HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
July 31, 1863.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following outline of the recent operations of this army, for the information of the Department:
The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg -being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker, and that in any even-t that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations that may hereafter be presented, the movement began on June 3. McLaws' division, of Longstreet's corps, left Fredericksburg for Culpeper Court-House, and Hood's division, which was encamped on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. They were followed on the 4th and 5th by Ewell's corps, leaving that of A. P. Hill to occupy our lines at Fredericksburg.
The march of these troops having been discovered by the enemy on the afternoon of the 5th, on the following day he crossed a force amounting to about one army corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, on a pontoon bridge laid down near the mouth of Deep Run. General Hill disposed his command to resist their advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather than attack, the movements in progress were not arrested.
The forces of Longstreet and Ewell reached Culpeper Court-House by the 8th, at which point the cavalry, under General Stuart, was also concentrated.
On the 9th, a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly's Fords, and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving 400 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.
General Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, had been ordered to advance to Winchester, to co-operate with the infantry in the proposed expedition into the lower Valley, and at the same time General Imboden was directed with his command to make a demonstration in the direction of Romney, in order to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent the enemy at that place from being re-enforced by the troops on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both of these officers were in position when General Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on the 10th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, he detached Rodes' division to- Berryville, with instructions, after dislodging the force stationed there, to cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac. With the divisions of Early and [Edward] Johnson, General Ewell advanced directly upon Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town on the 13th. On the same day the troops at Berryville fell back before General Rodes, retreating to Winchester.
On the 14th, General Early stormed the works at the latter place, and the whole army of General Milroy was captured or dispersed. Most of those who attempted to escape were intercepted and made prisoners by General Johnson. Their leader fled to Harper's Ferry with a small party of fugitives.
General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the latter place on the 14th, where he took 700 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. These operations cleared the Valley of the enemy, those at Harper's Ferry withdrawing to Maryland Heights. More than 4,000 prisoners, 29 pieces of artillery, 270 wagons and ambulances, with 400 horses, were captured, besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small.
On the night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the Federal troops in front of A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg recrossed the Rappahannock, and the next day disappeared behind the hills of Stafford. The whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the line of the Rappahannock, pursuing the roads near the Potomac, and no favorable opportunity was offered for attack. It seemed to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position which would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington City. With a view to draw him farther from his base, and at the same time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg for the Valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. His force had been augmented, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. The cavalry under General Stuart was thrown out in front of Longstreet, to watch the enemy, now reported to be moving into Loudoun.
On the 17th, his cavalry encountered two brigades of ours under General Stuart, near Aldie, and was driven back with loss. The next day the engagement was renewed, the Federal cavalry being strongly supported by infantry, and General Stuart was, in turn, compelled to retire. The enemy advanced as far as Upperville, and then fell back. In these engagements, General Stuart took about 400 prisoners and a considerable number of horses and arms.
In the meantime, a part of General Ewell's corps had entered Maryland, and the rest was about to follow. Genera] Jenkins, with his cavalry, who accompanied General Ewell, penetrated Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg. As these demonstrations did not have the effect of causing the Federal Army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the Valley. General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Mary]and, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as, in his judgment, should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced.
By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed at Williamsport and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns reunited at Hagerstown, and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, en- camping near Chambersburg on the 27th.
No report had been received that the Federal Army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. In order, however, to retain it on the east side of the mountains, after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communication with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the South Mountain. Early's division was detached for this purpose, and proceeded as far east as York, while the remainder of the corps proceeded to Carlisle.
General Imboden, in pursuance of the instructions previously referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of General Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. He had driven off the forces guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, destroying all the important bridges on that route from Cumberland to Martinsburg, and seriously damaged the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He subsequently took position at Hancock, and, after the arrival of Longstreet and Hill at Chambersburg, was directed to march by way of McConnellsburg to that place.
Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but, on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the Federal Army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his farther progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle.
General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the Federal Army south of the Potomac, after our own had entered Maryland, and, in his efforts to impede its progress, advanced as far eastward as Fairfax Court-House. Finding himself unable to delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca, and marched through Westminster to Carlisle, where he arrived after General Ewell had left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued, the Federal Army was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal Army been known.
The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack. The remainder of Ewell's and Hill's corps having arrived, and two divisions of Longstreet's, our preparations were made accordingly. During the afternoon, intelligence was received of the arrival of General Stuart at Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg and take position on our left. A full account of these engagements cannot be given until the reports of the several commanding officers shall have been received, and I shall only offer a general description.
The preparations for attack were not completed until the afternoon of the 2d. The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left of our line, General Hill the center, and General Longstreet the right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position. while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the Federal line, in order to prevent re-enforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark.
These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day. Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the positions gained by him the day before. The general plan of attack was unchanged, excepting that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.
The enemy, in the meantime, had strengthened his lines with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries, but our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage, and fall back to their original positions with severe loss.
The conduct of the troops was all that I could desire or expect, and they deserve success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude. More may have been required of them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their noble qualities and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy has suffered no abatement from the issue of this protracted and sanguinary conflict.
Owing to the strength of the enemy's position, and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport.
The army remained at. Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners. Nearly 2,000 had previously been paroled, but the enemy's numerous wounded that had fallen into our hands after the first and second days' engagements were left behind.
Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th. The march was continued during that day without interruption from the enemy, excepting an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield and the rest by way of Cashtown, guarded by General Imboden. In passing through the mountains in advance of the column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons and ambulances, but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss.
They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden. The attacking force was subsequently encountered and driven off by General Stuart, and pursued for several miles in the direction of Boonsborough. The army, after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of July 6 and morning of the 7th.
The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland as to be unfordable. Our communications with the south side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced by the high waters impeding the working of the neighboring mills. The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to await at Williamsport the subsiding of the river and the construction of boats, as the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed. The enemy had not yet made his appearance, but as he was in condition to obtain large re-enforcements, and our situation, for the reasons above mentioned, was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. Part of the pontoon bridge was recovered and new boats built, so that by the 13th a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters.
The enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines. Our preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport. Those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads, the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until 1 p.m., when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no loss of materiel excepting a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud. Before fresh horses could be sent back for them, the rear of the column had passed. During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the obscurity of the night., and these, with some stragglers, fell into the hands of the enemy.
Brigadier-General Pettigrew was mortally wounded in an attack made by a small body of cavalry, which was unfortunately mistaken for our own, and permitted to enter our lines. He was brought to Bunker Hill, where he expired a few days afterward. He was a brave and accomplished officer and gentleman, and his loss will be deeply felt by the country and the army.
The following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity of which it encamped for several days. The day after its arrival, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, which had crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, advanced toward Martinsburg. It was attacked by General Fitz. Lee, near Kearneysville, and defeated with heavy loss, leaving its dead and many of its wounded on the field.
Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah, the plan of operations which had been contemplated when we recrossed the Potomac could not be put into execution, and before the waters had subsided, the movements of the enemy induced me to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock, which was accordingly done.
As soon as the reports of the commanding officers shall be received, a more detailed account of these operations will be given, and occasion will then be taken to speak more particularly of the conspicuous gallantry and good conduct of both officers and men.
It is not yet in my power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe, including many brave men, and an unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers. Among them I regret to mention the following general officers: Major-Generals Hood, Pender, and Trimble severely, and Major-General Heth slightly wounded.
General Pender has since died. This lamented officer had borne a distinguished part in every engagement of this army, and was wounded on several occasions while leading his command with conspicuous gallantry and ability. The confidence and admiration inspired by his courage and capacity as an officer were only equaled by the esteem and respect entertained by all with whom he was associated for the noble qualities of his modest and unassuming character.
Brigadier-Generals Barksdale and [R. B.] Garnett were killed, and Brigadier-General Semmes mortally wounded, while leading their troops with the courage that always distinguished them. These brave officers and patriotic gentlemen fell in the faithful discharge of duty, leaving the army to mourn their loss and emulate their noble examples. Brigadier-Generals Kemper, Armistead, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Hampton, J. M. Jones, and Jenkins were also wounded. Brigadier-General Archer was taken prisoner.
General Pettigrew, though wounded at Gettysburg, continued in command until he was mortally wounded, near Falling Waters.

The loss of the enemy is unknown, but from observation on the field, and his subsequent movements, it is supposed that he suffered severely.

Respectfully submitted.
R. E. LEE,
General.

HDQRS. 1ST ARMY CORPS, DEPT. OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Near Culpeper Court-House, July 27, 1863.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General.

COLONEL: In obedience to orders from the commanding general, my command marched from Fredericksburg, on June 3, for Culpeper Court-House.
On the 15th, it moved from Culpeper Court-House along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, and, on the 19th, McLaws' division was posted in Ashby's Gap, Hood's at Snicker's Gap, and Pickett's supporting Hood's and guarding points between the two Gaps.
On June 20, I received a dispatch from general headquarters, directing that I should hold myself in readiness to move in the direction of the Potomac, with a view to crossing, &c. As I was ready, and had been expecting an order to execute such purpose, I supposed the intimation meant other preparation, and, knowing of nothing else that I could do to render my preparations complete, I supposed that it was desirable that I should cross the Shenandoah. I therefore passed the river, occupied the banks at the ferries opposite the Gaps, and a road at an intermediate ford, which was practicable for cavalry and infantry.
On the following day, the enemy advanced his cavalry in full force against General Stuart, and drove him into and nearly through Ashby's Gap. I succeeded in passing part of McLaws' division across the river in time to occupy the Gap before night, and, upon advancing a line of sharpshooters the next morning at daylight, the enemy retired. I believe that he engaged the sharpshooters lightly. General Stuart re-established his cavalry, and McLaws' division was withdrawn to the west bank of the Shenandoah before night.
On the 23d, I received orders to march, via Berryville, Martinsburg, and Williamsport, into Maryland. The command moved at early dawn on the following day: First, Pickett's division; second, the Reserve Artillery battalions; third, Hood's division, and, fourth, McLaws' division. Pickett's division and the battalions of Reserve Artillery crossed the Potomac on the 25th, Hood's and McLaws' divisions on the following day. The command reached Chambersburg, Pa., on the 27th, and a halt of two days was made for rest.
On the night of the 28th, one of my scouts came in with information that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us. The scout was sent to general headquarters, with the suggestion that our army concentrate east of the mountains, and bear down to meet the enemy.
I received orders on the following day to move part of my command, and to encamp it at Greenwood. The command, excepting Pickett's division, which was left to guard our rear at Chambersburg, moved on the morning of the 30th, and the two divisions and battalions of Reserve Artillery got into camp at Greenwood about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. General Hood was ordered to put a brigade and a battery on picket at New Guilford, on the road leading toward Emmitsburg.
On the next day, the troops set out for Gettysburg, excepting Pickett's division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law's brigade, left by Hood on picket at New Guilford. Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson's division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day, and joined about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining, I received instructions from the commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A.P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmitsburg road.
Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 p.m. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.
The enemy's first position along the Emmitsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws' upon his front. He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point, however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General [R. H.] Anderson's division, which were co-operating upon my left, drove one of them back, and, checking the support of the other, caused my left to be somewhat exposed and outflanked. Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was driven back at the same time. I thought it prudent not to push farther until my other troops came up.
General Hood received a severe wound soon after getting under fire, and was obliged to leave the field. This misfortune occasioned some delay in our operations. Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson, of his division, was also severely wounded, and obliged to leave the field. In the same attack, General McLaws lost two of his brigadiers (General Barksdale mortally wounded, and General Semmes severely wounded, and since died of his wounds). The command was finally so disposed as to hold the ground gained on the right, with my left withdrawn to the first position of the enemy, resting at the peach orchard. During the combat of this day, four pieces of artillery were captured and secured by the command, and two regimental standards.
On the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. This would have been a slow process, probably, but I think not very difficult. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were given, the commanding general joined me, and ordered a column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's, and part of Pender's divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position, the Cemetery Hill. The distance to be passed over under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the assault had been in a severe battle two days previous, Pickett's division alone being fresh.
Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the line of the enemy's defenses, and General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.
Heth's division, under the command of Brigadier-General Pettigrew, was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Major-General Pender's division, under Major-General Trimble. All of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery of First Corps, and Colonel Alexander had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon the signal for the batteries to open.
About 2 p.m. General Pickett, who had been charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind our batteries, reported that the troops were in order and on the most sheltered ground. Colonel Walton was ordered to open the batteries. The signal guns were fired, and all the batteries opened very handsomely and apparently with effective fire. The guns on the hill at the enemy's left were soon silenced. Those at the Cemetery Hill combated us, however, very obstinately. Many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them. Colonel Alexander was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack.
Some time after our batteries opened fire, I rode to Major [James] Dearing's batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon, if we hoped to accomplish anything before night. I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Colonel Alexander's position, I found that he had advised General Pickett that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege. The advance was made in very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation. About half way between our position and that of the enemy, a ravine partially sheltered our troops from the enemy's fire, where a short halt was made for rest. The advance was resumed after a moment's pause, all still in good order. The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. Pickett's troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Major-General Anderson's division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated, broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines or destroy him before Anderson's division could reach him, which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed Anderson. He was, therefore, ordered to halt. In a few moments the enemy, marching against both flanks and the front of Pickett's division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. General Wright, of Anderson's division, with all of the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division, and many of my staff officers were sent to assist in the same service. Expecting an attack from the enemy, I rode to the front of our batteries, to reconnoiter and superintend their operations.
The enemy threw forward forces at different times and from different points, but they were only feelers, and retired as soon as our batteries opened upon them. These little advances and checks were kept up till night, when the enemy retired to his stronghold, and my line was withdrawn to the Gettysburg road on the right, the left uniting with Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill's right. After night, I received orders to make all the needful arrangements for our retreat. The orders for preparation were given, and the work was begun before daylight on the 4th.
On the night of the 4th, the troops were withdrawn from our line, and my command took up the line of march, following the corps of Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill. Our march was much impeded by heavy rains and excessively bad roads. We succeeded, however, in reaching the top of the mountain early in the night of the 5th.
On the 6th, my command, passing to the front, marched for Hagerstown. As our exhausted men and animals were not in condition for rapid movement, I thought myself fortunate when I found that I could reach Hagerstown in time to relieve our trains at Williamsport, then seriously threatened. Reaching Hagerstown about 5 p.m., our column moved down the Sharpsburg turnpike, and encamped about 2 miles from Hagerstown.
The next day, the command was put in camp on the best ground that could be found, and remained quiet until the 10th, when the enemy was reported to be advancing to meet us. It was supposed at first to be a cavalry force only, but I thought it prudent to move some of the infantry down on the Antietam, at Funkstown. After reaching the Antietam, General Stuart asked for infantry supports for his batteries, and two brigades (Semmes', under Colonel [Goode] Bryan, and Anderson's, under Colonel [W. W.] White) were sent across, as he desired. For the report of their service, I refer to the report of Major-General Stuart and the brigade commanders. A line of battle was selected, extending from a point on the Potomac near Downsville to the Hagerstown and Williamsport turnpike, my command on the right. The troops were put to work, and, in twenty-four hours, our line was comfortably intrenched. A few of the enemy's sharpshooters came up on the Boonsborough road, and to within long range of our picket line on the 12th.
On the evening of the same day, a light skirmish was brought on by an advance of a line of sharpshooters at the Saint James' College. That night our bridge was completed, and, the day after, I received orders to recross the Potomac after night, and the caissons of the batteries were started back about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The troops marched as soon as it was dark, my command leading. Having but a single road to travel upon, our trains soon came to a halt. I rode on to the bridge, to hasten the movements as much as possible, and sent my staff officers to different points along the line to keep everything in motion. Details were made to keep up fires to light the road at the worst points, and Captain [J. H.] Manning, with his signal torches, lighted us across the bridge.
The natural difficulties in making such movements were increased by the darkness of the night, a heavy rain storm, flooding the road with mud and water, and finally by one of our wagons, loaded with wounded, running off the bridge, breaking it down, and throwing our wounded headlong into the river. We were so fortunate, however, as to rescue them in a few moments. They were made somewhat comfortable in other vehicles, and sent forward. Major [John J.] Clarke and Captains [Henry T.] Douglas and [S. R.] Johnston, of the Corps of Engineers, applied themselves diligently to the work of repairing the bridge, and, in two hours, our line was again in motion.
When the accident occurred at the bridge, I sent back orders for one of my divisions to occupy the redoubts that had been thrown up to protect the bridge, and also directed Colonel Alexander to place his batteries in position on the same line. As soon as the bridge was repaired, I rode back to this line, but finding that the enemy was not pursuing, the troops were again put in motion. The rear of my column passed the bridge at 9 o'clock in the morning, and encamped for the night at Hainesville.
On July 19, at Bunker Hill, I received orders to march with my command for Millwood, in order to obtain possession of Ashby's Gap, with a view to covering our future movements. We marched early on the next day, part of the command reaching Millwood at night. The Shenandoah was found to be past fording, however, and the enemy had driven our cavalry from the Gap, and were in possession down to the river bank. I reported this to the commanding general, and continued my march on the following day-for Manassas and Chester Gaps. Arriving at the Shenandoah at Front Royal, it was found to be past fording, and the work of laying our bridges was hardly [hurriedly?] begun. Brigadier-General Corse, who had been hurried forward with his brigade to secure the Gaps, succeeded in passing the stream with his men and several batteries. Detaching a regiment to Manassas Gap, he marched his main force into Chester Gap, and succeeded in getting possession of the latter some few moments before the enemy appeared. The enemy was in possession of Manassas Gap, but Colonel [Arthur] Herbert, of the Seventeenth Virginia Regiment, secured a strong position with his regiment, from which he held the enemy in check. The rest of Pickett's division was hurried over by crossing the ammunition and arms in a fiat-boat, the men wading. Re-enforcements were sent to Colonel Herbert, when he drove back the enemy, and secured as much of the Gap as was desirable. Re-enforcements were also sent to General Corse, who was engaged in skirmishing with the enemy, and was threatened by a strong cavalry force. The cavalry withdrew about the time the re-enforcements reached him. The bridges were completed about 12 o'clock at night, and the passage by our trains commenced.
The next day the enemy appeared in stronger force in Manassas Gap, but I had posted Hood's division there, under Brig. Gen. E. M. Law, and he gave us but little trouble. He also reappeared at the foot of the mountain, at Chester Gap. As soon as our men finished cooking their rations, General Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was ordered to disperse the cavalry that was at the foot of the mountain, and endeavor to capture his artillery. General Pickett was ordered to send a force down the mountain by a different route, to get in rear of and intercept the cavalry. After a light skirmish with General Wofford, the enemy made a hasty retreat. Our march was continued, arriving at Culpeper Court-House at noon on the 24th instant.
General Benning's brigade, which had been left on picket at Gaines' Cross-Roads with the Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama Regiments, to await the arrival of Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill's corps, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry while on the march, each having a smart skirmish.
I desire to mention the following-named officers as among those most distinguished for the exhibition of great gallantry and skill, viz: Major-Generals Pickett, Hood, and Trimble, the two latter severely wounded; Kemper, very seriously wounded; Semmes, severely wounded, and since died of his wounds; Pettigrew, slightly wounded; Kershaw, Law, and G. T. Anderson, the last severely wounded.
Brigadier-General Barksdale was mortally wounded in the attack on the evening of the 2d, while bravely leading his brigade in the assault.
Brig. Gen. R. B. Garnett was killed while gallantly leading his brigade in the assault upon the enemy's position upon the Cemetery Hill.
Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, and Colonel Alexander, Major Dearing, Major [Frank] Huger, Major Eshleman, and Captain [M. B.] Miller, of the Corps of Artillery, were noted for the courage, zeal, and ability with which they discharged their duties.
The troops all exhibited great determination and courage on the battle-field, which, together with the fortitude and endurance subsequently shown by them under circumstances of great trial, justly entitles them to our hearty thanks and highest praise.
Major-General Pickett's division merits especial credit for the determined manner in which it assaulted the enemy's strong position upon the Cemetery Hill.
For valuable and meritorious services on the field, I desire to express my renewed obligations to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel [G. M.] Sorrel, Lieutenant-Colonel [Peyton T.] Manning, Majors [John W.] Fairfax, [O.] Latrobe, [John J.] Clarke, and [Thomas] Walton, and Captains [Thomas J.] Goree, [John W.] Riely, and [H. J.] Rogers.
Major [S. P.] Mitchell, chief quartermaster; Major [R. J.] Moses, chief commissary of subsistence; Surgeon [J. S. D.] Cullen, medical director; Surgeons [Randolph] Barksdale and [Thomas F.] Maury, and Captain Manning, signal officer, discharged the duties of their respective departments with zeal and ability.
Statements of the casualties of the campaign, embracing the killed, wounded, and missing, have been already forwarded.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

Report of Brig. Gen. J. B. Kershaw, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, McLaws' division
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE,
Near Chattanooga, October 1, 1863.

Maj. J. M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the commencement of the march from Culpeper Court-House until the return of the army to that place.
Tuesday, June 16.--The brigade marched to Sperryville.
17th.--To Mud Run, in Fauquier County. These two days were excessively hot, and on the 17th many cases of sunstroke occurred. At Gaines' Cross-Roads, the wagons were sent by the way of Front Royal. Rice's battalion was detached as a guard to the division train.
18th.--Marched to Piedmont.
19th.--To Ashby's Gap, where Rice's battalion rejoined the command.
20th.--Crossed the Shenandoah River at Berry's Ford.
21st.--Recrossed, and took position in line of battle near Paris, to resist a threatened attack of the enemy.
22d.--Returned to camp on western side of the river.
23d.--Obtained 503 new arms from Winchester.
24th.--Marched to Summit Point.
25th.--To Martinsburg.
26th.--Crossed Potomac River; encamped near Williamsport.
27th.--Marched by the way of Hagerstown, Middleburg, and Green-castle, and encamped 5 miles from Chambersburg.
28th.--Marched through Chambersburg, and encamped 1 mile beyond.
Remained in camp until the 30th, when we marched to Fayetteville.
July 1.--Anderson's and Johnson's divisions and General Ewell's wagon train occupied the road until 4 p.m., when we marched to a point on the Gettysburg road, some 2 miles from that place, going into camp at 12 p.m.
The command was ordered to move at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, but did not leave camp until about sunrise. We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg, with only a slight detention from trains in the way, and moved to the right of the Third Corps, and were halted until about noon. We were then directed to move under cover of the hills toward the right, with a view to flanking the enemy in that direction, if cover could be found to conceal the movement. Arriving at the hill beyond the hotel, at the stone bridge on the Fairfield road, the column was halted while Generals Longstreet and McLaws reconnoitered the route. After some little delay, the major-general commanding returned, and directed a countermarch, and the command was marched to the left, beyond the point at which we had before halted, and thence, under cover of the woods, to the right of our line of battle. Arriving at the school-house, on the road leading across the Emmitsburg road by the peach orchard, then in possession of the enemy, the lieutenant-general commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road, with my left resting toward the Emmitsburg road. At the same time a battery of artillery was moved along the road parallel with my line of march. About 3 p.m. the head of my column came into the open field in front of a stone wall, and in view of the enemy. I immediately filed to the right along and in front of the wall, and formed line of battle under cover of my skirmishers, then engaged with those of the enemy, these extending along the Emmitsburg road.
In the meantime, examining the position of the enemy, I found him to be in superior force in the orchard, supported by artillery, with a main line of battle intrenched in the rear and extending to and upon the rocky mountain to his left far beyond the point at which his flank had supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions, would have been, if successful in driving him from the orchard, to present my own right and rear to a large portion of his line of battle. I therefore communicated the position of things to the major-general commanding, and placed my line in position under cover of the stone wall. Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes in reserve to me and Barksdale on my left, supported by Wofford, in reserve. Artillery was also placed along the wall to my right, and Colonel De Saussure's Fifteenth South Carolina Regiment was thrown beyond it to protect it. Hood's division was then moving in our rear toward our right, to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the peach orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood, on my right, and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle. I was told that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement.
These directions I received in various messages from the lieutenant-general and the major-general commanding, and in part by personal communication with them. In my center front was a stone house, and to the left of it a stone barn, both about 500 yards from our line, and on a line with the crest of the orchard hill. Along the front of the orchard, and on the face looking toward the stone house, the enemy's infantry was posted. Two batteries of artillery were in position, the one in rear of the orchard, near the crest of the hill, and the other some 200 yards farther back, in the direction of the rocky mountain. Behind the stone house, on the left, was a morass; on the right a stone wall running parallel with our line of battle. Beyond the morass some 200 yards was a stony hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth, extending some distance toward the enemy's main line, and inclining to our left, and in rear of the orchard and the batteries described. Beyond the stone wall, and in a line with the stony hill, was a heavy forest, extending far to our right. From the morass a small stream ran through this wood along the base of the mountain toward the right. Between the stony hill and this forest was an interval of about 100 yards, which was only sparsely covered with scrubby undergrowth, through which a small road ran in the direction of the mountain. Looking down this road from the stone house, a large wheat-field was seen. In rear of the wheat-field, and between that and the mountain, was the enemy's main line of battle, posted behind a stone wall.
Under my instructions, I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. Accordingly, about 4 o'clock, when I received orders to advance, I moved at once in this direction, gradually changing front to the left. The numerous fences in the way, the stone building and barn, and the morass, and a raking fire of grape and canister, rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order; but, notwithstanding these obstacles, I brought my center to the point intended. In order to restore the line of the directing battalion (the Seventh South Carolina), as soon as we reached the cover of the hill, I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately, this order given only to Colonel [D. Wyatt] Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked its advance.
Before reaching this point, I had extended an order to Colonel Kennedy, commanding Second South Carolina Regiment (my left center regiment), then moving in magnificent style, to charge the battery in their front, being the second battery mentioned above, and which most annoyed us, leaving Barksdale to deal with that at the orchard.
Meanwhile, to aid this attack, I changed the direction of the Seventh Regiment (Colonel Aiken) and the Third (Major [R. C.] Maffett) to the left, so as to occupy the rocky hill and wood, and opened fire on the battery. Barksdale had not yet appeared, but came up soon after, and cleared the orchard, with the assistance of the fire of my Eighth South Carolina (Colonel [John W.] Henagan), on my left, and James' battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel [W. G.] Rice), the next in order of battle. This brigade then moved so far to the left as no longer to afford me any assistance.
In a few minutes after my line halted, the enemy advanced across the wheat-field in two lines of battle, with a very small interval between the lines, in such a manner as to take the Seventh South Carolina in flank. I changed the direction of the right wing of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel [Elbert] Bland, to meet the attack, and hurried back to General Semmes, then some 150 yards in my right rear, to bring him up to meet the attack on my right, and also to bring forward my right regiment (Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel De Saussure), which, separated from the command by the artillery at the time of the advance, was now cut off by Semmes' brigade. Its gallant and accomplished commander had just fallen when I reached it, and it was under the command of Major [William M.] Gist. General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion toward the right, preparatory to moving to the front. I hastened back to the Seventh Regiment, and reached it just as the enemy, having arrived at a point about 200 yards from us, poured in a volley and advanced to the charge. The Seventh received him handsomely, and long kept him in check in their front. One regiment of Semmes' brigade came at a double-quick as far as the ravine in our rear, and for a time checked him in their front. There was still an interval of 100 yards between this regiment and the right of the Seventh, and into this the enemy was forcing his way, causing the Seventh to swing back more and more, still fighting at a distance not exceeding 30 paces, until the two wings were doubled on each other, or nearly so.
Finding that the battery on my left had been silenced, I sent for the Second South Carolina Regiment to come to the right, but by this time the enemy had swung around and lapped my whole line at close quarters, and the fighting was general and desperate. At length, the Seventh South Carolina gave way, and I directed Colonel Aiken to reform them at the stone wall, some 200 yards in my right rear. I fell back to the Third Regiment, then hotly engaged on the crest of the stony hill, and gradually swung around its right as the enemy made progress around our flank. Semmes' advanced regiment had given way. One of his regiments mingled with the Third, and, among the rocks and trees, within a few feet of each other, a desperate conflict ensued. The enemy could make no progress in front, but slowly extended around my right. Separated from view of my left wing by the hill and wood, all of my staff being with that wing, the position of the Fifteenth Regiment being unknown, and the Seventh being in the rear, I feared the brave men about me would be surrounded by the large force pressing around them, and ordered the Third Regiment and the [Fiftieth?] Georgia Regiment with them to fall back to the stone house, whither I followed them.
On emerging from the wood, I saw Wofford coming in in splendid style.
My left wing had held the enemy in check along their front, and lost no ground. The enemy gave way at Wofford's advance, and, with him, the whole of my left wing advanced to the charge, sweeping the enemy before them, without a moment's stand, across the stone wall, beyond the wheat-field, up to the foot of the mountain. At the same time, my Fifteenth Regiment, and part of Semmes' brigade, pressed forward on the right to the same point. Going back to the stone wall near my rear, I found Colonel Aiken in position, and at the stone building found the Third South Carolina and the regiment of Semmes' brigade. I moved them up to the stone wall, and, finding that Wofford's men were coming out, I retained them at that point to check any attempt of the enemy to advance.
It was now near nightfall, and the operations of the day were over. Gathering all my regiments, with Semmes' brigade, behind the wall, and placing pickets well to the front, I commenced the melancholy task of looking up my numerous dead and wounded. It was a sad list. First among the dead was the brave and able officer, Col. W. D. De Saussure, the senior colonel of the brigade, whom I had been pleased to regard as my successor in command should any casualty create a vacancy. His loss to his regiment is irreparable; to his State and the country not to be estimated. Major [D. McD.] McLeod, of the Eighth South Carolina Regiment, a gallant and estimable officer, was mortally wounded. Col. John D. Kennedy, of the Second South Carolina Regiment, was severely wounded while gallantly leading his command to the charge. Lieutenant-Colonel [F.] Gaillard conducted the regiment through its subsequent operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, of the Seventh South Carolina Regiment, while commanding the right wing of the regiment with his usual courage and ability, was severely wounded, as was also Maj. D. B. Miller, James' battalion [Third Battalion South Carolina Infantry]. A long list of brave and efficient officers sealed their devotion to the glorious cause with their blood, each of whom merits special mention did the proper limits of this report admit it.
All the officers and men of the command behaved most admirably, and are entitled to the gratitude of the country. I am especially indebted to the members of my staff--Captain [C. R.] Holmes, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant [Alfred E.] Doby, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant [W. M.] Dwight, acting assistant inspector-general--for most efficient services on the field under the most difficult circumstances.
About dark, I was ordered to move my brigade to the left, to the peach orchard, where I remained until noon of the next day, when I was ordered to return to the stone wall. An hour later, I was directed to return to the wall where I had first formed line of battle. Hood's division, then commanded by General Law, was engaged with the enemy's cavalry in his front, his line being formed across our right flank. Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to move to the right, so as to connect with Hood's left, retaining my then front. This I did, and remained in that position until the night of the 4th, when, about midnight, I moved with the army, via Franklin, to Monterey.
On the 6th, marched through Hagerstown, via Waterloo, and encamped near Funkstown.
On the 10th. I was directed to proceed, with my own and Semmes' brigades, and a section of [J. C.] Fraser's battery to the bridge across the Antietam, near Macauley's, and defend that position, the enemy having appeared in force on the other side. Some unimportant skirmishing occurred here, and next morning I rejoined the division, near the Saint James' College.
We remained in line of battle, with the enemy in front, until the night of the 13th, when we marched to Falling Waters, and recrossed the Potomac on the 14th.
March was continued next day to Bunker Hill, where we rested until the 18th, when we resumed the march for Culpeper Court-House, via Millwood, Front Royal, Chester Gap, and Gaines' Cross-Roads, arriving at 10 a.m. on the 24th.
I cannot close this report without expressing my thanks to Maj. W. D. Peck, assistant quartermaster, and Maj. Joseph Kennedy, acting commissary of subsistence, of the brigade staff, and all the regimental officers of their departments, for their assiduous and efficient exertions during this important campaign.
The reports of regimental commanders accompany this. The casualties have already been reported.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. KERSHAW,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Report of Col. H. C. Cabell, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

CAMP NEAR CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
August 1, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, First Corps, Army Northern Virginia.

COLONEL: In compliance with your order, at the earliest period to make a report of the operations of my battalion from the-time it left the Rappahannock for Maryland and Pennsylvania until its return, I have the honor to submit the following report:
The battalion left Stanard's farm, about 10 miles in the rear of Fredericksburg, on June 3.
Encamped near Culpeper Court-House June 7. Remained near Culpeper Court-House till the 16th. Were ordered to accompany the division to meet the enemy, who were pressing Stuart's cavalry at Brandy Station. The enemy did not advance, being driven off, as it seemed, by the appearance of our forces.
On the 16th, resumed the march. We arrived at Ashby's Gap on the 19th, and encamped on the mountain, there being some fighting between the cavalry. Crossed the Shenandoah on the evening of the 20th.
The division recrossed the river, accompanied by Captain Fraser's battery, on the 21st. Subsequently the rest of the battalion moved across the Shenandoah, and took position at Ashby's Gap, where we again encamped.
On the 22d, we again crossed the Shenandoah, and, resuming our march on the 24th, on the 26th crossed the Potomac. We encamped a mile beyond Chambersburg on the 28th.
On July 1, we encamped a few miles from Gettysburg, and, on July 2, moved up with the division. When we commenced to ascend the road leading to the crest of the hill, where the battle was subsequently fought my battalion moved to the head of the column. Near the crest of the hill, I turned to the right, and placed the battalion in position on the edge of the wood, the right resting near the road leading from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg. One horse was wounded while crossing the field, although this movement was made beyond the view of the enemy. On our right, and slightly in front, the enemy occupied a rocky mountain with several batteries, and directly in front, about 600 or 700 yards distant, were a large number of batteries, occupying a peach orchard. Receiving orders, we opened a most effective fire upon these batteries. Exposed ourselves to a flanking fire from the enemy's mountain batteries, our position gave us a similar advantage in firing upon a large part of his line, which was drawn up nearly parallel with the Emmitsburg road. The battalion, being first to open fire, received for a short time a concentrated fire from the enemy's batteries. The fire from our lines and from the enemy became incessant, rendering it necessary for us sometimes to pause and allow the smoke to clear away, in order to enable the gunners to take aim. During the same time, two guns were ordered to play upon the batteries on the stony mountain--I have reason to believe with great effect.
The loss of my battalion was very heavy during this cannonading, Captain Fraser, who had always in previous engagements, as in this, set an example of the highest courage, coolness, and gallantry, fell, dangerously wounded by the bursting of a shell. The same shell killed 2 sergeants and 1 man.
Lieutenant [R. H.] Couper, of the same battery, was wounded during the same engagement.
The batteries in the peach orchard were driven off, and our fire was suspended to allow the infantry to advance. The guns on the right continued to fire on the enemy's batteries on the mountain as soon as the infantry had charged.
The next day, finding that Captain Fraser's command was so much crippled by the loss of men, I placed two of his guns (3-inch rifles) in charge of Captain [B. C.] Manly. These two guns, under command of Lieutenant [J. H.] Payne, of Manly's battery, two 3-inch rifles of Captain [E. S.] McCarthy's battery, under command of Lieut. R. M. Anderson, and two Parrott guns of Captain Fraser's battery, under command of Lieutenant [W. J.] Furlong, were ordered to take position on the new and advanced line of battle.
These guns were placed several hundred yards in front of the infantry, near a small brick house, and fronted the road leading from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg. The line of artillery extended up the road for some distance. Captain [H. H.] Carlton's battery and a section of Captain McCarthy's battery (two Napoleons) were ordered to the left of the line, in front of Pickett's division, the guns being placed slightly en échelon, owing to the conformation of the line of battle. Their position was considerably to the left of the brick house, the interval being occupied by batteries of other battalions.
Captain McCarthy, who had, early in the morning, been placed 300 or 400 yards in advance of the skirmishers, fired 20 rounds, and, with a section of another battery, succeeded in driving back an advancing line of the enemy.
The fire of the artillery was opened about 1 p.m. For over two hours the cannonading on both sides was almost continuous and incessant, far, very far, exceeding any cannonading I have ever before witnessed. The last-named batteries were opposite the cemetery position of the enemy. During this cannonading, Lieutenant [Henry] Jennings, a brave and gallant officer, fell, wounded, and, later in the day, Captain Carlton, who has in action so gallantly commanded his battery, fell, also wounded.
The command of the battery fell upon, and was at once assumed by, First Lieut. C. W. Motes.
The artillery ceased firing, and a part of Pickett s division passed over the ground occupied by these batteries in their celebrated charge. Captain Manly occupied, slightly shifting the position of his guns, the same position occupied the day before, and engaged the mountain batteries, particularly, with effect.
After Pickett's division was ordered back from their assault on the Cemetery Hill, Captain McCarthy and Lieutenant Motes were ordered to move forward, and came in position immediately on the road above mentioned, occupying the left flank of the line extended, upon which were placed the sections commanded, respectively, by Lieutenants Anderson, Payne, and Furlong. One of Lieutenant Furlong's guns being entirely out of ammunition, was ordered to the rear. The other piece was placed about 300 yards on the left of his previous position.
The enemy's sharpshooters were continually firing and annoying us. Only a few of our pickets were in front of us; no infantry in sight in our rear, but [R. II.] Anderson's division was in the woods, about 400 yards in the rear. The ammunition of the guns was nearly exhausted. The position occupied by these guns was about 700 yards from the Cemetery Hill. The change in the position of the guns was made about 4 p.m., with orders to hold it till night. We fired upon a line of infantry approaching, and, with the other batteries, dispersed them or drove them back. The attack was not renewed. The guns remained in this position till after dark, When they were withdrawn.
During the next day there was but little firing on either side. During the night of the 4th, we withdrew from our position, and, after a most distressing march, encamped at Monterey Springs the night of the 5th.
We arrived at Hagerstown the next evening, and encamped about 1 mile from the town.
On July 8, Captain Manly's battery was ordered to picket near Funkstown, Md., on the Antietam.
On Friday, July 10, this battery crossed the Antietam, and went to the assistance of General Stuart's cavalry. It engaged the enemy at about 6 a.m. near the suburbs of Funkstown, and fought him from that position until late in the afternoon, compelling his artillery to change position twice during the engagement. Captain Manly was then ordered by Lieutenant-General Longstreet to report with four guns to Major-General Pickett. He rejoined the battalion after we recrossed the Potomac. Lieutenant [S. M.] Dunn, of this battery, with one gun, remained with the battalion.
On July 7, First Lieut. R. M. Anderson, of McCarthy's battery, was ordered to take command of Captain Fraser's battery. Owing to the wounds received by Captain Fraser and Lieutenant Couper, this battery had been left with only one officer.
On the morning of the 10th, the battery was ordered to report to Brigadier-General Kershaw, on the Sharpsburg turnpike. It was placed in position on the right of the road. About 2 o'clock, the battery took position on a hill to the left of the bridge over the Antietam, and in close range of the enemy's sharpshooters, who immediately opened a vigorous fire, killing l man and slightly wounding another. Lieutenant Anderson opened fire into a brick building on the opposite side of the Creek, under cover of which the enemy's sharpshooters were collecting and seriously annoying our forces. After a few rounds from each piece, he succeeded in dispersing them from the house, as well as (for the time) silencing their sharpshooters in his immediate front.
At twilight, he received orders to withdraw his pieces, and to report to Colonel [T. T.] Munford, commanding a brigade of cavalry. Remained with him until about 9 a.m. the following day, when, by order, he reported to the battalion.
Lieutenant Motes, commanding Carlton's battery, reported to Brigadier-General Wofford on the morning of the 10th and was placed in position on the left of the Williamsport and Sharpsburg pike, near Saint James' Church where he remained till the next evening, when, under orders, he retired to a position on the right of the road. My battalion was placed in position on this line on both sides of the road, with orders to fortify it, which was clone during the night and the following day.
During the evening of the 13th, I was ordered to send my caissons across the Potomac, and to withdraw my-pieces at dark. The order was promptly obeyed, and we recrossed the river, without loss, on the morning of the 14th.
We arrived at Culpeper Court-House on the 25th, having encamped, successively, near Bunker Hill; on a farm about 10 miles from Winchester; near Milwood; on the left bank of the Shenandoah; at Gaines' Cross-Roads, and on the right bank of Hazel River. During this march, although threatened by the enemy, there was no engagement, and we suffered no loss of an kind.
I was much indebted to Maj. S. P. Hamilton for assistance rendered me on every occasion.
I desire to return my thanks to my ordnance officer (Lieut. H. L. Powell) and ordnance sergeant (O. M. Price) for their efficiency. Lieutenant Powell, though wounded, continued on duty.
Captain Manly, in his report, calls attention to-- an act of coolness by Private H. E. Thain, by which many lives were probably saved. Thain was acting No. 6 at one of the guns, and, while adjusting a fuse-igniter, it accidentally exploded, and ignited the fuse already in the shell. He seized the shell, and ran with it several yards from the limber, at the same time drawing the burning fuse from the shell with his fingers.
Captain McCarthy pays the following high, but no less deserved, tribute to Corpl. Allan Morton, who fell on July 3:
In Corpl. Allan Morton the battery lost its best and bravest soldier--one who had endeared himself to all by his unflinching bravery, his strict attention to all duties, and his cheerful obedience to all orders.
Lieutenant Furlong says that he was-- much indebted to Corporals [Alexander] Campbell and [Francis] Keenan for the manner in which they managed their respective pieces.
The battalion sustained the following casualties:

Command	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Manly's Battery
Officers	----	----	----	----
Men	3	4	4	11
Total	3	4	4	11
(13 horses killed and 7 disabled)
McCarthy's Battery
Officers	----	----	----	----
Men	2	8	---	10
Total	2	8	----	10
(23 horses killed and 2 disabled)
Carlton's Batter
Officers	----	2	----	2
Men	1	5	----	6
Total	1	5	----	6
(18 horses killed and 4 wounded--disabled for a short time only)
Fraser's Battery
Officers	----	2	----	2
Men	6	11	----	17
Total	6	13	----	19
(18 horses killed)

Total killed, 12; wounded--officers, 4; enlisted men, 26; 67 horses killed and 13 disabled.
I have the honor to inclose the reports of the battery officers.
I have not language to express my admiration of the coolness and courage displayed by the officers and men on the field of this great battle. Their acts speak for them. In the successive skirmishes in which a portion of the battalion was engaged, and when placed in line of battle near Hagerstown, inviting and expecting an attack, their cool courage and energy are above praise. In crossing rivers; in overcoming the difficulties of a tedious march; in providing for the horses of the battalion, no officers ever exhibited greater energy and efficiency. Passing over muddy roads, exposed to rain nearly every day, they bore the difficulties of the march without a murmur of dissatisfaction. All seemed engaged in a cause which made privation, endurance, and any sacrifice a "labor of love."

Very respectfully,
H. C. CABELL,
Colonel, Commanding.

General W. N. PENDLETON,
Chief of Artillery, Army of Northern Virginia.

[P. S.]--GENERAL: This report, not having been finished before Colonel Walton left Virginia, is respectfully forwarded to you.

H. C. C.

Report of Maj. James Dearing, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion.
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]

AUGUST 16, 1863.

Col. J. B. WALTON,
Chief of Artillery, 1st Army Corps, Army Northern Virginia.

COLONEL: In obedience to instructions from you, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my battalion from the time it left Culpeper Court-House, in June last, until its return to that place in July:
At the time we started upon the late campaign, my battalion was attached to Maj. Gen. G. E. Pickett's division, First Corps.
I left the vicinity of Culpeper Court-House about June 15, taking the road known as the Sperryville pike, and arrived at Gaines' CrossRoads the next day about 3 p.m., where I rejoined the division, which had marched by the dirt road.
On the 17th, I took up the line of march with the division, taking the right at Gaines' Cross-Roads, and marching east and parallel to the Blue Ridge, encamping for the night at Piedmont.
The next day we continued our march to Paris, and from there we marched to Snicker's Gap, continuing east of the Blue Ridge all the time. From Snicker's Gap we marched to within a mile or so of Berryville, where we remained for two or three days.
About June 24, we left camp near Berryville, taking the Charlestown pike, but soon turned, the left coming out on the Valley pike near Darkesville, where we encamped for the night.
The next day we crossed the Potomac, encamping about midway between Williamsport and Hagerstown.
On the 26th, we passed through Hagerstown, taking the road to Chambersburg, Pa., encamping for the night near Greencastle, Pa.
The march was resumed the following day, and we passed through Chambersburg, encamping about 3 miles north of that place, and on the road to Carlisle.
We remained near Chambersburg until the morning of July 2. On that day we marched to within a few miles of the battle-field of Gettysburg, and went into camp, after a very long and tiresome march both to men and horses. That evening about dusk, orders were received to move at once to the field of battle, which was done, my battalion encamping (or rather bivouacking) for the night in rear of the line of battle of the First Corps.
About daybreak the next morning (the morning of July 3), it marched to the field of battle, and was, later in the morning, put in position on the crest of the hill immediately in front of the enemy's position, which was assailed by General Pickett's division. On my left and rear was Colonel Cabell's A