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STATEMENT
OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD HANLON, JR.
UNITED STATES
MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING GENERAL
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH
8, 2002
INTRODUCTION
Mr.
Chairman, and distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss our
training programs and their impact on
readiness.
I am Lieutenant General Ed Hanlon,
Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command (MCCDC) located in
Quantico, Virginia.
MCCDC
is responsible for developing the warfighting
concepts by which the Marine Corps will
organize, deploy, and employ forces within the
complex environment of the 21st
century.
In addition, the Command manages the
development and integration of Marine Corps
doctrine, organizational structure, training
and education, equipment, and support
facilities required to field combat ready
forces for the Joint Force Commander.
This effort assesses current and future
operating environments and involves continuous
adaptation of training and education
infrastructure and resources to ensure the
integrated capabilities we develop are able to
meet the challenges of those future
environments.
In my testimony, I will briefly
describe the Marine Corpsí training and
education continuum, the process by which we
make Marines and mold them into an integrated
and capable combat force.
I will provide an overview of the
current and anticipated changes in the
operating environment that drives our training
and education efforts, and provide an
assessment of how our current resources are
being used to meet those changes.
Lastly, I will address some of our
major training initiatives.
TRAINING
AND EDUCATION CONTINUUM
Marine Corps training and education is
built along a continuum that is well defined,
well structured, and of which we are extremely
proud. This continuum begins the day prospective Marines report to
one of our recruit depots or to Officer
Candidate School (OCS), and it guides their
steps until the day they depart the Corps.
It is constantly adapting to internal
forces (e.g., funding availability, personnel
manning levels, and societal changes, to name
a few), as well as external forces and
identified threats, such as those highlighted
by the events of September 11, 2001.
Our
training and education continuum is comprised
of five major parts:
entry-level training, common skills
training, skill progression training,
professional military education, and unit
training.
The continuum is firmly anchored in our
core competencies and the Marine Corpsí
capstone concept of Expeditionary Maneuver
Warfare.
Entry-level
training is a transformation process that
takes Americaís sons and daughters and molds
them into quality citizens and Marines capable
of winning our nationís battles. This
transformation process is founded upon
commonly shared entry-level training
experiences that begin in boot camp/OCS,
continue through Military Occupation Specialty
(MOS) skill training, and culminate when
Marines arrive at their first operational
unit. There,
they undergo training in collective skills
based on tightly focused requirements defined
by their unitís Mission Essential Tasks (METs).
As
Marines progress in their careers, they
continue to receive training specifically
designed to reinforce and supplement their MOS
skills. They
also receive professional military education
commensurate with advances in rank to increase
their understanding of warfighting. Increasingly, as they move along the continuum, Marines focus
less on individual skills and more on
collective and unit-level skills, with
emphasis on their role as part of a Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
To coordinate and synchronize the
multitude of training and education programs
throughout the continuum, we established the
Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM)
within MCCDC in July 2000. In establishing TECOM, the Commandant created a single
headquarters to ensure his Title X
responsibilities are met.
This headquarters commands our recruit
depots, all of our MOS producing schools, the
Marine Corps University, Marine Aviation
Weapons and Tactics Squadron at Yuma, AZ and
the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training
Command at 29 Palms, CA.
Our efforts have significantly enhanced
our ability to make Marines and build
effective operational units.
Our recruiters are obtaining the
quality people we need, and we have
intensified and strengthened the
transformation process to ensure our Marines
are ready to meet the demands of an
ever-changing operational environment.
Let me now address that environment
and, in particular, the changes that have
occurred since September 11, 2001.
OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
The
operational environment greatly affects how we
plan and execute our training and education
programs.
In particular, the factors of
uncertainty, complexity, and the increasing
concentration of the worldís population
within littoral and urban environments impact
our continuum.
The combination of these factors
results in a marked increase in the number and
types of tactical and operational tasks
Marines must be trained to execute.
In
the current and foreseeable operational
environment, we do not have the luxury of
facing a single threat to our security and
well-being.
Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union
necessitated a reassessment of the threats
facing our Nation, so too have the events of
September 11, 2001.
Uncertainty predominates as to who
poses a threat, when they might strike, and
the manner in which they might attack us. Our Nationís enemies recognize our strengths and therefore
seek to hurt us in ways that strike at our
vulnerabilities.
On September 11th we saw a
tangible example of just such an asymmetric
attack. Future adversaries will attempt to do the same, leveraging
readily available technology and striking at
those areas of greatest weakness.
Along with uncertainty, complexity
clouds our current operational environment.
Our operations in Somalia, Haiti,
Kosovo, and now Afghanistan clearly show that
our forces must be prepared for more than
conventional combat operations.
We saw a wide array of regional,
international, governmental, and
non-governmental organizations interacting
with each other while pursuing their own
interests.
Military and para-military forces,
whose goals and loyalties shifted from
day-to-day, made it difficult to discern
friend from foe.
In the midst of this, civilians
clamored for our aid and protection.
This translated into the type of
complex contingency that Marines refer to as
ìthe three block warî.
A ìwarî in which our Marines may
have to offer humanitarian assistance on the
first block; separate warring factions on a
second block; and in a third block engage in a
vicious, close-in battle against determined
adversaries.
The factors of
uncertainty and complexity are further
exacerbated by the likelihood that future
conflicts will take place within the confines
of urban complexes.
The continuing migration of the
worldís population to large urban centers
means conflict will be multi-dimensional: at,
above, and below the street level.
It will mean civilian non-combatants
will be an ever-increasing and constant
concern to our Commanders.
Furthermore, our forces will experience
increased scrutiny from the worldís press
and governments, while at the same time
feeling mounting political pressure to limit
collateral damage and ensure the well being of
these non-combatants.
Success in this
environment will require MAGTFs fully trained
to perform a broad range of capabilities that
enable them to respond to a multitude of
demanding situations.
Additionally, they must be capable of
interacting with other Services in a joint
environment, as well as with allies during
combined operations.
They must also be able to leverage the
available capabilities and services of
governmental and non-governmental agencies to
achieve success.
While
the current war on terrorism demands our
focus, we must not lose sight of the fact
other threats exist.
Combating these threats will demand the
use of a wide range of capabilities to achieve
our strategic, operational, and tactical
goals. In
some instances, coalition forces may be able
to play a role as they have in Afghanistan.
For others, victory may only be
achieved through the use of large numbers of
US forces in conjunction with allied
nationsí forces or through unilateral
action. In
this dynamic environment there is one
certainty: we will change the Marine Corps
training and education continuum as needed to
provide Marines capable of meeting these
diverse and challenging operational
environments.
Marines have always prided themselves
in their expeditionary competency and tactical
flexibility.
These attributes enable us to offer
Joint Force Commanders scalable and tailorable
forces capable of being rapidly integrated in
a short-notice contingency. For instance, following the events of September 11th,
forward deployed Marines of the 15th
and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units
were quickly employed in Afghanistan as part
of a Joint Combined Task Force.
These two organizations, belonging to
different commands, based and trained on
separate coasts, were rapidly integrated into
one expeditionary brigade-sized MAGTF while on
the scene, in order to expand the capabilities
and options for the Joint Force Commander.
The tactical flexibility they brought
to the conflict and their ability to rapidly
adjust to the changing nature of the war
reflects well on Marine training and education
programs.
The success of these Marine units in
this difficult and challenging environment was
a direct result of the tough, realistic, and
relevant training the Marine Corps continues
to provide to its operating forces.
It is this type of training that will
ensure our success in future conflicts.
ASSESSMENT
Having reviewed for you our training
and education continuum and the environment in
which we must prepare our Marines to operate,
I will now address how we are doing in some
critical areas that go to the heart of our
ability to provide those combat ready forces.
Let
me begin by stating that overall our training
and education continuum and the programs
supporting it have the resources necessary to
accomplish their mission.
In the area of funding, we are
unequivocally in much better shape than in
recent years.
This trend continues with our FY-03
budget, wherein the Marine Corps top line
increased by more than 16% over the FY02
level. This translates to more Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
funds available for training at our operating
units as well as our schools.
In addition, we should see increased
funding for attendance at formal schools.
With regard to
instructors, training equipment and operating
costs, the same applies.
The Marine Corps has always recognized
that our schools are an investment in
readiness.
As such, we strive to maintain a 95%
instructor manning level at our schools, and
for the most part, we succeed.
In large part, many of the instructors
are hand picked for these challenging
assignments.
Following an instructor tour, they
return to the operating forces ready to impart
the fresh knowledge they have gained. With respect to equipment, we ensure Marines receive
instruction either in the actual equipment
they will see at their operating units or in
simulators that faithfully replicate these
systems. To ensure this, TECOM works closely with the Marine Corps
Systems Command so that our schools and
training facilities are prepared to meet the
training requirements for new equipment.
Through
the use of outsourcing and our ongoing A-76
studies, we also are taking steps to ensure
the most effective use of our resources.
Where prudent, we use civilian
contractors to provide specialized training
support for our training and education
establishment.
For instance, due to the unique nature
of its equipment, much of the training for our
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
is provided by civilian contractors.
Also, we make extensive use of
contractors to manage and operate our
simulators, training devices, ranges, and
various support functions, thus freeing
Marines for other critical jobs.
Facilities,
however, are one of the areas where I do have
some significant concerns. Even though, with the help of Congress, we have been able to
invest over $53 million in construction
for training facilities between fiscal
year 2000 and 2003, our training facilities,
like many others in the Marine Corps, continue
to be a collection of the new and ancient. The Marine Corps Combat Services Support School, Camp
Johnson, Camp Lejeune, NC has one funded
construction project for a Consolidated
Academics Facility.
Funding for a new Basic Reconnaissance
Course training facility at Expeditionary
Warfare Training Group Pacific, San Diego, CA
has been approved and is in process of
replacing existing WWII era facilities.
This year we are proposing new Recruit
Training facilities at Parris Island.
Outside of the construction arena,
stopgap funding has been provided to maintain
Basic Reconnaissance Course training
facilities at Expeditionary Warfare Training
Group Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.
Still on our plate are facilities
dating back to pre-WWII such as the Field
Medical Services School, the School of
Infantry, and the Marine Corps Engineer School
ñ all located at Camp Lejeune.
Camp Pendleton has similar shortfalls
for its Field Medical School.
At our Officer Candidates School in
Quantico, 1940ís era temporary metal
buildings continue to house academic
facilities.
While
these shortfalls have not prevented the
schools from executing their training
requirements, lack of desired funding
requires, in many instances, that training
continue in deteriorated facilities.
Many of these facilities are not
habitable, are ill suited to accommodate the
technology necessary for effective
instruction, and most do not support the
professional environment in which we want to
train our Marines.
Let me now turn to another critical
issue affecting training in the Marine Corps:
encroachment.
We are increasingly finding that the
ability of our operational units to conduct
realistic and effective training is degraded
by the many forms of encroachment at our bases
and stations.
I know the members of this committee
are no strangers to the issues of
encroachment, but I would be remiss if I did
not take this opportunity to review this major
issue and its impact on training.
The Defense Test
and Training Steering Group, with input from
all the Services, defines eight areas of
encroachment that impact the training and
readiness of our forces.
The cumulative effect of these
encroachment areas on any given range or
training area may preclude realistic training
or prevent training altogether. I will condense these eight areas into four broad categories
and address each of them.
They are Urban Growth, Environmental
Regulatory Encroachment, Airspace
Encroachment, and Frequency Encroachment.
Urban
Growth
Many
of the encroachment issues (noise, airspace,
endangered species, frequency encroachment,
and environmental regulations) result from, or
are subsets of, population growth and
urbanization.
As communities grow toward the
boundaries of ranges and installations, land
use incompatibilities emerge.
These incompatibilities can compromise
the health, safety, and welfare of both
military and civilian sectors.
Often, residents file lawsuits against
military installations with the goal of
reducing installation operations (such as
aircraft operations or weapons firing) because
they feel these operations have impacted the
value, or restricted the use of, their
property.
When land use conflicts emerge, the
military often loses operational efficiency,
operational capacity, and future mission
flexibility.
As
the former base commander at Camp Pendleton, I
will offer that base as a prime example of a
critical training facility faced with many
urban growth encroachment issues. The state of
California continues to experience
extraordinary growth.
Within the last 5 to 7 years, housing
developments have either been approved for
construction or built in the surrounding
communities of Oceanside, Fallbrook, and San
Clemente.
At Camp Pendleton, the Marine Corps has
been threatened by lawsuits by the city of San
Clemente and a private citizen group called
Homeowners United to Stop Helicopters (HUSH);
their objective is to stop construction of the
new 3,000 foot helicopter landing field on
Camp Pendleton. Pressure from the public is increasing because the last BRAC
relocated air assets from Marine Corps Air
Station (MCAS) Tustin and MCAS El Toro to MCAS
Pendleton and MCAS Miramar.
As a result of the relocation, the
Marine Corps now conducts more flight
operations, in a smaller geographic area with
a higher population density. This
situation is a source of on-going noise
complaints and friction with the local
community and will not likely abate in the
future. For
instance, San Diego County alone will likely
add another projected 1.4 million people in
the north county area within the next 20
years.
Environmental
Regulatory Encroachment
The
Marine Corps is fully cognizant of its
responsibilities as steward of the lands that
are entrusted to our care.
Military lands provide habitat for over
300 Federally listed threatened or endangered
species requiring protection under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Many of our installations are
surrounded by urban development, and
frequently they are the only large undeveloped
areas remaining to support endangered species
habitats.
As such, we work hard with Federal,
state, and local agencies to ensure our
compliance with existing laws and to take the
necessary steps to safeguard the natural
environment lying within, and adjacent to, our
military installations.
Despite our environmental efforts,
operational training requirements sometimes
place us in conflict with various regulatory
requirements.
Compliance
with environmental regulations, such as those
protecting endangered species, mandating noise
abatement, or specifying requirements for air
or water purity, can sometimes restrict our
ability to train.
Where possible, we work around these
restrictions by modifying the timing, tempo,
and location of training, as well as the
equipment used.
However, these workarounds are
increasingly difficult, costly, and compromise
the realism essential to effective training.
In order to gain a better appreciation
for the impact on training of these
restrictions we recently undertook a study at
Camp Pendleton.
The early results of this study suggest
that less than two-thirds of required combat
arms training events can be accomplished in
realistic scenarios.
We believe it is important to ensure a
balanced approach between environmental
concerns and military readiness needs.
Airspace
Encroachment
Although
military force structure and total flying
hours have decreased over the past ten years,
DoD has a continuing requirement for airspace
designed to satisfy its needs.
DoD special use airspace is necessary
to conduct critical equipment testing and
required aircrew training.
At the same time, fueled by
deregulation and relatively affordable fares,
the civil airline industry has grown steadily. The projected growth rate of this industry, although perhaps
abated at present due to the events of
September 11, 2001, will result in an increase
of passengers from 600 million last year to an
estimated 1 billion passengers in 2010.
Furthermore, that growth is expected to
continue at a 6% rate for the foreseeable
future. In
1998, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) initiated the National Airspace Redesign
(NAR) program to review the design of all
national airspace resources and ensure the
effective and efficient management of the
national airspace.
The goals of the redesign program are
to maintain system safety, decrease system
delay, and to increase system flexibility,
predictability, and user access.
Therefore, we must engage in the NAR
process to ensure that the FAA incorporates
DoD requirements into the new system,
providing the military airspace required to
prepare units for combat.
Frequency
Spectrum
The
growth of consumer communications devices
since the 1980's has resulted in pressure from
the telecommunications industry for the
reallocation of the radio spectrum from
Government to non-Government control.
As a result, since 1992 DoD has lost
approximately 27% of the total spectrum
allocated for aircraft telemetry, with varying
degrees of impact.
Some of the reallocations have resulted
in operating restrictions at specific
locations.
Others have resulted in DoDís
complete loss of access to specific frequency
bands. The
telecommunications industry continues to seek
use of spectrum currently used for Federal
purposes, including that of DoD activities.
One response to this problem is to seek
greater efficiency in all partiesí use of
the spectrum.
As the demand for spectrum grows and
greater sharing of spectrum occurs we must
devise new methods of spectrum utilization.
While we pursue these new methods, DoD
is a full participant in the policy
deliberation on future spectrum reallocations.
Our
Commandant has referred to our bases and
stations as the ìfifth element of the MAGTFî,
since they are the platforms wherein we train
our Marines and from which we launch our
MAGTFs. To
perform this function they must offer our
units the ability to train in realistic
environments in the air, on land, and sea.
Our MAGTFs must have the ability to
train, in partnership with the Navy, as a
single, cohesive entity.
Increasingly this is becoming more
difficult to do.
As we lose access to key training areas
due to encroachment, we are forced to train in
a piecemeal fashion with related training
events separated by time and space; often
unable to ìtie it all togetherî prior to
force deployment.
Regardless
of the aforesaid encroachment challenges, I
want to assure the members of the Committee
that the Marine Corps continues to embrace its
roles as steward of the environment and
servant of the people seriously.
Commanders at all levels continue to
reach out to local communities and to federal
and state agencies seeking common ground to
mitigate the impacts of growth and other
obstacles to training in our quest to remain
combat ready.
We are supportive of the initiatives
DoD has taken to come to grips with these
issues affecting the readiness of all the
Services, and we participate actively in
DoDís environmental programs.
Additionally, the Administration is in
the process of identifying ways to sustain the
readiness of our forces, and is working on a
legislative proposal that will likely include
provisions to clarify ambiguous statutory and
regulatory requirements.
We
also recognize that much of our concern about
encroachment pressures and their direct
relationship to our training is subjective,
and much of our evidence anecdotal.
To help us better quantify the capacity
of our ranges to support essential training
and to streamline Marine range management, we
have established the Range and Training Area
Management Office within the Marine Corpsí
Training and Education Command.
One of the missions of this office will
be to provide us the cost, in terms of
training capabilities, associated with the
loss of access to specific ranges or training
areas. It will allow us to recognize when an impediment to training
becomes a decrement to readiness.
INITIATIVES
We are pursuing other initiatives to
further increase the effectiveness of our
training and education system.
I will focus on four major areas:
distance learning/advanced distributed
learning, simulators and simulation, the
future of our Marine Air Ground Task Force
Training Command (MAGTFTC), at 29 Palms, CA
and finally specific training initiatives we
have undertaken since September 11, 2001.
Distance
Learning/Advanced Distributed Learning
Our
efforts in Distance Learning / Advanced
Distributed Learning are a means to exploit
advances in technology in order to meet two
different objectives.
First, we are using Distance Learning
to fill the gaps in both professional and
supplemental skills development in our
training culture.
Intermediate level professional
military education is one targeted area.
Due to school seat limitations, career
progression, and timing, not every Marine
officer is able to attend a resident school.
This gap is being met by correspondence
courses available through the Marine Corps
Institute, instructor-led seminars available
at the Marineís duty station, and, in the
future, supplemented by distance learning
courseware.
This model will be used to provide
effective alternatives to resident education
and ensure our Marinesí professional and
supplemental skills remain current.
Secondly, we are using Distance
Learning to supplement and replace formal
training in our schools where effectiveness
can be enhanced and cost efficiencies
achieved.
Having
said that, I must emphasize one point.
While distance learning offers many
opportunities, it does not always offer the
total solution to meeting training
requirements.
For example, distance learning has
great application when used to teach some
technical skills; however, training Marines in
other skills like driver training, weapons
handling, and flight training cannot be met
solely by distance learning.
When compounded with the high cost of
producing distance learning courses, this
means we must be judicious in applying this
technology.
Accordingly, we envision our brick and
mortar schools will continue to serve in their
traditional capacity for the foreseeable
future. Within these constraints, we are aggressively moving forward
with distance learning systems to export as
many courses as lend themselves to the
application of this technology.
This will enable us to deliver training
and education to our Marines where and when it
is needed.
Simulators/Simulation
The
Marine Corps uses training devices and
simulation to enhance our live training
activities. However, we do not envision the use of simulation to replace
live training.
When live training cannot be conducted,
simulation provides the ability to slow or
prevent the atrophy of cognitive skills and
reduce the impact of lost live training on
warfighting capabilities.
For example, once a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is deployed aboard
ship, simulation can significantly help to
preserve the MEUís warfighting skills until
actual unit training can be conducted ashore.
Virtual and constructive simulations also
enhance live training by offering the ability
to train individual and unit skill-sets with
less (time, space, fiscal) cost.
Virtual and constructive simulation
will enhance realism during training exercises
and better prepare Marine leaders in the
dynamic decision-making required in the 21st
century.
Virtual
simulation incorporates the use of a
simulator to provide a realistic environment
to train specific skills prior to applying
those skills in a live environment.
We use constructive simulation to train teams and staffs.
Constructive simulations utilize
representations of forces and the environment
to provide either aggregated or entity level
behavior and performance feedback. In sum, our simulation-based training initiatives are meant to
exploit advances in technology. Simulation
increases and improves training and education
opportunities, increases readiness, makes
training readily available, and decreases
costs. Simulation
will not replace field or live-fire training,
but it will help Marines prepare for more
costly and demanding live training events and
minimize skill atrophy when live training is
not possible.
MAGTFTC
Marine
Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC),
located at 29 Palms, California, is the Marine
Corpsí premier training center for live
fire, combined arms training.
It will continue to play a central role
as the Corpsí foremost training and testing
site for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
Ongoing initiatives will expand the
role of MAGTFTC and transform it into the
ìMAGTF Training Center of Excellence,î
enabling it to facilitate and support the
development of new concepts and capabilities
that reinforce the Marine Corpsí combat
effectiveness, while enhancing joint
interoperability and supporting DOD
transformation efforts.
The
future role of MAGTFTC will grow beyond its
current emphasis on battalion level live fire
combined arms training to support expanded
training opportunities for all the elements
(ground, air, logistics, and command element)
of a MAGTF, up to and including a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).
Several efforts are currently underway
to exploit and realize the full potential of
MAGTFTC.
These efforts include: enabling
multi-site, distributed training evolutions
that tie together units from various bases,
and investing in technology that
simultaneously links live, virtual, and
constructive training to create more realistic
training scenarios for all Marine Air Ground
Task Force elements.
Additionally, improvements to the
existing Expeditionary Air Field (EAF),
construction of a large-scale Military
Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility,
and the acquisition of additional land are
being studied as possible ways to enhance
training opportunities at 29 Palms.
All of these efforts have the potential
to exponentially increase the capability of
MAGTFTC to support evolving and future MAGTF
training requirements.
Other
Initiatives Since September 11, 2001
Since
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
operations in Afghanistan, all of our schools
and training sites have undertaken a
systematic examination of their curriculums to
identify areas where they can support the war
on terrorism.
At our Engineer School, for example, a
think tank was instituted whereby current
events were studied and courses of action and
tactics, techniques, and procedures were
generated for likely scenarios, i.e., cave
warfare, mine warfare, expeditionary
airfields. Operating forces are able to
use the school as a reach back capability,
using this information to help them prepare
for the conduct of combat operations.
Immediately
following the attacks our Commandant, General
James Jones, foresaw the need for a rapidly
deployable, specially trained, and sustainable
force to detect and deter terrorist
activities, defend designated facilities
against terrorist attacks, and conduct initial
incidence response in the event of chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist
attacks.
To that end, the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) was
formed at Camp Lejeune, NC combining our
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF),
Marine Security Guard Battalion, Marine Corps
Security Force Battalion, and an infantry
battalion under a single headquarters. Here again TECOM provided invaluable support in helping
define the mission, developing Mission
Essential Tasks (METs) and identifying the
training tasks necessary to support those METs.
CONCLUSION
In
conclusion, the Marine Corpsí training and
education continuum is dynamic, responsive,
and effective.
It allows us to make Marines with the
skills, character, and warrior ethos necessary
for success in current and future operational
environments.
It ensures that our MAGTFs are highly
trained and ready to respond to any number of
contingencies, across the full spectrum of
military operations.
With your continued support, we will
continue to provide the best possible programs
so that our training and education continuum
continues to deliver what the nation expects
ñ Marines and Marine forces ready to win our
Nationís battles.
I
thank you for this opportunity to present my
views and look forward to your
questions.
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