HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
July 31, 1863.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following outline of the recent operations of this army, for the information of the Department:
The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg -being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker, and that in any even-t that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations that may hereafter be presented, the movement began on June 3. McLaws' division, of Longstreet's corps, left Fredericksburg for Culpeper Court-House, and Hood's division, which was encamped on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. They were followed on the 4th and 5th by Ewell's corps, leaving that of A. P. Hill to occupy our lines at Fredericksburg.
The march of these troops having been discovered by the enemy on the afternoon of the 5th, on the following day he crossed a force amounting to about one army corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, on a pontoon bridge laid down near the mouth of Deep Run. General Hill disposed his command to resist their advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather than attack, the movements in progress were not arrested.
The forces of Longstreet and Ewell reached Culpeper Court-House by the 8th, at which point the cavalry, under General Stuart, was also concentrated.
On the 9th, a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly's Fords, and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving 400 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.
General Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, had been ordered to advance to Winchester, to co-operate with the infantry in the proposed expedition into the lower Valley, and at the same time General Imboden was directed with his command to make a demonstration in the direction of Romney, in order to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent the enemy at that place from being re-enforced by the troops on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both of these officers were in position when General Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on the 10th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, he detached Rodes' division to- Berryville, with instructions, after dislodging the force stationed there, to cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac. With the divisions of Early and [Edward] Johnson, General Ewell advanced directly upon Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town on the 13th. On the same day the troops at Berryville fell back before General Rodes, retreating to Winchester.
On the 14th, General Early stormed the works at the latter place, and the whole army of General Milroy was captured or dispersed. Most of those who attempted to escape were intercepted and made prisoners by General Johnson. Their leader fled to Harper's Ferry with a small party of fugitives.
General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the latter place on the 14th, where he took 700 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. These operations cleared the Valley of the enemy, those at Harper's Ferry withdrawing to Maryland Heights. More than 4,000 prisoners, 29 pieces of artillery, 270 wagons and ambulances, with 400 horses, were captured, besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small.
On the night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the Federal troops in front of A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg recrossed the Rappahannock, and the next day disappeared behind the hills of Stafford. The whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the line of the Rappahannock, pursuing the roads near the Potomac, and no favorable opportunity was offered for attack. It seemed to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position which would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington City. With a view to draw him farther from his base, and at the same time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg for the Valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. His force had been augmented, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. The cavalry under General Stuart was thrown out in front of Longstreet, to watch the enemy, now reported to be moving into Loudoun.
On the 17th, his cavalry encountered two brigades of ours under General Stuart, near Aldie, and was driven back with loss. The next day the engagement was renewed, the Federal cavalry being strongly supported by infantry, and General Stuart was, in turn, compelled to retire. The enemy advanced as far as Upperville, and then fell back. In these engagements, General Stuart took about 400 prisoners and a considerable number of horses and arms.
In the meantime, a part of General Ewell's corps had entered Maryland, and the rest was about to follow. Genera] Jenkins, with his cavalry, who accompanied General Ewell, penetrated Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg. As these demonstrations did not have the effect of causing the Federal Army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the Valley. General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Mary]and, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as, in his judgment, should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced.
By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed at Williamsport and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns reunited at Hagerstown, and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, en- camping near Chambersburg on the 27th.
No report had been received that the Federal Army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. In order, however, to retain it on the east side of the mountains, after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communication with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the South Mountain. Early's division was detached for this purpose, and proceeded as far east as York, while the remainder of the corps proceeded to Carlisle.
General Imboden, in pursuance of the instructions previously referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of General Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. He had driven off the forces guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, destroying all the important bridges on that route from Cumberland to Martinsburg, and seriously damaged the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He subsequently took position at Hancock, and, after the arrival of Longstreet and Hill at Chambersburg, was directed to march by way of McConnellsburg to that place.
Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but, on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the Federal Army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his farther progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle.
General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the Federal Army south of the Potomac, after our own had entered Maryland, and, in his efforts to impede its progress, advanced as far eastward as Fairfax Court-House. Finding himself unable to delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca, and marched through Westminster to Carlisle, where he arrived after General Ewell had left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued, the Federal Army was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal Army been known.
The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack. The remainder of Ewell's and Hill's corps having arrived, and two divisions of Longstreet's, our preparations were made accordingly. During the afternoon, intelligence was received of the arrival of General Stuart at Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg and take position on our left. A full account of these engagements cannot be given until the reports of the several commanding officers shall have been received, and I shall only offer a general description.
The preparations for attack were not completed until the afternoon of the 2d. The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left of our line, General Hill the center, and General Longstreet the right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position. while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the Federal line, in order to prevent re-enforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark.
These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day. Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the positions gained by him the day before. The general plan of attack was unchanged, excepting that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.
The enemy, in the meantime, had strengthened his lines with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries, but our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage, and fall back to their original positions with severe loss.
The conduct of the troops was all that I could desire or expect, and they deserve success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude. More may have been required of them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their noble qualities and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy has suffered no abatement from the issue of this protracted and sanguinary conflict.
Owing to the strength of the enemy's position, and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport.
The army remained at. Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners. Nearly 2,000 had previously been paroled, but the enemy's numerous wounded that had fallen into our hands after the first and second days' engagements were left behind.
Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th. The march was continued during that day without interruption from the enemy, excepting an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield and the rest by way of Cashtown, guarded by General Imboden. In passing through the mountains in advance of the column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons and ambulances, but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss.
They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden. The attacking force was subsequently encountered and driven off by General Stuart, and pursued for several miles in the direction of Boonsborough. The army, after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of July 6 and morning of the 7th.
The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland as to be unfordable. Our communications with the south side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced by the high waters impeding the working of the neighboring mills. The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to await at Williamsport the subsiding of the river and the construction of boats, as the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed. The enemy had not yet made his appearance, but as he was in condition to obtain large re-enforcements, and our situation, for the reasons above mentioned, was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. Part of the pontoon bridge was recovered and new boats built, so that by the 13th a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters.
The enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines. Our preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport. Those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads, the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until 1 p.m., when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no loss of materiel excepting a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud. Before fresh horses could be sent back for them, the rear of the column had passed. During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the obscurity of the night., and these, with some stragglers, fell into the hands of the enemy.
Brigadier-General Pettigrew was mortally wounded in an attack made by a small body of cavalry, which was unfortunately mistaken for our own, and permitted to enter our lines. He was brought to Bunker Hill, where he expired a few days afterward. He was a brave and accomplished officer and gentleman, and his loss will be deeply felt by the country and the army.
The following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity of which it encamped for several days. The day after its arrival, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, which had crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, advanced toward Martinsburg. It was attacked by General Fitz. Lee, near Kearneysville, and defeated with heavy loss, leaving its dead and many of its wounded on the field.
Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah, the plan of operations which had been contemplated when we recrossed the Potomac could not be put into execution, and before the waters had subsided, the movements of the enemy induced me to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock, which was accordingly done.
As soon as the reports of the commanding officers shall be received, a more detailed account of these operations will be given, and occasion will then be taken to speak more particularly of the conspicuous gallantry and good conduct of both officers and men.
It is not yet in my power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe, including many brave men, and an unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers. Among them I regret to mention the following general officers: Major-Generals Hood, Pender, and Trimble severely, and Major-General Heth slightly wounded.
General Pender has since died. This lamented officer had borne a distinguished part in every engagement of this army, and was wounded on several occasions while leading his command with conspicuous gallantry and ability. The confidence and admiration inspired by his courage and capacity as an officer were only equaled by the esteem and respect entertained by all with whom he was associated for the noble qualities of his modest and unassuming character.
Brigadier-Generals Barksdale and [R. B.] Garnett were killed, and Brigadier-General Semmes mortally wounded, while leading their troops with the courage that always distinguished them. These brave officers and patriotic gentlemen fell in the faithful discharge of duty, leaving the army to mourn their loss and emulate their noble examples. Brigadier-Generals Kemper, Armistead, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Hampton, J. M. Jones, and Jenkins were also wounded. Brigadier-General Archer was taken prisoner.
General Pettigrew, though wounded at Gettysburg, continued in command until he was mortally wounded, near Falling Waters.

The loss of the enemy is unknown, but from observation on the field, and his subsequent movements, it is supposed that he suffered severely.

Respectfully submitted.
R. E. LEE,
General.

 

HDQRS. 1ST ARMY CORPS, DEPT. OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Near Culpeper Court-House, July 27, 1863.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General.

COLONEL: In obedience to orders from the commanding general, my command marched from Fredericksburg, on June 3, for Culpeper Court-House.
On the 15th, it moved from Culpeper Court-House along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, and, on the 19th, McLaws' division was posted in Ashby's Gap, Hood's at Snicker's Gap, and Pickett's supporting Hood's and guarding points between the two Gaps.
On June 20, I received a dispatch from general headquarters, directing that I should hold myself in readiness to move in the direction of the Potomac, with a view to crossing, &c. As I was ready, and had been expecting an order to execute such purpose, I supposed the intimation meant other preparation, and, knowing of nothing else that I could do to render my preparations complete, I supposed that it was desirable that I should cross the Shenandoah. I therefore passed the river, occupied the banks at the ferries opposite the Gaps, and a road at an intermediate ford, which was practicable for cavalry and infantry.
On the following day, the enemy advanced his cavalry in full force against General Stuart, and drove him into and nearly through Ashby's Gap. I succeeded in passing part of McLaws' division across the river in time to occupy the Gap before night, and, upon advancing a line of sharpshooters the next morning at daylight, the enemy retired. I believe that he engaged the sharpshooters lightly. General Stuart re-established his cavalry, and McLaws' division was withdrawn to the west bank of the Shenandoah before night.
On the 23d, I received orders to march, via Berryville, Martinsburg, and Williamsport, into Maryland. The command moved at early dawn on the following day: First, Pickett's division; second, the Reserve Artillery battalions; third, Hood's division, and, fourth, McLaws' division. Pickett's division and the battalions of Reserve Artillery crossed the Potomac on the 25th, Hood's and McLaws' divisions on the following day. The command reached Chambersburg, Pa., on the 27th, and a halt of two days was made for rest.
On the night of the 28th, one of my scouts came in with information that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us. The scout was sent to general headquarters, with the suggestion that our army concentrate east of the mountains, and bear down to meet the enemy.
I received orders on the following day to move part of my command, and to encamp it at Greenwood. The command, excepting Pickett's division, which was left to guard our rear at Chambersburg, moved on the morning of the 30th, and the two divisions and battalions of Reserve Artillery got into camp at Greenwood about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. General Hood was ordered to put a brigade and a battery on picket at New Guilford, on the road leading toward Emmitsburg.
On the next day, the troops set out for Gettysburg, excepting Pickett's division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law's brigade, left by Hood on picket at New Guilford. Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson's division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day, and joined about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining, I received instructions from the commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A.P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmitsburg road.
Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 p.m. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.
The enemy's first position along the Emmitsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws' upon his front. He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point, however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General [R. H.] Anderson's division, which were co-operating upon my left, drove one of them back, and, checking the support of the other, caused my left to be somewhat exposed and outflanked. Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was driven back at the same time. I thought it prudent not to push farther until my other troops came up.
General Hood received a severe wound soon after getting under fire, and was obliged to leave the field. This misfortune occasioned some delay in our operations. Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson, of his division, was also severely wounded, and obliged to leave the field. In the same attack, General McLaws lost two of his brigadiers (General Barksdale mortally wounded, and General Semmes severely wounded, and since died of his wounds). The command was finally so disposed as to hold the ground gained on the right, with my left withdrawn to the first position of the enemy, resting at the peach orchard. During the combat of this day, four pieces of artillery were captured and secured by the command, and two regimental standards.
On the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. This would have been a slow process, probably, but I think not very difficult. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were given, the commanding general joined me, and ordered a column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's, and part of Pender's divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position, the Cemetery Hill. The distance to be passed over under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the assault had been in a severe battle two days previous, Pickett's division alone being fresh.
Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the line of the enemy's defenses, and General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.
Heth's division, under the command of Brigadier-General Pettigrew, was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Major-General Pender's division, under Major-General Trimble. All of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery of First Corps, and Colonel Alexander had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon the signal for the batteries to open.
About 2 p.m. General Pickett, who had been charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind our batteries, reported that the troops were in order and on the most sheltered ground. Colonel Walton was ordered to open the batteries. The signal guns were fired, and all the batteries opened very handsomely and apparently with effective fire. The guns on the hill at the enemy's left were soon silenced. Those at the Cemetery Hill combated us, however, very obstinately. Many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them. Colonel Alexander was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack.
Some time after our batteries opened fire, I rode to Major [James] Dearing's batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon, if we hoped to accomplish anything before night. I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Colonel Alexander's position, I found that he had advised General Pickett that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege. The advance was made in very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation. About half way between our position and that of the enemy, a ravine partially sheltered our troops from the enemy's fire, where a short halt was made for rest. The advance was resumed after a moment's pause, all still in good order. The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. Pickett's troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Major-General Anderson's division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated, broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines or destroy him before Anderson's division could reach him, which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed Anderson. He was, therefore, ordered to halt. In a few moments the enemy, marching against both flanks and the front of Pickett's division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. General Wright, of Anderson's division, with all of the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division, and many of my staff officers were sent to assist in the same service. Expecting an attack from the enemy, I rode to the front of our batteries, to reconnoiter and superintend their operations.
The enemy threw forward forces at different times and from different points, but they were only feelers, and retired as soon as our batteries opened upon them. These little advances and checks were kept up till night, when the enemy retired to his stronghold, and my line was withdrawn to the Gettysburg road on the right, the left uniting with Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill's right. After night, I received orders to make all the needful arrangements for our retreat. The orders for preparation were given, and the work was begun before daylight on the 4th.
On the night of the 4th, the troops were withdrawn from our line, and my command took up the line of march, following the corps of Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill. Our march was much impeded by heavy rains and excessively bad roads. We succeeded, however, in reaching the top of the mountain early in the night of the 5th.
On the 6th, my command, passing to the front, marched for Hagerstown. As our exhausted men and animals were not in condition for rapid movement, I thought myself fortunate when I found that I could reach Hagerstown in time to relieve our trains at Williamsport, then seriously threatened. Reaching Hagerstown about 5 p.m., our column moved down the Sharpsburg turnpike, and encamped about 2 miles from Hagerstown.
The next day, the command was put in camp on the best ground that could be found, and remained quiet until the 10th, when the enemy was reported to be advancing to meet us. It was supposed at first to be a cavalry force only, but I thought it prudent to move some of the infantry down on the Antietam, at Funkstown. After reaching the Antietam, General Stuart asked for infantry supports for his batteries, and two brigades (Semmes', under Colonel [Goode] Bryan, and Anderson's, under Colonel [W. W.] White) were sent across, as he desired. For the report of their service, I refer to the report of Major-General Stuart and the brigade commanders. A line of battle was selected, extending from a point on the Potomac near Downsville to the Hagerstown and Williamsport turnpike, my command on the right. The troops were put to work, and, in twenty-four hours, our line was comfortably intrenched. A few of the enemy's sharpshooters came up on the Boonsborough road, and to within long range of our picket line on the 12th.
On the evening of the same day, a light skirmish was brought on by an advance of a line of sharpshooters at the Saint James' College. That night our bridge was completed, and, the day after, I received orders to recross the Potomac after night, and the caissons of the batteries were started back about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The troops marched as soon as it was dark, my command leading. Having but a single road to travel upon, our trains soon came to a halt. I rode on to the bridge, to hasten the movements as much as possible, and sent my staff officers to different points along the line to keep everything in motion. Details were made to keep up fires to light the road at the worst points, and Captain [J. H.] Manning, with his signal torches, lighted us across the bridge.
The natural difficulties in making such movements were increased by the darkness of the night, a heavy rain storm, flooding the road with mud and water, and finally by one of our wagons, loaded with wounded, running off the bridge, breaking it down, and throwing our wounded headlong into the river. We were so fortunate, however, as to rescue them in a few moments. They were made somewhat comfortable in other vehicles, and sent forward. Major [John J.] Clarke and Captains [Henry T.] Douglas and [S. R.] Johnston, of the Corps of Engineers, applied themselves diligently to the work of repairing the bridge, and, in two hours, our line was again in motion.
When the accident occurred at the bridge, I sent back orders for one of my divisions to occupy the redoubts that had been thrown up to protect the bridge, and also directed Colonel Alexander to place his batteries in position on the same line. As soon as the bridge was repaired, I rode back to this line, but finding that the enemy was not pursuing, the troops were again put in motion. The rear of my column passed the bridge at 9 o'clock in the morning, and encamped for the night at Hainesville.
On July 19, at Bunker Hill, I received orders to march with my command for Millwood, in order to obtain possession of Ashby's Gap, with a view to covering our future movements. We marched early on the next day, part of the command reaching Millwood at night. The Shenandoah was found to be past fording, however, and the enemy had driven our cavalry from the Gap, and were in possession down to the river bank. I reported this to the commanding general, and continued my march on the following day-for Manassas and Chester Gaps. Arriving at the Shenandoah at Front Royal, it was found to be past fording, and the work of laying our bridges was hardly [hurriedly?] begun. Brigadier-General Corse, who had been hurried forward with his brigade to secure the Gaps, succeeded in passing the stream with his men and several batteries. Detaching a regiment to Manassas Gap, he marched his main force into Chester Gap, and succeeded in getting possession of the latter some few moments before the enemy appeared. The enemy was in possession of Manassas Gap, but Colonel [Arthur] Herbert, of the Seventeenth Virginia Regiment, secured a strong position with his regiment, from which he held the enemy in check. The rest of Pickett's division was hurried over by crossing the ammunition and arms in a fiat-boat, the men wading. Re-enforcements were sent to Colonel Herbert, when he drove back the enemy, and secured as much of the Gap as was desirable. Re-enforcements were also sent to General Corse, who was engaged in skirmishing with the enemy, and was threatened by a strong cavalry force. The cavalry withdrew about the time the re-enforcements reached him. The bridges were completed about 12 o'clock at night, and the passage by our trains commenced.
The next day the enemy appeared in stronger force in Manassas Gap, but I had posted Hood's division there, under Brig. Gen. E. M. Law, and he gave us but little trouble. He also reappeared at the foot of the mountain, at Chester Gap. As soon as our men finished cooking their rations, General Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was ordered to disperse the cavalry that was at the foot of the mountain, and endeavor to capture his artillery. General Pickett was ordered to send a force down the mountain by a different route, to get in rear of and intercept the cavalry. After a light skirmish with General Wofford, the enemy made a hasty retreat. Our march was continued, arriving at Culpeper Court-House at noon on the 24th instant.
General Benning's brigade, which had been left on picket at Gaines' Cross-Roads with the Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama Regiments, to await the arrival of Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill's corps, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry while on the march, each having a smart skirmish.
I desire to mention the following-named officers as among those most distinguished for the exhibition of great gallantry and skill, viz: Major-Generals Pickett, Hood, and Trimble, the two latter severely wounded; Kemper, very seriously wounded; Semmes, severely wounded, and since died of his wounds; Pettigrew, slightly wounded; Kershaw, Law, and G. T. Anderson, the last severely wounded.
Brigadier-General Barksdale was mortally wounded in the attack on the evening of the 2d, while bravely leading his brigade in the assault.
Brig. Gen. R. B. Garnett was killed while gallantly leading his brigade in the assault upon the enemy's position upon the Cemetery Hill.
Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, and Colonel Alexander, Major Dearing, Major [Frank] Huger, Major Eshleman, and Captain [M. B.] Miller, of the Corps of Artillery, were noted for the courage, zeal, and ability with which they discharged their duties.
The troops all exhibited great determination and courage on the battle-field, which, together with the fortitude and endurance subsequently shown by them under circumstances of great trial, justly entitles them to our hearty thanks and highest praise.
Major-General Pickett's division merits especial credit for the determined manner in which it assaulted the enemy's strong position upon the Cemetery Hill.
For valuable and meritorious services on the field, I desire to express my renewed obligations to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel [G. M.] Sorrel, Lieutenant-Colonel [Peyton T.] Manning, Majors [John W.] Fairfax, [O.] Latrobe, [John J.] Clarke, and [Thomas] Walton, and Captains [Thomas J.] Goree, [John W.] Riely, and [H. J.] Rogers.
Major [S. P.] Mitchell, chief quartermaster; Major [R. J.] Moses, chief commissary of subsistence; Surgeon [J. S. D.] Cullen, medical director; Surgeons [Randolph] Barksdale and [Thomas F.] Maury, and Captain Manning, signal officer, discharged the duties of their respective departments with zeal and ability.
Statements of the casualties of the campaign, embracing the killed, wounded, and missing, have been already forwarded.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

 

Report of Brig. Gen. J. B. Kershaw, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, McLaws' division
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE,
Near Chattanooga, October 1, 1863.

Maj. J. M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the commencement of the march from Culpeper Court-House until the return of the army to that place.
Tuesday, June 16.--The brigade marched to Sperryville.
17th.--To Mud Run, in Fauquier County. These two days were excessively hot, and on the 17th many cases of sunstroke occurred. At Gaines' Cross-Roads, the wagons were sent by the way of Front Royal. Rice's battalion was detached as a guard to the division train.
18th.--Marched to Piedmont.
19th.--To Ashby's Gap, where Rice's battalion rejoined the command.
20th.--Crossed the Shenandoah River at Berry's Ford.
21st.--Recrossed, and took position in line of battle near Paris, to resist a threatened attack of the enemy.
22d.--Returned to camp on western side of the river.
23d.--Obtained 503 new arms from Winchester.
24th.--Marched to Summit Point.
25th.--To Martinsburg.
26th.--Crossed Potomac River; encamped near Williamsport.
27th.--Marched by the way of Hagerstown, Middleburg, and Green-castle, and encamped 5 miles from Chambersburg.
28th.--Marched through Chambersburg, and encamped 1 mile beyond.
Remained in camp until the 30th, when we marched to Fayetteville.
July 1.--Anderson's and Johnson's divisions and General Ewell's wagon train occupied the road until 4 p.m., when we marched to a point on the Gettysburg road, some 2 miles from that place, going into camp at 12 p.m.
The command was ordered to move at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, but did not leave camp until about sunrise. We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg, with only a slight detention from trains in the way, and moved to the right of the Third Corps, and were halted until about noon. We were then directed to move under cover of the hills toward the right, with a view to flanking the enemy in that direction, if cover could be found to conceal the movement. Arriving at the hill beyond the hotel, at the stone bridge on the Fairfield road, the column was halted while Generals Longstreet and McLaws reconnoitered the route. After some little delay, the major-general commanding returned, and directed a countermarch, and the command was marched to the left, beyond the point at which we had before halted, and thence, under cover of the woods, to the right of our line of battle. Arriving at the school-house, on the road leading across the Emmitsburg road by the peach orchard, then in possession of the enemy, the lieutenant-general commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road, with my left resting toward the Emmitsburg road. At the same time a battery of artillery was moved along the road parallel with my line of march. About 3 p.m. the head of my column came into the open field in front of a stone wall, and in view of the enemy. I immediately filed to the right along and in front of the wall, and formed line of battle under cover of my skirmishers, then engaged with those of the enemy, these extending along the Emmitsburg road.
In the meantime, examining the position of the enemy, I found him to be in superior force in the orchard, supported by artillery, with a main line of battle intrenched in the rear and extending to and upon the rocky mountain to his left far beyond the point at which his flank had supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions, would have been, if successful in driving him from the orchard, to present my own right and rear to a large portion of his line of battle. I therefore communicated the position of things to the major-general commanding, and placed my line in position under cover of the stone wall. Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes in reserve to me and Barksdale on my left, supported by Wofford, in reserve. Artillery was also placed along the wall to my right, and Colonel De Saussure's Fifteenth South Carolina Regiment was thrown beyond it to protect it. Hood's division was then moving in our rear toward our right, to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the peach orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood, on my right, and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle. I was told that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement.
These directions I received in various messages from the lieutenant-general and the major-general commanding, and in part by personal communication with them. In my center front was a stone house, and to the left of it a stone barn, both about 500 yards from our line, and on a line with the crest of the orchard hill. Along the front of the orchard, and on the face looking toward the stone house, the enemy's infantry was posted. Two batteries of artillery were in position, the one in rear of the orchard, near the crest of the hill, and the other some 200 yards farther back, in the direction of the rocky mountain. Behind the stone house, on the left, was a morass; on the right a stone wall running parallel with our line of battle. Beyond the morass some 200 yards was a stony hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth, extending some distance toward the enemy's main line, and inclining to our left, and in rear of the orchard and the batteries described. Beyond the stone wall, and in a line with the stony hill, was a heavy forest, extending far to our right. From the morass a small stream ran through this wood along the base of the mountain toward the right. Between the stony hill and this forest was an interval of about 100 yards, which was only sparsely covered with scrubby undergrowth, through which a small road ran in the direction of the mountain. Looking down this road from the stone house, a large wheat-field was seen. In rear of the wheat-field, and between that and the mountain, was the enemy's main line of battle, posted behind a stone wall.
Under my instructions, I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. Accordingly, about 4 o'clock, when I received orders to advance, I moved at once in this direction, gradually changing front to the left. The numerous fences in the way, the stone building and barn, and the morass, and a raking fire of grape and canister, rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order; but, notwithstanding these obstacles, I brought my center to the point intended. In order to restore the line of the directing battalion (the Seventh South Carolina), as soon as we reached the cover of the hill, I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately, this order given only to Colonel [D. Wyatt] Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked its advance.
Before reaching this point, I had extended an order to Colonel Kennedy, commanding Second South Carolina Regiment (my left center regiment), then moving in magnificent style, to charge the battery in their front, being the second battery mentioned above, and which most annoyed us, leaving Barksdale to deal with that at the orchard.
Meanwhile, to aid this attack, I changed the direction of the Seventh Regiment (Colonel Aiken) and the Third (Major [R. C.] Maffett) to the left, so as to occupy the rocky hill and wood, and opened fire on the battery. Barksdale had not yet appeared, but came up soon after, and cleared the orchard, with the assistance of the fire of my Eighth South Carolina (Colonel [John W.] Henagan), on my left, and James' battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel [W. G.] Rice), the next in order of battle. This brigade then moved so far to the left as no longer to afford me any assistance.
In a few minutes after my line halted, the enemy advanced across the wheat-field in two lines of battle, with a very small interval between the lines, in such a manner as to take the Seventh South Carolina in flank. I changed the direction of the right wing of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel [Elbert] Bland, to meet the attack, and hurried back to General Semmes, then some 150 yards in my right rear, to bring him up to meet the attack on my right, and also to bring forward my right regiment (Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel De Saussure), which, separated from the command by the artillery at the time of the advance, was now cut off by Semmes' brigade. Its gallant and accomplished commander had just fallen when I reached it, and it was under the command of Major [William M.] Gist. General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion toward the right, preparatory to moving to the front. I hastened back to the Seventh Regiment, and reached it just as the enemy, having arrived at a point about 200 yards from us, poured in a volley and advanced to the charge. The Seventh received him handsomely, and long kept him in check in their front. One regiment of Semmes' brigade came at a double-quick as far as the ravine in our rear, and for a time checked him in their front. There was still an interval of 100 yards between this regiment and the right of the Seventh, and into this the enemy was forcing his way, causing the Seventh to swing back more and more, still fighting at a distance not exceeding 30 paces, until the two wings were doubled on each other, or nearly so.
Finding that the battery on my left had been silenced, I sent for the Second South Carolina Regiment to come to the right, but by this time the enemy had swung around and lapped my whole line at close quarters, and the fighting was general and desperate. At length, the Seventh South Carolina gave way, and I directed Colonel Aiken to reform them at the stone wall, some 200 yards in my right rear. I fell back to the Third Regiment, then hotly engaged on the crest of the stony hill, and gradually swung around its right as the enemy made progress around our flank. Semmes' advanced regiment had given way. One of his regiments mingled with the Third, and, among the rocks and trees, within a few feet of each other, a desperate conflict ensued. The enemy could make no progress in front, but slowly extended around my right. Separated from view of my left wing by the hill and wood, all of my staff being with that wing, the position of the Fifteenth Regiment being unknown, and the Seventh being in the rear, I feared the brave men about me would be surrounded by the large force pressing around them, and ordered the Third Regiment and the [Fiftieth?] Georgia Regiment with them to fall back to the stone house, whither I followed them.
On emerging from the wood, I saw Wofford coming in in splendid style.
My left wing had held the enemy in check along their front, and lost no ground. The enemy gave way at Wofford's advance, and, with him, the whole of my left wing advanced to the charge, sweeping the enemy before them, without a moment's stand, across the stone wall, beyond the wheat-field, up to the foot of the mountain. At the same time, my Fifteenth Regiment, and part of Semmes' brigade, pressed forward on the right to the same point. Going back to the stone wall near my rear, I found Colonel Aiken in position, and at the stone building found the Third South Carolina and the regiment of Semmes' brigade. I moved them up to the stone wall, and, finding that Wofford's men were coming out, I retained them at that point to check any attempt of the enemy to advance.
It was now near nightfall, and the operations of the day were over. Gathering all my regiments, with Semmes' brigade, behind the wall, and placing pickets well to the front, I commenced the melancholy task of looking up my numerous dead and wounded. It was a sad list. First among the dead was the brave and able officer, Col. W. D. De Saussure, the senior colonel of the brigade, whom I had been pleased to regard as my successor in command should any casualty create a vacancy. His loss to his regiment is irreparable; to his State and the country not to be estimated. Major [D. McD.] McLeod, of the Eighth South Carolina Regiment, a gallant and estimable officer, was mortally wounded. Col. John D. Kennedy, of the Second South Carolina Regiment, was severely wounded while gallantly leading his command to the charge. Lieutenant-Colonel [F.] Gaillard conducted the regiment through its subsequent operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, of the Seventh South Carolina Regiment, while commanding the right wing of the regiment with his usual courage and ability, was severely wounded, as was also Maj. D. B. Miller, James' battalion [Third Battalion South Carolina Infantry]. A long list of brave and efficient officers sealed their devotion to the glorious cause with their blood, each of whom merits special mention did the proper limits of this report admit it.
All the officers and men of the command behaved most admirably, and are entitled to the gratitude of the country. I am especially indebted to the members of my staff--Captain [C. R.] Holmes, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant [Alfred E.] Doby, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant [W. M.] Dwight, acting assistant inspector-general--for most efficient services on the field under the most difficult circumstances.
About dark, I was ordered to move my brigade to the left, to the peach orchard, where I remained until noon of the next day, when I was ordered to return to the stone wall. An hour later, I was directed to return to the wall where I had first formed line of battle. Hood's division, then commanded by General Law, was engaged with the enemy's cavalry in his front, his line being formed across our right flank. Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to move to the right, so as to connect with Hood's left, retaining my then front. This I did, and remained in that position until the night of the 4th, when, about midnight, I moved with the army, via Franklin, to Monterey.
On the 6th, marched through Hagerstown, via Waterloo, and encamped near Funkstown.
On the 10th. I was directed to proceed, with my own and Semmes' brigades, and a section of [J. C.] Fraser's battery to the bridge across the Antietam, near Macauley's, and defend that position, the enemy having appeared in force on the other side. Some unimportant skirmishing occurred here, and next morning I rejoined the division, near the Saint James' College.
We remained in line of battle, with the enemy in front, until the night of the 13th, when we marched to Falling Waters, and recrossed the Potomac on the 14th.
March was continued next day to Bunker Hill, where we rested until the 18th, when we resumed the march for Culpeper Court-House, via Millwood, Front Royal, Chester Gap, and Gaines' Cross-Roads, arriving at 10 a.m. on the 24th.
I cannot close this report without expressing my thanks to Maj. W. D. Peck, assistant quartermaster, and Maj. Joseph Kennedy, acting commissary of subsistence, of the brigade staff, and all the regimental officers of their departments, for their assiduous and efficient exertions during this important campaign.
The reports of regimental commanders accompany this. The casualties have already been reported.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. KERSHAW,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Report of Col. H. C. Cabell, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

CAMP NEAR CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
August 1, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, First Corps, Army Northern Virginia.

COLONEL: In compliance with your order, at the earliest period to make a report of the operations of my battalion from the-time it left the Rappahannock for Maryland and Pennsylvania until its return, I have the honor to submit the following report:
The battalion left Stanard's farm, about 10 miles in the rear of Fredericksburg, on June 3.
Encamped near Culpeper Court-House June 7. Remained near Culpeper Court-House till the 16th. Were ordered to accompany the division to meet the enemy, who were pressing Stuart's cavalry at Brandy Station. The enemy did not advance, being driven off, as it seemed, by the appearance of our forces.
On the 16th, resumed the march. We arrived at Ashby's Gap on the 19th, and encamped on the mountain, there being some fighting between the cavalry. Crossed the Shenandoah on the evening of the 20th.
The division recrossed the river, accompanied by Captain Fraser's battery, on the 21st. Subsequently the rest of the battalion moved across the Shenandoah, and took position at Ashby's Gap, where we again encamped.
On the 22d, we again crossed the Shenandoah, and, resuming our march on the 24th, on the 26th crossed the Potomac. We encamped a mile beyond Chambersburg on the 28th.
On July 1, we encamped a few miles from Gettysburg, and, on July 2, moved up with the division. When we commenced to ascend the road leading to the crest of the hill, where the battle was subsequently fought my battalion moved to the head of the column. Near the crest of the hill, I turned to the right, and placed the battalion in position on the edge of the wood, the right resting near the road leading from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg. One horse was wounded while crossing the field, although this movement was made beyond the view of the enemy. On our right, and slightly in front, the enemy occupied a rocky mountain with several batteries, and directly in front, about 600 or 700 yards distant, were a large number of batteries, occupying a peach orchard. Receiving orders, we opened a most effective fire upon these batteries. Exposed ourselves to a flanking fire from the enemy's mountain batteries, our position gave us a similar advantage in firing upon a large part of his line, which was drawn up nearly parallel with the Emmitsburg road. The battalion, being first to open fire, received for a short time a concentrated fire from the enemy's batteries. The fire from our lines and from the enemy became incessant, rendering it necessary for us sometimes to pause and allow the smoke to clear away, in order to enable the gunners to take aim. During the same time, two guns were ordered to play upon the batteries on the stony mountain--I have reason to believe with great effect.
The loss of my battalion was very heavy during this cannonading, Captain Fraser, who had always in previous engagements, as in this, set an example of the highest courage, coolness, and gallantry, fell, dangerously wounded by the bursting of a shell. The same shell killed 2 sergeants and 1 man.
Lieutenant [R. H.] Couper, of the same battery, was wounded during the same engagement.
The batteries in the peach orchard were driven off, and our fire was suspended to allow the infantry to advance. The guns on the right continued to fire on the enemy's batteries on the mountain as soon as the infantry had charged.
The next day, finding that Captain Fraser's command was so much crippled by the loss of men, I placed two of his guns (3-inch rifles) in charge of Captain [B. C.] Manly. These two guns, under command of Lieutenant [J. H.] Payne, of Manly's battery, two 3-inch rifles of Captain [E. S.] McCarthy's battery, under command of Lieut. R. M. Anderson, and two Parrott guns of Captain Fraser's battery, under command of Lieutenant [W. J.] Furlong, were ordered to take position on the new and advanced line of battle.
These guns were placed several hundred yards in front of the infantry, near a small brick house, and fronted the road leading from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg. The line of artillery extended up the road for some distance. Captain [H. H.] Carlton's battery and a section of Captain McCarthy's battery (two Napoleons) were ordered to the left of the line, in front of Pickett's division, the guns being placed slightly en échelon, owing to the conformation of the line of battle. Their position was considerably to the left of the brick house, the interval being occupied by batteries of other battalions.
Captain McCarthy, who had, early in the morning, been placed 300 or 400 yards in advance of the skirmishers, fired 20 rounds, and, with a section of another battery, succeeded in driving back an advancing line of the enemy.
The fire of the artillery was opened about 1 p.m. For over two hours the cannonading on both sides was almost continuous and incessant, far, very far, exceeding any cannonading I have ever before witnessed. The last-named batteries were opposite the cemetery position of the enemy. During this cannonading, Lieutenant [Henry] Jennings, a brave and gallant officer, fell, wounded, and, later in the day, Captain Carlton, who has in action so gallantly commanded his battery, fell, also wounded.
The command of the battery fell upon, and was at once assumed by, First Lieut. C. W. Motes.
The artillery ceased firing, and a part of Pickett s division passed over the ground occupied by these batteries in their celebrated charge. Captain Manly occupied, slightly shifting the position of his guns, the same position occupied the day before, and engaged the mountain batteries, particularly, with effect.
After Pickett's division was ordered back from their assault on the Cemetery Hill, Captain McCarthy and Lieutenant Motes were ordered to move forward, and came in position immediately on the road above mentioned, occupying the left flank of the line extended, upon which were placed the sections commanded, respectively, by Lieutenants Anderson, Payne, and Furlong. One of Lieutenant Furlong's guns being entirely out of ammunition, was ordered to the rear. The other piece was placed about 300 yards on the left of his previous position.
The enemy's sharpshooters were continually firing and annoying us. Only a few of our pickets were in front of us; no infantry in sight in our rear, but [R. II.] Anderson's division was in the woods, about 400 yards in the rear. The ammunition of the guns was nearly exhausted. The position occupied by these guns was about 700 yards from the Cemetery Hill. The change in the position of the guns was made about 4 p.m., with orders to hold it till night. We fired upon a line of infantry approaching, and, with the other batteries, dispersed them or drove them back. The attack was not renewed. The guns remained in this position till after dark, When they were withdrawn.
During the next day there was but little firing on either side. During the night of the 4th, we withdrew from our position, and, after a most distressing march, encamped at Monterey Springs the night of the 5th.
We arrived at Hagerstown the next evening, and encamped about 1 mile from the town.
On July 8, Captain Manly's battery was ordered to picket near Funkstown, Md., on the Antietam.
On Friday, July 10, this battery crossed the Antietam, and went to the assistance of General Stuart's cavalry. It engaged the enemy at about 6 a.m. near the suburbs of Funkstown, and fought him from that position until late in the afternoon, compelling his artillery to change position twice during the engagement. Captain Manly was then ordered by Lieutenant-General Longstreet to report with four guns to Major-General Pickett. He rejoined the battalion after we recrossed the Potomac. Lieutenant [S. M.] Dunn, of this battery, with one gun, remained with the battalion.
On July 7, First Lieut. R. M. Anderson, of McCarthy's battery, was ordered to take command of Captain Fraser's battery. Owing to the wounds received by Captain Fraser and Lieutenant Couper, this battery had been left with only one officer.
On the morning of the 10th, the battery was ordered to report to Brigadier-General Kershaw, on the Sharpsburg turnpike. It was placed in position on the right of the road. About 2 o'clock, the battery took position on a hill to the left of the bridge over the Antietam, and in close range of the enemy's sharpshooters, who immediately opened a vigorous fire, killing l man and slightly wounding another. Lieutenant Anderson opened fire into a brick building on the opposite side of the Creek, under cover of which the enemy's sharpshooters were collecting and seriously annoying our forces. After a few rounds from each piece, he succeeded in dispersing them from the house, as well as (for the time) silencing their sharpshooters in his immediate front.
At twilight, he received orders to withdraw his pieces, and to report to Colonel [T. T.] Munford, commanding a brigade of cavalry. Remained with him until about 9 a.m. the following day, when, by order, he reported to the battalion.
Lieutenant Motes, commanding Carlton's battery, reported to Brigadier-General Wofford on the morning of the 10th and was placed in position on the left of the Williamsport and Sharpsburg pike, near Saint James' Church where he remained till the next evening, when, under orders, he retired to a position on the right of the road. My battalion was placed in position on this line on both sides of the road, with orders to fortify it, which was clone during the night and the following day.
During the evening of the 13th, I was ordered to send my caissons across the Potomac, and to withdraw my-pieces at dark. The order was promptly obeyed, and we recrossed the river, without loss, on the morning of the 14th.
We arrived at Culpeper Court-House on the 25th, having encamped, successively, near Bunker Hill; on a farm about 10 miles from Winchester; near Milwood; on the left bank of the Shenandoah; at Gaines' Cross-Roads, and on the right bank of Hazel River. During this march, although threatened by the enemy, there was no engagement, and we suffered no loss of an kind.
I was much indebted to Maj. S. P. Hamilton for assistance rendered me on every occasion.
I desire to return my thanks to my ordnance officer (Lieut. H. L. Powell) and ordnance sergeant (O. M. Price) for their efficiency. Lieutenant Powell, though wounded, continued on duty.
Captain Manly, in his report, calls attention to-- an act of coolness by Private H. E. Thain, by which many lives were probably saved. Thain was acting No. 6 at one of the guns, and, while adjusting a fuse-igniter, it accidentally exploded, and ignited the fuse already in the shell. He seized the shell, and ran with it several yards from the limber, at the same time drawing the burning fuse from the shell with his fingers.
Captain McCarthy pays the following high, but no less deserved, tribute to Corpl. Allan Morton, who fell on July 3:
In Corpl. Allan Morton the battery lost its best and bravest soldier--one who had endeared himself to all by his unflinching bravery, his strict attention to all duties, and his cheerful obedience to all orders.
Lieutenant Furlong says that he was-- much indebted to Corporals [Alexander] Campbell and [Francis] Keenan for the manner in which they managed their respective pieces.
The battalion sustained the following casualties:

Command	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Manly's Battery
Officers	----	----	----	----
Men	3	4	4	11
Total	3	4	4	11
(13 horses killed and 7 disabled)
McCarthy's Battery
Officers	----	----	----	----
Men	2	8	---	10
Total	2	8	----	10
(23 horses killed and 2 disabled)
Carlton's Batter
Officers	----	2	----	2
Men	1	5	----	6
Total	1	5	----	6
(18 horses killed and 4 wounded--disabled for a short time only)
Fraser's Battery
Officers	----	2	----	2
Men	6	11	----	17
Total	6	13	----	19
(18 horses killed)

Total killed, 12; wounded--officers, 4; enlisted men, 26; 67 horses killed and 13 disabled.
I have the honor to inclose the reports of the battery officers.
I have not language to express my admiration of the coolness and courage displayed by the officers and men on the field of this great battle. Their acts speak for them. In the successive skirmishes in which a portion of the battalion was engaged, and when placed in line of battle near Hagerstown, inviting and expecting an attack, their cool courage and energy are above praise. In crossing rivers; in overcoming the difficulties of a tedious march; in providing for the horses of the battalion, no officers ever exhibited greater energy and efficiency. Passing over muddy roads, exposed to rain nearly every day, they bore the difficulties of the march without a murmur of dissatisfaction. All seemed engaged in a cause which made privation, endurance, and any sacrifice a "labor of love."

Very respectfully,
H. C. CABELL,
Colonel, Commanding.

General W. N. PENDLETON,
Chief of Artillery, Army of Northern Virginia.

[P. S.]--GENERAL: This report, not having been finished before Colonel Walton left Virginia, is respectfully forwarded to you.

H. C. C.

 

 

Report of Maj. James Dearing, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

AUGUST 16, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, 1st Army Corps, Army Northern Virginia.

COLONEL: In obedience to instructions from you, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my battalion from the time it left Culpeper Court-House, in June last, until its return to that place in July:
At the time we started upon the late campaign, my battalion was attached to Maj. Gen. G. E. Pickett's division, First Corps.
I left the vicinity of Culpeper Court-House about June 15, taking the road known as the Sperryville pike, and arrived at Gaines' CrossRoads the next day about 3 p.m., where I rejoined the division, which had marched by the dirt road.
On the 17th, I took up the line of march with the division, taking the right at Gaines' Cross-Roads, and marching east and parallel to the Blue Ridge, encamping for the night at Piedmont.
The next day we continued our march to Paris, and from there we marched to Snicker's Gap, continuing east of the Blue Ridge all the time. From Snicker's Gap we marched to within a mile or so of Berryville, where we remained for two or three days.
About June 24, we left camp near Berryville, taking the Charlestown pike, but soon turned, the left coming out on the Valley pike near Darkesville, where we encamped for the night.
The next day we crossed the Potomac, encamping about midway between Williamsport and Hagerstown.
On the 26th, we passed through Hagerstown, taking the road to Chambersburg, Pa., encamping for the night near Greencastle, Pa.
The march was resumed the following day, and we passed through Chambersburg, encamping about 3 miles north of that place, and on the road to Carlisle.
We remained near Chambersburg until the morning of July 2. On that day we marched to within a few miles of the battle-field of Gettysburg, and went into camp, after a very long and tiresome march both to men and horses. That evening about dusk, orders were received to move at once to the field of battle, which was done, my battalion encamping (or rather bivouacking) for the night in rear of the line of battle of the First Corps.
About daybreak the next morning (the morning of July 3), it marched to the field of battle, and was, later in the morning, put in position on the crest of the hill immediately in front of the enemy's position, which was assailed by General Pickett's division. On my left and rear was Colonel Cabell's Artillery Battalion, and on my right and rear was the Washington Artillery Battalion. Early that morning, the enemy threw forward a strong line of skirmishers in front of my position, and, having no infantry to drive them away, Captain [R. M.] Stribling's battery was ordered to drive them in, which was done by firing about a dozen rounds. Several of my men and horses were wounded by these sharpshooters. There was no more firing from my battalion until the signal guns for the commencement of the general attack were fired.
Maj. J.P. W. Read, who was superintending the firing of Captain Stribling's battery in the morning, was wounded in the head by a fragment of shell. Though not dangerous, the wound was painful. Major Read did not leave the army on account of this wound, but has been with it all of the time.
When the signal guns were fired, I at once brought my battalion in battery to the front, and commenced firing slowly and deliberately. To insure more accuracy and to guard against the waste of ammunition, I fired by battery. The firing on the part of my battalion was very good, and most of the shell and shrapnel burst well. My fire was directed at the batteries immediately in my front, and which occupied the heights charged by Pickett's division. Three caissons were seen by myself to blow up, and I saw several batteries of the enemy leave the field. At one time, just before General Pickett's division advanced, the batteries of the enemy in our front had nearly all ceased firing; only a few scattering batteries here and there could be seen to fire.
About this time my ammunition became completely exhausted, excepting a few rounds in my rifled guns, which were used upon a column of infantry which advanced on General Pickett's right flank. I had sent back my caissons an hour and a half before for a fresh supply, but they could not get it. Two of my batteries and a part of Captain [G. V.] Moody's battery, of Colonel Alexander's battalion, under command of Captain Moody, remained under a very heavy fire for upward of an hour without being able to fire a single shot. My own batteries remained on the field after every round of ammunition was exhausted and until I could receive some fresh batteries which Colonel Alexander sent to me.
Captain Moody's four 24-pounder howitzers, two of Captain [Joe] Norcom's guns, and one of Captain [M. B.] Miller's, and Captain [O. B.] Taylor's battery were sent to me. I put them in position, and succeeded in driving back the column of infantry which was at that time advancing. This was near 6 o'clock, as nearly as I can recollect. After the enemy was driven back at this point, nothing but desultory picket firing could be heard on that part of the line for the rest of the day.
In this engagement, Captain Stribling's battery had 3 men wounded and 10 horses killed and left on the field. Captain [M. C.] Macon had 3 men killed. 3 wounded, and 8 horses killed and left on the field; Captain [W. H.] Caskie, 3 men wounded and 7 horses killed and left on the field; Captain [J. G.] Blount had 5 men killed and wounded, and 12 horses killed. There were others so slightly wounded as not to unfit them for duty, and, consequently, not reported.
Captain Moody and the others who served under my orders that day will, of course, hand in their reports to their respective battalion commanders.
The behavior of officers and men was all that could be desired by any commander. They were all cool, collected, and in earnest, and perfectly indifferent to danger. In the field and staff, Major Read was wounded, as above mentioned, early in the morning. The horse of my color-bearer and courier was shot under him while bearing the flag along the line. There were no other casualties.
On the morning of July 4, I took position in line of battle with General McLaws' division, to the right and rear of the position occupied by me on the 3d. It was nearly the same position occupied by Colonel Alexander on July 2. I remained in line of battle until nearly sundown, when I was ordered back to what was known as the Black Horse Tavern, to join in the line of march of the corps.
We did not leave that point until about sun-up on the morning of the 5th. We stopped an hour or so in the middle of the day at Fayetteville. There I was ordered to report to Col. E. P. Alexander, who was put in command of the Reserve Artillery, First Corps. That evening we continued our march, stopping for the night on the top of South Mountain, at a place called Monterey Springs.
On the morning of July 6, we proceeded in the direction of Hagerstown, Md. After marching a mile or so, I was ordered by Colonel Alexander to send two batteries to report to General Pickett, who had charge of the prisoners. I sent Captain Stribling's and Captain Macon's batteries, under command of Captain Stribling. With the remainder of my command, we marched through Hagerstown the same day, taking the Sharpsburg pike, and went into camp that night about 2 miles from Hagerstown.
From this time to July 10, nothing of interest occurred. Some of my batteries were on picket, and I was engaged in getting horses to supply the places of those killed and broken down. During this time, Captain Stribling was ordered back with the two detached batteries to the battalion.
On July 10, I was ordered over to the right of our line, near a place called Downsville, not far from Saint James' College. Here, under direction of Colonel Alexander, we took up an excellent position in line of battle, and hastily dug very excellent pits for all of our guns.
We remained in line of battle until the night of July 13, when we took up the line of march for the pontoon bridges at Failing Waters.
I crossed the bridge about 7 o'clock in the morning of July 14, and continued the march until within 4 miles of Martinsburg, Va., where we rested until the morning of the 15th, when the march was continued to Bunker Hill, where we went into camp, and rested until the 19th, when we marched to Smithfield.
From there, on the 20th, we continued our march through Berryville to Millwood, where we encamped for the night.
At 3 a.m. of the 21st, I sent two batteries, under Major Read (who, though not recovered, was anxious to go), in advance with General Corse's brigade, of Pickett's division. With the remainder of the battalion, I came along with General Pickett, to whom I have been reattached on being relieved from further duty with the Reserve Artillery at Bunker Hill, on July 17.
The advance of my battalion, under Major Read, after a rapid march and crossing both forks of the Shenandoah, one of which was very deep, succeeded in reaching Chester Gap just before the enemy. Major Read made a judicious selection of positions, and when the enemy (two brigades and a battery) advanced, they were handsomely driven back by Captain Blount's and Captain Caskie's batteries, under Major Read, without the assistance of the infantry.
The rest of my battalion crossed about daylight on the morning of July 22 on the pontoons, which were just completed, and, after reaching the summit of the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, rested there until 6 p.m., when the march was continued in the night to Gaines' CrossRoads, where all of my command arrived about 3 a.m. of the 23d, excepting Caskie's battery, which was rear guard, and did not get up until 7 a.m.
At 10 a.m. on the 23d, I started for Culpeper Court-House, going by the Sperryville pike, the infantry going the dirt road. I encamped that night a mile and a half south of Woodville, and, starting early next morning, reached my old camp near Culpeper CourtHouse about 2 p.m. on July 24, both horses and men very much jaded and worn out for want of proper food and rest.
From the time I arrived at Downsville, Md., July 10, until July 25, my horses had not a mouthful of corn, and subsisted entirely on wheat and grass, or new hay. I was also in great need of horseshoes; and from these causes and the long and frequent marches day and night a good many of my animals broke down and had to be abandoned on the road. I lost nothing in the way of guns, caissons, harness, or equipments of any kind.
At the battle of Gettysburg, Colonel Alexander being unable to man a 20-pounder Parrott, and such guns being much needed, I exchanged a 12-pounder howitzer with him for it. I have the 20-pounder Parrott gun now.
While in line of battle on July 4, I sent off by some teams two 12-pounder howitzers left on the field in rear of General McLaws' position. Also, I got a wagon, and made my men dismount a piece which had its axle and wheels broken in the engagement of July 2, and placed the piece in a wagon, and fastened the rear part of the caisson on to the wagon also, and sent them off. These pieces belonged to Colonel Alexander's battalion. I think one of the 12-pounder howitzers was the one he had exchanged with me for his 20-pounder Parrott.
The behavior of my command in this campaign has met with my entire approbation. There was no straggling, no molesting of private property, and the willingness and promptitude with which all orders were obeyed reflect much credit upon them.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAMES DEARING,
Major, Comdg. Battalion Artillery, First Corps.

 

 

Report of Col. James L. Sheffield, Forty-eighth Alabama Infantry.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

AUGUST 7, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to give a statement of the part taken by the Forty-eighth Alabama in the battle of Gettysburg, on July 2 and 3.
On the morning of the 2d ultimo, this regiment, with the brigade, marched from New Guilford to the field, a distance of 20 miles, where we were placed in line of battle in the open field, where Companies A and H were ordered on picket. After lying in line of battle a half hour, we were ordered forward, and advanced a distance of 1 mile over a very rough and rugged road--the worst cliffs of rocks there could have been traveled over.
On reaching the enemy's lines, where they were well and strongly situated, I ordered my regiment forward, which was gallantly obeyed until within about 20 paces of their line. Here the fire of the enemy was severe. Here the men opened fire on the enemy, and for some time continued, until the left, from the loss of men and their exposed position to a fire front the front and from the mountain on the right, were forced to fall back. The right steadily maintained its position for some time, forcing the enemy to withdraw from their first line and establish their line a short distance to their rear, where they continued their fire. After the contest had continued for an hour and a half, and my whole regiment had been brought to the front the third time, only to be driven back, I ordered them to reform in the rear of their advanced position. While doing this, I was ordered to take command of the brigade. After this, the regiment was commanded by Capt. T. J. Eubanks, who reformed and carried it to the front, where the battle-ground was held during the night, bringing off our wounded.
In this battle the regiment had 275 men engaged. There were 102 killed, wounded, and missing.
On the 3d ultimo, the regiment was withdrawn a short distance, where we remained during the day, excepting while engaged in a short fight with cavalry.
At night, we were still farther withdrawn to the rear. The men and officers acted very well.
I cannot close without speaking of those who acted most conspicuously during the hottest of the conflict. Lieutenants IF. M.] Burk and [R. T.] Ewing and Captains Eubanks and [Jeremiah] Edwards are especially noticed for their gallantry in leading their men forward and remaining in front of their commands encouraging their men.
Lieutenant-Colonel [W. M.] Hardwick and Major [C. B.] St. John were very efficient in performing their part until wounded.
It is proper to state that in the account of missing, 24 men were taken prisoners, with Captain Edwards and Lieutenant [T. L.] Christian (of General Law's staff), while posting pickets after night on the 2d ultimo.

Very respectfully,
J. L. SHEFFIELD,
Colonel Forty-eighth Alabama Regiment.

 

 

Report of Brig. Gen. J. B. Robertson, C. S. Army, commanding brigade
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS TEXAS BRIGADE,
Near Bunker Hill, Va., July 17, 1863.

Maj. W. H. SELLERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Hood's Division.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit through you my report of the action of my brigade in the battle of Gettysburg, on July 2 and 3. I have been too much occupied with the duties imposed by the marches and maneuvers we have gone through to allow me to make this report at an earlier time.
The division arrived on the ground in front of the position of the enemy that we were to attack but a few minutes before we were ordered to advance. I therefore got but a glance at the field on which we had to operate before we entered upon it. I was ordered to keep my right well closed on Brigadier-General Law's left, and to let my left rest on the Emmitsburg pike. I had advanced but a short distance when I discovered that my brigade would not fill the space between General Law's left and the pike named, and that I must leave the pike, or disconnect myself from General Law, on my right. Understanding before the action commenced that the attack on our part was to be general, and that the force of General McLaws was to advance simultaneously with us on my immediate left, and seeing at once that a mountain held by the enemy in heavy force with artillery to the right of General Law's center was the key to the enemy's left, I abandoned the pike, and closed on General Law's left. This caused some separation of my regiments, which was remedied as promptly as the numerous stone and rail fences that intersected the field through which we were advancing would allow.
As we advanced through this field, for half a mile we were exposed to a heavy and destructive fire of canister, grape, and shell from six pieces of their artillery on the mountain alluded to, and the same number on a commanding hill but a short distance to the left of the mountain, and from the enemy's sharpshooters from behind the numerous rocks, fences, and houses in the field.
As we approached the base of the mountain, General Law moved to the right, and I was moving obliquely to the right to close on him, when my whole line encountered the fire of the enemy's main line, posted behind rocks and a stone fence. The Fourth and Fifth Texas Regiments, under the direction of their gallant commanders (Colonels Powell and Key), while returning the fire and driving the enemy before them, continued to close on General Law, to their right. At the same time, the First Texas and Third Arkansas, under their gallant commanders (Lieutenant-Colonel [P. A.] Work and Colonel Manning), were hotly engaged with a greatly superior force, while at the same time a heavy force appeared and opened fire on Colonel Manning's left, seriously threatening his left flank, to meet which he threw two or three companies with their front to his left flank, and protected his left.
On discovering this heavy force on my left flank, and seeing that no attack was being made by any of our forces on my left, I at once sent a courier to Major-General Hood, stating that I was hard pressed on my left; that General McLaws' forces were not engaging the enemy to my left (which enabled him to move fresh troops from that part of his line down on me), and that I must have re-enforcements.
Lieutenant-Colonel Work, with the First Texas Regiment, having pressed forward to the crest of the hill and driven the enemy from his battery, I ordered him to the left, to the relief and support of Colonel Manning, directing Major [F. S.] Bass with two companies to hold the hill, while Colonel Work with the rest of the regiment went to Colonel Manning's relief. With this assistance, Colonel Manning drove the enemy back, and entered the woods after him, when the enemy reoccupied the hill and his batteries in Colonel Work's front, from which Colonel Work again drove him.
For an hour and upward, these two regiments maintained one of the hottest contests, against five or six times their number, that I have witnessed. The moving of Colonel Work to the left, to relieve Colonel Manning while the Fourth and Fifth Texas were closing to the right on General Law's brigade, separated these two regiments from the others. They were steadily moving to the right and front, driving the enemy before them, when they passed the woods or ravine to my right. After finding that I could not move the First and Third to the right to join them, I sent to recall them, ordering them to move to the left until the left of the Fourth should rest on the right of the First; but my messenger found two of General Law's regiments on the left of my two (the Fourth and Fifth Texas), and did not find these regiments at all.
About this time my aide, Lieutenant Scott, reported my two regiments (the Fourth and Fifth Texas) in the center of General Law s brigade, and that they could not be moved without greatly injuring his line. I sent a request to General Law to look to them.
At this point, my assistant adjutant and inspector general reported from the Fourth and Fifth that they were hotly engaged, and wanted re-enforcements. My courier, sent to General Hood, returned, and reported him wounded and carried from the field. I sent a messenger to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for re-enforcements, and at the same time sent to Generals [George T.] Anderson and Benning, urging them to hurry up to my support. They came up, joined us, and fought gallantly; but as fast as we would break one line of the enemy, another fresh one would present itself, the enemy re-enforcing his lines in our front from his reserves at the base of the mountain to our right and front, and from his lines to our left. Having no attack from us in his front, he threw his forces from there on us.
Before the arrival of Generals Anderson and Benning, Col. J. C. G. Key, who gallantly led the Fourth Texas Regiment in, up to the time of receiving a severe wound, passed me, being led to the rear. About the same time, I learned of the fall and dangerous wounding of Col. R. M. Powell, of the Fifth, who fell while gallantly leading his regiment in one of the impetuous charges of the Fourth and Fifth Texas on the strongly fortified mountain.
Just after the arrival of General Anderson on my left, I learned that the gallant Col. Van H. Manning, of the Third Arkansas, had been wounded and carried from the field, and about the same time I received intelligence of the wounding and being carried from the field of those two able and efficient officers, Lieut. Cols. K. Bryan, of the Fifth, and B. F. Carter, of the Fourth, both of whom were wounded while bravely discharging their duty. Captain [J. R.] Woodward, acting major of the First Texas, was wounded near me while gallantly discharging his duty.
The Fourth and Fifth Texas, under the command of Majors [J. P.] Bane and [J. C.] Rogers, continued to hold the ground of their original line, leaving the space over which they had made their successive charges strewn with their wounded and dead comrades, many of whom could not be removed, and were left upon the field. The First Texas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Work, with a portion of Benning's brigade,-held the field and the batteries taken by the First Texas. Three of the guns were brought off the field and secured; the other three, from the nature of the ground and their proximity to the enemy, were left. The Third Arkansas, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel [R. S.] Taylor, ably assisted by Major [J. W.] Reedy, after Colonel Manning was borne from the field, sustained well the high character it made in the earlier part of the action.
When night closed the conflict, late in the evening, I was struck above the knee, which deprived me of the use of my leg, and prevented me from getting about the field. I retired some 200 yards to the rear, leaving the immediate command with Lieutenant-Colonel Work, the senior officer present, under whose supervision our wounded were brought out and guns secured, and our dead on that part of the field were buried the next day.
About 2 o'clock that night, the First Texas and Third Arkansas were moved by the right to the position occupied by the Fourth and Fifth, and formed on their left, where the brigade remained during the day of the 3d, keeping up a continuous skirmishing with the enemy's sharpshooters, in which we had a number of our men severely wounded. I sent my assistant adjutant-general, Capt. F. L. Price, at daybreak to examine the position of the brigade, and report to me as soon as he could, and, while in the discharge of that duty, was either killed or fell into the hands of the enemy, as he has not been seen or heard of since.
About dark on the evening of the 3d, the brigade, with the division, fell back to the hill, and formed in line, where it remained during the 4th.
Lieutenant [J. R.] Loughridge, commanding Company I, Fourth Texas, who commanded the skirmishers in front of the Fourth, and who was left when that regiment moved to the right, joined the First Texas, and did gallant service during the engagement.
In this, the hardest fought battle of the war in which I have been engaged, all, both officers and men, as far as my observation extended, fully sustained the high character they have heretofore made. Where all behaved so nobly, individual distinction cannot with propriety be made.
I cannot close this report without expressing my thanks to my personal staff for the able and satisfactory manner in which they discharged their duties. The wounding of so many commanding officers, among them the division commander, rendered their duties peculiarly arduous. They were discharged with zeal and promptness. Capt. F. L. Price, my assistant adjutant-general, whose loss on the morning of the 3d I have to deplore, was an active, efficient officer, and did his duty nobly. My aide-de-camp, Lieut. John G. Scott, my assistant adjutant and inspector general, Lieut. John W. Kerr, and Lieut. John Grace, volunteer aide, discharged their duties with a promptness and ability that merit special notice.
A list of the casualties in the several regiments, together with the reports from each of the regimental commanders, is herewith submitted.

J. B. ROBERTSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

 

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS BENNING'S BRIGADE,
August 3, 1863.

Maj. W. H. SELLERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: In obedience to an order from the headquarters of this division, I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the operations of this brigade since it left Culpeper Court-House for the other side of the Potomac:
About 2 or 3 p.m. on July 2, ultimo, I was informed by Major-General Hood that his division, as the right of Lieutenant-General Longstreet's corps, was about to attack the left of the enemy's line, and that in the attack my brigade would follow Law's brigade at the distance of about 400 yards. In order to get to the place they assigned me, in the rear of General Law, it was necessary to move the brigade 500 or 600 yards farther to the right. Having clone this, I advanced in line of battle. A wood intervened between us and the enemy, which, though it did not prevent their shells from reaching us and producing some casualties, yet completely hid them from our view. On emerging from the woods, their position became visible. Before us, at the distance of 600 or 800 yards, was an oblong mountain peak, or spur, presenting to us a steep face, much roughened by rocks. To the right, 400 or 500 yards from the peak, was the main mountain itself, with a side that looked almost perpendicular. Its summit overlooked the peak just sufficiently to command it well. On the summit of the peak were three pieces of artillery, and a little in advance of them, on a sort of uneven, irregular shelf, were three others. To the right and left of the battery, as well as immediately in its rear, were lines of infantry, as we afterward ascertained. This formed the enemy's first line of battle.
On the top of the mountain itself, and a little to the right of the peak, were five other guns. These commanded our approaches to the peak, for nearly the whole way. To the right and left of these guns extended the enemy's second line of infantry. Where that line crossed the gorge running between the peak and the mountain, a point 500 or 600 yards in the rear of the peak, were two other guns. This we ascertained when the right of the brigade reached the gorge, by the terrible fire from them which swept down the gorge.
Thus, what we had to encounter were thirteen guns, and two, if not more, lines of infantry posted on mountain heights. The intervening spur over which we had to march to reach the first line was nearly all open. Our own first line also became visible advancing about 400 yards in our front. The part of it in our front I took to be Law's brigade, and so I followed it. In truth, it was Robertson's, Law's being farther to the right. This I did not discover until late in the fight, a wood on the right concealing from me most of Law's brigade. My line continued to follow the first line, halting once or twice to preserve its interval. At length I saw that the first line would not be able alone to carry the peak, so I advanced without halting again.
When my line reached the foot of the peak, I found there a part of the First Texas, struggling to make the ascent, the rest of the brigade having gone to the right and left--the Fourth and Fifth Texas to the right, and the Third Arkansas to the left. The part of the First Texas referred to falling in with my brigade, the whole line commenced ascending the rugged steep and (on the right) crossing the gorge. The ground was difficult--rocks in many places presenting, by their precipitous sides, insurmountable obstacles, while the fire of the enemy was very heavy and very deadly. The progress was, therefore, not very rapid, but it was regular and uninterrupted. After awhile the enemy were driven from their three front guns. The advance continued, and at length they were driven completely from the peak, but they carried with them the three rear guns on its summit, its sudden descent on the other side favoring the operation, so that we captured only the three front guns. These were 10-pounder Parrotts. A number of prisoners also were taken--more, I suppose, than 100. The peak being thus taken and the enemy's first line driven behind his second, I made my dispositions to hold the ground gained, which was all that I could do, as I was then much in advance of every other part of our line of battle, and the second line of the enemy on the mountain itself was in a position which seemed to me almost impregnable to any merely front attack even with fresh men. Indeed, to hold the ground we had appeared a difficult task. The shells of the enemy from the adjacent mountain were incessantly bursting along the summit of the peak, and every head that showed itself was the target for a Minie ball. Several attempts by flank movements were made to dislodge us, but by the gallantry of the regiments on the right and left they all failed. We held the position until late next day, when we were ordered back to the crest of the wooded hill from which we first saw the enemy on the clay before.
Our loss was heavy, not less than 400 in killed, wounded, and missing. Of this number, an unusually large proportion were killed and badly wounded. Among the killed were Col. John A. Jones, of the Twentieth Georgia, and Lieut. Col. William T. Harris, commanding the Second Georgia. Colonel Jones was killed late in the action, not far from the captured guns, after the enemy's forces were driven from the position and they had themselves opened upon it with shell from their other batteries, a fragment of one of which, glancing from a rock, passed through his brain. He had behaved with great coolness and gallantly. He fell just as success came in sight. Colonel Harris was farther to the right, where he and his regiment were exposed to the terrible fire of the two pieces which swept the gorge, as well as to the infantry fire of the enemy's left. A ball passed through his heart, killing him instantly. His gallantry had been most conspicuous.
I had no means of ascertaining the precise loss of the enemy. In killed and wounded it must have been large. Dead and wounded lay scattered over the ground of the conflict and of the retreat. From the latter they were removed by the enemy during the night. We took about 300 prisoners in all.
The conduct of both officers and men was generally, as far as I could observe it, excellent. Under a fire from so many cannon, and toward the last from so much musketry, they advanced steadily over ground for the most part open, mounted a difficult height, drove back from it the enemy, occupied his line, took three guns, captured a number of prisoners, and against his utmost efforts held all they had gained. The captured guns were taken by the Twentieth Georgia (Colonel Jones, and after his death Lieutenant-Colonel Waddell), the part of the First Texas above referred to (Colonel Work), and the Seventeenth Georgia (Colonel Hodges); but the honor of the capture was not exclusively theirs. They could not have taken (certainly could not have held) the guns if Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, and after his death Major [William S.] Shepherd, on the left with the Second Georgia, and Colonel Du Bose, with the Fifteenth Georgia, on the right, had not by the hardest kind of fighting and at great loss, protected their flanks. Colonel Du Bose not only drove back the enemy's line, but repulsed repeated attacks made to recover it, taking over 100 prisoners. The same may be said of the Second, excepting that it did not take so many prisoners.
To my staff--Capt. Seaborn J. Benning, adjutant, Lieut. John R. Mott, aide, and Lieut. Herman H. Perry, brigade inspector, voluntarily acting as aide---I was much indebted. They performed well duties that kept them in almost constant danger. The former having been disabled by a wound, the whole weight of staff duty toward the end of the fight fell upon the two latter.
At the close of the day the fighting ceased, and I employed the night in arranging my line, establishing pickets, and removing the wounded. The last was a work of great labor, as, owing to some fault or mistake in the surgeon having charge of the brigade ambulances, but two of them made their appearance, so that the labor to the litter-bearers became very heavy.
The enemy employed the whole night in throwing up two lines of breastworks, one above the other, on the mountain side. These works were formed from the loose stones which abounded on the surface of the mountain. The sound of the stones dropping into place could be distinctly heard from our line during the whole night. The morning light revealed the two long lines completed. The upper line was sufficiently above the lower for its fire to pass over the lower. The crest was still frowning, with its old line greatly strengthened since the day before. From this line the fire of both artillery and infantry would pass over both of the lines below.
Until late in the afternoon, nothing occurred more important than picket firing. About 5 o'clock, two or three pickets of McLaws' division came to me, and told me that the troops of General McLaws had for some hours been withdrawn from my left, leaving my flank entirely exposed. This was the first notice I had of that movement, so important to my brigade. I immediately ordered the strongest picket force I could spare to the abandoned post of General McLaws' line.
Shortly afterward, a courier from General Law came to me, and told me that General Law wished me to move to the crest of the hill. I asked him what crest--what hill. He said all he knew was that General Law waved his hand thus (making a wave of his hand). I was much at a loss to know what the wave meant. It seemed to me, however, to be in the direction of a ridge that ran through the woods toward the ground from which McLaws' troops had been withdrawn, and I concluded that the object of the order was to cause me to occupy that ground. Consequently, I immediately gave Colonel Du Bose orders to take his regiment along the crest to that ground, his regiment being most convenient, at the beginning of the crest. He moved off at once.
In a few minutes afterward, I received what was the same order from General Law, but this time clearly and in a very different sense. It was to move back immediately to the crest of the hill from which we had advanced the day before. I gave the necessary orders, and the three regiments remaining in position commenced moving out.
A little afterward, I heard a heavy infantry fire on the left, in the direction in which Colonel Du Bose had gone. Subsequently I learned from him that, after following the ridge for 500 or 600 yards, he suddenly found himself in the immediate presence of two long lines of the enemy, one almost at right angles to the other, with his own line between the two, the head of it being not far from the angle they made with each other. They opened fire on him, which he returned, so as to check their advance a little. He then fell back, and, availing himself of a stone fence, fought his way out, not, however, without a heavy loss in prisoners and some loss in killed and wounded.
He was fortunate to escape at all. His escape is high evidence both of his skill and courage. I did not go to his assistance, because, when I heard the fire, it seemed to be (and was, indeed) so far on my left that I thought some of General McLaws' men had been sent forward to check an advance of the enemy, and that it came from a collision between them and the enemy. The other three regiments got out with slight loss.
The whole loss of the brigade in the movement to the rear was about 100, of which about 80 or 90 belonged to the Fifteenth Georgia. A report of the killed, wounded, and missing for the two days has been sent up. The total was 509. The loss on the first day was about 400.
The next day (the 4th), the division was formed in line of battle, facing down the Emmitsburg road, and was ordered to erect breastworks, which it did. My brigade was on the left, its left resting on that road.
About 12 o'clock at night, the division commenced moving back toward Hagerstown, by Fairfield, my brigade bringing up the rear.
Nothing more of much interest happened to the brigade until the division had crossed the Shenandoah. It crossed that river at Berry's Ford by wading, and found the water deep and swift.
At dawn the next day [23d], the division took the road from Front Royal to Linden, by Manassas Gap. It found the Gap occupied by the enemy's cavalry and artillery, with pickets some distance in their front, and some regiments of cavalry between these and the Gap. My brigade was stretched across the road (relieving a portion of General Corse's brigade), on a ridge parallel with the Gap, and such dispositions were made by General Law on my flanks with the other brigades that the enemy's pickets soon fell back a mile or more, and his reserve regiments quite to the Gap.
Toward night, General Law informed me that he would soon move the other three brigades of the division over to the Chester Gap road, and stay there during the night, and at the same time ordered me to remain with my brigade and the Fourth Alabama Regiment until relieved by Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill, and then to follow the division, and overtake it as soon as possible. He stated that General Hill was to relieve me during the night, or, at furthest, by daybreak. So I remained, but it was 9 a.m. before I was relieved. I then started to overtake the division.
When I reached the Chester Gap road, I found it filled with the rear of General Hill's long wagon train, the rest of that train and all of his troops having already passed. To get by these wagons and the artillery in the mountain road, was a work of no small difficulty. It was near night before I could do it. I succeeded, however, in passing them and the corps which had bivouacked near Flint Hill, and with my brigade bivouacked 2 miles this side of Flint Hill.
At daylight next day, the march was resumed. I halted for an hour or more at Gaines' Cross-Roads, which is 2 miles this side of my camp of the night before, to wait for the Fifteenth Alabama Regiment (Colonel Oates), which was holding the mountain road until General Hill's corps should come up and relieve it. That regiment having joined me, the march was resumed, General Hill's corps being close behind me.
When near Newby's Cross-Roads, 2 men of the cavalry, coming from one of those roads which leads to Amissville, dashed up to me, and told me that, as they were going over toward Amissville to get their horses shod, they had met a squad of Yankee cavalry coming from the opposite direction. Colonel [W. C.] Oates immediately proposed to take his regiment, which was in front, and go forward and make a reconnaissance. I accepted his services, and he advanced beyond the crossing of the roads. Very soon his skirmishers were engaged with those of the enemy. After some time, as I heard and saw nothing but skirmishing, I concluded to move on, General Hill sending me word that he would relieve Colonel Oates and let him follow me.
After moving on less than half a mile, a shell, much to my surprise, passed over my line, and then others in rapid succession. They had been fired by the enemy at our skirmishers. My-line was concealed from the enemy by an intervening hill and the cut of the road, so I continued to move on unharmed.
When I had almost reached the ford of Hazel River, I received a request from General Hill to wait for his artillery, and let it follow me. I accordingly halted. After waiting for some time, there came to me, instead of artillery, another message from General Hill, to the effect that it was necessary to drive the enemy back from their position in the mountain, and that he wished me to move my command on their flank and rear to the road by which they had come, and thus cut off their retreat, and to do this by a route which the bearer of the message (Lieutenant [Robert C.] Stanard) would show me.
The request seemed reasonable. The enemy had evidently gotten artillery into a mountain position difficult to be carried by a front attack, from which position they commanded the road at several points, including, I think, the ford, and thus, unless dislodged, could greatly annoy troops and trains passing by, if not stop their progress. My command was the one most conveniently situated to execute the suggested movement. I thought it right, therefore, to accede to General Hill's request. Signifying this to Lieutenant Stanard, he went forward as guide, and I followed him with the brigade and the Fourth Alabama Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel [L. H.] Scruggs. The route was so well chosen that we passed through the enemy's picket line, and got near enough to the road in their rear to command it before they discovered us.
Before fire was opened, Captain [J. B.] Newell, Second Georgia, commanding the skirmishers, reported to me a battery considerably on my right, just across the road, in a field. I moved to the right in the woods to get near it, and seize it before it could run back. The wood was thick. I got the right of the brigade opposite the battery, and then ordered an advance in line of battle. When the line emerged from the wood, the battery was gone. It had run back the way it came, having found out our presence by the fire which had opened between their skirmishers and ours. Our line fired upon such of the enemy as were in sight. Those of the latter who were not disabled fled in confusion to the opposite wood, where, on the left, was another battery, as I had just learned by its fire. The road, I found when the line reached it, a good place for protection against this battery, and also for assailing the cavalry on their expected retreat. I therefore halted in it. I now thought we had their cannon and cavalry secured. I had been assured by Lieutenant Stanard, as well as by citizens, that there was no practicable way to Amissville excepting this road occupied by the brigade, all others being excluded by the mountain and its spurs.
They were mistaken. The enemy found another road nearer to the mountain, and by it escaped with their artillery and most of their cavalry. We took a few of them prisoners, and killed and wounded more.
As soon as it was clear that the enemy had retreated, at the suggestion of General Hill, I returned to the ford, and resumed the march, the command having spent four hours, marched at least 4 miles over very difficult ground, and fought a brisk fight with cavalry and artillery in the détour.
Such was the part contributed by the brigade and the Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama to the defeat of a well-laid plan of the enemy, organized on rather a large scale, to impede the march and cut off the trains of a large part of our army. They must have had two, if not three, brigades of cavalry and two or three batteries of artillery.
This, major, is a much longer report than I would have had it to be, but, under the order requiring it, I do not see how it could have been shorter. Indeed, I have omitted some things showing the arduousness of the long march, which are, perhaps, called for by the order.
I must, in closing, ask leave to pay a tribute to the merit of the brigade in that respect. There was no straggling to speak of, either on the advance or the return. The rolls when we arrived at Gettysburg showed almost the same number which they showed when we left Culpeper Court-House; so they showed on our return to Culpeper Court-House almost the same number which they showed when we left Gettysburg.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY L. BENNING,
Brigadier-General.

 

Report of Maj. M. W. Henry, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, HOOD'S DIVISION,
Fredericksburg, August 23, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, First Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following journal of this battalion:

June 15.--Left camp near this place (Culpeper Court-House), and marched to Little Washington, Rappahannock County, a distance of 31 miles.
June 16.--Left camp near Little Washington, and marched to Markham Station, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, a distance of 20 miles.
June 17.--Marched to Upperville, 15 miles.
June 18.--Marched to Snicker's Ford, on the Shenandoah River, 18 miles.
June 19.--Took position at Snicker's Gap.
June 20.--Left position at Snicker's Gap. Recrossed the river, and encamped. Before the battalion was ordered to recross, the river rose, and upward of 400 rounds of ammunition in the chest were destroyed.
June 21.--Remained in camp near Snicker's Ford.
June 22.--Marched 10 miles, and encamped near Millwood.
June 23.--Remained in camp.
June 24.--Marched 20 miles, and encamped near Bunker Hill.
June 25.--Marched 20 miles, and encamped near Falling Waters, Potomac River.
June 26.--Crossed the Potomac River at Williamsport, and marched 20 miles, to Greencastle, Pa.
June 27.--Marched 18 miles, to Chambersburg, Pa.
June 28.--Remained in camp. All prisoners released, by order of General Lee.
June 29.--Remained in camp.
June 30.--Marched 8 miles, to Fayetteville, Pa.
July 1.--Left camp (Fayetteville) in the afternoon, and marched 10 miles on the road to Gettysburg, Pa.
July 2.--Left camp, marched to Gettysburg, and took position in the afternoon on the right of our line, and engaged the enemy's artillery with two batteries, Captains [James] Reilly and [A. C.] Latham. During the evening, one 3-inch rifle belonging to Captain Reilly's battery burst. Captured and brought off the field this night three 10-pounder Parrott rifles.
July 3.--Engaged the enemy again in the same position with the whole battalion. During the two days' fighting, lost 4 men killed and 23 wounded. Expended about 1,500 rounds of ammunition.
July 4.--Changed position, and remained on battle-field until 6 p.m.; then took up line of march, and continued it through the night. Hauled off one 6-pounder bronze field piece and one 12-pounder howitzer, for which the captured Parrott guns had been substituted.
July 5.--Still marching. At 2 p.m. took up camp on the South Mountain. The 6-pounder and 12-pounder howitzers, having merely the gun-carriage attached, were abandoned necessarily for the want of the proper means of transportation.
July 6.--Marched 16 miles, and encamped near Hagerstown, Md.
July 7, 8, and 9.--Remained in camp.
July 10.--Left camp, and took position on the right of the line of battle, in the vicinity of Downsville, Md.
July 11 and 12.--Remained in position.
July 13.--Took up line of march at 8 p.m., on the road to the Potomac River.
July 14.--Recrossed the Potomac River on the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters, and marched to Martinsburg, 8 miles.
July 15.--Marched 12 miles, and encamped near Darkesville, Va. July 16.--Marched 5 miles, and encamped near Bunker Hill. July 17, 18, and 19.--Remained in camp.
July 20.--Marched 20 miles, and encamped near Millwood.
July 21.--Marched 20 miles, and encamped on the Shenandoah River.
July 22.--Crossed the Shenandoah, and encamped 2 miles beyond Front Royal, at Chester Gap.
July 23.--Marched 18 miles, and encamped near Little Washington.
July 24.--Marched 27 miles, and encamped near Culpeper CourtHouse, Va.
July 24 to August 1.--Remained in camp.
August 1.--Left camp, marched 12 miles, and encamped near Somerville Ford, on the Rapidan River.
August 2.--Crossed the Rapidan River, marched 9 miles, and encamped near Rapidan Station, Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
August 3 and 4.--Remained in camp.
August 5.--Marched 20 miles, and encamped on the battle-field of Chancellorsville.
August 6.--Marched 12 miles, and encamped near Fredericksburg.
August 23.--Have remained in camp up to date.

M. W. HENRY,
Major, Commanding Artillery Battalion.

Per L. MITCHELL,
Adjutant.

 

Reports of Maj. B. F. Eshleman, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

AUGUST 11, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, First Corps.

COLONEL: I have the honor to transmit the following report of the operations of the Washington Artillery Battalion under my command at the battle of Gettysburg, Pa., July 3:
I moved my command, in obedience to orders, from Culpeper Court-House, on June 15, in the direction of Winchester. Crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 25th; arrived at Chambersburg, Pa., on the 27th; crossed the South Mountain at Cashtown Gap on July 1, and arrived on the 2d near the battle-field of Gettysburg.
Owing to the excessive heat, dry weather, and dust, the march was a severe one, but the endurance of the men and animals proved equal to the task, and my command arrived at Gettysburg in good fighting condition. On arriving within about 3 miles of the battlefield, by your direction, I went into park to await orders. Just before dark, your orders came to move speedily to the front. I mounted my cannoneers, and moved forward at a trot, but before reaching the old school-house the firing had ceased, and, it being dark, you ordered me again into park.
About midnight, I received orders from Colonel Alexander, commanding reserve artillery, to take position on the field before daylight, and with his assistance I placed my battalion, consisting of eight Napoleon guns and two 12-pounder howitzers, as follows, viz: Three Napoleons (Third Company), Lieutenants [Andrew] Hero, jr., and [Frank] McElroy, and one Napoleon (First Company), Lieutenant [C. H. C.] Brown, all under command of Captain [M. B.] Miller, about 100 yards to the left of the peach orchard, and on the immediate left of Captain [O. B.] Taylor's battery, of Alexander's battalion; two Napoleons (Fourth Company), Captain Norcom and Lieutenant Battles, on Captain Miller's left, and two Napoleons (Second Company), Captain [J. B.] Richardson and Lieutenant [Samuel] Hawes, on the left of Captain Norcom. The two howitzers--one of the Second and one of the Fourth Company--were held in reserve, under command of Lieutenant [George E.] Apps, Fourth Company.
As soon as day broke and the enemy's lines became visible, it was apparent that to provide against an enfilade fire, the left of my line had better be thrown a little to the rear. Colonel Alexander having approved the proposed change, Captain Norcom's battery was retired about 30 yards, and Captain Richardson's moved about 200 yards to the left and to the rear of Norcom, forming en échelon by batteries. Major Dearing afterward took position with his battalion on my left, and five guns of Colonel Cabell's battalion were placed in position between Captains Norcom and Richardson.
During the morning, the enemy threw forward heavy lines of skirmishers, endeavoring to gain the ravine and cover of the woods in my front. My guns, with those of Captain Taylor, opened upon them moderately with evident effect. The enemy's batteries replied, but I paid little attention to them, seldom answering their fire at their batteries, in order to save my ammunition for the grand attack.
Early in the day my attention was called by Captain Richardson to a 3-inch rifled gun (that had been abandoned by the enemy the previous day) standing between the lines, about 300 yards in advance of our line of skirmishers. The horses had all been killed, and lay harnessed to the piece. William Forrest and Jim Brown (drivers), of Captain Richardson's company, immediately volunteered and earnestly requested permission to bring it off. Having given them directions how to proceed, I allowed them to do so, and the piece was drawn off under a heavy fire from the enemy's sharpshooters. Several shots struck the carriages, but the men and horses were unharmed. The limber contained about 50 rounds of ammunition, and the gun was immediately placed in position by Captain Richardson.
I was deprived of the services of Capt. Joe Norcom early in the day, who, being struck by a piece of shell, had to retire from the field after turning over the command to Lieut. H. A. Battles.
Between 1 and 2 p.m. you ordered me to give the signal for opening along the entire line. Two guns in quick succession were fired from Captain Miller's battery, and were immediately followed by all the battalions along the line opening simultaneously upon the enemy behind his works. The enemy answered vigorously, and a most terrific artillery duel ensued. Notwithstanding a most galling fire from the enemy's artillery from behind his works, and an enfilade fire from the mountain on my right, my men stood bravely to their work, and by their steady and judicious firing caused immense slaughter to the enemy.
About thirty minutes after the signal guns had been fired, our infantry moved forward over the plateau in our front. It having been understood by a previous arrangement that the artillery should advance with the infantry, I immediately directed Captain Miller to advance his and Lieutenant Battles' batteries. Captain Miller having suffered severely from the loss of men and horses, could move forward only three pieces of his own battery and one of Lieutenant Battles' section. Then, with one piece of Major Henry's battalion, under the direction of Major [J. C.] Haskell, he took position 400 or 500 yards to the front, and opened with deadly effect upon the enemy. With the exception of these five guns, no others advanced.
Captain Taylor, on my right, and Major Dearing, on my left, at this juncture ran out of ammunition and withdrew, leaving my battalion alone to bear the brunt of this portion of the field. The battery of Colonel Cabell's command, on Captain Richardson's right, had also ceased firing.
The advanced position of Captain Miller and Lieutenant Battles made them, as soon as the batteries on their flanks had ceased firing, the center of a concentrated fire from several of the enemy's batteries. Our artillery fire seemed to have slackened upon the whole line, and our infantry, unable to hold the works they had so gallantly taken, were falling back, and being pressed by the enemy, who had advanced from behind his breastworks.
At this juncture, General Longstreet ordered that all the artillery that could be spared from the right should be sent to the position just evacuated by Major Dearing. Finding my advanced guns were suffering severely, I determined to change their position to that indicated by General Longstreet. Captain Miller, Lieutenant Battles, and Captain Richardson were immediately withdrawn, and placed with the section of howitzers, under Lieutenant Apps (till now held in reserve), in this position.
This change, however, could not be made, I regret to say, under such a galling fire, without the loss of several of my gallant men, who fell, killed and wounded; among whom was Lieutenant Brown, commanding the First Company piece, severely wounded in the abdomen by a Minie ball. Lieutenant Battles had both of his pieces disabled-one struck on the face and so badly indurated as to prevent loading, and the other by having the axle broken. Captain Miller's loss in horses was so great that he could maneuver but one piece. Three pieces of the Third Company and the section of the Fourth Company were, therefore, sent to the rear. The captured rifle (Captain Richardson's), after having fired away all its ammunition, was struck on the axle by a solid shot and disabled, and was also withdrawn.
Our infantry having fallen back about 200 yards to the rear of my guns, I was left, with the assistance of Captain Moody's section of howitzers, Captain Parker's battery, and one section of Colonel Cabell's, under Lieutenant ------- -------, and a few skirmishers, to hold the enemy in check.
After having once been driven back, he made no farther advance in force, but threw out a heavy line of sharpshooters, which we held in check till dark, when, by order of Colonel Alexander, I withdrew, and by your direction went into park near the old school-house, and bivouacked for the night.
My officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, by their good judgment, intrepidity, and zealous conduct on the field, fully sustained the proud reputation already won on so many bloody fields.
I am under especial obligations to Sergt. Maj. E. J. Kursheedt, who (having no adjutant) acted as my aide. He was always at hand, frequently under the heaviest fire, performing his duty with coolness and efficiency.
Too much cannot be said in praise of William Forrest (driver), of Captain Richardson's company, for the gallant manner in which he acted in getting off the Yankee gun. Having secured the gun, and finding ammunition with it, it was necessary, in order to put it to immediate use, to have horses and harness. Forrest was indefatigable in his exertions till he had captured from between the lines horses and harness sufficient to haul the gun, having several times approached within near range of the enemy's sharpshooters. He was afterward wounded by a Minie ball in the arm at the battle of Williamsport, Md.
My casualties were: Wounded, 3 officers. Killed, 3; wounded, 23, and missing, 16, non-commissioned officers and privates; 37 horses killed and disabled; 3 guns disabled; 1 limber blown up.
I omitted to state in the proper place that Lieutenant Apps, shortly after putting his howitzers in position, was struck by a piece of shell, and had his horse killed under him. He was obliged to leave the field.

I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant,
B. F. ESHLEMAN,
Major, Commanding.

 

AUGUST 18, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, First Army Corps.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Washington Artillery Battalion under my command since leaving Gettysburg, Pa., July 4, embracing the battle of Williamsport, Md., July 6:
I moved from my bivouac near the battle-field of Gettysburg, in obedience to your order, about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, and reported to General Imboden, commanding the cavalry escort to the wagon train, at Cashtown, with seven Napoleons, one rifle, and one howitzer, 12-pounder. My ammunition-chests bad been partly replenished, and Captain Richardson's rifle, since transferred from its carriage with a broken axle to that of his howitzer. The howitzer was attached to one of Captain [John] Wood's (acting quartermaster Washington Artillery Battalion) empty wagons for transportation. Captain Norcom's disabled Napoleon was turned over to the ordnance officer, Captain [James M.] Garnett.
On reaching Cashtown, I placed my battalion in the column of wagons, distributing it in sections, at intervals of about a mile. A drenching rain, which continued during the afternoon and night, made the roads very heavy, and my men and horses suffered much from the forced march, having made the whole distance from Gettysburg to Williamsport without halting to feed, and only once to water.
No special incident occurred on the march till I passed Greencastle, when the enemy's cavalry made a dash into the wagon train about 2 miles to the front of my forward section. Obtaining the support of a skeleton regiment of infantry that had been posted near Greencastle to protect our flanks, I immediately pressed forward Captain Norcom's section, but the enemy withdrew before I could get within range of him. I ordered the trains to be put in new trim again as quickly as possible, and the column closed up. The balance of the march was made without additional incident.
Arriving at Williamsport at 3 a.m. on the 6th, I was ordered by General Imboden to go into position at once on the Boonsborough and Hagerstown roads, near town. Captain Miller, Lieutenants Hero and McElroy, with a section of Napoleons, and Captain Nor-com, Lieutenants Battles and Apps, with one howitzer and one Napoleon, were posted on the Boonsborough road, half a mile from town. Captain [C. W.] Squires, with one Napoleon, in charge of Lieutenant [John M.] Galbraith, and Captain Richardson, with a section of Napoleons under Lieutenant Hawes, and one 3-inch rifle, were posted on the Hagerstown road, about a half mile from town. Between these two roads, Captain [Joseph D.] Moore, of Garnett's battalion, had two rifled, and [James F.] Hart's battery a section of 12-pounder howitzers, but with very little ammunition. The Donaldsonville battery was in position on the Greencastle road, and a few guns of General Imboden's command occupied positions between the Greencastle road and the river on the left, and between the Boonsborough road and the river on the right. An opportunity was now offered to repose my men and horses, who, after the severe battle of Gettysburg, had been steadily marching for forty-two hours, without sleep, rest, or subsistence.
About 5 p.m. the enemy made his appearance in force with cavalry and artillery on the Boonsborough road, and soon afterward on the Hagerstown road. Dismounting his cavalry, he threw forward heavy lines of skirmishers, and placed a battery on each side of the Boons-borough road. Captains Miller and Norcom opened on him, but the range was found too great for their Napoleon guns. Captains Moore's and Hart's batteries engaged their right battery, but soon exhausted their short supply of ammunition, and had to withdraw.
Seeing our only salvation was to make a bold and determined attack, I immediately advanced Captain Miller's battery about 600 yards, ordering the line of skirmishers forward with him. The enemy deployed his skirmishers to the right, and soon got possession of a house and commanding position immediately on the right of Captain Miller's position, from whence he was annoying Miller very much. I directed Captain Norcom, who had advanced his Napoleon gun, to shell the house, and at the same time ordered our skirmishers on my right to advance and drive the enemy back. This was executed at once, and we afterward held the position.
Lieutenant Battles during this time engaged the enemy farther to the right with his howitzer, checking his advance on a farm road, and Captains Squires and Richardson, on the left of the center, handsomely beating back his advancing column over the Hagerstown road.
Having assumed command of all the artillery, and the unerring and destructive fire of my guns under Captains Miller and Norcom having signally repulsed the enemy in their front, my attention and presence was directed to the left, where Captains Squires and Richardson were gallantly battling with the enemy in this unequal contest. As soon as Hart and Moore had retired, Captain Richardson sent his two Napoleons, under Lieut. Samuel Hawes, to hold that part of the line. Hawes fought the enemy under a most galling fire, in which he lost in killed and wounded 12 men on one piece.
At 6.30 p.m. General Imboden stated to me that General Fitz. Lee's brigade of cavalry was close at hand, and that he wanted all the artillery that could be spared from other parts of the field to be posted so as to command the enemy's position in the center, and at the proper time to silence his battery, with a view to making a charge. The artillery was soon in position, but the cavalry, under command of General Lee, did not arrive till about dark. At dark, the enemy withdrew, and I retired my guns to the original line, and remained in position all night.
Too much cannot be said in praise of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of my battalion for the zeal and devotion manifested on this occasion. They had just undergone a most fatiguing march of two days and two nights, without sleep, food, or rest. Nevertheless, on the approach of the enemy they sprang with alacrity to their guns, and, by their assiduity and courage and noble defense of our wounded men and transportation, and of Williamsport, have again placed the service and their commanding officer under lasting obligations. Captain Richardson makes special mention of Sergeant [John] Newton, of Captain Hart's South Carolina battery, who volunteered as gunner on one of his pieces after he had lost so many men as to render it difficult to work the gun. I regret to say that Sergeant Newton was mortally wounded, and died before he could be taken off the field.
My loss was:

Command	Killed	Wounded	Total
First Company
Enlisted Men	----	2	2
Second Company
Enlisted Men	1	12	13
Third Company
Enlisted Men	----	2	2
Sergeant Newton, Hart's battler	1	----	1
Total	2	16	18

Killed and disabled, 12 horses.

On July 8, by order of General Imboden, I crossed the Potomac with my battalion (ferrying the river), and went into position on the hill about 1 mile from the ford, to guard the approaches against the enemy's cavalry, where I remained, getting nothing but hay for my horses, till the 13th, when I received orders from General Pickett to move in the direction of Martinsburg, in front of his division.
I arrived at Bunker Hill on the 15th, and by your order reported on the lath to Colonel Alexander, with whom I marched till we reached Gaines' Cross-Roads, when, by Colonel Alexander's order, I was again temporarily attached to General Pickett. It being understood that Dearing's horses were in too poor a condition to make the march over the mud road to Culpeper Court-House with his division (General Pickett's), he was sent by the pike. On arriving at Culpeper, I again reported to Colonel Alexander.
On July 11, Captain Miller's battery was detached and sent with General Imboden to Strasburg, to guard the Yankee prisoners. He reported to me again at Bunker Hill on the 18th.
On the march and in battle, Acting Ordnance Officer [B. L.] Brazel-man acted with his usual efficiency in his department.

I am, colonel, with great respect, your obedient servant,
B. F. ESHLEMAN,
Major, Commanding.

 

 

HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
-------- ---, 1863.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General.

COLONEL: The Second Corps, at the time of leaving Hamilton's Crossing (June 4). comprised the following troops:
The division of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, containing the brigades of Brig. Gens. H. T. Hays (Louisiana), J. B. Gordon (Georgia), William Smith (Virginia), and R. F. Hoke (North Carolina), temporarily commanded by Colonel [I.E.] Avery, of the Sixth North Carolina, in the absence of General Hoke, from wounds received at the battle of Fredericksburg, May 4. To this division was attached Lieut. Col. H. P. Jones' battalion of light artillery.
The division of Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson, containing the brigades of Brig. Gens. George H. Steuart (Virginia and North Carolina), James A. Walker (Stonewall, Virginia), John M. Jones (Virginia), and F. T. Nicholls (Louisiana), temporarily commanded by Col. J. M. Williams, of the Second Louisiana Regiment, in the absence of General Nicholls, from wounds received at the battle of Chancellorsville. To this division was attached Lieut. Col. R. Snowden Andrews' battalion of light artillery.
The division of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, containing the brigades of Brig. Gens. Junius Daniel (North Carolina), George Doles (Georgia), A. Iverson and S. D. Ramseur (North Carolina), and Rodes' (Alabama) brigade, commanded by Col. Edward A. O'Neal, of the Twenty-Sixth Alabama Regiment. To this division was attached Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Carter's battalion of light artillery.
Lieut. Col. William Nelson's battalion and five batteries of the First Virginia Artillery, under Col. J. Thompson Brown, acting chief of artillery, in the absence of Col. S. Crutchfield, from wounds received in the battle of Chancellorsville, May 2, formed the artillery reserve of the corps.

TO CULPEPER AND WINCHESTER.

Marching via Verdierville and Somerville Ford, the corps reached Culpeper on June 7.
On the 9th, the enemy being reported to have crossed the Rappahannock in force, I moved my corps, by direction of the general commanding, to General Stuart's support, but on reaching Brandy Station with General Rodes' division, found the enemy already retiring.
Resuming the march on the 10th, we passed by Gaines' Cross-Roads, Flint Hill, and Front Royal, arriving at Cedarville on the 12th. At this point I detached General Rodes division, together with General Jenkins' cavalry brigade, which here reported to m-, to capture, if possible, a force of 1,800 men, under Colonel [A. T.] McReynolds, reported at Berryville, and thence to press on to Martinsburg. With the remaining two divisions and the Sixteenth Virginia Cavalry Battalion [Regiment], (Major [James H.] Nounnan), of Jenkins' brigade, I proceeded to attack Winchester. From all the information I could gather, the fortifications of Winchester were only assailable on the west and northwest, from a range of hills which commanded the ridge occupied by their main fortifications. The force there was represented at from 6,000 to 8,000, under General Milroy.
On the 13th, I sent Early's division and Colonel Brown's artillery battalion (under Captain [W. J.] Dance), to Newtown, on the Valley pike, where they were joined by the [First] Maryland Infantry Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel [J. R.] Herbert, and the Baltimore Light Artillery, Captain [W. H.] Griffin. General Early was directed to advance toward the town by the Valley pike.
The same day Johnson's division, preceded by Nounnan's cavalry, drove in the enemy's pickets on the Front Royal and Winchester road, and formed line of battle 2 miles from town, preparatory to an attack. After some skirmishing, the enemy opened from a battery near the Millwood road, and [J. C.] Carpenter's battery, Lieutenant [W. T.] Lambie commanding, was placed by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews to the left of the Front Royal road, and opened vigorously, soon driving off the opposing battery and blowing up a caisson. This drew upon our battery a heavy fire from twelve or fifteen pieces in and near the town, but beyond the range of our guns.
About 5 pm. General Early had a pretty sharp skirmish with the enemy's infantry and artillery near Kernstown, Gordon's brigade, supported by Hays', driving them at a run as far as Milltown Mills. Here Early, coming within range of the enemy's fortifications, halted for the night. Before morning, the enemy withdrew all their artillery into their fortifications from Bowers' Hill and the south and east sides of the town. On examining the enemy's fortifications from General Johnson's position, I found they had put up works on the hills I had intended gaining possession of, and were busy strengthening them.
Having reconnoitered with General Early from Bowers' Hill (9 a.m. on the 14th), I coincided with his views as to the best point of attack, and directed him to move his main force to the left, and carry by assault one of the works above mentioned, a small, open work on a commanding hill near the Pughtown road, which overlooked the main fort.
About 11 a.m., finding there was no danger of a sortie, and seeing the enemy fortifying a hill north of their main fort, I directed General Johnson to move to the east of the town, and interfere with their work as much as possible, and so divert attention from General Early. He accordingly took up position between the Millwood and Berryville pikes, and threw forward the Fifth Virginia, under Lieut. Col. H. J.Williams, as skirmishers, who annoyed the enemy so as to force them to leave off work and effectually to engross their attention. General Gordon's brigade and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert's Maryland battalion, with two batteries, were left by General Early at Bowers Hill, and pushed their skirmishers into Winchester, who were recalled for fear of drawing the enemy's fire on the town.
By 4 p.m. General Early had attained, undiscovered, a wooded hill (one of the range known as Little North Mountain) near the Pughtown road, on the south side of which an orchard and on the north a corn-field afforded excellent positions for artillery in easy range of the work to be attacked--a bastion, front open toward the town. Hays' brigade was designated for the assault, and Smith's for its support, and about 6 o'clock Colonel Jones ran his pieces and those of the First Virginia Artillery, under Captain Dance, forward by hand into position, and opened simultaneously from twenty guns, completely surprising the enemy, whose entire attention at this point was engrossed by Gordon.
In half an hour their battery was silenced, Jones' artillery firing excellently. General Hays moved quietly to within 200 yards of their work, when our guns ceased firing, and he charged through an abatis of brushwood, and captured the Work, taking six rifled pieces, two of which were at once turned upon and dispersed the columns that the enemy were endeavoring to form to recapture it. Two works to the left of the one taken were immediately abandoned, their defenders retreating to the main fort. It was by this time too late to do more than prepare to improve this important advantage promptly in the morning. This result established the correctness of General Early's views as to the point of attack, and rendered the main fort untenable.
Accordingly, anticipating the possibility of the enemy's attempting to retreat during the night, I ordered General Johnson, with the Stonewall, Nicholls', and three regiments of Steuart's brigades, and [W. F.] Dement's battery, with sections of [Charles I.] Raine's and [J. C.] Carpenter's (the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews), to proceed to a point on the Martinsburg pike about 24 miles from Winchester, so as to intercept any attempt to retreat, or to be ready to attack at daylight if the enemy held their ground.
Finding the road to this point very rough, General Johnson concluded to march, via Jordan Springs, to Stephenson's Depot, where the nature of the ground would give him a strong position. Just as the head of his column reached the railroad, 200 yards from the Martinsburg road, the enemy were heard retreating down the pike towards Martinsburg. Forming line parallel with the pike behind a stone wall, Steuart on the right and the Louisiana brigade on the left (1,200 men in all), and posting the artillery favorably, he was immediately attacked by Milroy with all his force of infantry and cavalry, his artillery having been abandoned at the town, the enemy making repeated and desperate efforts to cut their way through. Here was the hardest fighting which took place during the attack, the odds being greatly in favor of the enemy, who were successfully repulsed and scattered by the gallantry of General Johnson and his brave command.
After several front attacks had been steadily met and repulsed, they attempted to turn both flanks simultaneously, but were met on the right by General Walker and his brigade, which had just arrived on the field (having been left behind by a mistake), and on the left by two regiments of Nicholls' brigade, which had been held in reserve. In a few minutes the greater part of them surrendered, 2,300 to 2,500 in number. The rest scattered through the woods and fields, but most of them were subsequently captured by our cavalry. General Milroy, with 250 or 300 cavalry, made his way to Harper's Ferry.
The fruits of this victory were 23 pieces of artillery (nearly all rifled), 4,000 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, more than 300 horses, and quite a large amount of commissary and quartermaster's stores.
My loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing; aggregate, 269. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, who handled his artillery with great skill and effect in the engagement of the 15th, was wounded just at the close of the action.

BERRYVILLE AND MARTINSBURG.

General Rodes encamped near Stone Bridge, on the road to Millwood, on the night of June 12, and, moving on next morning toward Berryville, his infantry were met by a detachment of Yankee cavalry before reaching Millwood. Finding himself discovered, he pushed on rapidly, but before reaching Berryville the enemy's infantry had retreated on the Charlestown road, holding Jenkins at bay for awhile with their artillery, which was withdrawn as soon as ours came up. Turning off by the road to Summit Point, the enemy retreated to Winchester. After securing the small amount of supplies at Berryville, General Rodes, sending Jenkins in pursuit, followed with his infantry to Summit Point, where he encamped. Jenkins failed from some cause to overtake the enemy.
Late on the 14th, General Rodes came to Martinsburg, before reaching which place Jenkins drove the enemy from some barricaded houses at Bunker Hill, capturing 75 or 100 prisoners. At Martinsburg, General Rodes found the enemy's infantry and artillery in position before the town. He immediately sent Jenkins' cavalry to the left and rear of the place, and, putting some of Carter's artillery in position, drove off the opposing battery, which retreated toward Williamsport, so closely pursued by Jenkins' dismounted cavalry and two squadrons mounted that they were forced to abandon five out of their six guns, and many prisoners were taken. The infantry fled by way of Shepherdstown, a fact not known for some hours, which, together with the darkness, will account for their escape. The enemy destroyed many of the stores at Martinsburg, but 6,000 bushels of grain and a few quartermaster's and commissary stores fell into our hands.
The results of this expedition were 5 pieces of artillery, 200 prisoners, and quartermaster's and subsistence stores in some quantity.
General Rodes mentions with commendation the conduct of Major [J. W.] Sweeney, of Jenkins' brigade, wounded in charging the enemy's rear near the Opequon, as they retreated to Winchester from Berryville.

CROSSING THE POTOMAC, AND MARCH TO CARLISLE.

I sent notice to General Rodes of Milroy's escape, but he was not in position to intercept him, Jenkins' cavalry being already (10 a.m. 15th) on the Potomac, hear Williamsport. The same evening, General Rodes crossed at Williamsport with three brigades, sending Jenkins forward to Chambersburg, and on the 19th moved his division by my orders to Hagerstown, where he encamped on the road to Boons-borough, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg, and Early moved to Shepherdstown, to threaten Harper's Ferry.
In these positions we waited until June 21 for the other two corps to close up, on the afternoon of which day I received orders from the general commanding to take Harrisburg, and next morning (22d) Rodes and Johnson marched toward Greencastle, Pa. Jenkins reoccupied Chambersburg, whence he had fallen back some days before, and Early moved by Boonsborough to Cavetown, where the Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry (Colonel [William H.] French) reported, and remained with him till the battle of Gettysburg.
Continuing our march, we reached Carlisle on the 27th, halting one day at Chambersburg to secure supplies. The marching was as rapid as the weather and the détours made by Major-General Early and Brigadier-General Steuart would admit. Early having marched parallel with us as far as Greenwood, then turned off toward Gettysburg and York. At Carlisle, General George H. Steuart, who had been detached to McConnellsburg from Greencastle, rejoined the corps, bringing some cattle and horses. At Carlisle, Chambersburg, and Shippensburg, requisitions were made for supplies, and the shops were searched, many valuable stores being secured. At Chambersburg, a train was loaded with ordnance and medical stores and sent back. Near 3,000 head of cattle were collected and sent back by my corps, and my chief commissary of subsistence, Major [W. J.] Hawks, notified Colonel [R. G.] Cole of the location of 5,000 barrels of flour along the route traveled by the command.
From [Carlisle] I sent forward my engineer, Captain [H. B.] Richardson, with General Jenkins' cavalry, to reconnoitre the defenses of Harrisburg, and was starting on the 29th for that place when ordered by the general commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg. Agreeably to the views of the general commanding, I did not burn Carlisle Barracks.

EXPEDITION TO YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE.

Col. E. V. White's cavalry battalion reported to me at Chambersburg, and was sent to General Early, then at Greenwood. Arriving at Cashtown, General Early sent Gordon's brigade with White's cavalry, direct to Gettysburg, taking the rest of the division on the Mummasburg road. In front of Gettysburg, White charged and routed the Twenty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Militia, of whom 170 were taken and paroled. From Gettysburg, Gordon, with Tanner's battery and White's battalion, was sent on the direct road to York, and General Early moved in the direction of Dover with the rest of the division.
On approaching York, General Gordon met the mayor and a deputation of citizens, who made a formal surrender of the place.
Pushing on, by order of General Early, to Wrightsville, on the Susquehanna, he found 1,200 militia strongly intrenched, but without artillery. A few shots drove them across the magnificent railroad bridge, a mile and a quarter long, which they burned as they retreated over it. The little town of Wrightsville caught fire from the bridge, and General Gordon, setting his brigade to work, succeeded in extinguishing the flames. Yet he is accused by the Federal press of having set fire to the town.
General Early levied a contribution on the citizens of York, obtaining, among other things, $28,600 in United States currency, the greater part of which was turned over to Colonel [J. L.] Corley, chief quartermaster, Army of Northern Virginia; 1,000 hats, 1,200 pairs of shoes, and 1,000 pairs of socks were also obtained here.

GETTYSBURG.

On the night of June 30, Rodes' division, which I accompanied, was at Heidlersburg; Early 3 miles off, on the road to Berlin, and Johnson, with Colonel Brown's reserve artillery, between Green Village and Scotland. At Heidlersburg, I received orders from the general commanding to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate, and a note from General A. P. Hill, saying-he was at Cashtown.
Next morning, I moved with Rodes' division toward Cashtown, ordering Early to follow by Hunterstown. Before reaching Middletown, I received notice from General Hill that he was advancing upon Gettysburg, and turned the head of Rodes' column toward that place, by the Middletown road, sending word to Early to advance directly on the Heidlersburg road. I notified the general commanding of my movements, and was informed by him that, in case we found the enemy's force very large, he did not want a general engagement brought on till the rest of the army came up.
By the time this message reached me, General A. P. Hill had already been warmly engaged with a large body of the enemy in his front, and Carter's artillery battalion, of Rodes' division, had opened with fine effect on the flank of the same body, which was rapidly preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were moving into position in my front. It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up, and I determined to push the attack vigorously. General Rodes had drawn up his division, Iverson's brigade on the right, Rodes' (old) brigade (Colonel O'Neal) in the center (these two on the ridge leading to the west of Gettysburg), and Doles on the left, in the plain. The Fifth Alabama was retained by General Rodes, to guard a wide gap left between O'Neal and Doles. Daniel and Ramseur were in reserve. He at once moved forward, and, after advancing for some distance in line, came in sight of the enemy, and O'Neal and Iverson were ordered to attack, Daniel advancing in line 200 yards in rear of Iverson's right, to protect that flank.
At this time, only desultory artillery firing was going on on the rest of the field. Carter was warmly engaged. O'Neal's brigade, advancing in some disorder in a direction different from that indicated by Major-General Rodes in person to Colonel O'Neal, and with only three regiments (the Third Alabama being by some mistake left with Daniel's brigade), was soon forced to fall back, notwithstanding the Fifth Alabama was sent to its support. The left of Iverson's brigade was thus exposed, but these gallant troops obstinately stood their ground till the greater part of three regiments had fallen where they stood in line of battle. A few of them, being entirely surrounded, were taken prisoners: a few escaped.
The unfortunate mistake of General Iverson at this critical juncture in sending word to Major-General Rodes that one of his regiments had raised the white flag and gone over to the enemy might have produced the most disastrous consequences. The Twelfth North Carolina, being on the right of his brigade, suffered least. A slight change in the advance of General Iverson had uncovered the whole of Daniel's front, and he found himself opposed to heavy bodies of infantry, whom he attacked and drove before him till he reached a railroad cut extending diagonally across his front and past his right flank, which checked his advance. A battery of the enemy beyond this cut near a barn enfiladed his line, and fresh bodies of infantry poured across the cut a destructive enfilade and reverse fire. Seeing some troops of the Third Corps lying down beyond the railroad, in front of the enemy, who were on his flank, General Daniel sent an officer to get them? advance. As they would not, he was obliged--leaving the Forty-fifth North Carolina and Second North Carolina Battalion to hold his line--to change the front of the rest of his brigade to the rear, and throw part across the railroad beyond the cut, where, having formed line directly in front of the troops of the Third Corps already mentioned, he ordered an advance of his whole brigade, and gallantly swept the field, capturing several hundred prisoners in the cut.
About the time of his final charge, Ramseur, with his own and Rodes' brigades, and remnants of Iverson's, under Capt. D. P. Halsey, assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, who rallied the brigade and assumed command, had restored the line in the center.
Meantime an attempt by the enemy to push a column into the interval between Doles and O'Neal had been handsomely repulsed by Doles, who, changing front with his two right regiments, took them in flank, driving them in disorder toward the town.
All of General Rodes' troops were now engaged. The enemy were moving large bodies of troops from the town against his left, and affairs were in a very critical condition, when Major-General Early, coming up on the Heidlersburg road, opened a brisk artillery fire upon large columns moving against Doles' left, and ordered forward Gordon's brigade to the left of Doles', which, after an obstinate contest, broke Barlow's division, captured General [F. C.] Barlow, and drove the whole back on a second line, when they were halted, and General Early ordered up Hays' and Hoke's brigades on Gordon's left, and the three drove the enemy precipitately toward and through the town just as Ramseur broke those in his front.
General Gordon mentions that 300 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground passed over by his brigade. The enemy had entirely abandoned the north end of the town, and Early entering by the York Railroad at the same time that Rodes came in on the Cashtown road, they together captured over 4,000 prisoners and three pieces of artillery, two of which fell into the hands of Early's division. So far as I can learn, no other troops than those of this corps entered the town at all. My loss on this day was less than 2,900 killed, wounded, and missing.
The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town, I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson's division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to the town.
Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to outflank our extreme left, and I could see that seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction.
Before this report could be investigated by Lieut. T. T. Turner, aide-de-camp of my staff, and Lieut. Robert D. Early, sent for that purpose, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.
I received orders soon after dark to draw my corps to the right, in case it could not be used to advantage where it was; that the commanding general thought from the nature of the ground that the position for attack was a good one on that side. I represented to the commanding general that the hill above referred to was unoccupied by the enemy, as reported by Lieutenants Turner and Early, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as I could judge.
He decided to let me remain, and on my return to my headquarters, after 12 o'clock at night, I sent orders to Johnson by Lieut. T. T. Turner, aide-de-camp, to take possession of this hill, if he had not already done so. General Johnson stated in reply to this order, that after forming his line of battle this side of the wooded hill in question, he had sent a reconnoitering party to the hill, with orders to report as to the position of the enemy in reference to it. This party, on nearing the summit, was met by a superior force of the enemy, which succeeded in capturing a portion of the reconnoitering party, the rest of it making its escape. During this conversation with General Johnson, one man arrived, bringing a dispatch, dated at 12 midnight, and taken from a Federal courier making his way from General Sykes to General Slocum, in which the former stated that his corps was then halted 4 miles from Gettysburg, and he would resume his march at 4 a.m. Lieutenant Turner brought this dispatch to my headquarters, and at the same time stated that General Johnson would refrain from attacking the position until I had received notice of the fact that the enemy were in possession of the hill, and had sent him further orders. Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of place.
Meantime orders had come from the general commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard General Longstreet's guns open on the right. Lieutenant Turner at once returned to General Johnson, and delivered these instructions, directing him to be ready to attack, Early being already in line on the left and Rodes on the right of the main street of the town, Rodes' line extending out on the Fairfield road.
Early in the morning, I received a communication from the commanding general, the tenor of which was that he intended the main attack to be made by the First Corps, on our right, and wished me, as soon as their guns opened, to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack if an opportunity offered.
I made the necessary preparations, and about 5 p.m., when General Longstreet's guns opened, General Johnson commenced a heavy cannonade from Andrews' battalion and [Archibald] Graham's battery, the whole under Major [J. W.] Latimer, against the Cemetery Hill.
After an hour's firing, finding that his guns were overpowered by the greater number and superior position of the enemy's batteries, Major Latimer withdrew all but one battery, which he kept to repel any infantry advance. While with this battery, this gallant young officer received, from almost the last shell fired, the wound which has since resulted in his death. Colonel Brown says justly of that calamity, "No greater loss could have befallen the artillery of this fire, showing when most needed the full possession of all his faculties. Though not twenty-one when he fell, his soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those of any officer in my command.
Immediately after the artillery firing ceased, which was just before sundown, General Johnson ordered forward his division to attack the wooded hill in his front, and about dusk the attack was made. The enemy were found strongly intrenched on the side of a very steep mountain, beyond a creek with steep banks, only passable here and there. Brig. Gen. J. M. Jones was wounded soon after the attack began, and his brigade, which was on the right with Nicholls' (Louisiana) brigade (under Colonel Williams), was forced back, but Steuart, on the left, took part of the enemy's breastworks, and held them till ordered out at noon next day.
As soon as information reached him that Johnson's attack had commenced, General Early, who held the center of my corps, moved Hays' and Hoke's brigades forward against the Cemetery Hill. Charging over a hill into a ravine, they broke a line of the enemy's infantry posted behind a stone wall, and advanced up the steep face of all other hill, over two lines of breastworks. These brigades captured several batteries of artillery and held them until, finding that no attack was made on the right, and that heavy masses of the enemy were advancing against their front and flank, they reluctantly fell back, bringing away 75 to 100 prisoners and four stand of captured colors. Major-General Rodes did not advance, for reasons given in in his report.
Before beginning my advance, I had sent a staff officer to the division of the Third Corps, on my right, which proved to be General Pender's, to find out what they were to do. He reported the division under command of General Lane, who succeeded Pender, wounded, and who sent word back that the only orders he had received from General Pender were that he was to attack if a favorable opportunity presented. I then wrote to him (it being too late to communicate with the corps commander) that I was about attacking with my corps, and requested that he would co-operate. To this I received no answer, nor do I believe that any advance was made. The want of co-operation on the right made it more difficult for Rodes' division to attack, though, had it been otherwise, I have every reason to believe, from the eminent success attending the assault of Hays and Avery, that the enemy's lines would have been carried.
I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as Johnson's position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was re-enforced by Smith's brigade, of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old) brigades, of Rodes' division. Just before the time fixed for General Johnson to advance, the enemy attacked him, to regain the works captured by Steuart the evening before. They were repulsed with very heavy loss, and he attacked in turn, pushing the enemy almost to the top of the mountain, where the precipitous nature of the hill and an abatis of logs and stones, with a very heavy work on the crest of the hill, stopped his farther advance.
Half an hour after Johnson attacked, and when too late to recall him, I received notice that Longstreet would not attack until 10 o'clock; but, as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after 2 o'clock. In Johnson's attack, the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder, and, as they ran across an open space to another work, were exposed to the fire of Daniel's brigade at 60 or 70 yards. Our men were at this time under no fire of consequence. Their aim was accurate, and General Daniel thinks that he killed here in half an hour more than in all the rest of his fighting. Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy were moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him about 1 p.m. to evacuate the works already gained. These reports reached me also, and I sent Capt. G. C. Brown, of my staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation, and General Johnson finally took up a position about 300 yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held, under a cross-fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters, until dark. At night my corps fell back, as ordered, to the range of hills west of the town, taken by us on Wednesday, where we remained unmolested during July 4.
The behavior of my troops throughout this campaign was beyond praise, whether the points considered be their alacrity and willing endurance of the long marches, their orderly and exemplary conduct in the enemy's country, their bravery in action, or their patient endurance of hunger, fatigue, and exposure during our retreat.
The lists of killed and wounded, as well as the results gained, will show the desperate character of their fighting. In the infantry, Daniel's brigade, of Rodes' division, and in the artillery, Andrews' battalion, of Johnson's division, suffered most loss. The Second North Carolina Battalion, of Daniel's brigade, lost 200 of 240 men, killed and wounded, without yielding an inch of ground at any time.

BACK TO DARKESVILLE.

By order of the commanding general, the Third Corps was to move at dark on July 4, and the First to follow with the prisoners, mine being rear guard. Next day the Third was to take the rear, &c.
At 10 a.m. on the 5th, the other corps were not all in the road, and, consequently, mine did not take up its march till near noon, and only reached Fairfield at 4 p.m. Here the enemy, who had been threatening our rear and occasionally opening a fire of artillery on the rear guard (Gordon's brigade, of Early's division), showed more boldness in attacking, throwing out a line of skirmishers over a mile in length. They were repulsed, and a battery which was shelling our column driven off.
We encamped for the night on a hill 1 miles west of Fairfield, and next day, July 6, the Third Corps moving by another road, we were still in the rear, Rodes' division acting as rearguard, and repelling another attack of the enemy. The Forty-fifth North Carolina, Daniel's brigade, under Captain [James A.] Hopkins, being summoned to surrender, attacked the troops making the summons, and drove them out of a wood in which they were posted. The enemy did not follow much beyond Fairfield. The road was again blocked till noon. That night we encamped near Waynesborough, and reached Hagerstown about noon of July 7.
On the 11th, we were moved into line between Hagerstown and Williamsport, our right joining the left of the Third Corps, and began fortifying, and in a short time my men were well protected. Their spirit was never better than at this time, and the wish was universal that the enemy would attack.
On the night of the 14th, I was ordered with my infantry and artillery to ford at Williamsport, the ammunition-chests going in the ferry-boats. I could find no ferry-boats, nor any one in charge; it was dark and raining. The entrance to the river would have been impracticable for artillery in daylight, and, as well as I could ascertain, the exit was worse. Everything was in confusion. Colonel Corley, chief quartermaster Army of Northern Virginia, who had charge of the arrangements, recommended Colonel Brown, my chief of artillery, to cross by the pontoons, and sent to the same point my reserve train of ambulances with wounded, originally intended to cross by the ferry-boats. Just before midnight, my advance (Rodes' division) commenced crossing. The men had directions to sling their cartridge-boxes over their shoulders, but many rounds of ammunition were necessarily lost, as the water was up to their armpits the whole way across, sometimes deeper. By 8 o'clock my whole corps was over, all fording excepting Hays' brigade, which was sent with the artillery to the pontoons.
While in camp near Darkesville, the enemy, under Kelley, were reported between Martinsburg and Hedgesville, protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and occasionally skirmishing with Johnson's division, which was destroying the track.
General Lee, commanding, directed on the 21st an effort to be made to capture this force, said to be 6,000 strong, sending Early's division to get in rear through Mill's Gap and down Back Creek, while I joined Rodes to Johnson, and marched against their front. Though these movements were made in the night of the 21st, the enemy heard of them through spies, and early on the 22d had retreated out of reach.
The other corps had already marched toward the Blue Ridge, and accordingly we followed, and bivouacked near Winchester, and next day, on reaching Manassas Gap, found Wright's brigade, of Anderson's division, deployed to repel a large body of the enemy who were advancing upon it through the Gap. The insignia of two corps could be seen in the Gap, and a third was marching up; over 10,000 men were in sight.
The enemy were so close to Wright's brigade that the line of battle had to be chosen some distance in the rear, and accordingly some 250 sharpshooters, of Rodes' division, under Major [Eugene] Blackford, were added to Wright's brigade, to hold the enemy in check while the line was formed. Rodes' (old) brigade, Colonel O'Neal, deployed as skirmishers, formed the first, and the remainder of Rodes' division, with Carter's battalion of artillery, the second line. These dispositions were made by General Rodes with his usual promptness, skill, and judgment. The enemy were held in check for some time by the line of Wright's brigade and the skirmishers under Major Blackford, which they at last drove back with considerable loss to themselves by flanking it. These troops, in full view, showed great gallantry, and though intended merely to make a show, held the enemy back so long and inflicted such loss that they were satisfied not to come within reach of O'Neal, but remained at a safe distance, where they were leisurely shelled by Carter's artillery.
Johnson's division was ordered to take position near the river, to prevent the enemy cutting me off from the ford at Front Royal, and, though not required in action, was promptly in place. Early's division, much jaded, was 15 miles off, near Winchester, and could not possibly reach me before the afternoon of next day.
I had reason to believe that Meade's whole army was in our front, and having but two divisions to oppose him, I decided to send Early up the Valley, by Strasburg and New Market, while I marched the other two divisions up the Page Valley to Luray, the route pursued by Jackson, in 1862, in his campaign against Banks. Johnson's and Rodes' divisions moved back 2 to 4 miles, and encamped near Front Royal, the rear guard, under Col. B. T. Johnson, of Johnson's division, leaving Front Royal after 10 o'clock next day, the enemy making only a slight advance, which was driven back by a few rounds of artillery. Rodes' division, the only troops of my corps that I saw during this affair, showed great eagerness and alacrity to meet the enemy, and, had he advanced, would have given him a severe lesson.
I was indebted for correct and valuable information regarding the strength and movements of the enemy at this point to Capt. W. F. Randolph, commanding cavalry escort attached to my headquarters, and to Captain [R. E.] Wilbourn, of the signal corps.
In this campaign, the loss of my corps was as follows: At Winchester and in the Valley, 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing; aggregate, 269. At Gettysburg and in Pennsylvania, 883 killed, 3,857 wounded, 1,347 missing; aggregate, 6,094. For the entire campaign, 930 killed, 4,076 wounded, and 1,350 missing; aggregate, 6,356. Before crossing the Potomac, it captured 28 pieces of artillery and about 4,500 prisoners. About 200 prisoners were taken before reaching Gettysburg. At that place over 4,000 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and 4 stand of colors, memorable as having been brought off Cemetery Hill, were the spoils gained, making altogether nearly 9,000 prisoners and 31 pieces of artillery.
The Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment of Hoke's brigade, and the Fifty-eighth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, in Early's division, sent to Staunton from Winchester with prisoners, returned in time to aid General Imboden in repelling the enemy's attack on the wagon trains at Williamsport.
Iverson's brigade, sent back to guard my wagon train from Fairfield, had a handsome affair with the enemy's cavalry at Hagerstown, in which they are reported by General Iverson as killing, wounding, and capturing a number equal to their whole force.
At Winchester, the Maryland battalion was attached to General Steuart's brigade, and the Baltimore Light Artillery to Colonel Brown's battalion, with which they served with their usual gallantry throughout the campaign.
At Gettysburg, July 1, I was much pleased with the conduct of Captain Carter's battery, which came under my immediate observation.
The conduct of Hays' (Louisiana) and Hoke's (North Carolina) brigades (the latter under Colonel Avery) at Cemetery Hill, Gettysburg, was worthy of the highest praise. In this and at Winchester the Louisiana brigade and their gallant commander gave new honor to the name already acquired on the old fields of Winchester and Port Republic, and wherever engaged.
Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, of the artillery, not fully recovered from his serious wounds received at Cedar Run, was again wounded at Winchester, and, while suffering from his wounds, appeared on the field at Hagerstown, and reported for duty.
The rapid and skillful advance of Gordon's brigade on June 13, near Winchester, with great spirit driving the enemy in confusion toward the town, was one of the finest movements I have witnessed during the war, and won for the troops and their gallant commander the highest commendation. I beg leave to call attention to the gallantry of the following men and officers:

AT WINCHESTER.

Lieut. John Orr, adjutant Sixth Louisiana, was the first man to mount the enemy's breastworks on the 14th, receiving in the act a bayonet wound in the side. General Early recommends him for captain of cavalry, he being desirous of entering that branch of the service, for which he is eminently qualified.
Lieut. C. S. Contee's section of Dement's battery was placed in short musket-range of the enemy on June 15, and maintained its position till 13 of the 16 men in the two detachments were killed or wounded, when Lieut. John A. Morgan, of the First North Carolina Regiment, and Lieut. R. H. McKim, aide-de-camp to Brig. Gen. G. H. Steuart, volunteered and helped to work the guns till the surrender of the enemy. The following are the names of the gallant men belonging to this section: First gun--Sergt. John G. Harris; Corpls. William P. Compton, Samuel Thompson; Privates Robert Chew, William Koester, Charles Pease, A. James Albert, jr., William T. Wootton, John R. Yates, jr., H. J. Langsdale, and John R. Buchanan. Second gun--Sergt. John E. Glascocke; Corpls. William H. May, Charles Harris; Privates Thomas Moore, William Gorman, F. Frayer, William W. Wilson, Samuel Thomas, R. T. Richardson, William Sherburne, James Owens, William Dallam, and Joseph Mockabee.
Colonel Brown, acting chief of artillery, recommends Lieutenant Contee for promotion to the captaincy of the Chesapeake Artillery, vice Capt. W. D. Brown, a most gallant and valuable officer, killed at Gettysburg.
Sergeants [A. L.] East, [William H.] Eades, and [F. D.] Milstead, jr., of Captain Raine's battery, are mentioned for gallantry on the 15th.

AT GETTYSBURG.

Capt. D. P. Halsey, assistant adjutant-general of Iverson's brigade, displayed conspicuous gallantry, and rendered important service in rallying the brigade, which he led in its final attack.
General Rodes speaks of the services rendered by Col. D. H. Christie, North Carolina (mortally wounded July 1), as having been especially valuable. First Lieut. F. M. Harney, Fourteenth North Carolina, while in command of sharpshooters, defeated the One hundred and fiftieth Pennsylvania Regiment, and took their colors with his own hand, falling, mortally wounded, soon after.
Capt. A. H. Gallaway, Forty-fifth North Carolina, recaptured the flag of the Twentieth North Carolina, of Iverson's brigade.
Sergt. Thomas J. Betterton, Company A, Thirty-seventh Virginia, took a stand of colors, and was dangerously wounded.
Private W. H. Webb, orderly to General Johnson, remained on the field after being severely wounded. General Johnson says, "His conduct entitles him to a commission."
The following non-commissioned officers and privates are honorably mentioned for gallantry: Sergeant [P. B.] Grier, Company B; Sergeant [G. W.] Wills, Company D, Forty-third North Carolina; Sergeant [E. J.] Null and Private [W. D.] McAdoo, Company A, Fifty-third North Carolina; Sergt. Christopher Clark, Twelfth Alabama; Private A. F. Senteo, Company H, Twenty-fifth Virginia (detailed in ambulance corps).
Many officers besides those above named are distinguished by their commanders for gallant behavior. I have only space for the names of a few, whose acts of gallantry are specified.
I was fortunate in this campaign in the assistance of three division commanders--Maj. Gens. Jubal A. Early, Edward Johnson, and Robert E. Rodes--whose wise counsel, skillful handling of their commands, and prompt obedience to orders are beyond praise-gen-erals whose scars bear witness to the manner in which were won their laurels and rank.
Col. J. T. Brown, commanding artillery of this corps, showed himself competent to his position, and gave me perfect satisfaction.
I have to express my thanks to the officers of my staff for their valuable services during the campaign: Maj. (now Lieut. Col.) A. S. Pendleton, chief of staff; Maj. G. Campbell Brown, assistant adju-tant-general; Lieuts. T. T. Turner and James P. Smith, aides-de-camp; Col. A. Smead and Maj. B. H. Green, assistant inspectors-general; Surg. H. McGuire, medical director; Maj. J. A. Harman, chief quartermaster; W. J. Hawks, chief commissary of subsistence; William Allan, chief of ordnance; Capts. R. E. Wilbourn, chief of signals; H. B. Richardson, chief engineer, and Jed Hotchkiss, topographical engineer. Col. J. E. Johnson, formerly of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry; Lieuts. Elliott Johnston, of General Garnett's staff, and R. W. B. Elliott, of General Lawton's staff, were with me as volunteer aides-de-camp.
Colonel Pendleton's knowledge of his duties, experience, and activity relieved me of much hard work. I felt sure that the medical department, under Surg. H. McGuire, the quartermaster's, under Major Harman, and the subsistence, under Major Hawks, would be as well conducted as experience, energy, and zeal would allow. The labor and responsibility of providing the subsistence of the whole army during its advance rested to a great measure on Major Hawks, and could not have been more successfully accomplished.
Col. J. E. Johnson, formerly of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, was placed in charge of the pickets on the Shenandoah, covering my flank and rear during the attack on Winchester, and I rested securely in that respect, trusting to his experience, judgment, and coolness.
Capt. H. B. Richardson, chief engineer, was severely wounded at Gettysburg, and was left, I regret to say, in the enemy's hands--a loss I have very seriously felt ever since that engagement.
The efficiency and value of Major Allan and Captain Wilbourn in their respective departments are well known.
The reports of the division commanders accompany this report, as also those of the brigade commanders and the chief of artillery. To these I beg leave to refer for greater detail in their respective operations than is practicable in the report of the corps commander.
I have the pleasure to send you the accompanying maps of the campaign by Capt. Jed Hotchkiss, topographical engineer, being the map of routes to and from Gettysburg, map of the battle-field of Winchester, and map of the battle-field of Gettysburg.

I have the honor to remain, &c.,
R. S. EWELL,
Lieutenant-General, Provisional Army, C. S. Army.

 

[Inclosures.]

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 44.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
June 15, 1863.

The lieutenant-general commanding asks the men and officers of the corps to unite with him in returning thanks to our Heavenly Father for the signal success which has crowned the valor of this command.
In acknowledgment of Divine favor, chaplains will hold religious services in their respective regiments at such times as may be most convenient.
With wonderfully small loss (less than 300 killed, wounded, and missing), we have carried strong works defended by an abundance of superior artillery, capturing over 3,000 prisoners and large quantities of military stores and supplies. Such a result should strengthen the reliance in the righteousness of our cause, which has inspired every effort of our troops.

By command of Lieut. Gen. R. S. Ewell:

A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

 

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 45.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
June 15, 1863.

I. Major-General Early, while in the vicinity, will assume command of the Department of Winchester, comprising all the Valley south as far as Woodstock and north as far as the lines of the army.

II. All captured property will be turned over to the proper departments, excepting such supplies as may be needed for present consumption, which will at once be issued to the command. The provost-marshal will use the most stringent measures to prevent individual appropriations of what belongs to all. Clothing will be issued under the rules that govern the quartermaster's department, on requisitions approved by the lieutenant-general commanding. All the divisions will be furnished in proportion. When horses or supplies are absolutely necessary for individual wants, the applications must be approved at these headquarters, or by Major-General Early, commanding Department of Winchester.

The garrison flag captured by Major-General Early's division will be sent to Richmond by a detail to be made by Major-General Early.
The lieutenant-general commanding desires in every manner to ameliorate the condition of the men in the ranks, who have the work to do, and who do it so nobly. He is fully sensible of the oppression and outrages of the enemy on our people. He appeals to the intelligence and patriotism that mark this army to assist him in repressing every act of individual plunder on the part of those who may think such only just retaliation.
But this plundering must be repressed or our discipline is gone, the prestige of victory which has hitherto marked our course will be lost, and we will become, like our enemies, a band of robbers, without spirit to win victories.

By command of Lieut. Gen. R. S. Ewell:

A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

 

ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, August 13, 1864.

Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond:

SIR: I beg leave to ask your attention to the following statements, made with the view to correct some errors which obtain in regard to the military services of Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson.
In the attack upon Winchester last summer, General Early about dark succeeded in taking a position which rendered that of the enemy doubtful, if not untenable. At all events, his success induced the enemy to evacuate the place about 12 o'clock that night. This was done in good order and without loss in men.
The next morning, Milroy was intercepted in his retreat by General Johnson, with but two of the four brigades constituting his division. One of the four brigades was detained with the main army, while another, which should have been with him, had mistaken its line of march. The two brigades did not reach 2,000 in number, while the enemy had between 5,000 and 6,000 men.
Notwithstanding this disparity of force, General Johnson immediately engaged the enemy. By this bold attack, which was stubbornly resisted, the retreat was checked until re-enforcements could arrive, after which the enemy were speedily put to rout. His losses in this engagement were little short of 4,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Milroy himself, with a few followers, was hotly pursued, and barely made good his escape.
This decisive and valuable achievement was due to the energy and valor of General Johnson and his command; yet in General Lee's outline report of the campaign, these events are not clearly represented, and General Johnson is made to appear as capturing stragglers after a victory won by General Early.
While under my command, General Johnson was uniformly distinguished for hard and successful fighting. At Mine Run last fall, with his single division he defeated with great slaughter an entire corps of the enemy. So signal was this success, that the commander of the corps, General French, was relieved from the command, and since then, it is believed, has never been assigned to duty.
In the battle of the Wilderness, of the present campaign, no general officer could have been more conspicuous for brave and meritorious conduct.
These facts are submitted for the consideration of the Department at my own instance, without the knowledge of General Johnson, and to the sole end that his valuable services may be properly understood.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
R. S. EWELL,
Lieutenant-General.

 

[Indorsement.]

AUGUST 14, 1864.

Received with satisfaction, as the generous and voluntary tribute of one gallant soldier to another, his brother-in-arms on many a hard-fought field. It was not necessary, however, to [impress] on the Department a high appreciation of the courage and skill of General E. Johnson, whose deeds and merits have fully won him high estimation. It may, perhaps, have been supposed, from the purpose entertained by the Department to transfer him to another field of service, that such vindication was called for, but in reality that change is rather to be regarded as a tribute to his merits and capacities for usefulness, as it is expected he will probably be employed in larger command and in an arena certainly, under present circumstances inferior to none other in importance.

J. A. SEDDON.

 

 

 

Report of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding division.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS EARLY'S DIVISION,
August 22, 1863.

Maj. A. S. PENDLETON,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Corps. Army of Northern Virginia.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division during the recent campaign, commencing with its departure from Fredericksburg, and ending with its arrival in the vicinity of Orange Court-House:

MARCH FROM FREDERICKSBURG.

On June 4, the division marched from Hamilton's Crossing, and, having been joined by Jones' battalion of artillery, passed Spotsylvania Court-House, Verdierville, Somerville Ford (on the Rapidan), Culpeper Court-House, Sperryville, Washington (the county seat of Rappahannock County), and, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, arrived at Front Royal late on the night of the 12th. Hoke's and Smith's brigades crossed both branches of the Shenandoah that night, and encamped, and Hays' and Gordon's brigades, with Jones' battalion of artillery and the division trains, encamped on the east side of the South Branch, near Front Royal.

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER.

Early on the morning of the 13th, Hays' and Gordon's brigades and Jones' artillery and the trains were crossed over to the north side of the North Branch of the Shenandoah, and I received orders from the lieutenant-general commanding to move my division to the Valley turnpike, and advance to the vicinity of Kernstown, and then move to the left, so as to get a position from which the main work of the enemy at Winchester could be attacked with advantage, information at the same time being given me that there was a hill to the westward of this work, and commanding it, of which it was desired I should get possession.
Lieutenant [W. S.] Barton, of the Second Virginia Regiment, of Walker's brigade, Johnson's division, accompanied me as a guide, and Brown's battalion of reserve artillery, under Captain Dance, was ordered to accompany my division.
Having received the instructions of the lieutenant-general commanding, the wagons, excepting the ambulances and regimental ordnance and medical wagons, were left at Cedarville, and I diverged from the Winchester and Front Royal turnpike at Nineveh, and reached the Valley turnpike at Newtown, and thence advancing toward Winchester, I found Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, of the Maryland Line, with his battalion of infantry, the battery of Maryland artillery, and a portion of the battalion of Maryland cavalry, occupying the ridge between Bartonsville and Kernstown, and engaged in occasional skirmishing with a portion of the enemy which had taken position near Kernstown.
I halted my command here, forming it in line on either side of the turnpike, and proceeded to reconnoiter the ground for the purpose of ascertaining the strength and position of the enemy near Kernstown, and also of finding the road by which I was to diverge from the turnpike, so as to reach the position in rear of the enemy's works which I had been directed to gain.
The only portion of the enemy in sight on my arrival consisted of cavalry; but I was informed that an infantry picket occupied Kerns-town, and I soon discovered that a battery of artillery was located on Pritchard's Hill, near Kernstown, which was the same position occupied by the enemy's artillery at the time of General Jackson's engagement at this place.
Finding it necessary to dislodge the enemy from this hill, after making a reconnaissance, I moved Hays' brigade to the left, through a skirt of woods and a meadow, to the foot of the ridge along which General Jackson made his advance, and thence along a road which runs from Bartonsville to the Cedar Creek turnpike, until it reached an eligible position for advancing upon Pritchard's Hill from the left. From this point. Hays was ordered to advance and gain possession of Pritchard's Hill, which he did without opposition, the enemy having withdrawn his battery; but, while advancing, General Hays sent me word that the enemy had a considerable infantry force on the ridge to his left, and I immediately conducted Gordon s brigade over the same route, and sent word to Hays to halt his command until Gordon's should get up. Gordon then advanced his brigade to the left of Hays, and, in conjunction with skirmishers sent out by Hays, drove the enemy's force across the Cedar Creek turnpike and over the ridge between that road and Abraham's Creek, which here crosses the Valley turnpike.
While this was going on, Hoke's and Smith's brigades, which had been formed in line on the right and left of the Valley turnpike, respectively, were ordered to advance toward Kernstown. Gordon having advanced so that his right reached the Valley turnpike, was halted, and Hays was moved to his left, and then Smith s brigade was moved to the left of Hays, the whole being formed in line in rear of the crest of the ridge which is immediately south of Abraham's Creek.
The enemy then occupied Bowers' Hill, near Barton's Mills, with infantry and artillery, and it being too late for any further operations that evening, Hoke's brigade, under the command of Colonel [I.E.] Avery, of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, which had been ordered up to the support of the other brigades, was ordered back to Kernstown, where it was placed in position to protect the ambulances, wagons, and artillery, which had been brought up to that position, from an attack from the left and rear, and Herbert was ordered to take position with his battalion of infantry on the right of Gordon, who had extended his line on the right across the Valley turnpike. In this position the troops remained all night, under a drenching rain.
Early next morning, the 14th, I ordered Gordon and Hays, respectively, to advance a regiment across the creek and get possession of Bowers Hill, then occupied only by the enemy's skirmishers, as his artillery had been withdrawn during the night. This was accomplished after some skirmishing, and the skirmishers from Smith's brigade were also advanced across the creek, to the left of those of Hays and Gordon.
General Ewell having come up in the meantime, we proceeded together to reconnoiter the position, and, having gone to the top of Bowers' Hill, now occupied by my skirmishers, had a fair view of the enemy's works about Winchester, and from this point we discovered that the hill to the northwest of the enemy's works, which I had been directed to gain, had also been fortified, and was occupied. It became necessary, then, to take this hill by assault, and, having discovered a position to the northwest of it from which it was thought it might be attacked with advantage, I was directed to move my division around to that position and make the attack, leaving a force where the division then was to amuse the enemy and conceal the movement upon his flank and rear.
I will here state that when Hays' and Gordon's skirmishers had advanced to Bowers' Hill, Major [W. W.] Goldsborough, of the Maryland battalion, with the skirmishers from that battalion, had advanced into the outskirts of the town of Winchester, but, fearing that the enemy would shell the town from their main fort, I ordered him back.
After receiving final instructions from General Ewell, I replaced the skirmishers of Hays' and Smith s brigades by others from Gordon's brigade, and leaving General Gordon, with his brigade, the Maryland battalion, and two batteries of artillery (the Maryland battery and [A.] Hupp's battery, of Brown's battalion) to amuse the enemy and hold him in check in front, I moved with Hays', Hoke's, and Smith's brigades, and the rest of Jones' and Brown's battalions of artillery, to the left (west), following the Cedar Creek turnpike for a short distance, and then leaving that and passing through fields and the woods, which I found sufficiently open to admit of the passage of artillery, thus making a considerable detour, and crossing the macadamized road to Romney about 3 miles west of Winchester and a half mile from a point at which the enemy had had a picket the night before.
After crossing the Romney road, at which point I left the Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment, of Hoke s brigade, on picket, I continued to move on until I got very near to the Pughtown road before I reached the position from which I wished to assault the enemy's works, which proved to be a wooded hill, a part of the range of hills called Little North Mountain, close to the Pughtown road, and on the south side of which was an old orchard and the ruins of a house called Folk's Old House, and on the north side a corn-field, on Mrs. Brierly's land. Both these points afforded excellent positions for posting artillery in easy range of the enemy's works on the hill overlooking his main fort, this hill being on Fahnestock's land and adjoining the Pughtown road. To this point I was guided by a worthy and intelligent citizen, whose name I forbear to mention, as he has already been the object of the enemy's persecution; and I was so fortunate as to reach it without meeting with any scouts, pickets, or stragglers of the enemy, or exciting his attention in any way.
I reached here about 4 p.m., and as the day was excessively hot, and the men had marched a circuit of some 8 or 10 miles without meeting with water to drink, and were very much fatigued, I massed them in the woods in rear of the position, and gave them time to blow.
In the meantime, I proceeded to reconnoiter the enemy's position and the ground over which I would have to operate. I discovered the favorable positions for my artillery before mentioned, and that the intervening woods afforded an excellent cover for troops to advance under to within a short distance of the foot of the hill I wished to carry by assault. I also discovered that the body of the enemy occupying the work on this hill, which was a bastion front, presenting the appearance of an inclosed work from my point of view, was not keeping a lookout in my direction, but was looking intently in the direction of Gordon's command, on which a gradual advance was being made with infantry skirmishers and a few pieces of artillery.
In the meantime, Colonel Jones had quietly prepared for getting his artillery in position as quickly as possible when the moment should arrive for the attack, and the men having rested as much as possible under the circumstances, I directed General Hays, whose brigade had been selected to make the assault, to move his brigade near to the edge of the woods facing the enemy's works, and to keep them under cover until the artillery opened, and then to advance as rapidly as possible to the assault, with three regiments in front and two following a short distance in rear, as soon as he should discover that the enemy was sufficiently demoralized. Jones' artillery was divided so as to put twelve pieces in the orchard mentioned, and eight pieces in the edge of the corn-field to the north of the woods. The Fifty-seventh North Carolina Regiment was detached, so as to protect these latter pieces from an attack in the direction of the Pughtown road, near which they were posted, and the residue of Hoke's brigade and the whole of Smith's were placed in line about a quarter of a mile in rear of Hays, so as to be ready to support him.
The enemy's works on the front presented to me consisted of the bastion front on the high hill, which has been mentioned, another smaller breastwork between that and the Pughtown road, and a more extensive but incomplete work on the north side of the Pughtown road. He had evidently been making recent preparations against an attack from this quarter, but, strange to say, on this occasion failed to keep a lookout in that direction.
About an hour by sun, everything being ready, Jones ran his pieces by hand into position from which they could fire, and opened almost instantaneously from the whole of his twenty pieces upon the enemy before he was aware of our vicinity.
This cannonading was kept up briskly about three-quarters of an hour, when Hays advanced, as directed, and ascended the steep slope of the hill leading to the enemy's works, through a brushwood that had been felled to answer the purpose of an abatis, and drove the enemy from his works in fine style, capturing in the assault six rifled pieces, two of which were immediately turned upon the enemy, thus preventing an effort to recapture the works before re-enforcements could arrive, for which the enemy commenced preparing.
As soon as I saw Hays' men entering the enemy's work, I ordered forward Smith's brigade to his support, and also ordered Jones to advance with his pieces, which ware posted on the left, leaving Avery with part of Hoke's brigade to look out for the rear. On reaching the captured hill, I found that it overlooked and commanded, as had been anticipated, the enemy's main work, and also a smaller redoubt to the north of the main work, which was also occupied, and that all the works to the left of this hill had been evacuated.
The enemy was in evident commotion, but by the time the artillery and Smith's brigade reached the captured hill, it was too late to take any further steps for the capture of the main work, which was very strong, and to accomplish which would have required the cooperation of the other troops around Winchester. I contented myself, therefore, with directing an artillery fire to be kept up until near dark on the enemy's position, which was returned from the main work and the redoubt spoken of, but with little effect.
During the night, I had the captured works turned and embrasures cut, so as to open at early light on the main work, and the Fifty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, of Hoke's brigade, was ordered to occupy the work on the north of the Pughtown road. Hays occupied the works captured by him, and Smith's brigade was formed in line in rear of him, Avery being left with two regiments in the rear, to prevent any surprise by the enemy in that direction, and the Fifty-fourth still remaining on picket on the Romney road. In this position the troops lay on their arms all night. I sent my aide (Lieutenant [William G.] Calloway) to General Gordon, to direct him to move upon the main fort at daylight, and also sent a courier to General Ewell to inform him of what had been accomplished, and that I thought the enemy would evacuate before morning.
As soon as it was light enough next morning to see, it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated, taking the road toward Martinsburg, and very shortly afterward firing was heard on the Martinsburg road, which proved to be from the encounter of General Johnson's division with the retreating enemy. I immediately ordered my whole command in pursuit, having detached the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, to guard the abandoned wagons and property. Gordon's brigade, which first reached the fort and pulled down the flag flying over it, preceded the rest of the division, and, on reaching the point at which General Johnson had encountered the enemy, I found his division halted, and in-possession of the greater part of the enemy's infantry as prisoners. It was evident, then, that further pursuit on foot was useless, and I therefore halted my command, and encamped them near this place.
The enemy had abandoned all his artillery, all his wagons, and a considerable quantity of public stores. Twenty-five pieces of artillery with their caissons were secured, and a considerable quantity of artillery ammunition, though somewhat damaged. Though in the hurry I gave such directions and took such steps as it was possible to take under the circumstances to preserve the captured property, 'much of it was pilfered and damaged by stragglers, and, even after it got into the hands of the quartermasters and commissaries, a good deal of it was made away with.
I cannot too highly commend the conduct of Generals Hays and Gordon and their brigades in the two days' fighting which took place around Winchester. The charge of Hays' brigade upon the enemy's works was a most brilliant achievement, and the affair of the day before, when General Gordon drove the enemy from the position he occupied to the left of Kernstown, reflected equal credit upon himself and his brigade.
All the arrangements of Colonel Jones and the conduct of himself and his artillery were admirable, and have not been surpassed during the war. I must also commend the gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert and Major Goldsborough, of the Maryland Line, and their troops.
Hoke's and Smith's brigades did not become engaged on either day. The members of my staff--Majs. S. Hale, division inspector, and John W. Daniel, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenants [Andrew L.] Pitzer and Calloway, aides-de-camp--acquitted themselves to my entire satisfaction. Mr. Robert D. Early and Mr. Lake, volunteer aides (the latter a citizen of Maryland, who had been sent through the lines the day before our arrival), rendered me efficient service, as did Lieutenant Barton, of the Second Virginia Infantry, detailed to accompany me as a guide.
My loss in the whole affair was slight, consisting of 30 killed, 143 wounded, and 3 missing. Among the killed and wounded, however, were some gallant and efficient officers.
Having been afterward assigned to the command of Winchester for a short time, I sent to Richmond, by the way of Staunton, 108 officers and 3,250 enlisted men as prisoners, leaving in Winchester several hundred prisoners sick and wounded. The greater part of the prisoners were captured by General Johnson's division while attempting to make their escape after the evacuation.

MARCH FROM WINCHESTER INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE DATE OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

While in command at Winchester, I detached the Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment, of Hoke's brigade, and the Fifty-eighth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, to Staunton, in charge of prisoners, and, leaving the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, of Smith's brigade, on duty in Winchester, I left that place on the afternoon of the 18th, and proceeded, with the residue of Hoke's brigade and Jones' battalion of artillery, to Shepherdstown on the next day. Gordon's, Hays', and Smith's brigades having preceded me to that place.
On the 22d, I crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and moved through Sharpsburg and Boonsborough, encamping on the road toward Hagerstown, about 3 miles from Boonsborough. The Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry, under Col. William H. French, of Jenkins' brigade, reported to me on this day, by order of General Ewell, and remained with me until the battle of Gettysburg.
On the 23d, I moved through Cavetown, Smithsburg, and Ringgold (or Ridgeville, as it is called), to Waynesborough, in Pennsylvania.
On the 24th, I moved through Quincy and Altodale to Greenwood, on the turnpike from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.
At this point, my division remained in camp on the 25th, and I visited General Ewell at Chambersburg, and received from him instructions to cross the South Mountain to Gettysburg, and then proceed to York, and cut the Northern Central Railroad, running from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and also destroy the bridge across the <ar44_465> Susquehanna at Wrightsville and Columbia, on the branch road from York toward Philadelphia, if I could, and rejoin him at Carlisle by the way of Dillsburg.
Colonel [E. V.] White's battalion of cavalry was ordered to report to me for this expedition, and on the morning of the 26th, having sent all my trains to Chambersburg, excepting the ambulances, one medical wagon for a brigade, the regimental ordnance wagons, one wagon with cooking utensils for each regiment, and fifteen empty wagons to gather supplies with, and carrying no other baggage, I moved toward Gettysburg, and on reaching the forks of the road, about l miles front Cashtown, I sent General Gordon, with his brigade and White's battalion of cavalry, on the pike through Cashtown toward Gettysburg, and moved with the rest of the command to the left, through Hilltown to Mummasburg. I had heard on the road that there was probably a force at Gettysburg, though I could get no definite information as to its size, and the object of this movement was for Gordon to amuse and skirmish with the enemy while I should get on his flank and rear, so as to capture his whole force.
On arriving at Mummasburg, I ascertained that the force at Gettysburg was small, and while waiting here for the infantry to come up (whose march was considerably delayed by the muddy condition of the roads), a company of French's cavalry that had been sent toward Gettysburg captured some prisoners, from whom it was ascertained that the advance of Gordon's force (a body of cavalry from White's battalion) had encountered a regiment of militia, which fled at the first approach, and I immediately sent forward Colonel French with his cavalry to pursue this militia force, which he did, capturing a number of prisoners. Hays' brigade on arriving was also dispatched toward Gettysburg, and the other brigades with the artillery were halted and encamped near Mummasburg.
I then rode to Gettysburg, and found Gordon just entering the town, his command having marched more rapidly than the other brigades, because it moved on a macadamized road. The militia regiment which had been encountered by White's cavalry was the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Militia, consisting of 800 or 900 men, and had arrived in Gettysburg the night before, and moved that morning a short distance out on the road toward Cashtown, but had fled on the first approach of White's cavalry, taking across the fields between Mummasburg and Gettysburg, and going toward Hunterstown. Of this force, 175 prisoners in all were captured and subsequently paroled. Hays brigade was halted, and encamped about a mile from Gettysburg, and two regiments were sent to aid French in the pursuit of the fugitive militia, but could not get up with it.
The authorities of Gettysburg declared their inability to furnish any supplies, and a search of the stores resulted in securing only a very small quantity of commissary supplies, and about 2,000 rations were found in a train of cars, and issued to Gordon's brigade. The cars, numbering l0 or 12, were burned, as was also a small railroad bridge near the place. There were no railroad buildings of consequence. The day was rainy and the roads very muddy, and as it was late when I reached the place, and having to move upon York early next day, I had no opportunity of compelling a compliance with my demands in this town, or ascertaining its resources, which I think, however, were very limited.
I ordered Tanner s battery of Jones' battalion, to report to General Gordon during the night, and also a company of French's cavalry, and directed him to move with them and his brigade on the turnpike toward York at light next morning, and I also directed Colonel White to proceed with his cavalry to Hanover Junction, on the Northern Central road, destroying the railroad bridges on the way, and to destroy the junction and a bridge or two south of it, and then proceed toward York, burning all the bridges up to that place.
With the rest of the command, I moved next morning (the 27th) from Mummasburg, through Hunterstown, New Chester, Hampton, and East Berlin, toward Dover, and encamped a short distance beyond Berlin: and I rode over to Gordon's camp, on the York pike, which was about 4 miles distant, to arrange with him the manner of the approach upon York, if it should be defended. But all the information we could gain induced me to believe there was no force in York, and that night a deputation from the town came out to Gordon's camp, to surrender it. I directed General Gordon, in the event of there being no force in York, to march through and proceed to Columbia Bridge, and secure it at both ends, if possible.
Next morning (the 28th), General Gordon marched into the town of York without opposition, and I proceeded with the rest of the command by the way of Weigelstown, leaving Dover to my left. At Weigelstown, I dispatched Colonel French with the greater part of his cavalry to the mouth of the Conewago, to burn two railroad bridges at that point and all others between there and York, and then proceeded on to York, sending Hays' and Smith's brigades into camp at Lauck's Mills, near the railroad, some 2 miles north of the town. Avery's command was marched into the town, and put into quarters in some extensive buildings put up for hospitals. I here met with General Gordon, and repeated to him my instructions to proceed to the Susquehanna and secure the Columbia Bridge, if possible, and he moved in that direction with his command.
I then made a requisition upon the authorities for 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 hats, 1,000 pairs of socks, $100.000 in money, and three days' rations of all kinds. Subsequently between 1,200 and 1,500 pairs of shoes, the hats, socks, and rations, were furnished, but only $28,600 in money was furnished, which was paid to my quartermaster (Major [C. E.] Snodgrass), the mayor and other authorities protesting their inability to get any more money, as it had all been run off previously, and I was satisfied they made an honest effort to raise the amount called for.
A short time before night, I rode out in the direction of Columbia Bridge, to ascertain the result of Gordon's expedition, and had not proceeded far before I saw an immense smoke rising in the direction of the Susquehanna, which I subsequently discovered to proceed from the burning of the bridge in question. On arriving at Wrightsville, on the banks of the Susquehanna, opposite Columbia, I ascertained from General Gordon that, on approaching Wrightsville, in front of the bridge he found a command of militia some 1,200 strong, intrenched, and, after endeavoring to move around their flank to cut them off from the bridge (which he was unable to do from want of knowledge of the locality), he opened his artillery on the militia, which fled at the bursting of the third shell, and he immediately pursued; but as his men had marched a little over 20 miles, on a very warm day, the enemy beat him running. He, however, attempted to cross the bridge, and the head of his column got half way over, but he found the bridge, which had been prepared for the purpose, on fire in the middle. As he had nothing but muskets and rifles, he sent back for buckets to endeavor to arrest the flames, but, before they arrived, the fire had progressed so far that it was impossible to arrest it. He had, therefore, to return, and leave the bridge to its fate.
This bridge was one mile and a quarter in length, the superstructure being of wood, on stone pillars, and it included in one structure a railroad bridge a pass-way for wagons, and also a tow-path for the canal, which here crosses the Susquehanna. The bridge was entirely consumed, and from it the town of Wrightsville caught fire and several buildings were consumed, but the further progress of the flames was arrested by the exertions of Gordon's men. I regretted very much the failure to secure this bridge, as, finding the defenseless condition of the country generally, and the little obstacle likely to be afforded by the militia to, our progress, I had determined, if I could get possession of the Columbia Bridge, to cross my division over the Susquehanna, and cut the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, march upon Lancaster, lay that town under contribution, and then attack Harrisburg in the rear while it should be attacked in front by the rest of the corps, relying, in the worst contingency that might happen upon being able to mount in division from the immense number of horses that had been run across the river, and then move to the west, destroying the railroads and canals, and returning back again to a place of safety. This project, however, was entirely thwarted by the destruction of the bridge, as the river was otherwise impassable, being very wide and deep at this point. I therefore ordered General Gordon to move his command back to York next day, and returned to that place myself that night.
Colonel White succeeded in reaching Hanover Junction and destroying the depot and also one or two bridges in the vicinity, but he did not, however, destroy all the bridges between that point and York, as he reported that one or two of them were defended by an infantry force.
Colonel French succeeded in destroying the bridges at the mouth of the Conewago, and all the bridges from that point to York, and I sent him to destroy the remaining bridges over the Codorus, between York and Hanover Junction, which he succeeded in doing, any force which may previously have been defending them having disappeared.
I found no public stores at this place. A few prisoners found in the hospital at York, with 19 captured by Gordon at Wrightsville, were paroled. All the cars at that point were destroyed, but the railroad buildings and two car manufactories, as well as the hospital buildings, were not burned, because, after examination, I was satisfied that the burning of them would cause the destruction of the greater part of the town, and, notwithstanding the barbarous policy pursued by the enemy in similar cases, I determined to forbear in this case, hoping that it might not be Without its effect even upon our cruel enemy. This example has been lost upon the Yankees, however, as, so far from appreciating the forbearance shown, I am informed that it has been actually charged by some of their papers that Gordon's command fired the town of Wrightsville, whereas the exertions of his men saved the place from utter destruction.
On the evening of the 29th, I received, through Capt. Elliott Johnston, rode to General Ewell, a copy of a note from General Lee, and also verbal instructions, which required me to move back, so as to rejoin the rest of the corps on the western side of the South Mountain; and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 30th, I put my whole command in motion, moving by Weigelstown and East Berlin in the direction of Heidlersburg, from which I could move either to Shippensburg or to Greenwood by the way of Arendtsville, as circumstances might require. At the same time, I sent Colonel White's cavalry on the pike from York toward Gettysburg, to ascertain if any force of the enemy was on that road.
At East Berlin, a small squad of the enemy's cavalry was seen and pursued by my cavalry advance, and I received information at this point from Colonel White that a cavalry and infantry force had been on the York road, at Abbott s Ford, but had moved south toward Hanover. A courier from General Ewell met me here with a dispatch, informing me of the fact that he was moving with Rodes' division by the way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and directing me to march in that direction.
I encamped about 3 miles from Heidlersburg, and rode to see General Ewell at that point, and was informed by him that the object was to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown, and received directions to move next day to that point. I was informed that Rodes would move by the way of Middletown and Arendtsville, but it was arranged that I should go by the way of Hunterstown and Mummasburg.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

Having ascertained that the road from my camp to Hunterstown was a very rough and circuitous one, I determined next morning (July 1) to march by the way of Heidlersburg, and then from that point to the Mummasburg road. After passing Heidlersburg a short distance, I received a note from you, written by order of General Ewell, informing me that General Hill was moving from Cashtown toward Gettysburg, and that General Rodes had turned off at Middletown, and was moving toward the same place, and directing me to move also to that point. I therefore continued to move on the road I was then on toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving in sight of that place, on the direct road from Heidlersburg, I discovered that General Rodes' division was engaged with the enemy to the right of me, the enemy occupying a position in front of Gettysburg, and the troops constituting his right being engaged in an effort to drive back the left of General Rodes' line.
I immediately ordered my troops to the front, and formed my line across the Heidlersburg road, with Gordon's brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade (under Colonel Avery) on the left, Hays' brigade in the center, an(1 Smith's brigade in the rear of Hoke's. Jones' battalion of artillery was posted in a field on the left of the Heidlers-burg road, immediately in front of Hoke's brigade, so as to fire on the enemy's flank, and, as soon as these dispositions could be made, a fire was opened upon the enemy's infantry and artillery by my artillery with considerable effect.
Gordon's brigade was then ordered forward to the support of Doles' brigade, which was on Rodes' left, and was being pressed by a considerable force, of the enemy, which had advanced from the direction of the town to a wooded hill on the west side of Rock Creek, the stream which runs northeast of the town, and as soon as Gordon was fairly engaged with this force, Hays' and Hoke's brigades were ordered forward in line, and the artillery, supported by Smith's brigade, was ordered to follow.
After a short but hot contest, Gordon succeeded in routing the force opposed to him, consisting of a division of the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General Barlow, of the Federal Army, and drove it back with great slaughter, capturing, among a number of prisoners, General Barlow himself, who was severely wounded. Gordon advanced across the creek, over the hill on which Barlow had been posted, and across the fields toward the town, until he came to a low ridge, behind which the enemy had another line of battle, extending beyond his left. I directed him to halt here, and then ordered Hays and Avery, who had been halted on the east side of Rock Creek while I rode forward to where Gordon had been engaged, to advance toward the town, on Gordon's left, which they did in fine style, encountering and driving back into the town in great confusion the second line of the enemy.
Hays' brigade entered the town, fighting its way, and Avery moved to the left of it across the railroad, and took his position in the fields on the left, and facing Cemetery Hill, which here presented a very rugged ascent. This movement was made under the fire of artillery from this hill, which had previously opened when my artillery had first opened its fire, but Avery succeeded in placing his men under the cover of a low ridge which here runs through the fields from the town. Hays' brigade was formed in line in the street running through the middle of the town.
A very large number of prisoners were captured in the town, and before reaching it, their number being so great as really to embarrass us. Two pieces of artillery (Napoleons) were also captured outside of the town, the capture being claimed by both brigades; but it is unnecessary to decide which reached these pieces first, as the capture was unquestionably due to the joint valor of both brigades.
While these operations were going on with my division, I saw, farther to the right, the enemy's force on that part of the line falling back and moving in comparatively good order on the right of the town toward the range of hills in the rear, and I sent back for a battery of artillery to be brought up to open on this force and the town, from which a fire was opened on my brigades, but before it got up, my men had entered the town, and the force on the right had retired beyond reach. I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith to advance with his brigade, but he thought proper not to comply with this order, on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road.
As soon as my brigades had entered the town, I rode into that place myself, and, after ascertaining the condition of things, I rode to find General Ewell and General Rodes, or General Hill, for the purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy before he should recover from his evident dismay, in order to get possession of the hills to which he had fallen back with the remnant of iris forces; but before I found either of these officers, General Smith's son, who was acting as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked: and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon with his brigade to take charge of Smith's also, and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm.
Meeting with an officer of Major-General Pender's staff, I sent word by him to General Hill that if he would send up a division, we could take the hill to which the enemy had retreated; and shortly after meeting with General Ewell, I communicated my views to him, and was informed that Johnson's division was coming up, and it was determined with this division to get possession of a wooded hill to the left of Cemetery Hill, which it commanded; but this division arrived at a late hour, and its movement having been delayed by the report of the advance on the York road, no effort to get possession of the wooded hill on the left of the town was made that night.
Having been informed that a large portion of the rest of our army would come up during the night, and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and the left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade under cover of night from the town into the field in front of the left of the town, to a place where he would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance upon Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with General Ewell to examine a position for the artillery on the left.
Having been subsequently informed that the attack would begin at 4 p.m., I directed General Gordon to move his brigade to the railroad in rear of Hays and Avery, Smith being left, under General J. E. B. Stuart, to guard the York road. The fire from the artillery having opened on the right and left at 4 o'clock, and continued for some time, I was ordered by General Ewell to advance upon Cemetery Hill with my two brigades that were in position as soon as General Johnson's division, which was on my left, should become engaged at the wooded hill on the left, which it was about to attack, information being given me that the advance would be general, and made also by Rodes' division and Hill's divisions on my right.
Accordingly, as soon as Johnson became Warmly engaged, which was a little before dusk, I ordered Hays and Avery to advance and carry the works on the heights in front. These troops advanced in gallant style to the attack, passing over the ridge in front of them under a heavy artillery fire, and then crossing a hollow between that and Cemetery Hill, and moving up this hill in the face of at least two lines of infantry posted behind stone and plank fences; but these they drove back, and, passing over all obstacles, they reached the crest of the hill, and entered the enemy's breastworks crowning it, getting possession of one or two batteries. But no attack was made on the immediate right, as was expected, and not meeting with support from that quarter, these brigades could not hold the position they had attained, because a very heavy force of the enemy was turned against them from that part of the line which the divisions on the right were to have attacked, and these two brigades had, therefore, to fall back, which they did with comparatively slight loss, considering the nature of the ground over which they had to pass and the immense odds opposed to them, and Hays' brigade brought off four stand of captured colors.
At the same time these brigades advanced, Gordon's brigade was ordered forward to support them, and did advance to the position from which they had moved, but was halted here because it was ascertained that no advance was made on the right, and it was evident that the crest of the hill could not be held by my two brigades supported by this one without any other assistance, and that the attempt would be attended with a useless sacrifice of life. Hays' and Hoke's brigades were reformed on the line previously occupied by them, and on the right and left of Gordon, respectively.
In this attack, Colonel Avery, of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, commanding Hoke's brigade, was mortally wounded. With this affair' the fighting on July 2 terminated.
After night, I was ordered by General Ewell to send Smith's brigade to report to General Johnson, on the left, by daylight, and General Smith was ordered to do so, and did report to General Johnson, and his three regiments were engaged on the 3d on the extreme left, under General Johnson's directions.
As the operations of this brigade on this day were under the immediate order's of General Johnson, I will merely refer to the report of Colonel [John S.] Hoffman, the present brigade commander, herewith forwarded.
Before light on the morning of the 3d, I ordered Hays' and Hoke's brigades (the latter now under the command of Colonel [A. C.] Godwin, of the Fifty-seventh North Carolina Regiment) to the rear, and subsequently formed them in line in the town on the same street formerly occupied by Hays. Gordon being left to occupy the position which was occupied by these brigades on the previous day. In these positions these three brigades remained during the day, and did not again participate in the attack, but they were exposed during the time to the fire of sharpshooters and an occasional fire from the enemy's artillery on the hills.
At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, my brigades were quietly withdrawn from their positions, and moved back on the Cashtown road, and formed in line on both sides of that road, in rear of Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, which occupied the front line, running along the crest of the ridge on the west of the town.
My loss in the three days' fighting at Gettysburg was 158 killed, 796 wounded, and 227 missing, a large proportion of the missing being, in all probability, killed or wounded. The enemy's loss at the points where the three brigades of Gordon, Hays, and Hoke were engaged far exceeded my loss, and a very large number of prisoners were secured.

THE MARCH BACK FROM GETTYSBURG, AND RECROSSING OF THE POTOMAC.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, under orders from General Ewell, my division moved back on the road toward Fairfield, following in the rear of the corps, and constituting the rear guard of the whole army.
While waiting at the junction of the road on which I had moved with the direct road from Gettysburg to Fairfield for the passage of all the troops and trains, a few pieces of artillery were opened by the enemy at long range, but without doing any damage. The whole force having gotten on the road in front of me. I moved on slowly in the rear. Gordon's brigade bringing up my rear, followed by White's cavalry battalion, and on arriving in view of Fairfield, which is situated in a wide and low plain surrounded by hills, I found the wagon trains in front blocked up. While waiting here for the road to be cleared. Colonel White sent forward to inform me that a force of the enemy was advancing in the rear, and I sent forward to hasten up the trains, but as they did not move off, I was preparing to fire a blank cartridge or two for the purpose of quickening their pace, when the advance of the enemy appeared on a hill in my rear, and <ar44_472> it became necessary to open on him with shell: and a battery having been brought up by the enemy, and replying to my fire, the trains soon cleared the road. One of Gordon's regiments was deployed as skirmishers to hold the enemy in check, which it did effectually, driving back' his advance, and my division was gradually moved forward beyond Fairfield, and formed in line in a favorable position, and Gordon s regiment was called in.
In this affair, this regiment (the Twenty-sixth Georgia) sustained a loss of 11 wounded and missing.
The division was then encamped, by order of General Ewell, not far from Fairfield, and so posted as to protect the trains, which had been parked a little farther on.
The enemy did not again molest me, and at light next morning, the 6th, my skirmishers having been replaced by those of General Rodes' division (which was this day to constitute the rear guard), I moved to the front of the corps, and, passing Monterey Springs, on the summit of the mountain, crossed over to Waynesborough, where I encamped for the night.
Very early next morning, the 7th. I moved on toward Hagerstown, by Leitersburg, following Rodes, and being followed by Johnson, whose division this day constituted the rear guard. My division was halted and encamped about a mile north of Hagerstown, on the Chambersburg pike. It remained in this position until the afternoon of the 10th, when it was moved through Hagerstown, and placed in position on the Cumberland road, on the crest of the ridge southwest of Hagerstown. On the next day, the 11th, it was moved farther to the right, and placed in position, with its right resting near the road from Hagerstown to Williamsport.
It remained here until after dark on the 12th, when it was moved to the right across the Williamsport road to the rear of General Hill's position, for the purpose of supporting his line, which faced the road leading toward Sharpsburg, and in front of which a considerable force of the enemy had been massed.
At dark on the night of the 13th, my division was withdrawn, and moved to Williamsport that night, bringing up the rear of the corps, and, after light on the 14th, it was recrossed over the Potomac, Gordon's, Hoke's, and Smith's brigades (the latter now commanded by Colonel Hoffman, as General Smith had tendered his resignation on the 10th, and received leave of absence) fording above Williamsport, and Hays' brigade, with Jones' battalion of artillery, crossing over the bridge at Falling Waters.
The division encamped near Hainesville that night, and the next day moved through Martinsburg, and on the 16th reached Darkesville, where it went into camp, and remained until the afternoon of the 20th, when it was ordered to move across North Mountain, at Mills' Gap, and down Back Creek, to intercept a body of the enemy reported to have advanced to Hedgesville.
On the night of the 20th, I encamped near Gerrardstown, and next day crossed the mountain, and, proceeding down Back Creek, reached the rear of Hedgesville, but found that the enemy had hastily retreated the night before. I then moved through Hedgesville and encamped.
Receiving orders that night to move up the Valley, with a view to crossing the mountains, I moved next day to Bunker Hill, and then through Winchester to the Opequon, on the Front Royal road, but in consequence of instructions received from General Ewell, I turned off to the Valley road from Cedarville, and thence, marching by the way of Strasburg, New Market. Fisher's Gap, Madison Court-House, Locust Grove, and Rapidan Station, I reached my present camp, near Clark's Mountain, in the vicinity of Orange Court-House, on the 1st of this month.
The Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment and Fifty-eighth Virginia Regiment rejoined their respective brigades near Hagerstown on the march back, after having participated in the repulse of the enemy's attack on our trains near Williamsport, and the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment rejoined its brigade on the passage through Winchester.
The conduct of my troops during the entire campaign, on the march as well as in action, was deserving of the highest commendation.
To Brigadier-Generals Hays and Gordon I was greatly indebted for their cheerful, active, and intelligent co-operation on all occasions, and their gallantry in action was eminently conspicuous.
I had to regret the absence of the gallant Brigadier-General Hoke, who was severely wounded in the action of May 4, at Fredericksburg, and had not recovered, but his place was worthily filled by Colonel Avery, of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, who fell, mortally wounded, while gallantly leading his brigade in the charge on Cemetery Hill, at Gettysburg, on the afternoon of July 2. In his death the Confederacy lost a good and brave soldier.
The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones and his artillery battalion on all occasions, as well as that of Brown's battalion at Winchester, was admirable.
My commendations are also due to Colonel French and Lieutenant-Colonel White and their respective cavalry commands for the efficient service performed by them.
To the members of my staff--Majors Hale, division inspector; Daniel, assistant adjutant-general: Lieutenants Pitzer and Calloway, my aides, and Mr. Robert D. Early, a volunteer aide--I was indebted for the active zeal, energy, and courage with which they performed their duties.
Though I do not wish to make invidious distinctions by calling attention to individual acts of daring and gallantry, of which there were so many instances, I must refer to the case of Lieut. John Orr, adjutant of the Sixth Louisiana Regiment (mentioned by General Hays), who mounted the enemy s breastworks at Winchester, and received a bayonet wound on the top of the parapet, and I respectfully recommend this officer for promotion to the position of captain of cavalry, he being desirous of entering that branch of the service, for which he is eminently qualified.
Accompanying this report will be found lists of killed, wounded, and missing and also the official reports of Brigadier-Generals Hays and Gordon. Colonels Godwin and Hoffman, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones: also a report of Lieutenant-Colonel Murchison, of the Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment, of the part taken by his regiment in the repulse of the enemy's cavalry near Williamsport, Md.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. EARLY,
Major-General, Commanding Division

 

 

Reports of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS HAYS' BRIGADE, August 4, 1863.

Maj. JOHN W. DANIEL,
Asst Adjt. Gen., Early's Division.

MAJOR: I have the honor of submitting the following report of the operations of my brigade on June 13 and 14, in the vicinity of Winchester, Va.:
On the morning of June 13. being encamped on the south side of the Shenandoah River, I crossed that stream at daylight, and, joining the division, was marched in the direction of Winchester, taking the Newtown road.
Reaching Newtown, we took the Valley turnpike, and proceeded to within a short distance of Kernstown, where we met with Colonel Herbert's command of the Maryland Line, engaged in skirmishing with the enemy Having halted here for a short time I was conducted by Major-General Early to another road, to the left and west of the Valley turnpike. I then advanced my brigade about half a mile on this road, halted, and sent out the Ninth Regiment, Colonel [L. A.] Stafford commanding, to deploy as skirmishers, and drive the enemy from a wooded eminence between my position and the Valley turnpike. This having been effected, I advanced my brigade, and formed it in line of battle on the above-mentioned hill, throwing out six companies as skirmishers, to advance to another piece of woods in my front.
At this juncture. I was ordered by General Early to remain in my position until Gordon's brigade should have swept around and entered the woods to my left. Gordon, having met the enemy, drove him steadily before him, my six companies of skirmishers advancing with his brigade. My brigade was then put in motion, and continued to advance until both brigades were halted, by command of General Early, when we were formed in line on the crest of a hill in front of the Cedar Creek road, and in rear of Barton's Mills, on the Valley turnpike, Gordon's right resting on the pike and my brigade on his left. In this position we remained during that evening and night.
At daylight on the morning of June 14, brisk skirmishing took place, and at sunrise, in obedience to orders from General Early, I sent the Seventh Regiment, Colonel Pelto commanding, with directions to advance with a regiment of Gordon's brigade, to take possession of a hill in front of the old mill, the same taken by the Louisiana brigade in May, 1862. This was accomplished after a short engagement with the enemy's skirmishers.
Sharp skirmishing continued during the morning, and at 11 o'clock I received orders from General Early to withdraw the Seventh Regiment and my skirmishers so soon as they should be relieved by General Gordon, and to form my brigade on the Cedar Creek road. From this place we were marched around to the left and weal of Winchester, until we reached, at about 3.30 p.m., a position to the north of the Romney road, and between that road and the Pughtown road, in the rear of a fortified hill, to the north of and commanding the main fort. There we halted.
The artillery having been put in position, I was ordered by General Early at about 5 p.m. to form my brigade, and be in readiness to charge and take the fortified position of the enemy in our front, which was the key to all the other fortifications in and around Winchester. Having, in company with General Early, made a careful reconnaissance. I proceeded to form my line on the slope of a wooded hill, in advance of and between the two positions selected for our artillery, placing the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Regiments (commanded, respectively by Colonels [William] Monaghan, Penn, and Stafford) in the front line, and the Fifth and Eighth Regiments (commanded by Colonels [Henry] Forno and [T. D.] Lewis) at a convenient distance in the rear, to be used on the flanks or in support, as occasion might require.
Having informed General Early that my arrangements were completed, and my brigade in readiness to advance, the artillery at once opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's position. So well directed was this fire, that in a few minutes the enemy were forced to seek shelter behind their works, and scarcely a head was discovered above the ramparts.
At this time, a favorable opportunity presenting itself for me to advance from the woods and cross the open field in my front (at about 6 or 6.30 o'clock). I gave the order to forward. I continued to advance slowly and steadily, and succeeded in clearing the woods, crossing the field, and had begun to ascend the hill upon which were the enemy's fortifications, when, coming in view of our own artillery, it ceased firing. The enemy immediately arose from their hiding-places behind their works, and discovered us just as we had reached the edge of an abatis of felled timber, about 150 yards from the fortifications. The order to charge was given, and so rapidly did this brigade push forward that the enemy had time to give us but a few volleys of musketry and only four or five rounds of canister from their field pieces before the position was reached and carried.
About 150 yards above and to the left of the main fortifications was a small redoubt, manned by infantry and mounted with two pieces of artillery. This work was abandoned by the enemy immediately upon the fall of the other; but as they attempted to carry off their artillery, the Seventh Regiment was at once faced to the left, and, by shooting a few of the horses, saved both guns and caissons.
Owing to the difficulty experienced by my men in getting over the ditches and embankments after the works had been reached, and the precipitate flight of the enemy, the loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners was very small. We captured one battery of the Fifth U. S. Artillery (regulars), of six guns, with caissons and trappings complete, and all the horses belonging thereto, save a few which we found it necessary to shoot in order to secure some of the guns.
Shortly after the fortifications had been carried, the enemy made a demonstration to retake it, and with that view had formed three columns. Two of the captured guns were immediately turned upon them, being served by some of my men who had previously been for a short time in the artillery service, and after a few well-directed rounds they were compelled to retire. Smith's brigade and Colonel Jones' battalion of artillery came up to my support shortly afterward. With the exception of quite a brisk cannonading, there was no further fighting that night.
The next morning, June 15, it was discovered that the enemy, seeing the key to all his other works in our possession, had evacuated Winchester, whereupon my brigade, with the remainder of the division, took up the line of march in the direction of Martinsburg.
The loss of my brigade in this engagement was 2 officers and 10 men killed, 8 officers and 59 men wounded, making a total of 12 killed and 67 wounded. My loss on June 13 was as follows: 2 men killed, 3 officers and 8 men wounded, and 3 men missing. Total of the two days' operations: 14 killed, 78 wounded, 3 missing.
I desire here to mention that my officers and men won my highest admiration by the cool, steady, unflinching bravery they exhibited in this action, and particularly would I call attention to the conspicuous gallantry of Lieutenant [John] Orr, adjutant of the Sixth Regiment, who was the first to mount the parapet of the enemy's redoubt, receiving while doing so a severe bayonet wound in the side.
To my staff--Capt. W. J. Seymour, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. John Freeland, aide-de-camp--I am again indebted for valuable services. Also to Capt. John G. Campbell, acting brigade quartermaster and commissary, who rendered me important assistance during this engagement. Captain [J. H.] New, assistant adjutant-general and inspector, was absent, sick.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HARRY T. HAYS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

 

HEADQUARTERS HAYS' BRIGADE,
August 3, 1863.

Maj. JOHN W. DANIEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Early's Division.

MAJOR: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command near the city of Gettysburg, Pa.:
On Wednesday, July 1, after a march of 12 or 14 miles, returning from the city of York, I arrived with my brigade on the Heidlers-burg road, within a mile and a half of Gettysburg. At this point I discovered that a space in the division line of battle had been left for my command, which had been marching in the rear of the column.
Brigadier-General Gordon having deployed to the right, Brigadier-General Hoke's brigade (commanded by Colonel Avery) and Smith's brigade to the left, I formed my line of battle, extending across the road, placing the Fifth, Sixth, and right wing of the Ninth Regiments on the right of the road, the left wing of the Ninth, Seventh, and Eighth Regiments on the left.
This arrangement being completed, Brigadier-General Gordon, a little after 2 o'clock, was ordered to advance. In a short time, Brigadier-General Gordon having encountered the enemy in force, I received an order to advance in support, Hoke's brigade moving forward at the same time on my left. Pressing steadily on, I met with no other opposition than that presented by the enemy's skirmishers and the firing of his artillery until I came up to the line of Gordon's brigade. Here I found the enemy in considerable strength. I still continued to move on, however, succeeding in driving before me all the force opposed until I arrived at the railroad, which here runs from east to west, just striking the edge of the city of Gettysburg. In my progress to this position, the fire to which my command was subjected from the enemy's batteries, posted upon well-selected rises of the ground, was unusually galling. But so rapid and impetuous was the movement of my troops in this advance, that my skirmishers, keeping well to the front, captured two pieces of artillery.
I had barely time to pause at the railroad referred to when I discovered a heavy column of the enemy s troops, which had been engaged with Gordon's brigade and the division of Major-General Rodes, advancing rapidly, threatening my right. Perceiving that a forward movement on my part would expose my flank to an attack from this force, exceeding in numbers that under my command, I immediately changed front forward on the first company, First Battalion, of a portion of my brigade--the Fifth, Sixth, and the right wing of the Ninth Regiments. With this line, after several well-directed volleys, I succeeded in breaking this column on my right, dispersing its men in full flight through the streets of the city. But for this movement on my flank, I should have captured several pieces of artillery opposite the left of my line, upon which the Seventh Regiment was advancing in front and the Eighth by a side street at the time I halted.
After reforming my line of battle, I advanced through the city of Gettysburg, clearing it of the enemy and taking prisoners at every turn; During this time, as well as in my progress to the city, a great number of prisoners were captured by my command, but unwilling to decrease my force by detailing a guard. I simply ordered them to the rear as they were taken. Many of these following the road to the left, fell into the possession of Major-General Rodes' troops. I am satisfied that the prisoners taken in the above-mentioned movements by my brigade exceeded in numbers the force under my command.
My loss this day was small--1 officer and 6 men killed, 4 officers and 37 men wounded, and 15 men missing. The loss of the enemy cannot be known with exactness, but it was apparent from an inspection of the field that his loss exceeded ours by at least six to one.
Having driven the enemy entirely out of the city, I rested my line on one of the upper southern streets, Hoke's brigade, on my left, extending beyond the eastern suburbs. In this position I remained until 12 o'clock that night. At that hour I received an order from Major-General Early to make a reconnaissance of the ground between my situation and that of the enemy, who, after abandoning the city, had intrenched himself on Cemetery Hill, a commanding height, one of a series or chain of hills belting Gettysburg on the south.
After a careful examination of the locality indicated, about 2 o'clock in the morning (July 2) I moved my troops into an open field between the city and the base of a hill intervening between us and Cemetery Hill, throwing out skirmishers to the front. In this field we remained the entire day of July 2, prominently exposed to the fire of the enemy's skirmishers and sharpshooters. During the afternoon of this day, I was directed by Major-General Early to hold my brigade in readiness at a given signal to charge the enemy in the works on the summit of the hill before me, with the information that a general advance of our entire line would be made at the same time.
A little before 8 p.m. I was ordered to advance with my own and Hoke's brigade on my left, which had been placed for the time under my command. I immediately moved forward, and had gone but a short distance when my whole line became exposed to a most terrific fire from the enemy's batteries from the entire range of hills in front, and to the right and left; still, both brigades advanced steadily up and over the first hill, and into a bottom at the foot of Cemetery Hill.
Here we came upon a considerable body of the enemy, and a brisk musketry fire ensued; at the same time his artillery, of which we were now within canister range, opened upon us, but owing to the darkness of the evening, now verging into night, and the deep obscurity afforded by the smoke of the firing, our exact locality could not be discovered by the enemy's gunners, and we thus escaped what in the full light of day could have been nothing else than horrible slaughter.
Taking advantage of this, we continued to move forward until we reached the second line, behind a Stone wall at the foot of a fortified hill. We passed such of the enemy who had not fled, and who were still clinging for shelter to the wall, to the rear, as prisoners. Still advancing, we came upon an abatis of fallen timber and the third line, disposed in rifle-pits. This line we broke, and, as before, found many of the enemy who had not fled hiding in the pits for protection. These I ordered to the rear as prisoners, and continued my progress to the crest of the hill.
Arriving at the summit, by a simultaneous rush from my whole line, I captured several pieces of artillery, four stand of colors, and a number of prisoners. At that time every piece of artillery which had been firing upon us was silenced.
A quiet of several minutes now ensued. Their heavy masses of infantry were heard and perfectly discerned through the increasing darkness, advancing in the direction of my position. Approaching within 100 yards, a line was discovered before us, from the whole length of which a simultaneous fire was delivered. I reserved my fire, from the uncertainty of this being a force of the enemy or of our men, as I had been cautioned to expect friends both in front, to the right, and to the left, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, Major-General Rodes, and Major-General Johnson, respectively, having been assigned to these relative positions; but after the delivery of a second and third volley, the flashing of the musketry disclosed the still-advancing line to be one of the enemy.
I then gave the order to fire; the enemy was checked for a time, but discovering another line moving up in rear of this one, and still another force in rear of that, and being beyond the reach of support, I gave the order to retire to the stone wall at the foot of the hill, which was quietly and orderly effected. From this position I subsequently fell back to a fence some 75 yards distant from the wall, and awaited the further movements of the enemy.
Only contemplating, however, to effect an orderly and controlled retreat before a force which I was convinced I could not hope to with-stand--at all events, where I then was--I was on the point of retiring to a better position when Captain [John G.] Campbell, the brigade quartermaster, informed me that Brigadier-General Gordon was coming to my support.
I immediately dispatched an officer to hasten General Gordon with all possible speed, but this officer returning without seeing General Gordon, I went back myself, and finding General Gordon occupying the precise position in the field occupied by me when I received the order to charge the enemy on Cemetery Hill, and not advancing, I concluded that any assistance from him would be too late, and my only course was to withdraw my command. I therefore moved my brigade by the right flank, leading it around the hill, so as to escape the observation of the enemy, and conducted it to the right of my original position, then occupied, as above stated, by Gordon's brigade. This was about 10 o'clock. I remained in this position for the night.
About daybreak in the morning, I received an order from Major-General Early to withdraw my command from its position, and to occupy that street in the city which I had held during July 1. I continued to remain here that day (the 3d), and until early in the morning of July 4, when I was ordered by Major-General Early out of the city to a range of hills on the west. Here I put my brigade in line of battle, the division line being on the left of Major-General Rodes.
In this position I remained with my command until 2 o'clock on the morning of July 5, when the line of march was taken toward Hagerstown, Md.
My loss was:

Officers and Men	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
July 2
Officers	5	15	3	23
Enlisted Men	16	104	38	158
July 3
Officers	1	3	1	5
Enlisted Men	7	37	18	62
July 4
Officer	----	----	----	----
Enlisted Men	----	----	20	20
Total	29	159	80	268

Total loss: 7 officers and 29 men killed, 22 officers and 178 men wounded, and 4 officers and 91 men missing. The missing, I fear, were either killed or wounded.
The artillery captured on the heights of Cemetery Hill I was compelled to abandon. The prisoners sent to the rear, being under charge of no guard, escaped in the darkness; 75 were brought back by my men in retreating from the hill. The colors taken I have now in my possession.
In all the operations in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, I am happy to state that both officers and men, while animated with a spirit of daring that disdained to concede any obstacle to their progress unsurmountable, were yet amenable to all the orders of their leaders, and accepted readily any position assigned them.
While rendering this tribute to the merit of all my command, I would call attention particularly to the efficiency of Cols. L. A. Stafford, Ninth Louisiana Regiment, and D. B. Penn, Seventh Louisiana Regiment. In the engagements of July I and 2, each of these officers distinguished himself by an exhibition of gallant bearing in leading his respective regiment into action, and of soldierly skill in its management and control.
My thanks are due to the several members of my staff, each of whom in his respective department was attentive to the discharge of his duties; Captain New, assistant adjutant-general and acting inspector; Captain Seymour, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Freeland, aide-de-camp.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HARRY T. HAYS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

 

 

Report of Col. Archibald C. Godwin, Fifty-seventh North Carolina Infantry, commanding Hoke's brigade.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS HOKE'S BRIGADE,
July 30, 1863.

Maj. JOHN W. DANIEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Early's Division.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of Hoke's brigade in the late campaign from Fredericksburg into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and back into Virginia:
From the commencement of the campaign to the night of July 2, the brigade was commanded by Col. I. E. Avery, Sixth Regiment North Carolina troops, General Hoke not having recovered from the effects of a severe wound received at the battle of Chancellorsville. Colonel Avery left no memoranda of the operations of his command, and this fact must serve to account for the meager and imperfect details of this report.
Leaving camp near Hamilton's Crossing on June 4, the brigade reached Culpeper Court-House on the 8th; encamped near Gaines' Cross-Roads on the 11th, and, by a forced march on the 12th, passed through Chester Gap to Front Royal, and forded both branches of the Shenandoah.
On June 13, the division having reached the vicinity of Winchester, via Newtown, a position was taken in front of the enemy on the left of the Valley turnpike, Gordon's brigade on the right, Hays' brigade in the center, Smith's-brigade on the left, the right of Gordon's brigade resting on the turnpike.
Sharp skirmishing ensued, and was kept up along the lines throughout the day. The action of Hoke's brigade consisted in moving rapidly from right to left of the line already established, and back again to a position about 600 yards in rear of Gordon's brigade. Night coming on, the brigade was faced by the rear rank, and further instructions received to establish a line of pickets in our late rear, to guard against any approach of the enemy in that quarter. Arms were stacked, and the men bivouacked on their lines.
At daylight on the morning of the 14th, the Fifty-fourth Regiment North Carolina troops was left on picket duty in the rear, and the brigade, now composed of the Sixth, Twenty-first, and Fifty-seventh Regiments, moved up within supporting distance of Gordon's brigade later in the day.
The plan of attack having been changed, General Gordon was left to divert the attention of the enemy in front, while the rest of the division were marched silently and rapidly by a circuitous route to a range of wooded hills running parallel with the line of intrenchments occupied by the enemy in rear and northwest of the town.
The command having been allowed time to rest, the division was formed in three lines of battle, Hays' brigade in front, Hoke's brigade 75 yards in rear, and Smith's brigade a like distance in rear of Hoke's. The artillery was placed in position on the flanks of the division, and at 6 p.m. opened a furious fire upon the enemy, very much to his surprise and confusion. He promptly returned the fire, with but little effect, however, and fifteen minutes later General Hays commenced to advance. Hoke's brigade moved forward at the same moment, but had scarcely gained 10 paces when the Fifty-seventh Regiment was ordered to move off by the left flank to the support of the batteries on the left, and a few moments later the two remaining regiments, viz, Sixth and Twenty-first, were ordered to move by the right flank to the support of the batteries on the right. General Hays soon succeeded in driving the enemy from his intrenchments, and the batteries on the left were immediately hurried forward to the position he had just gained. The Fifty-seventh Regiment then advanced in line of battle across the intervening valley, and was halted, by order of Major-General Early, in rear of Hays' brigade. Some loss was sustained in this position by the shells from the fort, which were directed at the troops upon the hill.
At sunset, by order of Major-General Early, this regiment was ordered to advance upon the works on the extreme right of the enemy's line. The order was executed without loss, the enemy retiring without firing a shot. Night put an end to further movements, and by the morning the enemy had evacuated their stronghold and inner line of fortifications.
At sunrise, Colonel Avery moved forward in pursuit with the Sixth and Twenty-first Regiments. By order of Major-General Early, the Fifty-seventh Regiment was left to hold the intrenchments against any attack which might be made by re-enforcements to the enemy from the direction of Romney.
Following the movements of the division, the brigade forded the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 22d, entered Pennsylvania on the 23d, and on the 28th occupied the town of York.
On July 1, we advanced upon Gettysburg, along the Heidlersburg road, and, when distant one mile and a half from the town, line of battle was formed on the left of the road, the right resting on Hays' brigade. The brigade at this time consisted of three regiments--the Sixth (commanded by Major [Samuel McD.] Tare), the Twenty-first (by Colonel [W. W.]Kirkland), and the Fifty-seventh (by Colonel Godwin), the Fifty-fourth having been sent back to Staunton with Federal prisoners captured at Winchester.
Skirmishers were deployed in front of our lines, and at 3 p.m. the order to advance was received. The enemy had formed line of battle on the hillside in front of the town, under cover of a strong fence, portions of which were made of stone. Our advance was made with great deliberation until we approached a sluggish stream, or slough, about 200 yards in front of the enemy's lines, when the batteries opened upon us with grape and canister, seconded by a very destructive fire from the infantry.
Colonel Avery now gave the order to double-quick, and the brigade gallantly dashed through the stream and up the hill to the fence, the enemy stubbornly holding their position until we had climbed over into their midst. Two Napoleon guns were taken by the Sixth North Carolina. A large number of prisoners taken at this point were sent to the rear. The enemy now fled into the town, many of them being killed in the retreat.
The brigade continued to advance toward the town, but, while yet in the outskirts, was wheeled to the left and reformed on the railroad. The enemy had now succeeded in planting a battery upon a high, sloping spur on the mountain side immediately in our front. Under cover of the railroad cut, we were moved by the left flank about 400 yards to the left, and again moved forward. The shells from the enemy proving very effective, we were soon after halted in a depression on the hillside, and the men ordered to lie down. Skirmishers were thrown forward, and this position held through the night and until 8 p.m. on the next day, July 2, when the brigade moved forward to the attack.
As soon as the summit of the hill was gained, it was discovered that the batteries which we had been ordered to take were in front of Hays' brigade, and considerably to the right of our right flank. We continued to advance, however, under a terrific fire, climbed a rail fence, and still farther beyond descended into a low bottom, and dislodged a heavy line of infantry from a stone wall running parallel with our front. The enemy's batteries now enfiladed us, and a destructive fire was poured into our ranks from a line of infantry formed in rear of a stone wall running at a right angle with our line of battle and immediately below the batteries.
Colonel Avery now ordered a change of front, and succeeded in wheeling the brigade to the right, a movement which none but the steadiest veterans could have executed under such circumstances. In swinging around, three stone walls had to be surmounted. The ground was rocky and uneven, and these obstacles prevented that rapidity of movement and unity of action which might have insured success. The men now charged up the hill with heroic determination, and drove the enemy from his last stone wall. In this charge, the command had become much separated, and in the darkness it was now found impossible to concentrate more than 40 or 50 men at any point for a farther advance. Major Tate, with a portion of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, aided by a small number of the Ninth Louisiana Regiment, succeeded in capturing a battery on the right. No supports were at hand, and the approach of the enemy in overwhelming force compelled him to retire. The scattered fragments of the brigade now withdrew, and were reformed near the position which it had occupied through the day.
Here I learned for the first time that our brigade commander (Col. Isaac E. Avery), had been mortally wounded. In his death the country lost one of her truest and bravest sons, and the army one of its most gallant and efficient officers.
In t-he desperate struggle through which we had just passed, the officers and men of Hoke's brigade fulfilled all the expectations which their gallantry on former occasions had excited. No body of men of equal number could have accomplished greater results against such overwhelming odds.
The command of the brigade now devolved upon me, and before daylight, by order of Major-General Early, I moved into position in the railroad cut on the outskirts of the town. Later in the day, I was ordered to form on the left of Hays' brigade, in one of the upper streets of the town, and in advance of the position on the railroad.
At 2 a.m. on the morning of July 4, by order of Major-General Early, I moved the brigade by the right flank to a position west of Gettysburg, and formed line of battle on the left of Hays' brigade. This position was maintained throughout the day.
At 2 a.m. on the morning of the 5th, the brigade moved off with the division in the direction of Hagerstown.
I respectfully beg leave to call your attention to the action of the Fifty-fourth North Carolina Regiment in the engagement at Williamsport, Md., on July 5. A full report of the operations of this regiment by Colonel [Kenneth M.] Murchison is herewith submitted.
For a list of casualties in the late campaign, reference is respectfully made to the reports heretofore submitted.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. C. GODWIN,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

 

 

Report of Brig. Gen. J. B. Gordon, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS GORDON'S BRIGADE,
August 10, 1863.

Maj. JOHN W. DANIEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Early's Division.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that my brigade began the march with Early's division from Hamilton's Crossing on June 4 last. Halting at Culpeper Court-House two days, on the night of the 12th, after a most exhausting march of 17 miles in about six hours, we reached Front Royal.
I was ordered to move on the pike leading to Winchester at 3 a.m. June 13. Fording both branches of the Shenandoah, we marched to a point on the Staunton pike about 3 miles from Winchester, when, as ordered by Major-General Early, I moved to the left of this road, and formed line of battle 3 miles southwest of the town. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I deployed a line of skirmishers, and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments (the Thirteenth and Thirty-first Georgia) in reserve. After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to bring into line these two regiments, the Thirty-first on the right and the Thirteenth on the left. The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle-line, a portion of which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from which he was immediately driven. A battery which I had hoped to capture was rapidly withdrawn. In this charge, which was executed with spirit and unchecked at any point, my brigade lost 75 men, including some efficient officers.
On the 14th, detachments from this brigade were engaged in skirmishing with the enemy in front of the town and fort.
In accordance with orders from Major-General Early, received on the night of the 14th, I began to move my brigade upon the fort at daylight the following morning. I soon discovered that the fort was evacuated, and, sending a detachment to occupy it and take possession of the garrison flag, I sent an officer to communicate with the major-general, and moved as rapidly as possible in the direction of the firing, distinctly heard, on the Martinsburg pike. My brigade reached the point where a portion of Johnson's division engaged the retreating enemy only in time to assist in collecting horses and prisoners.
Crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown on June 22, we marched through Boonsborough, Md., to Gettysburg. Pa. Before reaching this place, my brigade was detached by Major-General Early from the division, and ordered on a different road, with a battalion of cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel [E. V.] White. In front of Gettysburg, a regiment of Pennsylvania militia was charged and routed by this cavalry battalion.
I was here ordered to move on the direct pike to the city of York. Before entering this place, the mayor and a deputation of citizens were sent out by the city authorities to make a formal surrender. In accordance with prior instructions from Major-General Early, I moved directly through, having sent in front of the brigade a provost guard to occupy the city and take down the Federal flag left flying over the principal street.
We moved by the direct pike to Wrightsville, on the Susquehanna. At this point I found a body of Pennsylvania militia nearly equal in number to my brigade, reported by the commanding officer (whom we captured) at 1,200 men, strongly intrenched, but without artillery. A line of skirmishers was sent to make a demonstration in front of these works, while I moved to the right by a circuitous route with three regiments, in order to turn these works, and, if possible, gain the enemy's rear, cut off his retreat, and seize the bridge. This I found impracticable, and, placing in position the battery under my command, opened on the works, and by a few well-aimed shots and the advance of my lines, caused this force to retreat precipitately, with the loss of about 20 prisoners, including 1 lieutenant-colonel. I had no means of ascertaining the enemy's number of killed and wounded; 1 dead was left on the field: Our loss, 1 wounded.
It may not be improper in this connection, as evidence of the base ingratitude of our enemies, to state that the Yankee press has attributed to my brigade the burning of the town of Wrightsville. In his retreat across the bridge, the enemy fired it about midway with the most inflammable materials. Every effort was made to extinguish this fire and save the bridge, but it was impossible. From this the town was fired, and, notwithstanding the excessive fatigue of the men from the march of 20 miles and the skirmish with the enemy, I formed my brigade in line around the burning buildings, and resisted the progress of the flames until they were checked.
Leaving Wrightsville on the morning of the 29th, I sent the cavalry under my command to burn all the bridges (fourteen in number) on the railroad leading to York, to which place I marched my brigade, and rejoined the division, from which we had been separated since June 26.
Marching thence to Gettysburg, we participated in the battle of July 1. In accordance with orders from Major-General Early, I formed my brigade in line of battle on the right of the division, one regiment (the Twenty-sixth Georgia) having been detached to support the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones.
About 3 p.m. I was ordered to move my brigade forward to the support of Major-General Rodes' left. The men were much fatigued from long marches, and I therefore caused them to move forward slowly until within about 300 yards of the enemy's line, when the advance was as rapid as the nature of the ground and a proper regard for the preservation of my line would permit. The enemy had succeeded in gaining a position upon the left flank of Doles' brigade, and in causing these troops to retreat. This movement of the enemy would necessarily have exposed his right flank but for the precaution he had taken to cover it by another line. It was upon this line, drawn up in a strong position on the crest of a hill, a portion of which was woodland, that my brigade charged. Moving forward under heavy fire over rail and plank fences, and crossing a creek whose banks were so abrupt as to prevent a passage excepting at certain points, this brigade rushed upon the enemy with a resolution and spirit, in my opinion, rarely excelled. The enemy made a most obstinate resistance until the colors on portions of the two lines were separated by a space of less than 50 paces, when his line was broken and driven back, leaving the flank which this line had protected exposed to the fire from my brigade. An effort was here made by the enemy to change his front and check our advance, but the effort failed, and this line, too, was driven back in the greatest confusion, and with immense loss in killed, wounded, and 'prisoners. Among the latter was a division commander (General [F. C.] Barlow), who was severely wounded. I was here ordered by Major-General Early to halt.
I had no means of ascertaining the number of the enemy's wounded by the fire of this brigade, but if these were in the usual proportion to his killed, nearly 300 of whom were buried on the ground where my brigade fought, his loss in killed and wounded must have exceeded the number of men I carried into action. Neither was it possible for me to take any account of the prisoners sent to the rear, but the division inspector credits this brigade with about 1,800. I carried into action about 1,200 men, one regiment having been detached, as above stated.
The loss of the brigade in killed and wounded was 350, of whom 40 were killed.
The movements during the succeeding days of the battle (July 2 and 3), I do not consider of sufficient importance to mention.
In the afternoon of July 5, on the retreat from Gettysburg, my brigade, acting as rear guard, was pressed by the enemy near Fairfield, Pa. I was ordered by Major-General Early to hold him in check until the wagon and division trains could be moved forward. Detaching one regiment (the Twenty-sixth Georgia), I deployed it, and after a spirited skirmish succeeded in driving back the enemy's advance guard and in withdrawing this regiment through the woods, with the loss of 8 or 10 killed and wounded.
On July 14, this brigade, with the division, recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport.
It would be gratifying, and in accordance with my sense of justice, to mention the acts of individual courage which came under my own observation, and which have been reported to me, but as the exhibition of this virtue was the general rule, I should do injustice to many if I attempted it.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. GORDON,
Brigadier-General.

 

 

Reports of Lieut. Col. H. P. Jones, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

AUGUST 18, 1863.

Maj. JOHN W. DANIEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this battalion from the time it was attached to General Early's division until its return into Virginia:
I reported with my battalion of artillery, consisting of four batteries, with an aggregate of thirteen guns, to Major-General Early, commanding division, near Spotsylvania Court-House, on June 5. We marched thence, halting three days at Culpeper Court-House, to Winchester, in front of which we arrived about noon of June 13.
We found the enemy occupying Kernstown, and both sides commenced skirmishing with infantry, but no occasion was found for the use of artillery on our side, because the range was too great for our guns to do much service. Parts of three batteries, however, were placed in position, so as to be ready for any emergency. A shell from the enemy, exploding among the batteries held in reserve, killed 1 man and 2 horses in Captain [A. W.] Garber's, and 1 horse in Captain [James McD.] Carrington's battery.
On Sunday morning, June 14, Captain Dance, commanding Brown's battalion, and Captain [W. H.] Griffin, commanding battery attached to the Maryland Line, reported to me, by order, with their commands. I then received an order from General Early to move with all the artillery (my own battalion under Captain Carrington, and Brown s battalion under Captain Dance) in rear of the division around to the left, excepting two batteries, viz, Griffin's battery and [A.] Hupp's battery, Brown's battalion, the latter commanded by Lieutenant [Charles B.] Griffin, which were ordered to report to General Gordon.
We made a détour of 6 or 7 miles without being perceived by the enemy, and at about 3 p.m. succeeded in reaching his right and rear. Here twelve guns (four of my battalion and eight of Brown's, under Captain Dance) were placed in position and about three-fourths of a mile on their left. At a point nearer, and from which a better enfilade fire could be directed on their works, eight guns of my battalion were placed, under command of Captain Carrington. The guns were unlimbered just under the crest of the hill, so that they might be concealed from the enemy until all proper dispositions should be made.
When everything was in readiness, acting under the orders of the major-general commanding, I ordered the guns to be run up by hand to the crest and open fire, concentrating their fire upon the outwork of the enemy, which, from our position, was to the left of the flag fort. So completely unconscious was the enemy of our presence until we opened fire, that 2 miles to our right, and in front of General Gordon, occupying the position we had held in the morning, we could plainly see the rear of his line of battle, composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. This line rapidly disappeared at the report of the first gun. We kept up such a well-directed fire on this work that we destroyed the aim of the enemy's guns, causing him to shoot wildly over our heads, and also kept his infantry support closely sheltered under the works.
The fire of the artillery was continued until General Hays' brigade commenced to charge the works. Captain Carrington was then ordered to cease firing, and Captain Dance to direct his fire on the flag fort.
After General Hays succeeded in carrying the works, Captain Carrington, commanding the batteries on the left of the line, was ordered to advance his eight guns, which he did under a heavy flank fire from the flag fort of the enemy, and took position near the works and opened fire. Four guns from the right of the line were also brought up (two of the Louisiana Guard Artillery and two of Carrington's battery, commanded by Lieutenant [Alexander B.] Cochran, the whole under Captain [C.] Thompson, of the Louisiana Guard Artillery), and placed, by order of General Early, on the right of the works, so as to fire upon the flag fort.
The firing continued until nightfall, when it ceased. All the guns were then brought and placed in position behind the works, so as to open a concentrated fire on the enemy the next day. Just before dark, the noble and gallant Captain Thompson, of the Louisiana Guard Artillery, received a wound which terminated his life. In him the service lost one of its best officers. Carrington's battery lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded, and Garber's battery 1 wounded. In the assault upon these works, six guns were captured, two of which were turned upon the enemy. Four of these guns enabled me to supply the existing deficiencies in my battalion.
At light on the morning of the 15th, the enemy was found to have evacuated the position. The artillery then marched in rear of the division to a point 4 miles beyond Winchester, on the Martinsburg road, where we halted for a time. We then recommenced the march, crossing the river at Shepherdstown, and passed on through Boons-borough and Cavetown into Pennsylvania, and then by Waynesbor-ough and Greenwood to Gettysburg. Here one battery (Captain [W. A.] Tanner's) was detached, and ordered to report to General Gordon. With the remainder of the artillery, we followed in rear of the division through Berlin to York. Captain Tanner, with General Gordon, marched up to Wrightsville, where he fired a few rounds at the enemy without his replying with artillery.
After resting at York one day, we marched back in the direction of Gettysburg, before which place we arrived on Wednesday, July 1. Here, finding the enemy heavily engaging General Rodes on our right, the major-general commanding ordered me to put the batteries in position, so as to open fire. Acting under his orders, I immediately placed twelve guns in position, and opened fire with considerable effect on the enemy's artillery, and upon the flank of a column of troops that were being massed upon our right.
On the advance of General Gordon's brigade from our right, we directed our fire farther to the left, on the disordered masses of the enemy that were rapidly retreating before our troops. This was continued until the advance of our men rendered it dangerous to continue firing from that position. I immediately, by order of General Early, sent Captain Carrington's battery across the creek to take position in front of Gettysburg, but, moving with all rapidity, as it did, before it could reach any position the enemy had been driven through the town by Hays' brigade. In the first position we occupied, three guns were temporarily disabled by having shots wedged in the bores, and one Napoleon permanently disabled by being struck on the face of the muzzle and bent by a solid shot from the enemy.
We had 1 man killed of Captain Green's, and 1 man of Captain Garber's battery wounded. The guns that were temporarily disabled were soon rendered fit for service again, and I was enabled to replace the Napoleon gun permanently disabled by one of the two Napoleon guns captured by General Hays' brigade. The disabled gun and the other captured Napoleon I had carried and turned over to the ordnance department, thereby securing them.
In the other two days of the battle of Gettysburg, my battalion was not actively engaged, but was in position to guard against a reported flank movement of the enemy on our left, and afterward any advance the enemy might attempt to make from the hills in front of Gettysburg.
On the 2d, I ordered two guns of Captain Green's battery, at the request of General Stuart, to report to General Hampton at Hunterstown, where he engaged the enemy, with a loss of I man killed and 1 sergeant and 14 men wounded.
Captain Tanner having exhausted his ammunition, excepting a few rounds of canister, and it being impossible to supply him, I ordered him to go with the wagon train to the rear. When this was attacked in the mountains, he rendered very efficient service with his few rounds of canister, driving back the enemy's cavalry. Here he lost 2 men, missing. On reaching Williamsport, he received more ammunition, and rendered good service when the wagon train was attacked, with a loss of 1 man and 2 horses killed and 1 horse disabled. On the morning of the 5th, we fell back from Gettysburg, the division bringing up the rear of the army, and continued our march to Hagerstown, where we remained in line of battle a few days; then recrossed the river. Two empty wagons, ordered to report to the surgeon at Gettysburg, to bring off the wounded, have never since been heard from. One forge sent over with the wagon train was lost at the river.
In the expedition to and around Hedgesville, Captain Tanner's battery was detached, and went to Johnsontown with Colonel [Lawrence S.] Baker, commanding cavalry brigade, where it fired a few rounds at the enemy across the river. From Hagerstown to this point the horses suffered very much from long marches and want of proper food.
My thanks are due to both officers and men for their conduct in presence of the enemy and the patience with which they endured the hardships of the campaign.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. P. JONES,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Artillery Battalion.

 

AUGUST 4, 1863.

Lieutenant [S. V.] SOUTHALL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

SIR: On the morning of July 1, while marching in rear of Early's division, I received an order from General Early to bring the batteries at once to the front, for the purpose of engaging the enemy. This I did, and found on arriving at the front that the enemy were posted in front of Gettysburg, and engaging hotly what I afterward learned was General Rodes' division. I immediately brought twelve guns into position, and opened a brisk fire upon the enemy's artillery and infantry, taking them in flank as they were being massed upon Rodes' left and General Early's right.
The batteries were very soon driven from the position and forced to retire, leaving one carriage disabled, which, however, they afterward succeeded in getting off. Our fire was very effective upon their infantry, presenting, as they did, large bodies in easy range of us.
In this engagement, I had three guns temporarily disabled and one permanently so. One man of the Louisiana Guard Artillery was killed, and 1 of the Staunton Artillery wounded.
For your better information, I have the honor herewith to inclose the reports of Captains Tanner and Green, of the operations of their batteries at Wrightsville, Hunterstown, South Mountain, and Williamsport.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.
H. P. JONES. Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Artillery Battalion.

 

 

 

Reports of Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson, C. S. Army, commanding division.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION,
August 18, 1863.

Maj. A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: In obedience to orders, headquarters Second Army Corps, August 13, 1863, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division, from the time of leaving Fredericksburg for Winchester until it recrossed the Potomac:
The division left camp near Hamilton's Crossing June 5, and moved in the direction of Winchester, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap. Nothing occurred worthy of particular note during the march, which was steady and regular, the command being in good condition and excellent spirits.
At daylight of the morning of the 13th ultimo [June], the division left its camp at Cedarville, moving on the Winchester and Front Royal turnpike. The enemy's pickets were discovered 4 miles from the town, about 12 m. The Second Virginia Regiment, Colonel [J. Q. A.] Nadenbousch commanding, was detached from the Stonewall Brigade, and deployed as skirmishers to the left of the road. This regiment advanced handsomely, driving the enemy to a stone fence near the junction of the Millwood and Front Royal roads, behind which they made a stand. After a sharp skirmish, they were driven from this position.
At this juncture, they advanced a battery to an eminence on the right of the road, and opened fire upon our skirmishers and the woods in the vicinity. Carpenter's battery, Lieutenant [William T.] Lambie commanding, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel [R. S.] Andrews, was put in position on the left of the road and behind a stone fence, from which it opened an accurate fire upon the enemy's battery and supporting infantry, the effect of which was to explode a limber, killing 3 men and a number of horses, and put the enemy to precipitate flight upon the town.
The Stonewall and Steuart's brigades were formed in line of battle in a ravine to the right of the road, out of sight and range of the enemy's guns; J. M. Jones' and Nicholls' brigades to the left, in a body of woods. Later in the day, the brigades to the right of the road were advanced under cover of woods to a position nearer the town, where they remained until the following morning.
When General Early advanced on the left, a body of the enemy's infantry, retreating, became exposed to view, and were fired upon by two rifled guns of Carpenter's with good effect, greatly accelerating their speed. This attracted the fire from the fortifications north of the town upon the battery and such portions of the infantry as were necessarily exposed, which was maintained in a desultory manner until nightfall.
The casualties in my command during the day's operations were, happily, few--2 men killed and 3 horses disabled.
The following day (14th) was occupied in engaging the enemy's attention upon the right, while Early was putting his command in position upon the left, for the main attack upon the fortifications. For this purpose, the Stonewall Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. A. Walker commanding, was moved across the Millwood pike to a range of hills east of and fronting the town and between the Millwood and Berryville pikes. Steuart's brigade was posted in rear and within supporting distance of Walker. The Fifth Virginia Regiment, Lieut. Col. H. J. Williams commanding, was thrown forward as skirmishers, encountering the enemy on the crest of the hills above mentioned and driving them to the edge of the town, from which position, sheltered by houses and fences, they kept up a brisk and continual fire upon our line, which occupied the stone fence at the western base of the hills and within easy musket-range.
About 4 p.m. the enemy advanced a considerable force against the right of our line of skirmishers, compelling it to fall back, and capturing 10 men. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, Fifth Virginia, who had commanded the skirmish line during the day with conspicuous gallantry, was severely wounded in this engagement. The reserve of the skirmishers was immediately ordered forward, and succeeded in driving the enemy back and recovering their former line.
The only casualties during the day occurred in the Fifth Virginia, the only regiment engaged--3 killed, 16 wounded, and 10 missing.
About nightfall, I received an order from the lieutenant-general commanding to move by the right flank with three of my brigades and a portion of my artillery to a point on the Martinsburg turnpike, 2 miles north of Winchester, with the double purpose, I supposed, of intercepting the enemy's retreat and attacking him in his fortifications from that direction. Steuart's and Nicholls' brigades, with Dement's and portions of Raine's and Carpenter's batteries, under Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, were immediately put in motion, and Brigadier-General Walker, whose line was nearest the enemy, was ordered to follow, after having advanced his skirmishers to the town to conceal the movement and ascertain the position of the enemy. J. M. Jones' brigade and the remainder of Andrews' battalion, under Major [J. W.] Latimer, were left in reserve, and for the purpose of preventing the enemy's escape by the road we had advanced.
After moving some distance on the Berryville road, I was informed by my guide that I would be obliged to cross fields over a rough country in order to carry out literally the directions of the lieutenant-general; and, moreover, that near Stephenson's, 5 miles north of Winchester, there was a railroad cut masked by a body of woods, and not more than 200 yards from the turnpike (along which the enemy would certainly retreat), which would afford excellent shelter for troops in case of an engagement.
The night was very dark, and, being satisfied that the enemy would discover the movement and probably escape if I moved to the point indicated by the lieutenant-general, I determined to march to Stephenson's, by the road which led by Jordan Springs. Halting the head of the column at a small bridge which crosses the Winchester and Potomac Railroad a few hundred yards from the Martinsburg pike, I rode forward with my staff and sharpshooters to reconnoiter the position and assure myself of the whereabouts of the enemy. I had gone but a short distance when I distinctly heard the neighing of horses and sound of men moving, and in a few moments ascertained that I had opportunely struck the head of the enemy's retreating column. Their vedettes fired upon us, and I returned to my command to make the necessary dispositions for an instant attack. Along the edge of the railroad cut, next to the pike, ran a stone fence, behind which I deployed the three regiments of Steuart's brigade (Tenth Virginia and First and Third North Carolina Regiments) on the right, and three regiments of Nicholls' brigade, under Col. J. M. Williams, on the left. One piece of Dement's battery was placed upon the bridge, one piece a little to the left and rear, the remaining pieces, with sections of Raine's and Carpenter's batteries, the whole under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, on the rising ground in rear of the position occupied by the infantry. Two regiments of Nicholls' brigade were held in reserve as support to the artillery.
My dispositions were scarcely completed when the enemy, cheering, charged with his whole force the front of my position, driving in the skirmishers and delivering heavy volleys. My infantry and artillery fired with such rapidity and effect as to repulse them with considerable loss. At longer range the enemy maintained a heavy fire upon us, until, convinced that nothing could be effected by a front attack, he detached heavy flanking parties of cavalry and infantry to the right and left, whether for the purpose of breaking our lines and effecting his escape, or driving us out of the railroad cut, is not known: still, however, keeping a vigorous attack in front. My infantry had expended all but one round of ammunition; the ordnance wagons were 7 miles in rear. The situation was exceedingly critical, and nothing could have been more timely than the arrival of the Stonewall Brigade.
Owing to a misconception of orders, for which Brigadier-General Walker was not in the slightest degree responsible, his brigade did not leave its former position until 12 o'clock of the previous night. He was a mile from Stephenson's when the engagement began. Hurrying up his brigade, he arrived upon the ground just in time to meet the flanking party to the right. He pressed them hotly through the woods, beyond the turnpike, and into a woods a half mile to the right of the Carter House, where they surrendered as prisoners of war, the cavalry alone escaping.
The flanking party (about 300 cavalry and 600 infantry)which moved to the left, under the immediate command of Major-General Milroy (as was ascertained afterward from prisoners and citizens on the route of his escape), was met by two regiments of Nicholls' brigade (the Second and Tenth Louisiana). Raine's battery was faced to the left, and played upon them with fine effect, while sections from Dement's and Carpenter's batteries were hurried down the road to intercept their retreat. The two Louisiana regiments above named moved parallel with the enemy's line, a ridge intervening, until they reached a level space, when they opened a destructive fire upon them, killing a considerable number, and, with the aid of the artillery, scattering them in every direction. Most of them were captured by these two regiments. The person supposed to be Milroy (riding a fine white horse), with most of his cavalry, after a vigorous pursuit, unfortunately escaped.
The substantial results of the engagement were from 2,300 to 2,500 prisoners and about 175 horses, with arms and equipments in proportion, Steuart's brigade capturing about 900, the Stonewall Brigade about 900, and Nicholls' brigade the remainder. Eleven stand of colors were captured, of which the Stonewall Brigade captured six, Steuart's brigade four, and the Louisiana one.
For particulars as to the numbers captured and the individual instances of gallantry, I have the honor to refer you to the accompanying reports of the brigade and regimental commanders. It will be observed that my force, until the timely arrival of the Stonewall Brigade, did not amount to more than 1,200 muskets, with a portion of Andrews' battalion, J. M. Jones' brigade, and two regiments (the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia) of Steuart's brigade, a portion of the artillery having been left in the rear on the Front Royal road.
The number of prisoners considerably exceeded the whole number engaged on our side, including the Stonewall Brigade.
Before closing this report, I beg leave to state that I have never seen superior artillery practice to that of Andrews' battalion in this engagement, and especially the section under Lieutenant [C. S.] Contee (Dement's battery), one gun of which was placed on the bridge above referred to, and the other a little to the left and rear. Both pieces were very much exposed during the whole action. Four successive attempts were made to carry the bridge. Two sets of cannoneers (13 out of 16) were killed and disabled. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Contee, whose gallantry calls for special mention, fell wounded at this point. Lieut. John A. Morgan, First North Carolina Regiment, and Lieut. Randolph H. McKim, took the place of the disabled cannoneers, rendering valuable assistance, deserving special mention.
I feel much indebted to Majs. B. W. Leigh, H. K. Douglas, and E. L. Moore, of my staff, for their gallantry and efficiency on the field and in the pursuit of the enemy; to Surg. R. T. Coleman, for correcting a misapprehension of orders on the part of my engineer officers, thereby expediting the march of General Walker, who found me most opportunely.
The total list of casualties in the division during the operations embraced in this report amounted to 14 killed and 74 wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ED. JOHNSON,
Major-General.

 

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION,
September 30, 1863.

Maj. A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division from July 15 to July 31, embracing the campaign in Pennsylvania and battle of Gettysburg:
My division comprised the Stonewall Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. A. Walker, consisting of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-third Virginia Regiments, commanded, respectively, by Colonel [J. Q. A.] Nadenbousch, Major [William] Terry, Colonel [J. H. S.] Funk, Lieutenant-Colonel [D. M.] Shriver, and Captain [J. B.] Golladay; J. M. Jones' brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first, Twenty-fifth, Forty-second, Forty-fourth, Forty-eighth, and Fiftieth Virginia Regiments, commanded, respectively, by Capt. W. P. Moseley, Colonel [John C.] Higginbotham, Captain [J. M.] Richardson, Captain [T. R.] Buckner, Lieutenant-Colonel [R. H.] Dungan, and Lieutenant-Colonel [L. H. N.] Salyer; George H. Steuart's brigade, consisting of the Tenth, Twenty-third, and Thirty-seventh Virginia Regiments, First Maryland Battalion Infantry, and First and Third North Carolina Regiments, commanded, respectively, by Colonel [E. T. H.] Warren, Lieutenant-Colonel [S. T.] Walton, Major [H. C.] Wood, Lieutenant-Colonel [H. A.] Brown, Major [W. M.] Parsley, and Lieutenant-Colonel [J. R.] Herbert; Nicholls' brigade, Col. J. M. Williams commanding, consisting of the First, Second, Tenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Louisiana Regiments, commanded, respectively, by Lieutenant-Colonel [M.] Nolan, Lieutenant-Colonel [R. E.] Burke, Major [T. N.] Powell, Lieutenant-Colonel [D.] Zable, and Major [Andrew] Brady, with Andrews battalion of artillery, Major [J. W.] Latimer commanding, consisting of Raine's, Dement s, Brown's, and Carpenter's batteries.
On June 16, my division left camp at Stephenson's, and marched to Shepherdstown, where Jones' brigade was temporarily detached, with orders to destroy a number of canal-boats and a quantity of grain and flour stored at different points, and cut the canal (Chesapeake and Ohio Canal). A report of his operations and the disposition made of his captures has been forwarded.
June 18, we crossed the Potomac at Boteler's Ford, and encamped upon the battle-ground of Sharpsburg. Thence marched, via Hagerstown and Chambersburg, to within 3 miles of Carlisle. From Green-castle, Steuart's brigade was ordered to McConnellsburg, to collect horses, cattle, and other supplies which the army needed. The brigade, having accomplished its mission to my satisfaction, rejoined the division at our camp near Carlisle.
On June 29, in obedience to orders, I countermarched my division to Greenville, thence eastwardly, via Scotland, to Gettysburg, not arriving in time, however, to participate in the action of the 1st instant. The last day's march was 25 miles, rendered the more fatiguing because of obstructions caused by wagons of Longstreet's corps.
Late on the night of July 1, I moved along the Gettysburg and York Railroad to the northeast of the town, and formed line of battle in a ravine in an open field, Nicholls' brigade on the right, next Jones'; Steuart's and Walker's on the left. Pickets were thrown well to the front, and the troops slept on their arms.
Early next morning, skirmishers from Walker's and Jones' brigades were advanced for the purpose of feeling the enemy, and desultory firing was maintained with their skirmishers until 4 p.m., at which hour I ordered Major Latimer to open fire with all of his pieces from the only eligible hill within range, Jones' brigade being properly disposed as a support. The hill was directly in front of the wooded mountain and a little to the left of the Cemetery Hill; consequently exposed to the concentrated fire from both, and also to an enfilade fire from a battery near the Baltimore road. The unequal contest was maintained for two hours with considerable damage to the enemy, as will appear from the accompanying report of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews. Major Latimer having reported to me that the exhausted condition of his horses and men, together with the terrible fire of the enemy's artillery, rendered his position untenable, he was ordered to cease firing and withdraw all of his pieces excepting four, which were left in position to cover the advance of my infantry.
In obedience to an order from the lieutenant-general commanding, I then advanced my infantry to the assault of the enemy's strong position--a rugged and rocky mountain, heavily timbered and difficult of ascent; a natural fortification, rendered more formidable by deep intrenchments and thick abatis-- ones' brigade in advance, followed by Nicholls' and Steuart's. General Walker was directed to follow, but reporting to me that the enemy were advancing upon him from their right, he was ordered to repulse them and follow on as soon as possible.
The opposing force was larger and the time consumed longer than was anticipated, in consequence of which General Walker did not arrive in time to participate in the assault that night.
By the time my other brigades had crossed Rock Creek and reached the base of the mountain, it was dark. His skirmishers were driven in, and the attack made with great vigor and spirit. It was as successful as could have been expected, considering the superiority of the enemy's force and position. Steuart's brigade, on the left, carried a line of breastworks which ran perpendicular to the enemy's main line, captured a number of prisoners and a stand of colors, and the whole line advanced to within short range, and kept up a heavy fire until late in the night. Brigadier-General Jones and Colonel Higginbotham, Twenty-fifth Virginia, were wounded in this assault, and the command of Jones' brigade devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Dungan.
Early next morning, the Stonewall Brigade was ordered to the support of the others, and the assault was renewed with great determination. Shortly after, the enemy moved forward to recapture the line of breastworks which had been taken the night previous, but was repulsed with great slaughter. Daniel's and Rodes' brigades (Colonel [E. A.] O'Neal commanding), of Rodes' division, having reported to me, two other assaults were made; both failed. The enemy were too securely intrenched and in too great numbers to be dislodged by the force at my command.
In the meantime, a demonstration in force was made upon my left and rear. The Second Virginia Regiment, Stonewall Brigade, and Smiths brigade, of Early's division, were disposed to meet and check it, which was accomplished to my entire satisfaction. No further assault was made; all had been done that it was possible to do.
I held my original position until 10 o'clock of the night of the 3d, when, in accordance with orders, I withdrew to the hill north and west of Gettysburg, where we remained until the following day, in the hope that the enemy would give us battle on ground of our own selection.
My loss in this terrible battle was heavy, including some of the most valuable officers of the command.
Maj. J. W. Latimer, of Andrews' battalion, the "boy major," whose chivalrous bearing on so many fields had won for him a reputation to be envied by his seniors, received a severe wound on the evening of the 2d, from the effects of which he has since died.
Maj. B. W. Leigh, my chief of staff, whose conscientious discharge of duty, superior attainments, and noble bearing made him invaluable to me, was killed within a short distance of the enemy's line.
Maj. H. K. Douglas, assistant adjutant-general, was severely wounded while in the discharge of his duties, and is still a prisoner.
My orderly, W. H. Webb, remained with me after being severely wounded. His conduct entitles him to a commission.
Fewer wounded from my division were left in the hands of the enemy than from any other division of the army: for which I am indebted to the active exertions of Chief Surg. R. T. Coleman.
Mr. E. J. Martin, my volunteer aide-de-camp, rendered valuable service by his prompt transmission of orders, and Maj. E. L. Moore faithfully performed his duties as assistant inspector-general.
The troops are much indebted to Majs. T.E. Ballard and G. H. Kyle, of the commissary department, for supplies during the trying period covered by this report. Cattle and flour were frequently procured within the enemy's lines.
All of the officers and men of the division who came under my observation during their three days' exposure to the enemy's incessant fire of musketry and artillery from the front and artillery from the left and rear behaved as brave men.
For particular instances of gallantry, I have the honor to refer you to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, herewith transmitted.
I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the gallantry of Brigadier-General Daniel and Colonel O'Neal, and to Brigadier-General [William] Smith, and their brigades, while under my command.
We marched on the 5th across the mountain, by Waynesborough, toward Hagerstown, and remained for a few days within 3 miles of the latter place. Thence the division moved 2 miles from Hagerstown, and formed line of battle on both sides of and perpendicular to the Hagerstown and Williamsport pike.
On the night of the 13th. I recrossed the Potomac 1 mile above Williamsport, and continued the march next day to within 4 miles of Martinsburg; thence to Darkesville on the 15th, where we remained until ordered to return to Martinsburg, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and repel an advance of the enemy. This done, the division by steady marches recrossed the Blue Ridge at Front Royal, and went into camp near Orange Court-House about August 1.
The casualties in my division during the operations around Gettysburg were: Killed, 219; wounded, 1,229; missing, 375; total, 1,823.

I am, major, with great respect, your obedient servant,
ED. JOHNSON,
Major-General.

ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION, July 19, 1863.

Maj. A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Army Corps.

MAJOR: I have the honor to forward a United States flag captured in the enemy's breastworks near Gettysburg, Pa., by Sergt. Thomas J. Betterton, Company A, Thirty-seventh Virginia Regiment, Steuart's brigade. Sergeant Betterton was wounded at a later period of the engagement, and further details of the capture cannot be given at this time.

Very respectfully,
ED. JOHNSON,
Major-General.

 

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION, October 7, 1863.

Lieut. JAMES P. SMITH,
Aide-de-Camp.

LIEUTENANT: I herewith forward you a tabular statement of the losses in this division by brigades in the battles of Winchester and Gettysburg, as called for in your note of yesterday.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. W. HUNTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[lnclosure.]

Statement of Casualties in Johnson's division in the battles of Winchester and Gettysburg, in June and July, 1863.

At Winchester

Command	Officers Killed	Enlisted Killed	Officers Wounded	Enlisted Wounded	Officers Missint	Enlisted Missing	Total
Stonewall Brigade	----	3	1	15	----	----	19
Jones Brigade	----	----	----	1	----	----	1
Steuat's Brigade	----	9	1	26	----	----	36
Andrew's Battalion Artillery	----	----	2	15	----	----	17
Total	----	14	6	68	----	----	88

 

At Gettysburg

Command	Officers Killed	Enlisted Killed	Officers Wounded	Enlisted Wounded	Officers Missint	Enlisted Missing	Total
General Johnson's Staff	----	----	1	----	1	----	2
Stonewal Brigade	2	33	20	188	6	81	330
Jones' Brigade	6	52	25	277	2	59	421
Steuart's Brigade	4	79	25	384	4	186	682
Nicholls' Brigade	----	43	28	281	----	36	388
Total	12	207	99	1,130	13	362	1,823
Aggregate	12	221	105	1,198	13	362	1,911

 

 

 

 

Reports of Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart, C. S. Army, commanding brigade:
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS STEUART'S BRIGADE, June 19, 1863.

Maj. B. W. LEIGH,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Johnson's Division.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the recent operations around Winchester:
On the morning of the 13th instant, I marched up the Front Royal road toward Winchester, with the Tenth Virginia and First and Third North Carolina Regiments, the Twenty-third Virginia having been detached to guard the division train, and the Thirty-seventh Virginia to support the reserve artillery. The brigade was not engaged during the day, being posted to the right of the road as a support to the Stonewall Brigade.
Early on the morning of the 14th instant, that brigade moved nearer the town, throwing out skirmishers, and I also moved forward, and in the afternoon farther to the right, next to the Berryville turnpike. At dark, I was directed by the major-general commanding to move down the road toward Berryville, and, after marching several miles (a guide afterward coming up to show the way)., the brigade took a circuitous left-hand road, passing by Jordan Springs, and was halted just before daybreak on the 15th instant at the small bridge where the road crosses the Winchester and Potomac Railroad, about 4 miles from Winchester and a few hundred yards from the Martinsburg turnpike. Wagons were heard moving along the pike, and, after a few minutes' halt, the major-general commanding, who had gone forward to reconnoiter, gave orders to move into the woods to the right of the road between the railroad and turnpike; and just as the head of the column was crossing the bridge, it was fired into, causing momentary confusion.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of crossing, in the dark, fences to the right and left of the road, line of battle was soon formed along the railroad cut, the Tenth Virginia to the right of the bridge, and the First and Third North Carolina to the left, where there were no woods. Skirmishers were thrown forward, and a brisk fire commenced. The enemy advanced in line of battle, cheering and driving in our skirmishers, but were soon themselves in turn driven back.
Receiving information that an attempt was being made to turn our left flank, I threw out two companies of the Third North Carolina to protect it. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, commanding the artillery battalion attached to this division, had previously placed a piece of the Maryland artillery on the bridge, and the other pieces of that battery and a section from each of the batteries of Captains Raine and Carpenter on the rising ground in rear of my left, rendering most valuable support. A column of the enemy was now observed passing round to our left and rear, and I directed the Third North Carolina to repel the attack; but finding that two regiments of Nicholls' brigade were coming up, that regiment was returned to its original position. Colonel [E. T. H.] Warren, of the Tenth Virginia, sent word from the right that the enemy were pressing him very hard, his supply of cartridges rapidly diminishing, and I sent the First and subsequently a portion of the Third North Carolina to his support. Just before this, the major-general commanding, with the aforementioned regiments of Nicholls' brigade, attacked and pursued most vigorously that portion of the enemy who were passing to our left and rear. After awhile, I was informed that the ammunition of the Tenth Virginia was all expended but one round, held in reserve, and that the other two regiments of my brigade had only a few rounds left; also, that the ordnance wagons were behind, and, after sending repeatedly, I found it impossible to get more ammunition.
Several attempts were made by the enemy to carry the bridge, and almost all the cannoneers of the piece placed there were killed or wounded. The gallant Lieutenant Contee was also wounded; and I must here mention the gallant conduct of Lieut. John A. Morgan, First North Carolina Regiment, who, with Private [B. W.] Owens, of the Maryland artillery, and some occasional assistance, manned the piece most effectively, driving the enemy back from the bridge at a most critical moment, as the regiments near, from want of ammunition, were unable to render any assistance.
Up to this time my brigade (with assistance from the artillery), had alone sustained the attack upon the front and right. Brigadier-General Walker now came up on my right with two regiments of his brigade (Stonewall), and rapidly advanced in line of battle through the woods toward the turnpike. The major-general commanding being engaged in a different part of the field, I directed two regiments of Nicholls' brigade to cross the bridge and attack the enemy's rear, which was passing. At the same time, General Walker was pressing them on their right, and, thus hemmed in, they gave way, and many were taken prisoners, about 1,000 by my brigade and the remainder by General Walker. Four stand of colors were taken by my brigade; also about 175 horses.
I am glad to say that my loss was small (only 9 killed and 34 wounded), though I regret to mention among the killed Capt. J. S. R. Miller, a gallant and meritorious officer of the First North Carolina Regiment.
I cannot speak in terms too high of the manner in which all the officers and men conducted themselves, every one doing all in his power to accomplish the end in view.
Capt. G. G. Garrison, assistant adjutant-general, and First Lieut. R. H. McKim, my aide-de-camp, rendered valuable assistance, the latter occasionally serving at the piece on the bridge.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. STEUART,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

ADDENDA.

List of Casualties in Steuart's brigade, Johnson's division, Second Army Corps.

Command	Officers Killed	Enlisted Killed	Officers Wounded	Enlisted Wounded
10th Regiment Virginia Infantry	----	----	----	6
1st Regiment North Carolina Infantry	1	4	----	14
3rd Regiment North Carolina Infantry	---	4	2	12
Total	1	8	2