FREEDOM AND TRUTH: VERITATIS SPLENDOR IN LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Peter C. Phan
The Catholic University of America

In his 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor (= VS), Pope John Paul II intends to deal with "certain fundamental questions regarding the Church's moral teaching... to set forth, with regard to the problems being discussed, the principles of a moral teaching based upon Sacred Scripture and the living Apostolic Tradition, and at the same time to shed light on the presuppositions and consequences of the dissent which that teaching has met" (no. 5).

Among the "fundamental questions" of moral theology discussed in the encyclical the one that looms largest, the most basic question of all, concerns the relationship between freedom and truth. Indeed, for John Paul, the root of what he perceives to be the contemporary moral crisis, both on the personal and societal levels, lies in the misunderstanding of this relationship.

VS is composed of three chapters. The first offers a meditation on the dialogue between Jesus and the rich young man (Mt 19:16-21). The purpose of these homiletical reflections is to show that moral life, which presupposes human freedom and requires the observance of the commandments, is essentially a following of Christ. The second, the longest and written in traditional scholastic language, deals with issues of fundamental moral theology such as freedom and law, conscience, fundamental choice, and the moral act. The last chapter spells out the implications of the moral teachings contained in the previous chapter for the life of the church (e.g., martyrdom, evangelization, the role of moral theologians, the teaching responsibilities of bishops) and for the renewal of social and political life. The encyclical concludes with the usual invocation of Mary and presents her as "the radiant sign and inviting model of the moral life" (no. 120).

Of immediate interest for our theme is the second chapter in which the relationship between freedom and truth is elaborated at length. In the first part of this essay I will present in summary form and as accurately as possible John Paul II's teachings on this issue. In the second part I will highlight some aspects of the pope's teachings which in my judgment could be expanded and complemented by contemporary Catholic theological anthropology. In concluding I will offer some reflections on how the teachings of VS can be inculturated into the Asian-Vietnamese context.

FREEDOM IN RADICAL DEPENDENCE ON TRUTH

A Diagnosis of the Contemporary Moral Malaise

With VS John Paul has the "intention of clearly setting forth certain aspects of doctrine which are of crucial importance in facing what is certainly a crisis, since the difficulties which it engenders have most serious implications for the moral life of the faithful and for communion in the Church, as well as for a just and fraternal social life" (no. 5). What are the expressions of this "crisis" which is said to have deleterious effects on our lives, personal, social, and ecclesial? John Paul describes it in different ways: the tendency to "exalt freedom to such an extent that it becomes an absolute, which would then be the source of values" (no. 32); "a radically subjectivistic conception of moral judgment" (no. 32); "individualism" that "leads to denial of the very idea of human nature" (no. 32); the tendency "to question or even deny the very reality of human freedom" (no. 33); "an outright denial of universal human values, at least with a relativistic conception of morality" (no. 33); "subjectivism and individualism" (no. 34), "relativism and arbitrariness" (no. 48). The pope even notes that there is "the risk of an alliance between democracy and ethical relativism, which would remove any sure moral reference point from political and social life, and on a deeper level make the acknowledgement of truth impossible" (no. 101).

In sum: the current moral crisis is, according to John Paul, marked by ethical individualism, subjectivism, and relativism.

What is the root cause of all these errors? In John Paul's judgment, "despite their variety, these tendencies are at one in lessening or even denying the dependence of freedom on truth" (no. 34). This is the thesis that John Paul repeats opportune et inopportune throughout his encyclical. In particular, he sees this separation between freedom at truth operative in four areas of fundamental moral theology: law, conscience, fundamental choice, and the moral act.

1. Freedom and Law

With respect to moral law, the negation of the dependence of freedom upon truth, according to John Paul, takes the form of alleging a "conflict between freedom and law" and of granting individuals or social groups "the right to determine what is good or evil. Human freedom would thus be able to ‘create values' and would enjoy a primacy over truth, to the point that truth itself would be considered a creation of freedom. Freedom would thus lay claim to a moral autonomy which would actually amount to an absolute sovereignty" (no. 35).

This autonomy of freedom from the law leads to three related errors: first, a sharp distinction between an "ethical order" and an "order of salvation" with the attendant denial that divine revelation contains "a specific and determined moral content, universally valid and permanent" (no. 37). Second, an opposition between freedom and biological nature and in particular the human body which are regarded simply as "raw material for human activity," "a readily available biological or social material" (no. 46). This opposition is often accompanied by the accusation that the Church's traditional conception of the natural law is guilty of "physicalism and naturalism" (no. 47). Third, a denial of "the immutability of the natural law itself, and thus of the existence of ‘objective norms of morality'" (no. 53).

2. Conscience and Truth

Here the exaltation of freedom apart from truth leads, according to John Paul, to an erroneous understanding of conscience as "the individual personal decision on how to act in particular cases" (no. 55). In emphasizing the "creative" character of conscience, its actions are no longer called "judgments" but "decisions" (no. 55).

Proponents of this creative role of conscience propose "a kind of double status of moral truth": "Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential considerations. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law" (no. 56). In this way, one attempts "to legitimize so-called ‘pastoral' solutions contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium, and to justify a ‘creative' hermeneutic according to which the moral conscience is in no way obliged, in every case, by a particular negative precept" (no. 56).

3. Fundamental Choice and Specific Kinds of Behavior

The separation of freedom from truth leads, according to the pope, to an equally erroneous separation of "fundamental option" from particular acts. John Paul acknowledges the existence, within the person's choice for one or another particular action, of "a decision about oneself and a setting of one's own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately for or against God" (no. 65). He recognizes too "the importance of certain choices which ‘shape' a person's entire moral life, and which serve as bounds within which other particular everuday choices can be situated and allowed to develop" (no. 65).

Nevertheless, John Paul rejects the understanding of what has been called a "fundamental freedom" and its corollary, "fundamental option," in which "particular acts which flow from this option would constitute only partial and never definitive attempts to give it expression; they would only be its ‘signs' or symptoms" (no. 65).

John Paul also rejects "a clear disjunction between two levels of morality": the level of "the transcendental dimension proper to the fundamental option" to which the terms "good" and "evil" are applied, and the level of "specific kinds of behavior which are judged to be morally right or wrong only on the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the ‘premoral' or ‘physical' goods and evils which actually result from the action" (no. 65).

One unacceptable consequence of this disjunction, according to John Paul, is to conceive mortal sin as "an act which engages the person in his totality: in other words, an act of fundamental option ... carried out at a level of freedom which is neither to be identified with an act of choice nor capable of becoming the object of conscious awareness" (no. 69). The gravity of sin would then be measured by "the degree of engagement of the freedom of the person performing an act, rather than the matter of that act" (no. 69).

4. The Moral Act

Finally, the independence of freedom from truth leads, according to John Paul, to "an inadequate understanding of the object of moral action" (no. 75) espoused by theories he identifies as "teleologism" or "consequentialism" or "proportionalism." These moral theories "maintain that it is never possible to formulate an absolute prohibition of particular kinds of behavior which would be in conflict, in every circumstance and in every culture, with those values" (i.e., values indicated by reason and Revelation). Using their distinction of "pre-moral order" and "moral order," proponents of these theories affirm, says the pope, that "the morality of an act would be judged in two different ways: its moral ‘goodness' would be judged on the basis of the subject's intention in reference to moral goods, and its ‘rightness' on the basis of a consideration of its foreseeable effects or consequences and of their proportion" (no. 75).

One corollary of these theories, according to John Paul, is the denial of the existence of "intrinsically evil acts." It is characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories to hold "that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species -- its object -- the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned" (no. 79).

"Teaching What Befits Sound Doctrine" (Tit 2:1): A Prescription for Contemporary Ills

In the presence of the separation of freedom from truth in all its four manifestations, "the Magisterium, in fidelity to Jesus Christ and in continuity with the Church's tradition, senses more urgently the duty to offer its own discernment and teaching, in order to help man in his journey towards truth and freedom" (no. 27). Consequently, John Paul presents his own teaching on the four areas examined above.

1. Dependence of Freedom on Truth

John Paul begins his moral teachings with a peremptory assertion of "the fundamental dependence of freedom upon truth, a dependence which has found its clearest and most authoritative expression in the words of Christ: ‘You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free' (Jn 8:32)" (no. 34).

With regard to the alleged conflict between freedom and law, the pope affirms repeatedly that "God's law does not reduce, much less do away with human freedom; rather, it protects and promotes that freedom" (no. 35). Again: "Patterned on God's freedom, man's freedom is not negated by his obedience to the divine law; indeed, only through this obedience does it abide in the truth and conform to human dignity" (no. 42). Again: "God's plan poses no threat to man's genuine freedom; on the contrary, the acceptance of God's plan is the only way to affirm that freedom" (no. 45).

While recognizing that "man himself has been entrusted to his own care and responsibility" (no. 39) and that "rhe rightful autonomy of the practical reason means that man possesses in himself his own law" (no. 40), nevertheless John Paul strongly emphasizes that "the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone" (no. 35) and that "the autonomy of reason cannot mean that reason itself creates values and moral norms" (no. 40). Were freedom to create moral norms, the pope warns, "it would be the death of true freedom" (no. 40). The "rightful autonomy" of humans must be "theonomy, or participated theonomy, since man's free obedience to God's law effectively implies that human reason and human will participate in God's wisdom and providence" (no. 41).

This participation of human reason and will in God's wisdom and providence is what is called "natural law." Explaining the meaning of natural law, John Paul cites Pope Leo XIII's Libertas Prestantissimum (20 June 1988): "The natural law is itself the eternal law, implanted in beings endowed with reason, and inclining them towards their right action and end; it is none other than the eternal reason of the Creator and Ruler of the universe" (no. 44). Thus, the natural law is the human expression of God's eternal law. John Paul quotes St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2 to this effect: "Thus it (i.e., the rational creature) has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it a a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law" (no. 43).

In this context John Paul discusses the relationship between human freedom on the one hand and nature, and in particular the human body on the other. Rejecting the charges of physicalism and naturalism sometimes directed against the church's teachings on contraception, direct sterilization, autoeroticism, pre-marital sexual relations, homosexual relations and artificial insemination, the pope teaches that the human body is not "a raw datum, devoid of any meaning and moral values until freedom has shaped it in accordance with its design" nor "presuppositions or preambles, materially necessary for freedom to make its choice, yet extrinsic to the person, the subject and the human act" (no. 48). Rather, insisting on "the unity of the human person, whose rational soul is per se et essentialiter the form of his body," (no. 48), the pope teaches that "reason and free will are linked with all the bodily and sense faculties. The person, including the body, is completely entrusted to himself, and it is in the unity of body and soul that the person is the subject of his own moral acts. The person, by the light of reason and the support of virtue, discover in his body the anticipatory signs, the expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity with the wise plan of the Creator" (no. 48). In the light of this essential unity of body and soul, John Paul says that natural law "cannot be thought of as simply a set of norms on the biological level" but refers to "the person himself in the unity of soul and body, in the unity of his spiritual and biological inclinations and of all the other specific characteristics necessary for the pursuit of his end" (no. 50).

Finally, against moral relativism John Paul reiterates that "the natural law involves universality. Inasmuch as it is inscribed in the rational nature of the person, it makes itself felt to all beings endowed with reason and living in history. In order to perfect himself in his specific order, the person must do good and avoid evil, be concerned for the transmission of and preservation of life, refine and develop the riches of the material world, cultivate social life, seek truth, practice good and contemplate beauty" (no. 51).

Within natural law John Paul distinguishes between "positive precepts" such as "to serve God, to render him the worship which is his due and to honor one's parents as they deserve" and the "negative precepts" such as "You shall not murder, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness" (no. 52). Both positive and negative precepts are "universally binding" and "universally valid" (no. 52); in particular, negative precepts "oblige each and every individual, always and in every circumstance. It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a given action semper et pro semper, without exception, because the choice of this kind of behavior is in no case compatible with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbor" (no. 52).

John Paul recognizes "the need to seek out and to discover the most adequate formulation for universal and permanent moral norms in the light of different cultural contexts, a formulation most capable of ceaselessly expressing their historical relevance, of making them understood and of authentically interpreting their truth" (no. 53). But he insists that "the norms expressing that truth remain valid in their substance" and that they "must be specified and determined ‘eodem sensu eademque sententia' in the light of historical circumstances by the Church's Magisterium...." (no. 53).

2. Conscience as Witness of Truth

Over against the conception of conscience as decision about the truth, John Paul teaches that conscience is a judgment that "bears witness" to the truth and is "the witness of God himself, whose voice and judgment penetrate the depths of man's soul, calling him fortiter et suaviter to obedience" (no. 58). Thus, "the judgment of conscience does not establish the law; rather it bears witness to the authority of the natural law and of the practical reason with reference to the supreme good.... Conscience is not an independent and exclusive capacity to decide what is good and what is evil. Rather there is profoundly imprinted upon it a principle of obedience vis-à-vis the objective norm..." (no. 60).

John Paul points out that conscience has three functions: first, conscience judges whether an action is in conformity or not with the law of God; it is a "moral judgment about man and his actions" (no. 59). Second, conscience performs a practical judgment which makes known what one must do or not do, it "formulates moral obligation in the light of the natural law: it is the obligation to do what the individual, through the workings of his conscience, knows to be a good he is called to do here and now" (no. 59). Third, conscience is "imperative," that is, it commands man to act in accordance with it: "If man acts against this judgment ot, in a case where he lacts certainty about the rightness and goodness of a determined act, still performs that act, he stands condemned by his own conscience, the proximate norm of personal morality" (no. 60). In all these three functions, John Paul claims, "the link between freedom and truth is made manifest" (no. 61).

Lastly, John Paul mentions the possibility of an erroneous conscience, either in the case of invincible ignorance or culpable error (no. 62-63). Hence, there is the duty of forming our conscience correctly for which the church and the Magisterium offer a great help: "The authority of the Church, when she pronounces on moral questions, in no way undermines the freedom of conscience of conscience of Christians. This is so not only because freedom of conscience is never freedom ‘from' the truth but always and only freedom ‘in' the truth" (no. 64).

3. Fundamental Option and Mortal Sin

Over against the tendency of separating the "fundamental option" from specific kinds of behavior, John Paul teaches that "the so-called fundamental option, to the extent that it is distinct from a generic intention and hence one not yet determined in such a way that freedom is obligated, is always brought into play through conscious and free decisions. Precisely for this reason, it is revoked when man engages his freedom in conscious decisions to the contrary, with regard to morally grave matter" (no. 67). In fact, John Paul continues, "man does not suffer perdition only by being unfaithful to that fundamental option whereby he has made ‘a free self-commitment to God.' With every freely committed mortal sin, he offends God as the giver of the law and as a result becomes guilty with regard to the entire law" (no. 68). In other words, "the fundamental orientation can be radically changed by particular acts" (no. 70).

With regard to the possibility of mortal sin, John Paul reiterates the traditional teaching that "mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent" (no. 70). There are then three components of mortal sin: "grave matter," "full awareness," and "deliberate consent." Mortal sin can occur "in a direct and formal way, in the sins of idolatry, apostasy and atheism; or in an equivalent way, as in every act of disobedience to God's commandments in a grave matter" (no. 70).

4. The Morality of Human Act: Its "Object"

Over against what he takes to be the position of teleologism, proportionalism, and consequentialism, John Paul teaches that the morality of a human act cannot be judged on the agent's intention, or the proportion between the good and bad effects of that choice, or the foreseeable consequences deriving from a given choice: "Human activity cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject's intention is good. Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason" (no. 72). John Paul clarifies this statement by saying that "the morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the ‘object' rationally chosen by the deliberative will.... The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior.... By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, the object is the proximate end of a deliberative decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person" (no. 78).

As a consequence of this understanding of the morality of the act John Paul asserts that "reason attests that there are objects of the human act which by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered' to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in the image of God" (no. 80). These acts are termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum), that is, "they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances" (no. 80).

As examples of intrinsically evil acts John Paul cites the list contained in Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes, no. 27: homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide, mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit, subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children, degrading conditions of work which treat laborers as mere instruments of profit and not as free responible persons. To this list John Paul adds artificial contraception (no. 80). As biblical proof for his teaching on intrinsically evil acts, the pope repeatedly cites 1 Cor 6:9-10 (nos. 49 and 81) and Rom 3:8 (nos. 78 and 80 and heading of nos. 79-83).

FREEDOM IN TRUTH: INSIGHTS OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Sofar I have presented, with accuracy I believe, John Paul's teaching on the dependence of freedom on truth and its ramifications for an understanding of law, conscience, fundamental option, and the morality of the human act. Before proceeding to examine how his teaching can be expanded and complemented by contemporary Catholic theological anthropology, let us summarize in a series of concise propositions the pope's central affirmations in VS:

1. Human freedom cannot determine what is good and what is evil. It cannot create truths, values, and moral norms. On the contrary, its dignity consists in obeying these truths, values, and moral norms. Hence, there is no conflict between freedom on the one hand and truth and law on the other.

2. These truths, values, and moral norms are derived from the natural law which is a participation in God's eternal law.

3. The means with which the natural law is discovered are human reason, Scripture, and Tradition.

4. Given the unity of body and soul in the human person, the human body is part of the natural law and cannot be considered apart from the acting subject as something purely material and biological upon which the subject freely acts.

5. Both the positive and negative precepts of the natural law are universally valid and binding.

6. Conscience cannot create truths, values and moral norms. It is not a decision but a practical judgment about what should and should not be done in light of the truth that reason has recognized.

7. Because conscience can be erroneous, it must be formed in the truth. For the correct formation of conscience the church and the Magisterium render an important service.

8. An act against God's law in a grave matter, with full awareness and deliberate consent, is a mortal sin and leads to eternal perdition.

9. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the "object" rationally chosen by the deliberate will.

10. There are acts that are intrinsically evil because of their "objects," apart from their possible consequences and the agent's intention.

In proclaiming these teachings John Paul also takes issue with some contemporary ethical theories which appear to him to undermine the objectivity and universality of the natural law and some moral norms and lead to individualism, subjectivism, and relativism, the three viruses the pope perceives to be causing the contemporary moral malaise. These theories regard the nature of human freedom, conscience, the fundamental option, and the nature of the moral act.

Whether John Paul's interpretation of these theories has done full justice to them is a question distinguishable from that of the truth of the teachings he enunciates and which we have summarized in ten propositions above. It is this question that we have to take up because it is precisely in these areas -- human freedom, fundamental option, and the morality of the human act -- that a more nuanced and even truthful interpretation (I say "truthful" because what VS urges so powerfully is precisely concern for truth) will offer us deeper insights into the realities of freedom and truth, the central concerns of VS.

Of course, limited space does not permit us to treat these four weighty and difficult issues in full, and so nothing more than a general outline should be expected here.

How Do I Exercise My Freedom?

That individualism, relativism, and subjectivism are to be rejected, not only in ethics but in metaphysics and epistemology as well, is something very few, if any, Catholic philosopher and theologian would and could question. Again, that human freedom creates truths, values, and moral norms as if its autonomy were an absolute sovereignty is a position no reputable Catholic ethicist would and could hold. Not that individualism, relativism, subjectivism, and an exaggerated exaltation of the autonomy of human freedom are not found in our times, but of course they are not peculiar to our times. Perhaps in our ‘postmodern' mood more skeptical of the Enlightenment's excessive claims of rationality and objectivity, these errors are more prevalent than in the past, and we must be grateful to John Paul for reminding us of their deleterious effects on our moral lives.

However, it is doubtful whether it is fruitful to approach a discussion of human freedom within contemporary Catholic moral theology with an alleged conflict between freedom and truth. Most if not all Catholic moralists would readily agree with John Paul that there is and should not be a conflict between freedom and truth and that freedom perfects itself in accepting truth. But the issue is not whether freedom should obey truth; rather it is what human freedom really is and how it should be exercised so that truth becomes as it were incarnated in particular acts of choice and in one's life.

It is surprising that despite the centrality of the theme of freedom in VS little is said there about freedom as such. Its 100-odd pages are devoted to expounding on truth and on why truth must be obeyed. Not that freedom does not occupy an important place in Karol Wojti a's philosophy, but if one were to limit oneself to VS, its statements on freedom (besides its subordination to truth) are few and unoriginal indeed. In this respect reflections on human freedom by contemporary theologians such as Karl Rahner will shed useful light not only on the issue of freedom and truth but also that of fundamental option.

For Rahner freedom is the capacity (1) to determine or dispose of oneself, (2) in a final and definitive way. Such freedom by its very nature is exercised ultimately (3) with reference to God, that is, as received from and directed toward God, and (4) in a historical situation of sin and grace.

1. As one of the human being's existentials, freedom, says Rahner, should not be conceived as a particular datum of human reality alongside others, that is, the capacity to choose this or that ("categorical freedom"). Besides this ability, freedom is "the capacity to make oneself once and for all, the capacity which of its nature is directed towards the freely willed finality of the subject as such." Freedom in this sense can be termed "transcendental freedom" and ultimately means the subject's responsibility in disposing of oneself, not only in knowledge, and hence not only as self-consciousness, but also as self-actualization in love. Like subjectivity and personhood, freedom and responsibility are realities of transcendental experience. We become aware of them when we experiences ourselves as subjects and as persons, as beings who are self-conscious and open to Infinite Being. Of course, because we live and act in history, our transcendental freedom cannot exist separately but must be embodied in particular, concrete choices and actions, just as our transcendental orientation to and anticipation of the Infinite Being (Vorgriff) is always incarnated in particular acts of knowledge of individual, concrete objects. Hence, it is extremely important to note that transcendental freedom is never exercised apart from categorical freedom; rather, it occurs within and through day-to-day categorical choices as their condition of possibility.

Another approach to transcendental and categorical freedom involves the use of Rahner's distinction between ‘nature' and ‘person.' ‘Nature' defines human beings insofar as they are at their disposal. It is what we are born with. It includes such things as body, ecological, social and cultural environment, religious traditions, ‘world,' not as something separate from us but ourselves existing in history, in a world mediated by meanings, as the material given to ourselves for self-transformation in freedom. ‘Person' defines human beings as they freely dispose of or determine themselves by their fundamental freedom in and through their particular choices, insofar as they possess themselves as their own definitive reality that they themselves produce. True human freedom, then, is the transcendental freedom that belongs to a human being as person.

2. Freedom as freedom to become oneself and not just to do something is by its very nature the subject's capacity to determine himself or herself once and for all, definitively and with final validity. Through our decisions we become who we want to be forever. Our actions are not just transitory modifications of our identity for which we are rewarded or punished according to some arbitrary decision of a judge and which we are able to shed as if they were our clothing. On the contrary, they combine to shape our character and determine our eternal destiny. Through freedom we have the power to shape the whole of our existence, to decide for or against ourselves, to achieve or thwart our definitive self-fulfillment, to attain salvation (with God's grace) or damnation, so that we ourselves, and not simply our acts, are good and evil.

3. Freedom as definitive and final self-determination of the person can be exercised only against the background of the Ultimate Good, which we may call God. In the act of freedom the subject must necessarily, although implicitly, affirm the Absolute Value as the horizon or goal against which a particular value is chosen. We know and desire individual objects as partial goods only in relation to the Perfect Good itself. Our will, which is never satisfied by any particular good it possesses, drives beyond all particular goods and reaches out toward the infinite Good as its asymptotic goal.

Moreover, Rahner maintains that human freedom is not only related to God as its condition of possibility and sustaining ground but also that it is always and ultimately freedom vis-à-vis God. That is, human freedom must necessarily confront God as an ‘object' that it chooses or rejects. But this choice of God is always made in the choices of particular finite persons and things and never apart from them. Of course, in rejecting God human freedom rejects the condition of its own possibility and hence contradicts itself. This is a frightening possibility and a tragic paradox since in rejecting God, freedom at the same time affirms God as the condition of possibility for its act of rejection.

4. Finally, human freedom is a created freedom enacting itself in a situation of both guilt and grace. That it is a created freedom is shown by two facts. First, human freedom experiences itself as borne and empowered by its absolute horizon, which it does not create but which freely opens itself to it. Secondly, human freedom is always exercised in a context in which certain forces are antecedently operative and therefore cannot be planned or controlled. It is inevitably conditioned (though not fully determined) by these forces. Its task consists precisely in appropriating them as its own intrinsic and constitutive elements.

That the world of persons in which human freedom realizes itself is determined by guilt and that human freedom must be liberated from it is something not only known in everyday experience but also taught by Christian revelation. This situation of guilt is termed ‘original sin' by Christian theology. At the same time, Christian faith also affirms that this situation of universal guilt has been overcome by God who has communicated himself in his Son and Spirit. This self-communication of God in grace as an offer to human beings (though not always actually accepted) is a constitutive (though not essential) dimension of human existence. Rahner calls this self-communication of God in the mode of offer the "supernatural existential" which belongs intrinsically to all human beings.

These reflections on what human freedom is and how it is exercised do not contradict what John Paul teaches on freedom in VS. On the contrary, they affirm the pope's teaching fully, especially with regard to the dependence of freedom on truth. Of course, Rahner does not use these exact words, because his goal is not to combat moral relativism and subjectivism and because his context is not moral theology but theological anthropology. Neverthless, it is clear that for Rahner human freedom does not create truths, values, and moral norms because it is a created freedom which realizes itself in a situation of universal guilt and because it has to choose preexisting particular goods.

On the other hand, Rahner's theology of freedom significantly expands and clarifies John Paul's, at least in four respects. First, it shows how genuinely human freedom is not just the ability to choose this or that good but the capacity to shape one's eternal destiny finally and definitively, especially in dying and death. Second, it explains how human freedom must ultimately confront with the reality of God in its everyday exercise and not just in extraordinary moments of life. Third, it places human freedom in the context of the history of salvation, of guilt and grace, and does not consider it in the abtract as a philosophical category. And, fourth, it clarifies the connection between ‘transcendental freedom' and ‘categorical freedom.' As many commentators have correctly pointed out, VS's analysis of the concept of fundamental option (nos. 65-70) represents a caricature of this notion and not what its most authoritative exponents (among them Rahner himself) have said. In particular, no separation is admitted between the fundamental option and particular acts; on the contrary, the former is always manifested in and affected by the latter. Furthermore, the fundamental option is proposed as a way to explain the profound reality of sin and its diffusion through the various levels of personality to the deepest core of the human person, and not as a criterion for distinguishing between mortal and venial sin, much less as a way of denying the reality of mortal sin.

The Body and The Natural Law

John Paul has insisted that given the intrinsic unity between body and soul, the human body is not a raw datum upon which the person can decide at will. Rather it is in the unity of body and soul that the person is the subject of his own moral acts. Contemporary Catholic theological anthropology is in agreement with the pope's position that the person is a "unified totality," "a soul which expresses itself in a body and a body informed by an immortal spirit" (no. 49). But the question here is not whether the body is ontologically united with the soul but how the body and bodiliness are understood. If the body is, as John Paul says, "the anticipatory signs, the expression and the promise of the gift of the self" (no. 48), the question remains of how to interpret these "anticipatory signs." Obviously their meaning cannot be read off automatically from the body. The body possesses a semantic polyvalence and a sign is inherently ambiguous.

It is here that feminist anthropology can alert us to the covert patriarchalism and androcentrism in the traditional understanding of human sexual nature and gender roles. Feminist critics often call attention to women's actual experiences in order to challenge the "universals" which, in their view, reflect the biases of those in power. Of course, this deconstruction à la Derrida and Foucault can and does lead to a total semantic nihilism, and John Paul's reaffirmation of the universality of human values and the non-instrumentality of the human body is welcomed. But the question is whether VS has truly taken into account women's experience in its teaching on sexuality and the body. As Lisa Sowle Cahill has observed: "Veritatis Splendor reasserts traditional sexual norms, which have in the past tied to the role of women as wives and mothers. It makes no attempt to incorporate any special references to women's goods, women's experiences, or vocations of women beyond domesticity in its treatment of sexual norms which have a special impact on women (such as the ban on contraception). It condemns rape and prostitution, which have always been seen as sexual sins, yet does not specifically condemn sexual violence as a crime against women, nor social oppression of women."

Furthermore, in linking reason, freedom, soul, and body, VS has not indicated whether reason, freedom and soul must always and in every case submit to the boundaries set by the body or whether there are cases in which reason and freedom may legitimately and should control the body in order to achieve other ends. If the boundaries of the body must always and in every case be observed, what are the criteria used to establish these boundaries? Church teaching holds that "love" is the foundational meaning of sex, which is an interpersonal, social and even political relationship, but tends to revert to biological and physical criteria to determine the morality of sexual acts. John Paul rejects the charges of physicalism and naturalism leveled against Catholic sexual ethics (no. 47), but has not shown whether and how criteria other than "bodily" ones have functioned to assess the morality of certain sexual behaviors such as contraception.

Truth and Truths: How Do We Know Them?

These questions bring up the last issue to be considered, namely, how do we know a particular moral teaching to be true? John Paul rightly affirms the duty of freedom to obey truth. But the issue is not whether one must follow truth (in the singular and in the abstract), but, as Richard McCormick has correctly noted, how to determine that a particular action can be judged to be morally wrong from its "object" (ex objecto) independently of circumstances, and in this way assert a particular moral truth. The key questions are: what object should be characterized as morally wrong and on what criteria? What is to count as pertaining to the object? McCormick states that all proportionalists would accept John Paul's teaching that some acts are intrinsically evil from their object "if the object is broadly understood as including all the morally relevant circumstances."

All Catholic moralists would agree that an action that is morally wrong cannot be changed into a good action by the good intentions of the agent or by the good results of the act. Further, all would agree that an act that is morally wrong may not be done, even as a means to a good end.

Rather the question is how one can establish logically and reasonably that a certain action is morally wrong from the general moral norms under which it seems to fall. For example, from the positive precept that one must be "concerned for the transmission of and preservation of life" (no. 51) (negatively, thou shalt not kill), is it logical to conclude that all killings are wrong or that contraception by artificial means is intrinsically evil? Again, from the positive precept that one must "seek truth" (no. 51) (negatively, thou shalt not lie), is it reasonable to conclude that all tellings of falsehood are evil? Again, from the precept that thou shalt not steal, is it logical to conclude that no act of taking someone else's property is ever justified? Again, from the principle that sexual acts are legitimate only in marriage, is it logical to conclude that masturbation in the context of sperm testing is wrong? Again, from the principle that conception must be the result of intercourse between husband and wife, does it necessarily follow that in vitro fertilization of the husband's sperm and the wife's ovum is morally bad?

My point here is not the church has no right to teach on these particular matters nor that the church's teachings on these issues are wrong. Rather it is to argue that most Catholics do not use their freedom to disobey truth in general (the danger of separating freedom from truth) and that they do not follow particular moral truths because in their judgment (not conscience!) the reasons adduced to support their validity are not convincing. As Mary Tuck has put it gently with regard to John Paul's urging for martyrdom in witnessing to the truth: "I suspect that priests underestimate just what heroism it takes to be a Catholic anyway and what constant daily heroism is practiced by ordinary people in the pew. They can meet the challenge, as long as they are not asked to observe rules they think are mistaken."

VERITATIS SPLENDOR IN THE VIETNAMESE CONTEXT

In this concluding section I will be very brief. My reflections will center on only three aspects of the Vietnamese society: its sociopolitical situation, its religious traditions, and its didactic method.

1. In a society whose political regime is predominantly Communist and atheistic such as Vietnam, Pope John Paul's vigorous affirmation of the dependence of freedom on truth and of the transcendent dimension of human existence has profound implications more than ever for sociopolitical and economic activities of the country. Two statements of VS that spell out these implications deserve special consideration: "Only God, the Supreme Good, constitutes the unshakable foundation and essential condition of morality, and thus of the commandments, particularly those negative commandments which always and in every case prohibit behavior and action incompatible with the personal dignity of every man. The Supreme Good and the moral good meet in truth: the truth of God, the Creator and Redeemer, and the truth of man, created and redeemed by him. Only upon this truth is it possible to construct a renewed society and to solve the complex and weighty problems affecting it, above all the problem of overcoming the various forms of totalitarianism, so as to make way for the authentic freedom of the person" (no. 99).

"In the political sphere, it must be noted that truthfulness in the relations between those governing and those governed, openness in public administration, impartiality in the service of the body politic, respect for the rights of political adversaries, safeguarding the rights of the accused against summary trials and convictions, the just and honest use of public funds, the rejection of equivocal or illicit means in order to gain, preserve or increase power at any cost -- all these are principles which are primarily rooted in, and in fact derive their singular uegency from, the transcendent value of the person and the objective moral demands of the functioning of States" (no. 101).

Even John Paul's warning of a risk of an alliance between democracy and ethical relativism is opportune as Vietnam is attempting to move from state-controlled economy to some measure of market economy and from totalitarianism to some form of democracy. Of course, the pope's remark about democracy and moral relativism in no way suggests a rejection of democracy. Indeed, no defence of human dignity and rights can be done without at the same time defending the realm of democratic civility against colonization by market forces, the bureaucratic state, and political oppression. But it does remind us that capitalism, which Vietnam is rushing to embrace as the panacea for all ills, is not a medicine without serious side effects.

2. Vietnam had always been religious pluralistic, and religions have profoundly shaped the Vietnamese ethos. It is therefore impossible to transform Vietnamese society and culture without a fruitful and harmonious collaboration of all religions. Though there are profound theological differences between Christianity and the other three religions (Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism), there exist significant commonalities in their moral views and practices. Furthermore, John Paul's appeal to reason and the natural law to establish universal values and moral norms could be a useful basis for interreligious dialogue and for undertaking common projects to promote justice and peace in the country.

3. Finally, Vietnam has a long tradition of teaching not only with words and books but with personal example. The true teacher is not one endowed with extensive knowledge but one who embodies in her or his life the teachings he or she imparts to the students. More than knowledge it is wisdom and authenticity of life that make one a teacher. John Paul's insistence on the need for personal witness to the truth, even to the point of martyrdom, speaks powerfully to this Vietnamese tradition of teaching. This way of teaching is perhaps the only way to command other people's assent to the teachings the church offers, when all the arguments we concoct to buttress them fail to carry the day.