Information for historians.....a listing of material in the book... titled The King of Louisiana, 1862-1865, and Other Government Work... that differs from earlier publications.   

This 2005 book by Raymond H. Banks is a biography of Major General Nathaniel Prentice Banks.

Nathaniel P. Banks was a key figure in the founding of the Republican party and was NOT  a Civil War-era Democrat or a Cotton Whig as listed in multiple publications


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BACKGROUND OF N. P. BANKS

1. Whoops!   A review of the payroll books of Boston Manufacturing Company suggests that Nathaniel’s house carpenter father probably never worked as a supervisor there, as mentioned in some biographies.  Possibly confused with father's brother who held such a position.  [see note page 7.]

2. Whoops!  A number of biographies spell his middle names as "Prentiss," a spelling never used by him or his family. [see note page 4.] 

3.  New*   He and his wife indicated in several sources that they had miserable childhoods. [pages 8 to 9] 

4.  New*   He suffered in adulthood from night terrors and chronic insomnia. [page 35]

5.  New*    Newly available journal kept by Banks from 1840s gives details on his law study and a special interest in military matters and his own service in an artillery company. (pages 25, 26, 29)

6.  New*    Comments by friends and family depict a somewhat introverted man who spent much of his leisure time reading and studying, and unskilled in small-group conversation-making.   Possessing a rare speaking timbre and booming voice, he was nearly unequaled in speaking in the public arena.  He often used theatrical gestures in greeting others. [difficulty in being companionable, page 272-73; study habits, page  271; speaking style, pages 21-22, 37, 58; gestures, pages 36-37]

EARLY POLITICAL CAREER

1. Whoops??   Although he had evolving views on what to do about slavery, he was quite consistent in his fifty-year career in advocating tight-money policies, American expansionism, reduced working hours for workers.  Are previous views of him as only an opportunist overdone? [references are dispersed...see N. P. Banks Jr. entries beginning with "views on...." in the index.]

2. New*   Documents in the Beverly Historical Society and Caleb Cushing collection provide new details on Mass. Speaker Banks's attitudes and actions  involving the 1852 Democratic convention which ejected Banks's mentor (Rantoul) and nominated Franklin Pierce. [pages 44-45]

3. New*   New details on his fascination with Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1852, the visits, the church attendance, portraits done by Banks's brother-in-law.  [pages 46-47]

 4. New*  /sort of/    Chapters 5 and 6 make use of new studies in recent decades to put in perspective both the Know-Nothing sweep in Mass. and Banks's involvement in this.

SPEAKER  OF THE U.S. HOUSE

1. New*   Details on how he manipulated the first ballots for the speaker's contest to try to build momentum.  Also info on role of some of the operatives he used.  [pages 85, 88-89]

2. New*   Additional analysis of the men who voted for Banks in their other  votes in the House.  [page 98]

3. New*??   Some comments on what may have happened physically and mentally to Senator Charles Sumner after his caning wounds healed. [page 135] 

4. New*   New details on Banks's plan to buy the tiny slave state Delaware to tip the balance in favor of Free States.  [p 141]

THE 1856  ELECTION PROCESS

1. New*   Details on how Banks was initially working for a nomination for Sam Houston, a man with similar views, until his candidacy self-destructed. [pages 101-103]

2. New*   Banks had more involvement than previously reported in engineering a nomination for John C. Frémont, even naming his son after the Pathfinder well before there was any interest in him as a candidate.  [pages 85, 103-10]

GOVERNOR  OF  MASSACHUSETTS

1. New*   Use made of  recent studies and other sources to explain why his political adversaries, the Adamses, Birds and others did not then have as much political support, sometimes very little support.  Info on the "Banks party" in Massachusetts.   [pages 146, 149]

2. Whoops!   Though the governorship was not an exciting period, the author implies that the explanations of this period written by his political opponents are not the best explanations of what happened.  Sometimes historians have used these uncritically.   The period covered in chapter 9 and pages 174-75]

3. New*   Some emphasis given to Banks's efforts to modernize the militia because he would later make use of this "foresight" in first months of war.  [pages 157-58]

4. New*   Information on Banks's role in helping Frémont obtain financing for his mining ventures in California.  [pages 161-63]

5. New*   Information on how the various 1860 presidential candidates including Banks, were telling more than one other candidate they would their backing or deemphasizing controversial positions.  [pages 170, 174, 176]    Information on how Banks was playing the reluctant statesman with supportive editors like Samuel Bowles, but engaged in hardball electioneering with political insiders. [page 173]  Chapter 10 collects more info on Banks's presidential nomination efforts than previously assembled.

6. New*    Various sources show Lincoln was interested in finding some place for Banks in Washington, including several times  putting his name back in play when his operatives left him out  [pages 196-201]  The details of the flawed approach of Banks in trying to obtain an appointment shown and the context of why some were trying to prevent his appointment.  [pages 199-203]

RAILROAD  EXECUTIVE

1. New*    Info that George McClellan failed to sell significant railroad land while vice president of  the Illinois Central, the main source of revenue in the early years. [pages 191-92]

2. New*    Evidence provided from Illinois Central records and other sources that the railroad president primarily wanted Banks to sell their land.  He gave him a nearly  impossible goal of  $5 million for 1861. [pages 192-93]  If he had stayed, the developing conditions of war and few sales would have made his job superfluous.  [pages 207, 209]

3. Whoops!  A number of sketches list Banks as president or vice president of the ICRR.  Railroad records confirm this was not so.  Banks later did not like to use the actual term "resident director" because it conflicted with his supposed continuous legal residence in Massachusetts.  [page 183 and note page 183]

4. New*    Railroad records are used to show that the railroad president was a micromanager who had Banks on a very short leash.  [pages 205-06]


AN  INSTANT MAJOR  GENERAL

1. New*    In railroad records, Banks was unusual in his letters in early 1861 in calling for total mobilization for war and expecting a lengthy war.  [page 209]

2. New*   The appointment of Banks as general facilitated by millionaire Samuel Hooper, a major figure in war loans, letting Treasury Secretary Chase know Banks wanted to resign from railroad for a Washington appointment, but the request for any services would need to be originated in Washington.  [pages 211]  Later Speaker Colfax mediated the exact appointment.  [page 212]

3. New*   About the time of his appointment, some newspapers were touting Banks's foresighted modernization of the Mass. militia as an excellent reason for his appointment in the context of almost all states being unprepared.  [pages 213, 216] 

4. New*   Banks was seriously considered as the replacement for the exiting quartermaster general—probably because of the militia record.  [page 213]

5. Whoops!   Some have suggested Banks was chosen because Lincoln needed someone to raise regiments and money in the beginning of the war.  His contribution in this regards was zero in 1861 and miniscule later on.  [pages 217-18]  The author speculates Lincoln initially wanted a proven coalition builder who could tame the factions in Maryland and prevent secession there.  [page 217]


COMMANDER  IN  MARYLAND, 1861

1. New*    The author points out Banks moved Baltimore troops relatively quickly to Dam No. 5 in western Md., in contrast to Patterson's glacial movements.  May have been factor in his replacing Patterson at front. [pages 238-39]

2. New*    The correct evaluation of Harpers Ferry as an indefensible site, more realistic Confederate troop strengths and the occupation of supposedly uninhabitable Maryland Heights, probably got Banks off to good start in Washington.  [pages 246-47]

3. New*    In order to pin down when Lincoln held his poorly documented  Rockville, Maryland meeting that led to arrests, the author has assembled a collection of indirect references.  [page 251]

4. New ??    The author is critical of the way McClellan moved the troops of Banks and Stone just after the Ball's Bluff defeat, followed by less than accurate reports of what he ordered. [pages 260-62]

5. New *    At the end of the year 1861, Banks was still advocating total mobilization for war.  [page 262]

6. Whoops!     The various senior subordinates seemed more satisfied with Banks's military leadership than indicated in the postwar writings of the much-quoted General George H. Gordon, a fan of General Robert Patterson. [pages 273, 275-76]

7.  New *    There is a letter in the Banks collection in which General Stone in 1885 explained his conversations with Nicolay regarding a missing Lincoln letter pertaining to Stone's arrest.  [note, page 258]

8. New *    An 1886 letter from Charles Collis indicates Banks became angry at a meeting with McClellan for not quickly retaliating against those Confederates who caused the Ball's Bluff defeat.[page 261]


PURSUING STONEWALL UP THE VALLEY, 1862

1. New*    The author provides documentation that some of Banks's staff had important roles in the Kernstown battle. [pages 293-94, 296]

2. New*    The author provides some new sources to document supply crises in march up the valley, April 1862 [pages 303, 306, 309, 311, 315, 324]

3. New*    The author explains what was in the written [and generally ignored] recommendations of Banks's senior officers for dealing with Jackson's force, especially that of Genl. James Shields who wanted to eliminate cavalry [an ignored recommendation], and General Williams who was especially cautious. [pages 307, 310, 319]  Private letters also depict Shields as somewhat of a "loose cannon." [page 333]

4. New*    Goodwin family papers, Mass. Historical Society, contain a good , seemingly unused account of the Federal flank movement on Mount Jackson  [note, page 313]

5. New*  A newly available document from a private collection indicates Banks was calculating what agricultural resources were available on a route from the upper Shenandoah Valley to Tennessee.  Was he planning something with Frémont?  [note, page 318]

6. New*    The author uses multiple sources to show the wounded Genl. Shields was unable to ride a horse during this period though he was claiming he was now able to command any offensive assigned to him.  [pages 319-20]

7. Whoops!     Some histories have depicted Banks as deciding what to do about Jackson in late April.  The records make it quite clear his superiors in Washington were making such decisions and did not want much more than "cautious vigor" and there was oral feedback from at least one emissary to Washington.  [pages 320, 325]

8. New*    The author suggests it was the feedback from Genl. McDowell at Fredericksburg that influenced Lincoln most to order Banks's army to return north. [pages 324-25]

9. Ignored ??   Though Banks often portrayed as overly cautious, his plan (in Official Records) rejected by Washington in late April was to cross the Massanutten gap and Blue Ridge Mtns. and get into the rear of Ewell and Jackson. [page 326]

10. New*   The author presents the first of a series of observations by subordinates [and by Banks himself] that the general  had no confidence in himself. [pages 329, 395]

11. New*   The author puts some emphasis on sources indicating Stanton's not wanting  to combine valley  forces because he did not want the more senior Frémont in charge. [pages 329-30, 376]


RETREAT TO POTOMAC AND WINCHESTER  BATTLE, May, 1862

1. New*   The author provides some new sources further confirming that Banks was protesting through multiple channels that his army was too dispersed in May [pages 331, 335-36, 341, 345]

2. New*   The author is particularly critical of the Union command [and later Stonewall Jackson] for not using Massanutten Mtn. to keep track of the approaching forces. [pages 339, 341-44, 386]

3. New*   The author provides new sources that make more sense of the information coming from the Front Royal disaster and calls into question much of Genl. Gordon's memory of events leading up to the start of the retreat to Winchester from Strasburg and of the march itself. [pages 350-55, 358]

4. New*   Maj. Wilder Dwight's account of the rear guard holding action south of Winchester suggests Gordon left earlier than he portrayed. [page 360]

5. New*   The author provides the first-ever attempt to figure out how many wagons were lost on the road to Winchester, including some new sources.  There are many exaggerated accounts, possibly because of the presence of civilian wagons. [pages 1474-80.   Includes discussion of probable misinterpretation of a Genl. Banks note.]

6. Whoops ??   Multiple authors have given great prominence to Jackson's choosing a high place as the first step in his battle for Winchester.  The author suggests that the artillery in that position was neutralized.  [pages 364, 366]

7. New*   Multiple new primary sources cited suggest Gordon's account of Banks's activities in Winchester the night before the battle was badly flawed though he was probably correct that there was no plan on how to deal with an early attack.  [pages 363-65]

8. New*   Wilder Dwight's letters suggest it was [later general] George L. Andrews, not Gordon, who identified problems in the Union line and provided recommendations which Gordon adopted.  [page 366]

9. New*   The author suggests Banks was very passive during the Winchester battle, delegating everything to General Williams and that some opportunities were lost.  [pages 368-371]  He showed more initiative in the rear guard action north of Winchester.  [page 371]

10. New ??  The author provides possibly the most detailed compilation ever of reactions by Northern newspapers and political leaders to the Winchester battle and the retreat.  [pages 376-79]

11. New*   The author suggests that Lincoln probably criticized Banks privately for failure to have spies and scouts out who would have spotted Jackson's advance in the Luray Valley.  [page 377-78]  Banks's officers seemed to blame Stanton for their problems.  [page 378]


MOVING BACK INTO SHENANDOAH, THEN  EAST OF BLUE RIDGE 

1. New *  The author suggests it was strategically most important for Banks to be inactive and to keep Stonewall occupied up near the Potomac as long as possible to allow the other armies to get into his rear.  [page 384]

2. New *   The author makes use of material relating to Banks's adjutant (R. Morris Copeland) in which he sent forward to a newspaper a coded message of his own devising that someone decoded for Lincoln and Stanton.  It was highly critical of affairs and led to quick dismissal of Copeland.  This probably had some influence on subsequent conflict between Stanton and Pope's army over leaks to newspapers. [page 405]

3. New *   The author describes  intelligence activities of John S. S. Clark, Banks's intelligence aide, an overlooked officer who was one of the best on the war in this field.  [pages 410-11, 482-83, 491-93]

4. New *   Pope issued a famous order saying that in the west we have always seen the backs of our enemies.  This was same day he wrote an uncomplimentary letter to Banks about recent events.  The author asks whether Banks may have felt Pope issued the order specifically in reaction to Banks's news, [and this would have been an influence on him in actions later at Cedar Mountain.]  [page 401]

5. New *   Letters from Pope's aides indicate there were perceptions at Pope's headquarters that Jackson's July-August movements represented a retreat.  [page 414]

6. New *   Sigel papers indicate some special credence given to report from Mr. Hood from Madison Co., apparently thinking his employer, former local militia general Robert Adam Banks, was the same as Genl. N. P. Banks. [notes, page 415]


BATTLE AT CEDAR MTN., Aug. 1862 

1. New *    Genl. Sigel's papers indicate there were more messages than suspected sent to him in his travels toward Culpeper.   These seem to exonerate him from charges he did not know how to use the single road coming to Culpeper.  The apparent first message said only to go to Hazel River, a river that curves and was bisected by multiple roads from Sigel's camp.  Multiple aides of Pope then gave conflicting orders.  [pages 419-20]

 2. New *     Accounts from additional witnesses who verify the Pope/Marshall order to move to the front and attack.  Included is one from a Pope aide.  [page 426]

 3. New *    Col. Clark's diary entry indicates Genl. Pope told Banks he would come to Cedar Mountain by early or midafternoon and that McDowell's corps would follow Banks's to the front.  (Neither did.)  [page 428]

4. New *   The author points out apparently unreported discrepancies in accounts by General Roberts of his role in the decision-making. [pages 433-39, 474, 481]

5. New *   The author does not think the Confederate artillery was very effective for reasons stated in the text.  [pages 444-45]

6. New *   The author suggests that Colonel Joseph Knipe played a major role in Union decision-making.  [pages 441-42]

7. New *   New witnesses to the controversial delay by Genl. Gordon in moving his brigade to the battle are presented.  [pages 460-62]
  
8. New *   New witnesses to the activities of General Pope during the afternoon of the battle and what was known in Culpeper are presented. [pages 463-65]

9. New *   Additional conflicting information in statements of General Pope about the afternoon are presented. [pages 466-67]

10. New *   Claims by Banks that Pope's chief of staff was intimately involved in battlefield decision-making. and problems with Banks's later claims discussed. [page 467-70]

11. Whoops!   Contrary to statements of multiple recent historians, the author cites an array of newspaper editorials and reports that then unanimously described Cedar Mountain as a victory for the North and also usually contained exaggerated, adulatory comments about Banks's performance. [pages 474-476]  Lincoln, too, seemed to have had a positive view of Banks's performance in the context of the overall military situation based on the assembled evidence.  [page 476]

12. New *   The author provides new details about  the night attack by Stonewall Jackson,  which the author describes as perhaps the most dangerous situation in which Jackson ever put his men, who did what, and new details about Banks's serious injury.   [pages 469-71]

13. New *   The views of Banks's subordinates in the days just after the battle [new manuscript comments] and their later narratives seem to have undergone changes.  [pages 472, 477-78]

14. New *  The author provides some explanations for the "missing soldiers" in Banks's corps.  The discrepancy between the July returns and those present for the battle was a subject of controversy.  An unmentioned, detached regiment in Maryland, improperly assigned cavalry units and a disease outbreak account for most of the discrepancy. [pages 1481-83]


2nd BULL RUN, DEFENSES  OF WASHINGTON, TRIP TO NEW ORLEANS

1. New *   New details about Colonel Clark's spotting of Stonewall heading for the rear of Bull Run.  [page 489]

2. Whoops!    The author provides reasons why the connection of Banks with cotton mill representatives/Texas Unionists at this time probably considerably overemphasized in some earlier histories.  These men had much stronger connections with other figures in Washington and the South.  Banks was not a friend of the cotton mill owners before the war.   [pages 497-98.  This subject covered additionally in later period, and the cotton czars were just becoming interested in Banks.]

3. New *   Author suggests there were additional reasons for replacing Butler in New Orleans that may have influenced Lincoln and cabinet:  (1) Correspondence from Lincoln's friend Jackson Grimshaw and (2) concern about whether the French fleet was headed for New Orleans.   The dual role of Col. Jonas French both  in corruption and harassing the consuls may have significance.  [pages 503, 505-08, 511]

4. New  ??  Butler had strong clues that Banks would replace him. [pages 509, 538]

5. New *   There is some suggestive information in the fall that Secretary Seward's operative Thurlow Weed had been working to have their critic Senator Charles Sumner replaced by Banks during the upcoming Massachusetts legislative voting  for Sumner's third Senate term. [page 500]

6. New *   Captain Richard Irwin seems to have done much of the organizing and choosing of officers for Banks's new department in New Orleans.  Banks did not seem to have a good grasp of what needed to be done, and Washington did not sent key officers in a timely manner—especially for handling ordnance.  [pages 518-20, 522, 532-33]

 7. New *   The Stanton-Seward disaffection demonstrated in the refusal of Stanton to let Col. John Clark go on Banks's staff as intelligence aide though he recently called him "the best scout in the army."  Clark was a hometown friend of the Seward family.  Banks had to go to Lincoln to secure the appointment.  [page 520]

 8. New *   New information on the gifts and services provided to Banks and his wife by the shipping moguls Vanderbilt and Roberts who were heavily involved in the December 1862 expedition to Louisiana. [pages 530-31]  The author provides more details on the overcrowding on these ships and some other problems not mentioned in previous works. [pages 525-27, 534-35]  They were only able to find boats for seventy percent of Banks's men. [page 532]  The expedition did finally get underway much faster than the earlier Butler and Burnside sailings despite questionable activities of the transport chieftains.  [page 522]


ASSUMPTION COMMAND, N. ORLEANS, REORGANIZATION

1.Whoops!   Some authors have portrayed the soldiers heading for New Orleans in late 1862 as expecting to begin growing cotton in Texas.  The author has found virtually no mention of this in the records of the many regiments sent there, and this subject therefore not covered in the same way in this book.

 2. New *   Both Butler and Banks avoided criticizing each other publicly and privately after the transfer of command.  The author suggests Butler did not want his financial dealings exposed by Banks, and Banks did not want Butler—then very popular among the public for tough stands against England and Southerners—to criticize his new policies in Louisiana. [page 541, 551.  New documentation of Butler's misconduct later in book.]

3.Whoops!   Some have suggested Lincoln gave Butler undeserved command assignments because he did not want to offend the War Democrats.  The author mentions that the 1863 House resolution supporting Butler was overwhelmingly supported by Republicans, overwhelmingly rejected by Democrats. [pages 544-46]

4.Whoops!   The largest bribe offered to Banks on assuming power came from Charles A. Weed.  The author corrects info as to his background that has appeared in one publication, shows his relationship to powerful editor Thurlow Weed, and provides new info as to his offering similar bribe to the Illinois governor Richard Yates for efforts to get Butler back in New Orleans.  Mention made also of relation of Genl. McClernand and Yates to cotton operations.  Author also notes varying handwriting in Weed letters. [pages 549-51]

5.Whoops!   Some of the historians of the 1960s and 1970s presented an inaccurate, oversimplistic picture of Banks's forced labor policies.  The trend in recent years is reversing.   The first months of Banks's reign in Louisiana had a bed press in the North because—due to distance—he promulgated the earlier version of the Emancipation Proclamation  which lacked the major changes with regard to Louisiana, and some correspondents mischaracterized the peonage system Banks mandated as exactly the same as the old slavery system.  However it was implemented, there seems ample evidence Banks intended to stop whippings and separation of families, etc. though Lincoln had continued legal slavery in occupied Louisiana.  Banks's peonage system was especially intended as a replacement for the unfunded refugee camps where death from disease was rampant.  Most of the other Southern departments adopted the Banks labor system.[pages 562-69, 772-780]

 6. New *   The author is perhaps the first to comment on the odd configuration of the Louisiana parishes exempted under the Emancipation Proclamation and a possible connection in Lincoln's wording to the seating the Louisiana congressmen elected in 1862.   Some exempted areas included were under Confederate control.  Some nonexempted areas were under Union control and voted in elections.  Because news of the reoccupation of Baton Rouge had not reached Washington, Lincoln probably omitted that area from the EP. [page 563]

7. Whoops!   The author suggests many authors have not understood the severe problems with artillery and cavalry that prevented Banks from moving quickly on Port Hudson.  A month after his arrival, infantry had to perform reconnaissances due to lack of horses.  The only cavalry unit was over a month late getting to Louisiana, and most horses died.  The RI cavalry regiment was an ineffective group, composed mostly of New York City city slickers.  Secretary Stanton withheld a new cavalry regiment Banks had personally helped provision.  Artillery units lacked key equipment.  [pages 511, 575, 600]

8 .New *   The author is most critical of Banks in this period for taking a month to have his staff determine what equipment and resources were lacking in each department. [page 576]
 

ATTEMPTS TO  BYPASS PORT HUDSON, THEN A FEINT TO AID NAVY

1.  New *   The author presents probably the most detailed descriptions yet of the activities to bypass Port Hudson on its western bank.  [page 595]

2.  New *    Some historians have criticized Banks for not quickly moving against Port Hudson.  The author lists (a)  intelligence reports which all suggested too large a  force there in defensive works, as well as  (b) the most complete listing yet of the views of the senior generals that affected Banks's decision.  The comments of General Dwight are especially illuminating.  Banks rejected  in the early year some generals' advice for assaulting what was thought to be a similar-sized or larger force inside strong defenses.  [pages 584, 592-93]  The author also compares the quite different resources available to Genl. Sherman (who was descending the Mississippi) with those available to Banks ascending the river. [pages 579-80, 613-14] 

3.  New *   The author provides new descriptions of desertions and quite a few threatened officer resignations  (including a senior general) in response to the arrival of African American soldiers and officers in the midst of volunteer regiments.  Many of these incidents not mentioned in recent publications.  The author indicates this was a very serious situation and might explain why Banks moved to brigade the black regiments separately and to encourage black officers to resign as a solution to this.    [pages 598-99]

4.  New *   New details presented about the background and activities of Dr. Zacharie, the podiatrist-intelligence operative sent by President Lincoln.  [pages 586-89, more on him in a later section]

5.  New *   General Dwight privately accused General Halleck's 1863 annual report with deliberately distorting the size of Confederate forces at Port Hudson in early 1863.  Dwight had recently briefed him on quite different info found  in captured documents in that town. [notes on page 611]


TECHE EXPEDITION, ATTEMPTS TO UNITE WITH & CONTACT GRANT

1.  New *   General Dwight in his letters blamed General Cuvier Grover for being overly timid in his actions while in charge of the Irish Bend forces, and he provided specifics. [pages 626, 628]

2. Whoops!  At least one author accused Banks and army of dawdling at Fort Bisland instead of quickly pursuing Taylor's retreating forces.  The author assembles accounts that show the opposite.  The troops left at daylight and did not get to eat, and the problems rebuilding bridges and rear-action engagements seem to explain delays. [notes on page 629]

3.  New *   The author assembles  communications from Grant's associates and the navy and suggests that Grant made the decision to go to Vicksburg instead of Port Hudson about a week before May 3.  [page 662]  In his memoirs, Grant suggested no decision was made on this until he took a bath on a boat on May 3.   Although communication channels were open, the author suggests also that Grant deliberately delayed telling Banks of his decision to go inland.     The author has tried to make better sense of the decision-making by Banks by determining what messages were received when.  Both Banks and Grant had multiple revisions of campaign plans during the April-May period, but writers have only accused Banks of indecision. [much of chapter 34 devoted to the confused messages and context... a chart showing messages and reactions on page 652]

4.  New *   The author suggests the records seem to indicate that Banks did not have access to enough boats to allow him—via the Atchafalaya—to supply his men at Vicksburg or north of Port Hudson.  It was not until May that additional boats arrived in New Orleans from the North. [page 666]  This info is in the Official Records, but others seem to have overlooked it.  Also, little attention has been given to the threats by the navy to leave the middle Mississippi because of lack of army action against the river fortresses.  [pages 652, 668, 670-71]   Farragut, in particular, had foregone his Mobile and  blockade interests.  Both of these problems and the timing of events would have significantly influenced decision-making.

5.  New *   General William Dwight, Banks's emissary to General Grant, in his contemporary letters left a different account of his meeting(s) than listed in the later memoirs of General Grant.  [pages 675-76] 

6.  New *   The author assembles info on various situations that would have impacted Banks's decisions in May as to whether to operate north of Port Hudson. [page 670]  He also raises a question whether  General Dwight made commitments to Grant for aid which he did not have authority to promise.  [p 677]


SIEGE  OF  PORT HUDSON

1.  New *   The author has collected perhaps the most complete yet listing of opinions of the Union generals prior to the first assault.  [page 690-92]  Likewise, a collection of views preceding the second assault are provided.  [pages 728-29]

2.  New *   Apparent first-ever description of a serious feud between Banks and General. T. W. Sherman over the department's telegraph operated by Banks's brother-in-law.  [page 694]

3.  New *   The author perhaps for the first time provides the account of Genl. Thomas W. Sherman of his activities during the day his men did not join in the assault and a description of his meeting with Banks.  [pages 705-06]

 4.  New *   The author raises question of whether General Dwight's observations at Vicksburg influenced multiple decisions.  [page 697]

5.  New *   The author traces the strange relationship of William Slaughter, owner of the field at Port Hudson, to Parson Philip Slaughter, owner of the field at Cedar Mountain.  [page 710]

6.  New *   Genl. Dwight's letters explain why no African American troops were used in second assault.  He was their only sponsor and did not want his career tied to commanding them.  [page 717]

7.  New *   As is known, Banks and Grant were not particularly forthcoming to Washington about events during their sieges.  The author also presents—perhaps for the first time—obvious duplicity on the part of Genl. Halleck with Grant as to the orders given to Banks, as well as Genl. Grant's inconsistency in telling Halleck after the surrender he was sending Banks troops while making no mention in his letter at the same time to Banks that any troops would be available.  [pages 722, 735.  These letters are in the Official Records. ]

8.  New *   The author suggests that the boat, the General Price,  could have arrived several days earlier at Port Hudson with news of the surrender of Vicksburg.  [page 746]  This delay had some consequences.

9.  New *   General Dwight provides details of the surrender discussions with the Confederate commissioners.  [page 747]

10.  New *   A postwar letter by General Stone provides details on plans General Gardner said he had for breaking out and more details of surrender events.  [page 749]

11.  New *   The author provides details of the causes of the mental strain under which Banks was suffering and the unusual, month-long silence by Washington after the surrender .  Colonel Clark also wrote Banks details of  Secretary Stanton's anger that Seward was trying to have Banks replace him.  [pages 753-54]


CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE DEPT. OF THE GULF

1.  New *   Secretary of  State William Seward issued Banks an extraordinary $5 million line of credit in 1863.  The author suggests the best explanation was that this was intended for direct purchase of cotton, which was never implemented.  [pages 760-61]

2.  Whoops!   The author departs sharply from most of the previous accounts of the efforts to convene a constitutional convention in Louisiana in 1863.  By providing examples of the conflicting, sometimes deceitful,  views expressed by the major participants, he tries to explain the complexity of the situation.  The proslavery men had walked out of the Union associations.  Splits among the Unionist elements were spoken of by various parties, with Hahn promoting Lincoln, Flanders promoting Chase.   Supposed radicals like Rep. Flanders and others wrote pro-civil rights letters to Secretary Chase, but privately pursued other courses.  Durant, the leading voice for black civil rights, the year earlier had been a slave owner promoting different agenda and was not consistent in his views after the conversion.   The author also shows that it was well understood that Democratic (military) Governor George Shepley had the assignment of registering voters and calling elections.  He was obviously in no hurry to find his replacement.  Some have blamed Banks for not hurrying these elections, but it is clear this was not assigned to him.  [Info in paragraph two here from most of chapter 40 and pages 806, 810-11, 818-19]

3.  New *   Secretary Stanton singled out Louisiana as the state in which he invested certain overlapping powers in the military governor and military commander, and Stanton refused to put in writing that Banks had overall control.   The author speculates that this may or may not have something to do with Stanton's concern that Seward was trying to put Banks in his place.  Seward was a friend of the provost marshal, Bowen, whose powers Stanton also reduced in favor of Shepley. [pages 801-02.  Lincoln eventually assumed responsibility for causing this overlapping of authorities and corrected it, but it is not logical that he originated the orders which went out under Stanton's signature.]

4.  New *   Deductions from Banks's military "secret fund" clearly show that money was paid to newspapers and political operatives to assist the election of Governor Michael Hahn and his moderate slate in 1864 Louisiana elections.  [pages 816-17]   Banks also paid the hotel bill for General Grant's party during that general's short visit to New Orleans from the secret fund.  The bill amounted to almost 200 times the typical cost of one person staying one night.  [page 870]  The author perhaps for the first time provides the complete comments Genl. Washburn sent his brother, the political patron of Grant, after Grant's alleged drunken episode in New Orleans.   Washburn suggested there were severe problems with Grant that would rule him out as a political candidate.  The author also provides some insights into Banks's comments on the episode.  [pages 868-70]

5.  New *    Details of the activities of Mary Banks (wife of the general) in 1863 in a campaign to court important persons of influence in 1863 [pages 822-26]

6.  New *   Evidence provided that military funds were used to pay expenses at the inauguration of Gov. Hahn in 1864 and also for an elaborate Washington's Birthday event—though Banks also spent his monthly salary on the W.B. ball.  The probable reasons for these events explained. [page 821, 827-29] 

7.  Whoops!   The author again departs sharply from previous accounts about Banks's alleged intent to become president in 1864.  Authors have almost routinely mentioned this as his motivation for many decisions on the Red River expedition.  The author provides evidence the general had told multiple persons that he was supporting Lincoln's reelection.   Banks had assembled  professional politicos and editors early on to engineer candidacies in 1856 and 1860, but in 1863-64 such an assemblage was lacking.  In his home state of Massachusetts, his political enemies held the important Republican officers.  Many of Banks's expected key supporters had announced for Lincoln by December, and he seems to ended correspondence with several men who wanted to support him.  Cotton speculators accounted for most of those publicly advocating Banks as the nominee. Nevertheless, there is little doubt Banks would have accepted any nomination that might come his way in case of a convention deadlock.  [pages 829-38] 

8.  New *   In a departure from previous publications, the author suggests Banks's administration of New Orleans—based on the backgrounds of the appointments and other evidence— has all the earmarks of a coalition of the type in which Banks was a leader in Massachusetts.  This, Banks's secrecy and the patronage turf wars make interpretation of events difficult.  [pages 1288, 1290-93]


THE TEXAS  EXPEDITIONS  OF  FALL, WINTER, 1863

1.  New *   It is not clear that anyone has previously pointed out the serious problems in the Department of the Gulf caused by the failure to send boats to Banks in New Orleans in 1863 and the seizures of Banks's supplies upriver by Generals Grant and Hurlbut.  [page 847-48, 874] 

2.  New *   The author provides the text of an apparently never used document from the Natl. Archives in which Banks explained to Genl. Franklin that he was expected to pretend to move toward Texas while Banks attempted a second invasion of the Texas coast.  [pages 887-89]

3.  New *   New details of the very messy landing at Brazos Santiago, Texas in November 1863 made possible by additional boats.  [pages 902-03] 

4.  Whoops!      Explanation from various documents of how Banks was deceiving his generals in Texas as to an intention to carry on 1864 operations from the Texas coast.  The purpose was to maximize the Confederate forces left in Texas during the Louisiana campaign.  [page 907, notes to page 907]  Some have suggested Banks was serious about the Texas plans, he was diverted by political interests.


THE RED  RIVER  EXPEDITION, 1864

1.  New *   The author uses 1863-64 manuscript information to demonstrate that Generals Grant and Sherman apparently forgot their roles in planning a Red River campaign in their later writings.  [pages 921-22, 928-30, 950, notes for page 950]   Grant in the period during which he was about to assume the role of general-in-chief  was not as hostile to the project as he may have later suggested.  [page 950] The war department was already deferring to his decisions in the weeks before he officially took office.  Grant would repeat misperceptions about western Louisiana/Arkansas in 1865 orders. [page 1138]    Grant's wife's brother-in-law had a special, unique permit to gather cotton in the same enemy-held area.  [pages 921, 927...more on this later]

2.  New *    Again using 1863-64 documents, it is clear that Admiral Porter was withholding needed light-draft gunboats from Banks's department despite orders to the contrary and was duplicitous in his letters to those asking about the boats.  [pages 922-27]   Original documents also show that Genl. Halleck was not honest in communicating  those views of other generals concerning  use of  Shreveport as a permanent supply base which differed from his own.    [pages 931-32]  Halleck was also probably irresponsible in not providing General Grant a copy of the important Houston report which correctly outlined all the problems involved with use of the Red River.  Halleck himself had changed his mind about the Red River after reading it and started describing what had been his project as Banks's project. [pages 933-37, 950] 

3.  New *   Admiral Porter's memory of events leading up to the Red River expedition is considerably at variance with the records.  [pages 953-54]  Banks also later mischaracterized his attitude toward plans. [page 949]   Confederate General Richard Taylor's memory of his intelligence about the Federals not validated by the records. [pages 955-58]    Sherman misrepresented to Banks his prior lack of interest in the Red River project. [page 944]

4.  Whoops!      Some historians have repeated Admiral Porter's flawed explanations of what delayed the navy at Alexandria and have misidentified when Banks's forces moved upriver.  [pages 983-90, notes to pages 989-90]   One concluded Banks was motivated to move by a letter from Grant promising him command of the Mobile campaign, a promise that was not given. [notes to page 989]   Most of those commenting on the failure of the river to rise at the time, including the principal actors, have blamed a lack of snow in the mountains.  George McClellan in a printed report had already shown that mountain snow had nothing to do with the water level.  [page 981]

5.  New *   There has been much confusion about the choice of roads available from the base at Grand Ecore and the choosing on the one through the pine forest.  The author tries to make better sense of the options using contemporary maps.  [pages 1000-06] 

6.  Whoops!      Some historians have talked of  Banks needing to secure the Sabine Crossroads site at Mansfield to assure access to a road leading to the Red River.  The author uses contemporary maps to show these were dead-ends, and the Union maps were not much different in showing a lack of direct access.   It would have been debatable even then whether the river fleet could have directly resupplied the infantry anywhere in that area. [pages 1016-17]

7.  New *   The author tries to make sense of why the Federal column passing through Pleasant Hill was strung out despite Banks's orders to keep it compact—water locations being a major factor. [pages 1020-23]   A commentary in Dwight letters also suggests Banks, not Franklin, bears primary responsibility for not altering the march schedule to resolve the problem of too much distance among the units.  [page 1023]  Two previously unpublished  (and incorrectly dated) notes by chief of staff Charles P. Stone explain how the Federals were evaluating what was ahead of them at the battle site and probably explain a request for the cavalry to charge down the road.  [pages 1032-33]  New documents also indicate Genl. Franklin had orders to bring the remainder of the 13th Corps to the front before the Mansfield battle much earlier than reports would indicate but did not do so. [pages 1028-30]  Franklin's opposition to loaning his infantry in support of cavalry was partly due to the cavalry wanting infantry to do cavalry tasks on the earlier march.  [page 1019]  There was also an intent to move part of the force through Mansfield by nightfall.  [notes to pages 1031]

8.  New *   By odd circumstances, the most important outcome for history of the battle at Pleasant Hill may have been the unexpected survival of bachelor Texas cavalryman Sam Ealy Johnson, later grandfather of Lyndon Baines Johnson.  [notes to page 1051]

9.  New *   The author provides for the first time from letters and diaries the advice given to Banks at Pleasant Hill by senior officers as to whether he should resume the march.  [pages 1051-52]

10.  New *   Though none of the principal decision-makers on the Red River expedition left objective accounts (Admiral Porter in particular)  the author is able to assemble enough anecdotes to suggest that Banks's leadership had collapsed at Pleasant Hill with almost every decision delegated to someone else at a time when a strong leader was needed. [pages 1057-58]

11.  New *    The author suggests that some of the exaggerated navy accounts of the Red River expedition have their origin in (a) Banks's lack of communication after a letter arrived from Grant saying he was to keep a profound secrecy about the newly ordered move to Mobile, and (b) the navy's need to blame the army for something in light of the loss of a monster gunboat—a major black mark in navy circles. [pages 1073-74, 1087-88]

12.  New *   The author assembles multiple contemporary sources to make some sense of the recall of Genl. Stone during the Red River campaign and explain some of Stone's problems in Louisiana.  Also, new information is provided trying to explain why Banks chose William Dwight as Stone's replacement as chief of staff in light of the hostility of Genl. A. J. Smith.  [pages 1068-1072]

13.  New *   The navy and General A. J. Smith's group made charges on return to Alexandria that Banks was about to desert the fleet.  The author provides orders and other documents that show he probably was assembling additional resources there rather than making ready to leave.  [pages 1064, 1066, 1088, notes to page 1088]  The evidence is not overwhelming in one direction or the other.

14.  New *   Histrionics reached new highs when the military units returned to Alexandria.  Banks was trying to convince friendly contacts that he was planning to return upriver though he really had orders to go to Mobile.  Admiral Porter sent his brother-in-law to spread bizarre accounts up North though he privately admitted after the war that he had no worry about the fleet.  He just did not want to spend an extended period on Red River drinking urine-tainted water, he later said.  Porter's accounts of his cooperation in dam building also seem to be particularly faulty.   [pages 1092-93, 1104-06]  The editor of a St. Louis newspaper who had a stake in a cotton scheme was also responsible for irresponsible reports, and Banks's allies could be overly complimentary in their news reports. [pages 1098-99]  Genl. A. J Smith would later in the year make the same decisions regarding which he had supposedly suggested a mutiny against Banks.  [pages 1052-53, 1131-32]


LOUISIANA  CORRUPTION  ISSUES — SMITH-BRADY  COMMISSION

1.  New *   The first auditor sent to New Orleans turned out to be the one who defrauded the railroad at which multiple important generals worked in the 1850s, and he also ran off with army funds in 1840s.  When this background learned, his report indicating there was missing confiscated property could not be used, but this did not prevent Col. Stokes )the auditor) from later advancing to brevet general.   New Orleans Quartermaster Holabird, later quartermaster general, provided Stokes's reports from the early war for the Official Records, but there was nothing from Holabird's New Orleans assignment that made it into print. [pages 1193-95]

2.  New *   General Franklin in letters to commission chair, General W. F. Smith, made it clear that his only goal was to provide evidence to indict Genl Banks—though the information he provided was badly flawed.   [page 1197].  Quartermaster Holabird later related a conversation with Smith's chief assistant in which he indicated the commission was only interested in taking down volunteer officers. [page 1202]  The commission (usually only Smith present) indeed was very selective in what it investigated and what it reported, with volunteer officers coming out the overall losers. [pages 1489-92]   President Johnson and Secretary Stanton refused to release the report to Congress.  Chicago editor Joseph Medill obtained a copy and printed a portion of it critical of General Hurlbut to influence an election in 1872.  [page 1200]  The fact that Medill had a secret copy might have influenced Banks's subsequent actions though the full report did not seemingly circulate.   

3.  New *   Lincoln allowed Stanton to appoint a Democratic general (Smith)and a skilled Democratic lawyer  (Brady) to investigate everything in Louisiana.  They turned over the evaluation of the Louisiana civil government to an ultraradical who had lost a recent election bid.  His very biased evaluation of the state government was incorporated in the final report [page 1202]  The commission spent effort in trying to prove General Banks and wife's connections to prostitutes and baudy events but abandoned the effort.   The presence there of the mentioned Miss Wellington with definite connections to the Banks family and cotton speculators, however, does raises questions [page 1203] 

4.  New *   Multiple men who worked with Banks or with the quartermasters were shown to have received large gifts or had taken abandoned property.  [pages 1204-07]  Genl. Smith in his report ignored the fact that the courts had cleared several of wrongdoing.   Banks and his quartermaster purchased several Mexican ships that actually belonged to Confederate suppliers who did not need them while the Federals were on the Rio Grande.  These were subject to confiscation.  Who knew what about these boats at what point is left unanswered.   Large debts the U.S. consul in Mexico owed to middle man Jeremiah Galvin may have been a factor in the purchase process.  This may be the Jeremiah Galvin whom Banks helped find government work after the war. [pages 2111-12]   The commission investigation revealed Banks sent an emissary to General Juarez seeking Mexican recruits for the U. S. Army.  [page 1211] 

5.  New *   The Smith-Brady records and provost marshal records show Dr. Zacharie and assistant had arranged an influence-buying scheme for an established Confederate supplier.   Banks released the supplier from arrest, citing the requests of his friends. [pages 1208-09.  Zacharie's fraudulent postwar claims analyzed also.]  The commission went easy on West Point-educated Quartermaster Holabird whom others described as living well beyond his means.  However, Holabird did have to explain vaguely why German buyers were allowed to buy cotton directly from the army and the basis of his direct sales.   There is some question whether the purchaser was involved in the famed Erlanger loan for the Confederacy.  The commission called these direct sales illegal, ignoring (a) that this was standard procedure at times  in other departments and (b) the varying treasury regulations concerning these were issued over three years and were not promulgated in Louisiana until late.   [pages 1213-16]

6.  New *   Banks did issue extraordinary permits to Asa S. Mansfield, his ex-liquor commissioner, and another man in spring 1864, but these were for a locale lost to the Confederates by the movement of the Red River expedition.  Of concern, though, is that Mansfield had a fortune in sterling at his disposal, which he had been doling out to probable cotton sellers who had not yet claimed their money.  One Smith-Brady commission witness, of unknown reliability, claimed a prostitute obtained the special permits from a drunken Genl. Banks.  [pages 1217-18, 1220-22, 1226-27]  Banks or associates had also twice gotten one of the permit holders out of jail.  [page 1218]  Mansfield's sterling was provided principally by Rep. Oakes Ames, later to be the central figure in the Credit Mobilier scandal, but comments seem to indicate Banks did not know much of this relationship. [page 1225-26.  Mansfield's attorney partially explained this relationship in a postwar publication.]    Banks's private secretary became Mansfield's assistant later in the war, and he worked with him in steamboating after the war.[pages 1226, 1228]  

7.  New *   Banks ignored Charles Weed's earlier attempted bribe to allow Weed's partner extraordinary privileges on the Red River expedition.  Weed owned a list of where all the Confederate cotton was stored.  [pages 1223, 1232-34]   Weed openly admitted he also paid General Hurlbut $10,000 for securing his cotton permits.  [pages 1234-35]   The commission was not very interested in pursuing the activities of the navy or the former associates/relatives of Grant and Sherman. [pages 1230, 1232, 1236]

8.  New *   Almost all those delegates to the constitutional convention who switched to vote for allowing possible later black voting soon received government appointments.  [page 1240]  There was likely some truth to the charges of election fraud and wasteful spending, but most of the witnesses attacking the government before the commission did not themselves have clean records.  [pages 1241-49]   Commission associate Charles Hornor confused deficit-spending with corruption in his report. [page 1246]  Left hanging is whether Genl. Hurlbut was bribed to force the payment of interest on Confederate-era bonds which would likely have bankrupted the city of New Orleans. [pages 1248-49]

9.  New *    Apparently for the first time in print, the author provides strong evidence collected by the Smith-Brady commission that Genl. Butler, his brother and Col. French were engaged in illegal transactions.   In his private New Orleans account book, Benjamin Butler was making monthly transactions ranging between $77,000 and $103,956.   A. J. Butler similarly was making monthly transactions between $69,000 and $136,000.    Provost marshal Jonas French entered into about $35,000 a month in transactions.   None of these men were then earning more than several hundreds of dollars a month in salary, and the other parties to the transactions were not listed. [pages 1490-91]

10.  New *    The Smith-Brady commission, despite multiple charges against Quartermaster Holabird, had little to say about his lifestyle or specific accusations against him in its report. [pages 1250-51]   The commission was also complimentary of Treasury Special Agent Benjamin Flanders, a Banks opponent, despite some (poorly investigated) accusations.   Flanders's association with bribe-prone Charles Weed and partners leave many unanswered questions.  [pages 1253-54]  General Dwight commented at the time that Admiral Porter had brought a great excess of transport boats/barges to the Red River for use in cotton gathering.  [page 1255]  A seemingly first-ever published letter from loyalist  Judge Ariail offers strong evidence that Porter sent men well inland to gather cotton.  [page 1257]   Admiral Porter's records in Library of Congress indicate that during the Civil War he was in debt for about $10,000 with no property owned to offset this burden.   This would certainly have been a motivating factor in acquiring the approximate $100,000 he received under prize law for gathering cotton.   What he did with the considerable money received as an informer is not clear.  [pages 1257-58]   Although Porter obtained only a small percentage of stored cotton in 1864, he could have made himself (under the prize law) one of the richest men in the U.S. if he had concentrated on cotton gathering on the Ouachita River.  [page 1262]

11.  New *    Previous studies have not accused Banks of profiting from his stay in New Orleans, and the author's book found the same.  The payments to his servant from the secret fund, nevertheless, seem irregular.  For whatever reasons, Banks paid—in today's money amounts—about $100,000 or more for clothing for his wife for the Mardi Gras season, as well as for the related parties.  These expenditures represented much of his salary and put them in a cramped financial condition for several years. [pages 1279-82]

12.  New *    Using Dwight family papers, the author explains the "Five Associates," a coalition of New England mills and money men who put up a large sum of money to factor Confederate cotton from New Orleans.  This was not a traditional role for these men but could have brought them enormous profits.  While the views of those with the money are unknown, the record is clear that their agent, Daniel Dwight, was willing to use illegal means.  The relationship of the notorious Jim Fisk to this is explained. [pages 1493-1500]  The author also details what is known of the Bank of Louisiana and its Confederate cotton, why the name of General Grant's wife might have been listed among the stockholders and names the wealthy Northerners (friends of Secretary Stanton) who claimed ownership but who were not listed as stockholders. [pages 1506-07]   This bank's principal loan seems to have gone to John A. Stevenson, the only middle man fully approved by the Confederates—a man ignored during the Smith-Brady investigation.  [pages 1529-30]  This cotton was partially seized by Admiral Porter, and ownership of the rest passed to Union Pacific Railroad schemer, Thomas Clark Durant.   [pages 1530-31]  

13.  New *    The author explains that the Samuel L. Casey (Grant's wife's brother-in-law) operation would have netted him far more than any of the other more famous scandals involving Grant's relatives during his presidency.    Though Casey's relationship to Grant would have been well known to the navy and others on the Red River, many seemed hesitant to mention his name publicly.  There is evidence that in 1864 Casey was using an extraordinary permit issued earlier by President Lincoln, not the latest one.  Casey was illegally offering sterling to the Confederates as a means of payment..[pages 1508-13]  New information from various sources details some of the operations of Casey's partner, William Butler, a very close Illinois friend of Abraham Lincoln.   Butler was apparently helping to fund other speculators with connections to Generals Grant and Sherman.   Some of these men were definitely engaged in illegal activities.  [pages 1514-19, 1522-23]  Treasury emissary Frank Howe, who once had extraordinary oversight of civilian cotton operations for the Red River expedition, tried to hide this role when contacted by the Smith-Brady commission.  The commission uniquely took Howe's testimony in New York City.  Unwittingly or deliberately, Howe was allowed to provide misleading information, from which the final report generously quoted.  [pages 1533-35]


POSTWAR CAREER

1.  New *   About twenty-five authors have tried to determine if Banks possibly received money from the Russian government for his key role in obtaining appropriations for the purchase of Alaska.  Most said he received nothing; one suggested he received a gratuity.  New evidence is provided here, suggesting this latter scenario was the most likely one.   Key to this presentation is a Bowles Brothers bank statement, indicating Mrs. Banks in Europe in 1869 had been spending far more than her husband's annual salary.   Yet in 1867 and 1868, multiple documents show that the Bankses were just barely warding off creditors up to several weeks before the Alaska vote.  He and his wife did not take out new mortgages on their real estate, and shortly before the Alaska vote, Banks was still trying to obtain a private loan.   Almost all the documents pertaining to the period just after the Alaska vote are mysteriously missing from the Banks document collections.  [pages 1314-17]  One of the principal witnesses before Congress in favor of the Alaska bill was Charles S. Bulkley, who was actually Banks's brother-in-law but not identified as such.  Bulkley was chief engineer for the project to string telegraph wire across Siberia.  Later family records describe him as having been in the pay of the Russian government.  [page 1305, especially the footnote]

2.  New *   Details are provided about a little-known attempt by the French crown and American-European investors in 1869-70 to survey and obtain rights to a canal project in today's Panama.  Banks and wife were drawn into this.  [pages  1327-38]

3.  New *   Information listed indicating that one can add Oliver and Oakes Ames, and perhaps General Daniel Sickles, to the list of prominent Americans involved in the schemes surrounding the failed attempt to annex the Dominican Republic to the U.S. [page 1343, notes to page 1343]

4.  New *   Details provided on an attempt by Rep. Alley, moneyman Hooper, Banks and other Mass. politicians to take over the Union Pacific.  Their failure kept these politicos out of the Credit Mobilier scandal. [pages 1403-08].  Banks's brother, Gardner, would likely have gone to jail for his part in Whiskey Ring, but he died suddenly.  [pages 1412-13]    New details provided on Banks's role in Credit Mobilier investigation.  [pages 1408-12]   Details provided on apparently previously overlooked  assault (or fight?) that seriously injured  John C. Frémont.  [page 1418]  Also details on Frémont's apparently overlooked backing of a Kentucky railroad.   Banks  saw this railroad as the key to his financial future and seemed to be spending more time promoting it than voting in Congress.  The Panic of 1873 ruined it and multiple other railroads. [pages 1422-26]  Banks probably did more than anyone in Congress to help Adolph Sutro and his famous tunnel under the Comstock Lode.  Sutro reciprocated with some favors.  [pages  1428-33]    Few realize that Banks's adjutant from New Orleans, Richard Irwin, became one of the all-time champions in distributing cash to members of Congress.. [pages 1427-28]