After the battle at Cedar Mountain, someone discovered that the number of men listed as assigned to Banks's corps did not match the number present for the battle. The July returns indicated that about 9,404 men should have been present. A careful examination of the numbers indicates neither Pope nor Banks seemed to have had a good grasp of the figures. The report on July 31, showed 15,962 men present for duty in Banks's 2nd Corps.1 This figure was imperfectly broken down, and it would seem that Pope's staff would have noticed that Buford's large cavalry force was not listed on anyone's list. Williams's division, in contrast, was bloated in the figures to twice what would be expected. There is no doubt that the cavalry was included in this total in a departure from the previous routine. Buford had about 3,500 cavalrymen working elsewhere on July 31 and on the day of the battle. In addition, during the battle the 28th Pennsylvania was trying to retake Thoroughfare Mountain at Pope's request. The 3rd Delaware was at Front Royal, and this was lsited in an earlier report to Pope. The 441 men of Purnell's Legion were at Warrenton, Virginia. The 490 men of the 60th New York were at Warrenton Junction. An additional 275 were guarding various sites. This should have left 9,874 men present for duty in Banks's main force. From other comments, there probably were additional guard detachments and additional sick diminishing the effective strength. There may have also been some desertions or straggling on the 9th, but the various commanders bragged that they did not have this problem. The whereabouts of the 29th Pennsylvania Regiment may explain much of the discrepancy in the disputed figures. A later history of that regiment described that unit as being under Banks's command at
1. OR, I, 12, pt. III: 523. |
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page 1482 Cedar Mountain but suffered no casualties there.2 General Williams in his report on Cedar Mountain commented that the 29th had been on detached service from Gordon's brigade "for some months."3 The semiofficial records of the regiment show it was detached at Hagerstown, Sandy Hook and Williamsport, Maryland, in July and August 1862.4 In addition, some paroled soldiers from this regiment were awaiting permission to return to duty.5 Gordon's brigade was certainly reduced in size because only three regiments were listed at the battle. The detachment of the 29th was in addition to the detachment of the 28th Pennsylvania. Because multiple officers mentioned the 28th Regiment being sent to Thoroughfare Mountain from Geary's Brigade, the senior officers may have confused the 28th and 29th, which were both detached. Who was responsible for losing track of the 29th is unclear. The war department did not always know what regiments were with what commands. Pope's problem was that he was expecting 14,000 men to be with Banks, a figure that certainly included the cavalry force that was detached from Banks's control. Pope repeatedly later said Banks claimed he had only 8,000 men for the battle. Banks later used a much lower figure of 6,500 men present in a Charlestown speech. He listed this 6,500-man figure also in his 1862 notes, arrived at by subtracting approximately 2,000 additional men who were "detached" to unspecified locations.6 Yet another note in his records breaks these 2,000 extra men down as follows: (a) 250 as train guards, (b) 720 in six artillery batteries not in action, (c) 1,011 men in 28th Pennsylvania Regiment.7 His nonsensical calculations omit some important detachments and seem to exaggerate the number of artillerymen who were in support roles. Yet his mention of 6,500 men present—if restricted to artillery and infantry—could be a correct one. After the controversy had run its course,
Adjutant Pelouze wrote Banks in February 1863 to suggest there may have
been an additional 1,000 men detached as supply train guards at Culpeper
and a large number of sick at the
2. Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, Prepared in Compliance with the Acts of the Legislature, vol. I, p. 486. 3. OR, I, 12, pt II: 145. 4. Hewett, Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, pt. II, vol. 59, pp. 285-9. 5. Entries of May-Aug. 1862, David Mouat Reminiscences, "Three Years in the 29th Pennsylvania Volunteers," Coll. # 1808, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 6. Banks to "Colonel," Aug. 15, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 23. 7. Calculation sheet, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 79. |
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page 1483 old camp at Washington.8 The July 31 report should have reflected the absence of these sick men unless there was a subsequent massive disease outbreak in early August. And there is some evidence there was at least growing sickness. Thomas Antisell, the medical director, wrote Banks several days before the battle that there was a fever going around in the 60th New York and an "epidemic" in the 2nd Division.9 Likewise several days later Adjutant Henry Scott recorded eight to ten men a day dying in the 60th New York, and two other regiments were in the hospital.10 A history of the 111th Pennsylvania spoke of "large numbers" left in the hospital when that unit moved toward Cedar Mountain.11 The battle reports by Augur and Gordon and a letter by Williams pertaining to number of men present suggest that Banks's 6,500-man figure was correct when calculated from their perspective.12 Yet restricting the calculations to just the infantry divisions, the May returns suggest that the total should have been larger than 6,500. Desertions were known to be a problem in summer 1862, and these also might explain some of the differences.13 Errors can also explain the discrepancies. It is likely there will never be a
satisfactory denouement to this controversy.
8. Pelouze to Banks, Feb. 2, 1863, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 26. 9. Thomas Antisell to N. P. Banks, Aug. 4, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 22. 10. Henry Scott to Lizzie, Aug. 7, 1862, Henry Bruce Scott papers, 1861-1865, Mass. Historical Society. 11. Samuel P. Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, Prepared in Compliance with the Acts of the Legislature, vol. III, p. 1014. 12. Augur report, OR, I, 12, pt. II: 157; Gordon report, Ibid., 808; Williams, From the Cannon's Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus S. Williams, p. 101. 13. Robert G. Shaw who was General Gordon's aide twice mentioned problems with desertions in letters written in the several weeks before the Cedar Mountain battle. This was particularly a problem in the new regiments where men left soon after collecting the bounties. Shaw described one brigade where there were fewer than 200 men for duty in all but one regiment—while each regiment probably started with up to 1,000 men. (Russell Duncan, ed., Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune: The Civil War Letters of Robert Gould Shaw, pp. 217, 224.). |