| . | 
Because his objective is to expose the limitations of Enlightenment evidentialism, Clark begins with discussions of arguments for and against natural theology, concluding that all such arguments are inconclusive and thus fail as classical "proofs." Given both psychological differences and the stringent requirements of universal proof, none of these arguments can ever compel all rational beings to accept them. [Such arguments do often succeed as person-specific "proofs", more accurately, as sufficiently compelling inferences.] This standard -- to be universally accepted by all rational persons -- is one that extremely few propositions could ever attain. Held to this standard, one would be justified in believing nothing; he might even reject the proposition that his own mind exists (Descartes' famous argument not withstanding). The atheistic argument from the existence of evil and Plantinga's refutation of its claim of consistent logic receives more thorough attention than do the theistic arguments cited (cosmological, design, cumulative/probabilistic). The seemingly cursory treatment of the cosmological and probabilistic arguments becomes understandable in light of Clark's central argument, which emerges toward the end of chapter three. While recognizing that a professional philosopher should concern himself more with the form of an argument than with its species, it nonetheless seems that Clark misstates the probabilistic argument by citing inappropriate numbers (odds of one in one billion, one in ten billion). This is a mathematical argument and Clark's numbers are inconsistent with the actual mathematics of the argument. For example, mathematicians Hoyle and Wickramasinghe calculate the probability that an enzyme could be produced by shuffling amino acids at no better than one in 10 to the 6900th power. This level of improbability itself can only exist in a universe that is incredibly unlikely, Hawking and Beckenstein calculate a probability less than one over 10 raised to the power of 10 to the 123rd [Penrose says one over infinity]. None of this yet brings us to the odds of a living cell spontaneously appearing. Trillions of universes like ours would not be large enough to house the constituents (1, 2, 3 . . . ->) of the kind of number that would express odds like one over 10 to the 6900th, if the integrals of such a mathematical expression were be written out (the total number of particles in the universe, including the massless photons, is something like 10 to the one hundredth power, a miniscule number compared to those previously mentioned). These kinds of odds have no analogicity to odds such as a mere one in 10 billion!... None of this, of course, is what Clark intends this book to address. These mathematical (thus evidential) considerations do however carve a gaping hole in the beliefs of many 'Enlightened evidentialists.' The mathematician (information theory) Hubert Yockey notes that all college undergraduate textbooks present the primeval soup paradigm of spontaneous abiogenesis as an established fact although it cannot be evidentially supported either by biochemistry or by mathematics. Yockey says, "The belief that life on earth arose spontaneously from non-living matter, is simply a matter of faith in strict reductionism and is based entirely on ideology." The point being that the strict evidentiary standard of the 'Enlightened' agnostic is one that he himself does not satisfy in important instances where his will to believe sweeps aside his skepticism. While Clark is not particularly interested in probabilistic arguments, he does take some note of the practical inconsistencies of popular, so-called skepticism. In the second half of the book he examines the foundational structure of Enlightenment reasoning... That evidential investigation is important to scientific truth seeking cannot ameliorate this approach to all potential truths. Something is not proved false because it does not lend itself to evidential scrutiny, nor may it cease to be something that warrants rational belief. An authoritarian evidentialism may result in fear of error superceding willingness to risk truth-seeking. The interaction of minds provides relevant examples: Clark quotes C.S. Lewis; "There are times when we can do all that a fellow creature needs if only he will trust us. ...in extracting a thorn from a child's finger, in teaching a boy to swim or rescuing one who can't, in getting a frightened beginner over a nasty place on a mountain, the one fatal obstacle may be their distrust. We are asking them to trust us in the teeth of their senses, their imagination, and their intelligence.... We ask them to accept apparent impossibilities: ... that hurting the finger very much more will stop the finger hurting -- that the water which is obviously permeable will resist and support the body -- that holding onto the only support within reach is not the way to avoid sinking -- that to go higher and onto a more exposed ledge is the way not to fall.... If the young mountaineer were a scientist, it would not be held against him, when he came up for a fellowship, that he had once departed from Clifford's rule of evidence by entertaining a belief with strength greater than the evidence logically obliged him to." Clark examines Plantinga's argument that belief in the existence of God is rationally a species of belief in the existence of other minds. As such, belief in God's existence cannot be reasonably restricted to scientific evidentialism. It may be a matter of properly basic reasoning -- this being the relevant concept in our relational knowledge of other minds. "No philosopher has ever constructed a good argument for the existence of other minds, and it is difficult to see how this task might be accomplished." Clark examines classical foundationalism and finds that in certain areas outside of physical science, namely in the realm of relational experience with other minds -- with persons, evidentialism is often irrelevant, rationally absurd, impossible, even perverse. This is the heart of the Reformed epistemological argument -- the rationality of immediate knowledge. The argument thus separates itself from evidentiary arguments. 
Charles Darwin's storied "The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life" (1859) featured an appropriately long name. Darwin characterized it as "one long argument," and his recurring metaphysical assertions continue to be argued today, whether by Ken Miller, Mark Ridley, or the producers of PBS videos. The "long argument" has continued for a century and a half. In this volume, biophysicist Cornelius Hunter examines
these persistent metaphysical assertions. While metaphysical presuppositions
are woven into Darwinism / neo-Darwinism, it remains that metaphysical assertions
are not themselves within the logical domain of any physical science. "God
wouldn't have done it that way" is not a scientific argument, it is
a metaphysical -- more precisely, theological -- argument. This is the whole
of Hunter's thesis here, and while some reviewers may be disappointed that
the discourse is so narrowly defined, it is a philosophically important
treatment. If Darwinian theory is scientifically sound, why the persistent
usage of such an obviously questionable, perhaps even naïve, theological
justification? Readers familiar with Darwin's writings will find that his
arguments are reflected quite accurately in Hunter's examination. The author
isn't wrestling with straw men here, but the reader will find many reasons
to wonder what Hunter's theological ideas may be. Ultimately, this question
isn't important, Hunter isn't the one whose metaphysics are under consideration,
nor, unlike Darwin and his apologists, does the author misrepresent his
own metaphysical views as being science. Mark Ridley, in his textbook (Evolution,
1993) says, "Positing a God merely invites the question of how such
a highly adaptive and well-designed thing could in its turn have come into
existence." Hunter reflects on the metaphysical presuppositions and
logical poverty concomitant to such (often repeated) arguments, suggesting:
"It is little wonder that many people do not believe in evolution.
Whether coming from Le Conte in 1888 or Ridley in 1993, these sorts of metaphysical
meanderings say more about evolutionists than they do about evolution. .
. But Le Conte's and Ridley's premises, that only natural explanations are
rational and that God was designed, respectively, are nonscientific. They
are statements of personal belief." (p90). This criticism is rather
kind. Ridley effectively demands an infinite regress of causes, in which
case all explanation, including his own Darwinian one, is epistemologically
meaningless. |
. | 
Let me first say something about Roger Penrose. One notices how certain other mathematicians and mathematical physicists speak of him. He is not only admired and respected; it seems that he is positively enjoyed! This may be a bit surprising when one notices that Penrose is something of a thorn in the side of several popular ideas in contemporary physics (and psychology). Cosmic inflation theories and ideas regarding the fundamental nature of quantum uncertainty find a formidable and articulate critic in the Oxford mathematician. Of the somewhat less popular, but ever fanciful "many-worlds" interpretation of quantum superpositioning, Penrose says "[the 'many-worlds' view] is not a very economical description of the Universe but I think things are rather worse than that for the many--worlds description. It is not just its lack of economy that worries me. The main problem is that it does not really solve the problem." He brings the same mental rapier to what he has called "the missing science" of mind and to the idea of computational / artificial intelligence. It is the problem of superpositioning described by Schrodinger and the decoherence caused by quantum measurement that prompt Penrose's search for an 'objective reduction' (OR) of quantum state vectors, the key ingredient in a "revolutionary" physical theory that remains a mystery. He speculates that this physical mystery may be related to the mystery of consciousness. He is unconvincing in this regard, but his ideas and arguments are quite interesting. Well, let me now take this a bit further. Penrose also seems to terribly irk certain others! In particular he really raises the hackles of proponents of strong AI and the Dawkins/Dennett camp of 'consciousness-is-merely-mechanism' dogmatists. His views are much closer to those of perhaps most mathematicians and philosophers and stand on a deeper logical footing than do the doctrines that the human mind is mere biology. Let me say that I agree with Penrose in that the 'simple biology' view is never going to win this argument for reasons that can be demonstrated by the application of mathematical logic. To say that Penrose "doesn't understand biology" is to miss the point. The author freely admits, "there is a good deal of speculation in many of these ideas". Of course there is; science is largely -- we might even say wholly -- speculation. A more perceptive analysis would suggest that those committed to a rigid materialistic aesthetic don't understand (don't want to understand) the mathematics. Those who summarily dismiss Penrose do so unwisely. Given his contributions to mathematics (e.g., Penrose tiling, computability, mathematical logic) and his stature within the mathematics community, and given that the history of mathematics is essentially written by mathematicians, Roger Penrose may come to be considered the greatest mathematician of his generation. Given his work on black holes and space-time geometry (he recognizes the apparent "flatness" of the universe but suggests a more elegant geometry to describe that flatness), he may be one of his day's greatest physicists as well. Should his hunch ("OR") one day prove "true", his stature would approach that of a Newton or Einstein. The point being that any scientist who avoids or ignores Penrose's views, or is inclined to dismiss them by erroneously characterizing them, does so, as I say, unwisely. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are challenges to Penrose from A. Shimony, N. Cartwright, and S. Hawking, respectively. Apart from Shimony's discussion of A. N. Whitehead's views, its not on a par with the author's discourses; Cartwright suggests that nature may be a mess of "patchwork" laws (her view itself seems a horrible mess), and Hawking is disappointingly flippant. Penrose certainly meets these challenges. I must say that the "controversy" over Penrose's Platonism is nothing less than nonsensical. Hawking complains "basically, he's a Platonist," as though calling him an offensive name and thereby granting the reader cause to disregard Penrose's arguments. That's unfortunate. Most of history's great minds have been Platonists; even Aristotle*, so often cited as the philosophical godfather of reductionism, was arguably a Platonist. Augustine, Kepler, Descartes, Pascal, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Linnaeus, Heisenberg, Einstein*, Schrödinger, Gödel, Whitehead -- the list of Platonists is long and impressive. As Penrose has said, "... it is my direct personal impression that the considerable majority of working mathematicians are at least 'weak' Platonists." Yet it seems as if some who call themselves "positivists" feel a calling to be science's mind-police. I suggest that this should be the real controversy... So-called positivists would do well to honesty consider Gödel's observation that the idea that mind/mentality is simply material is nothing more than the "prejudice of our time." There is a rather child-like glee in the way Penrose sees and uses mathematics. His investigations and speculations are those of an extremely astute mind having fun! In his aggressive curiosity, his boldness, his clear-eyed honesty about the frailties of human thought and the limits of science, it seems to me that Penrose is something of a treasure and an inspiration. As he candidly states, "... the world-view that present-day physicists tend to present may well be grossly overstated as to its closeness to completion, or even to its correctness!" This volume presents a concise look at the Penrose ideas/arguments and even if nothing much ever comes of these arguments, they present a shining example of the kind of creative thinking that moves science into new frontiers. *(footnote: While recognizing that it can easily be argued that Aristotle and Einstein were not "strong" Platonists, it seems obvious to me that they were each Platonists in some fundamental ways. I consider them to have been "weak" Platonists.) 
One may point to Polkinghorne's credentials as a theoretical
physicist or an Anglican cleric, but in his writings we find that he is
also a philosopher, theologian, and student of the humanities (art, history,
comparative religion), although he is quick to label himself an "amateur"
in these areas. A thoughtful reading of "The Faith of a Physicist"
will be particularly valuable to philosophical materialists whose "skepticism"
of Christian theism should itself be exposed to skeptical consideration.
As Polkinghorne explains, dismissals of theism are often couched in convenient
but ignorantly simplistic characterizations: "Scientists who are hostile
to religion tend to make remarks such as 'Unlike science, religion is based
on unquestioning certainties' [Wolpert]. They thereby betray their lack
of acquaintance with the practice of religion. Periods of doubt and perplexity
have a well-documented role in spiritual development . . . Religion has
long known that ultimately every human image of God proves to be an inadequate
idol." |
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Reason: A Critique of Enlightenment Evidentialism and a Defense of Reason
and Belief in God. Kelly James Clark.
(I give it 4.5 stars)
(I give it 3.9
stars)
(I give it 4.9 stars)